NO. 4-06-0690 Filed 4/18/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re: TOMMY B., a Person Found ) Appeal from Subject to Involuntary Admission, ) Circuit Court of THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Sangamon County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 06MH474 v. ) TOMMY B., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant. ) George H. Ray, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
In July 2006, the trial court found respondent, Tommy
B., subject to involuntary admission to a mental-health facility
(405 ILCS 5/1-119(1), (2) (West 2004)). Respondent appeals,
arguing reversal is warranted because (1) the petition was
defective, (2) no clear and convincing evidence supported respon-
dent's involuntary commitment, and (3) hospitalization was not
the least-restrictive treatment alternative. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 17, 2006, a licensed practical nurse at Memo-
rial Medical Center (Memorial), Jolynne A. Ralston, filed a
petition for the involuntary admission of respondent, a voluntary
admittee who had filed a written notice requesting discharge.
The petition alleged respondent was mentally ill and by reason of
his mental illness (1) was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future, or (2)
was unable to provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard
himself from serious harm. In support of those allegations,
Ralston provided the following factual basis:
"[Respondent] has a chronic mental ill-
ness and is noncompliant with medication and
mental[-]health services. He has threatened
staff. He threatened to 'beat the shit[']
out of a staff member. He also attempted to
hit staff[']s hand with phone receiver."
Ralston left the following portion of the petition blank:
"Listed below are the names and
addresses of the spouse, parent, guardian, or
surrogate decision maker, if any, and close
relative or, if none, a friend of the respon-
dent whom I have reason to believe may know
or have any of the other names and addresses.
If names and addresses are not listed below,
the following describes my efforts to iden-
tify and locate these individuals."
The petition was accompanied by the certificates of two psychia-
trists.
The trial court set a hearing on the petition for July
21, 2006. On respondent's motion, and over the State's objec-
- 2 - tion, the hearing was continued until July 28, 2006.
At the hearing on June 28, 2006, psychiatrist James
Black testified he was board certified and currently respondent's
treating physician. Dr. Black examined respondent on July 27,
2006. During the examination, respondent exhibited signs of
mental illness, including delusions, pressured speech,
grandiosity, increased energy, and difficulty with sleep.
Respondent did not threaten anyone during that conversation.
However, Dr. Black testified that during the hospital stay
respondent had been threatening and insulting to others.
Dr. Black diagnosed respondent with bipolar disorder
with mania and psychosis. Dr. Black believed, within a reason-
able degree of medical certainty, that because of his mental
illness, respondent was unable to provide for his basic physical
needs so as to guard himself from serious harm. Dr. Black
testified that respondent had a number of potentially life-
threatening medical disorders, including recurrent renal cell
carcinoma, right periaortic mass of cancer, severe papillary
thyroid disease, and chronic renal failure (hereinafter referred
to as "nonpsychiatric medical disorders"). Respondent could not
understand his medical risks, the treatments offered, and risks
if he does not get treatment for his nonpsychiatric medical
disorders.
Dr. Black also believed, within a reasonable degree of
- 3 - medical certainty, that respondent was reasonably expected to
inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another within the
immediate future. Dr. Black testified that if respondent left
his supervised setting, he would "fairly quickly decompensate and
be dangerous to himself or others quickly." He based this
conclusion on the fact that respondent had done so on an almost
daily basis at the hospital (presumably during his voluntary
admission). On a number of occasions, almost every day, respon-
dent had threatened others, causing respondent to require re-
straints and medications to stabilize him.
In light of his opinions, Dr. Black believed respondent
needed treatment. A treatment plan had been formulated and was
admitted into evidence without objection for the limited purpose
of the dispositional hearing. According to Dr. Black, the
treatment plan was the least-restrictive alternative. Based on
the treatment plan, Dr. Black recommended respondent be treated
at Memorial for a period not to exceed 90 days.
Dr. Black did not testify in detail regarding the
treatment plan. However, an examination of the treatment plan
reveals that respondent's plan of care had been revised to
require restriction to his room with supervision to be evaluated
daily. The July 24, 2006, progress report indicates that due to
respondent's threatening behavior, inability to comply with limit
setting, and actual staff assaults, respondent was restricted to
- 4 - his room or under staff supervision outside of his room. No one
was permitted to enter respondent's room alone. Any threats of
harm to others would result in seclusion or restraints.
On cross-examination, Dr. Black admitted that in some
cases psychosis could be caused by thyroid disease. However, Dr.
Black did not believe thyroid disease caused respondent's psycho-
sis.
The delusions respondent suffered from included respon-
dent's belief that he had been a pharaoh and that bullets could
pass through him. When asked what delusion would place respon-
dent or another in serious physical harm, Dr. Black responded
that respondent refused treatment for his cancer. Dr. Black
later explained, however, that respondent had not been offered
treatment for his cancer at this point but had only been offered
diagnostic studies.
According to Dr. Black, respondent had interfered with
treatment for his thyroid disease by pulling out his IV (intrave-
nous) and heart-rhythm monitor. Other examples of delusional
beliefs that placed respondent or another in serious harm in-
cluded respondent's belief that he was going to live forever and
delusions that caused respondent to attack other patients and
threaten to kill staff.
Dr. Black testified respondent currently received
treatment from physicians and other personnel in oncology, renal,
- 5 - endocrinology, and nutrition. Respondent could not be discharged
to a medical floor to obtain that treatment because he was too
mentally ill. If respondent were on a medical floor, his behav-
ior would be too much for them to manage, and respondent would be
unsafe.
Respondent took his psychiatric medication some of the
time. Respondent's last incident of assaultive behavior occurred
the previous weekend. After that, Dr. Black started a new
behavioral program and confined respondent to his room. Respon-
dent had been doing better under the new program.
Respondent, who was represented by counsel, testified
on his own behalf. When asked if he would like to say anything
regarding the allegations of aggression, respondent explained two
incidents. On one occasion, an orderly or nurse named David kept
pushing respondent. Respondent told David he was going to his
room and not to push him anymore. When David pushed him again,
they "tussled" and went down on the floor. Another staff member,
Joe, came and grabbed respondent's arm. Respondent told Joe that
if Joe broke respondent's arm, respondent would take his eyes
out. Joe let go of respondent's arm. Respondent testified the
other incident happened the same way. Respondent stated he was
not going to be pushed around when he was going in the direction
he was supposed to be going.
Respondent testified he was originally a voluntary
- 6 - patient. He first went to St. John's Hospital because of kidney
failure. After his release, he and his wife had a "series of
incidents." They were supposed to get a divorce that Friday.
Respondent ended up back at the hospital. At Memorial, he was
treated for kidney failure. Respondent did not testify as to the
specific dates when these events occurred.
When asked if he was taking the medications prescribed,
respondent answered as follows:
"I am taking it to the best of my abil-
ity, sir; because they didn't always tell me
what I did. He had not even mentioned I had
a Christmas from Naked Mary Christmas Donner
(Phonetic). And she has worked with me for
years. I told him whenever I come to the
hospital, I want it brought up to speed and
her brought in."
If discharged, respondent wanted to do one of two
things. Either he would go back to his business, Capitol Shoe
Shine, for 28 days, or he would go to Barnes-Jewish Hospital in
St. Louis for a second opinion. Respondent was born in St.
Louis, and his father and brother died there.
Respondent did not know whether his nonpsychiatric
medical conditions were terminal. Respondent stated it was his
right to decide whether he would get a second opinion or go to
- 7 - hospice.
Respondent testified he was no longer married because
his wife divorced him when he went to Memorial. Every time
respondent went to the hospital, they offered him the option of
having a power of attorney. Respondent claimed the hospital
insisted he have a power attorney due to his mental capacity.
Respondent told them that he had no cancer in his brain. The
hospital told respondent they would take him to court to make
sure he had a power of attorney. Respondent did not testify
whether he had in fact executed a power of attorney or had a
substitute decision maker.
When asked if he believed bullets could pass through
him, respondent testified about an incident when two assailants
tried to shoot him. A man shot respondent point blank, and
respondent had an out-of-body experience. Respondent looked down
from his body and saw the bullets pass through him. Respondent
also felt them go through him. The bullets hit the assailant's
girlfriend in the knee. Respondent testified that if God pro-
tects you, then bullets go through you. However, he denied ever
telling "that man" (presumably Dr. Black) that bullets could go
through him. Respondent also denied telling anyone that he would
live forever or that he was a pharaoh.
The trial court made the following finding:
"Well, the [c]ourt finds that he is
- 8 - mentally ill and that as a result of that he
could be harmful to others. Sounds like he
is pretty harmful to himself if he doesn't
cooperate with the treatment that he needs.
He is not assisting in taking care of his
basic needs. I guess that would be basically
the same argument.
He will be ordered hospitalized in this
facility which is the least-restrictive al-
ternative at this time not to exceed ninety
days."
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Initially, we note that this case is moot. The under-
lying judgment, entered by the trial court in July 2006, was
limited to 90 days, which has passed. However, this case falls
within an exception to the mootness doctrine because the period
for involuntary admission is too short to permit appellate review
and the same actions will likely be taken against respondent in
the future. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491-92, 702
N.E.2d 555, 559-60 (1998).
Turning to the merits, respondent argues (1) the
petition was deficient because it (a) neither listed the names
and addresses of respondent's spouse, parent, guardian, substi-
- 9 - tute decision maker, close relative, or friend nor described the
steps petitioner took to diligently acquire that information; or
(b) failed to contain the dates of the alleged occurrences; (2)
no clear and convincing evidence warranted involuntary admission;
and (3) hospitalization was not the least-restrictive treatment
alternative.
A. Sufficiency of the Petition
Respondent argues that the petition was deficient
because Ralston failed to comply with (1) section 3-601(b)(2) of
the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405
ILCS 5/3-601(b)(2) (West 2004)), requiring the petition contain
the names and addresses of respondent's spouse, parent, guardian,
substitute decision maker, close relative, or friend or describe
the steps petitioner took to diligently acquire that information;
or (2) section 3-601(b)(1) of the Code requiring a detailed
statement of the reason for involuntary admission, including the
time and place of the occurrence (405 ILCS 5/3-601(b)(1) (West
2004)). Respondent's arguments raise a question of law that we
review de novo. In re Robert D., 345 Ill. App. 3d 769, 771, 803
N.E.2d 1067, 1070 (2004).
Section 3-601(b)(2) requires a petition include the
following:
"The name and address of the spouse,
parent, guardian, substitute decision maker,
- 10 - if any, and close relative, or if none, the
name and address of any known friend of the
respondent whom the petitioner has reason to
believe may know or have any of the other
names and addresses. If the petitioner is
unable to supply any such names and
addresses, the petitioner shall state that
diligent inquiry was made to learn this in-
formation and specify the steps taken." 405
ILCS 5/3-601(b)(2) (West 2004).
Strict compliance with statutory procedures is required in
involuntary-commitment proceedings because such proceedings
affect important liberty interests. In re Louis S., 361 Ill.
App. 3d 763, 768, 838 N.E.2d 218, 222 (2005). However, reversal
is not required for failure to strictly comply with the statutory
procedures unless the respondent suffered prejudice. Louis S.,
361 Ill. App. 3d at 768, 838 N.E.2d at 222.
Respondent cites, among other cases, this court's
decision in In re Wiessing, 229 Ill. App. 3d 737, 739, 593 N.E.2d
1137, 1138 (1992), in support of his claim that reversal is
required. In Wiessing, this court held that the failure to
comply with section 3-601(b)(2) required reversal. Wiessing, 229
Ill. App. 3d at 739, 573 N.E.2d at 1138. A social-work consulta-
tion report prepared a month before the petition was filed
- 11 - indicated respondent had three siblings living in the town where
he was hospitalized as well as three other siblings in Califor-
nia, Florida, and New Mexico. Wiessing, 229 Ill. App. 3d at 739,
593 N.E.2d at 1138. Although respondent had little contact with
his family, "there is no excuse for [the] failure to contact a
close relative as required by the statute." Wiessing, 229 Ill.
App. 3d at 739, 593 N.E.2d at 1138.
After Wiessing, the Illinois Supreme Court decided In
re Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 607 N.E.2d 134 (1992). Although ad-
dressing the failure to strictly comply with the requirement
under section 3-611 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 91 1/2, par. 3-
611) regarding notice to the respondent, the supreme court held
that procedural deviations from the Code do not require reversal
if the defects could have and should have been objected to
immediately, could have been easily cured if objected to immedi-
ately, and made no difference. Nau, 153 Ill. 2d at 419, 607
N.E.2d at 140.
Thereafter, this court, while noting that strict
compliance with the statute is required, has found that reversal
for failure to strictly comply with section 3-601(b)(2) of the
Code is not warranted unless the respondent suffered prejudice.
See In re Adams, 239 Ill. App. 3d 880, 883-85, 607 N.E.2d 681,
683-84 (1993) (finding the failure to strictly comply with
section 3-601(b)(2) does not always require reversal if it could
- 12 - be shown that no prejudice to the respondent occurred); In re
Robinson, 287 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1095, 679 N.E.2d 818, 823 (1997)
(the failure to strictly comply with section 3-601(b)(2) did not
require reversal because respondent failed to object to the
alleged errors in the trial court, and the respondent was not
prejudiced).
In the instant case, we likewise find respondent
suffered no prejudice. Respondent failed to object to the
alleged deficiency at the initial setting as well as the contin-
ued hearing. Moreover, although no report was attached to the
petition as was the case in Robinson, respondent has nonetheless
failed to show prejudice. In Robert D., 345 Ill. App. 3d 769,
771, 803 N.E.2d 1067,1069-70 (2004), the State failed to list a
substitute decision maker in the petition or state that a dili-
gent inquiry had been made to determine if the respondent had
one. Although the respondent failed to object to the deficiency
at trial, the Second District refused to apply the forfeiture
doctrine. Robert D., 345 Ill. App. 3d at 772-73, 803 N.E.2d at
1071. Nonetheless, the court found that reversal was not re-
quired because the respondent never alleged, at trial or on
appeal, that he executed a health care power of attorney or
declaration for mental-health treatment or that a substitute
decision maker existed. Robert D., 345 Ill. App. 3d at 773, 803
N.E.2d at 1071; see also, e.g., In re Jill R., 336 Ill. App. 3d
- 13 - 956, 965, 785 N.E.2d 46, 53 (2003) (Fourth District) (finding
that involuntary-administration-of-psychotropic-medication
petition's failure to state whether the petitioner made a good-
faith effort to determine whether the respondent had executed a
health care power of attorney or a declaration for mental-health
treatment was harmless because neither the record not the respon-
dent's brief on appeal indicated such instruments existed).
Such reasoning is equally applicable here. Although
respondent asserts in his brief that his "liberty interests were
prejudicially violated," he identifies no potential family member
who could have been listed or ascertained upon diligent inquiry.
The record does contain a psychiatric social service assessment
dated March 3, 2006, and attached to the treatment plan. Accord-
ing to that report, respondent's wife was supportive, his mother
lived in Maryland, and he had family in St. Louis. However,
respondent testified at the hearing that he and his wife had
divorced. Nothing in the record or in the briefs on appeal
indicate that this is incorrect. Further, respondent fails to
identify on appeal anyone--including his mother or family members
in St. Louis--that could have or should have been listed.
Moreover, respondent never testified or asserted on appeal that
he had executed a power of attorney.
This court has recently been flooded with appeals for
alleged deficiencies to involuntary-commitment petitions.
- 14 - Throughout the commitment process, numerous individuals review
the petition, including the person who completes the petition,
the facility director, the circuit clerk, the attorney for the
State, the attorney for the respondent, and the trial judge. Yet
not one person noticed the petition is missing required informa-
tion. If discovered at trial, these alleged deficiencies could
be addressed and avoid needless appeals. Compliance with the
requirements of the Code would save countless resources.
Respondent also argues the petition was deficient for
failing to contain the dates of the alleged occurrences. Section
3-601(b)(1) of the Code requires a petition contain:
"A detailed statement of the reason for
the assertion that the respondent is subject
to involuntary admission, including the signs
and symptoms of a mental illness and a de-
scription of any acts, threats, or other
behavior or pattern of behavior supporting
the assertion and the time and place of their
occurrence." 405 ILCS 5/3-601(b)(1) (West
2004).
Here, the petition alleged respondent had threatened staff and
attempted to hit a staff member at Memorial. The petition did
not allege the date of the occurrences. However, the alleged
deficiency was harmless. See, e.g., In re Sharon L.N., 368 Ill.
- 15 - App. 3d 1177, 1186, 859 N.E.2d 627, 634 (2006) (alleged deficien-
cies in petition that failed to contain factual allegations was
harmless where the respondent failed to object, the information
was substantially contained in the medical certificates filed
with the petition, a doctor testified at the hearing regarding
those allegations, and respondent was familiar enough with the
allegations to testify about them on her own behalf). Specifi-
cally, the medical certificates attached to the petition de-
scribed threats and an actual assault of a nurse. At the hear-
ing, the trial court heard allegations relating to respondent's
threats and attempts to assault staff members. Respondent
testified on his own behalf regarding two specific occasions,
respondent's assault of one staff member and the threat toward
another. Clearly, respondent suffered no prejudice for the
failure to contain specific dates regarding the alleged incidents
as he was familiar enough with the allegations to testify about
them on his own behalf and did not dispute the dates. On these
facts, the alleged procedural error was harmless.
B. Involuntary Commitment
Respondent next argues that the State failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that (1) respondent was
reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself
or another in the near future, (2) respondent was unable to
provide for his basic physical needs, and (3) hospitalization was
- 16 - the least-restrictive treatment alternative.
A trial court's finding that a person is subject to
involuntary admission will not be reversed unless it is against
the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Jakush, 311 Ill. App.
3d 940, 944, 725 N.E.2d 785, 789 (2000). This court gives great
deference to the trial court's findings because the trial court
had the opportunity to see the witnesses, hear their testimony,
determine their credibility, and weigh the evidence. In re
Carmody, 274 Ill. App. 3d 46, 50, 653 N.E.2d 977, 981 (1995).
1. Threat of Harm
A person is subject to involuntary commitment when the
evidence is clear and convincing that he suffers from a mental
illness and because of that mental illness is "reasonably ex-
pected to inflict serious physical harm" on himself or another in
the near future. 405 ILCS 5/1-119(1) (West 2004); In re Moore,
292 Ill. App. 3d 1069, 1071, 686 N.E.2d 641, 643 (1997). To meet
its burden, the State must submit "explicit medical testimony"
that the respondent is reasonably expected to be a serious danger
to herself or others as a result of her mental illness. In re
James, 191 Ill. App. 3d 352, 355, 547 N.E.2d 759, 760 (1989).
Proof of a mental illness, by itself, is not sufficient to
warrant involuntary admission. In re Grimes, 193 Ill. App. 3d
119, 124, 549 N.E.2d 616, 619 (1990). The State need not,
however, prove that the respondent is "a definite danger to
- 17 - himself or society." Grimes, 193 Ill. App. 3d at 124, 549 N.E.2d
at 619. "A commitment order should be affirmed where there is
evidence of prior conduct along with evidence that the respondent
remains in need of mental treatment." In re Robert H., 302 Ill.
App. 3d 980, 986-87, 707 N.E.2d 264, 269 (1999). The court need
not wait until respondent actually hurts himself or another
before involuntarily committing him. In re Manis, 213 Ill. App.
3d 1075, 1077, 572 N.E.2d 1213, 1214 (1991).
Respondent argues that no clear and convincing evidence
established that due to his mental illness, he was reasonably
expected to harm himself or another. According to respondent,
Dr. Black simply speculated about respondent's "substantially
expected dangerousness toward himself and others." Respondent
argues that absent direct evidence of dangerous events from any
witnesses, respondent's conduct might have been misconstrued.
To the contrary, Dr. Black testified that upon examina-
tion, respondent exhibited signs of mental illness, including
delusions, pressured speech, grandiosity, increased energy, and
difficulty with sleep. Dr. Black also testified that during the
hospital stay, respondent had threatened others.
In Dr. Black's opinion, respondent was reasonably
expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another
within the immediate future. The basis for Dr. Black's conclu-
sion was the fact that respondent had threatened others on an
- 18 - almost daily basis at the hospital to the extent of requiring
restraints and medications to stabilize him. Dr. Black also
testified that respondent's delusions caused him to attack other
patients and threaten to kill staff.
Dr. Black's testimony also supports the conclusion that
respondent was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical
harm upon himself. Dr. Black testified that respondent had
pulled out his IV and heart-rhythm monitor. Respondent also
believed he was going to live forever. Respondent could not
understand his medical risks, treatments offered, and risks if he
did not get treatment for his serious nonpsychiatric medical
Dr. Black's testimony was based, in part, on his review
of the medical chart. Such review was proper. An expert may
rely on documents prepared by others in formulating his opinion
so long as the documents are a type commonly used in the expert's
profession. See In re Germich, 103 Ill. App. 3d 626, 629, 431
N.E.2d 1092, 1094-95 (1981); In re Houlihan, 231 Ill. App. 3d
677, 683, 596 N.E.2d 189, 194 (1992) (a treating psychiatrist's
opinion of potential dangerousness need not be derived from
firsthand observations of violence and may be based on knowledge
of incidents derived from medical history records). Moreover, a
witness may use unsubstantiated evidence that is ordinarily
hearsay to explain the basis of his opinion, so long as that
- 19 - evidence is of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
field. In re Barnard, 247 Ill. App. 3d 234, 257, 616 N.E.2d 714,
730 (1993) (noting that an "expert may utilize otherwise inadmis-
sible reports prepared by others in forming his opinion if the
facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field").
Consequently, the trial court's determination that
respondent was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical
harm upon himself or another in the near future was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
2. Basic Needs
Because we have found that it was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence for the trial court to conclude
that respondent was reasonably expected to inflict serious
physical harm upon himself or another in the near future, we need
not address whether respondent was unable to provide for his
basic physical needs.
C. Least-Restrictive Treatment Alternative
Respondent last argues that the trial court's finding
that hospitalization was the least-restrictive treatment alterna-
tive was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent
claims Dr. Black did not consider treatment other than hospital-
ization. Respondent points to the March 2006 psychiatric social
service assessment that noted respondent was likely to return
- 20 - home with his "supportive wife" and follow up with treatment at
Southern Illinois University Behavioral Health.
Section 3-811 of the Code provides in relevant part as
follows:
"If any person is found subject to in-
voluntary admission, the court shall consider
alternative mental health facilities which
are appropriate for and available to the
respondent, including but not limited to
hospitalization. The court may order the
respondent to undergo a program of hospital-
ization in a mental[-]health facility desig-
nated by the Department, in a licensed pri-
vate hospital or private mental[-]health
facility if it agrees *** or the court may
order the respondent to undergo a program of
alternative treatment; or the court may place
the respondent in the care and custody of a
relative or other person willing and able to
properly care for him or her. The court
shall order the least[-]restrictive alterna-
tive for treatment which is appropriate."
405 ILCS 5/3-811 (West 2004).
The State must prove that hospitalization is the least-restric-
- 21 - tive alternative. In re Luttrell, 261 Ill. App. 3d 221, 226, 633
N.E.2d 74, 78 (1994). To do so, it must do more than produce an
expert who opines that commitment is the least-restrictive means;
it must show that the expert's opinion is supported by evidence.
Luttrell, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 227, 633 N.E.2d at 78.
In the instant case, no evidence suggests that a
relative or other person was willing to care for respondent. The
report to which respondent refers was apparently created before
respondent's divorce from his wife. The report identifies no
other family member willing to care for respondent.
Moreover, the evidence demonstrated outpatient treat-
ment was not an option. Dr. Black testified that respondent
threatened and assaulted others to the point of requiring re-
straints and being confined to his room. Dr. Black actually
considered whether respondent could receive his nonpsychiatric
medical treatment outside of the psychiatric wing of the hospital
but concluded he could not due to his behavior. Dr. Black also
testified that if respondent left a supervised setting, he would
"fairly quickly decompensate and be dangerous to himself or
others quickly." Given this evidence, the trial court's determi-
nation that hospitalization was the least-restrictive treatment
alternative was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial
- 22 - court's order finding respondent subject to involuntary admis-
sion.
Affirmed.
McCULLOUGH and COOK, JJ., concur.
- 23 -