The opinion of the court was delivered by
Hughes, C. J.
This appeal concerns a decision and order of the New Jersey State Board of Pharmacy (N. J. S. A. 45:14-1 et seq.) revoking the certificate of a registered pharmacist, Fred F. Heller, R. P., revoking the permit to conduct a pharmacy of Carfred, Inc., trading as Heller Pharmacy, and assessing a “civil penalty” of $50,472 jointly against both. Fred F. Heller is President of Carfred, a closely-held corporation, and was pharmacist-in-charge of Heller Pharmacy.
An appeal was taken to the Appellate Division, B. 2: 2-3(2), which affirmed both revocations and penalty assessment. 150 N. J. Super. 25 (1975). Although the judges were unanimous as to the validity of the revocations, Judge Crane dissented as to that of the penalty assessment. We granted certification, 69 N. J. 383 (1976), in order to deal with both issues.
The Board of Pharmacy had issued a complaint charging that appellants, during a period between May 1973 and October 1974, sold improperly more than 18,000 four-[295]*295ounce bottles of codeine-based cough syrup. This material was classified as a “controlled dangerous substance” under Schedule V of N. J. A. C. 8:65-10.1, promulgated pursuant to N. J. S. A. 24:21-3. It was permitted to be legally dispensed without prescription under standards set forth in N. J. A. C. 8:65-7.19, including recordation of such sales in a bound record book (an “Exempt Narcotics” book). The complaint charged that this volume of sales was “in gross excess” of the legitimate medical needs of the purchasers; that appellants failed to exercise proper professional judgment in making these sales, and that they sold the substances at unconscionable prices. It charged that such activities were not in good faith, were without medical justification or recognized and legitimate cause, and constituted grossly unprofessional conduct in violation of N. J. S. A. 45:14-12.
In a separate count the Board charged that the sale of these substances for a unit price of $8 per four-ounce bottle constituted a retail “mark-up” of 400 percent or five times the wholesale cost of a four-ounce bottle of such substances; and that the sale of the substances at such price was unconscionable and constituted grossly unprofessional conduct in violation of the statute. The complaint sought by way of remedy the suspension or revocation of appellants’ licenses to practice pharmacy and to operate a drug store. Both the complaint and the notice of hearing thereunder were silent, however, as to any claim for the assessment of civil penalties.
The Board, after hearing extensive testimony, determined that appellants were guilty of grossly unprofessional conduct and practices. It concluded that during the interval mentioned the appellants had realized (“grossed”) $100,944, “half of which or $50,472 is the minimum amount of unjust profit” gained from “unprofessional practices and pricing.”
The Board adjudged appellants guilty of all charges and entered an order revoking the permit of Heller Pharmacy [296]*296to conduct a pharmacy and the certificate of Heller to practice pharmacy. It further ordered:
That Heller Pharmacy and Fred Heller R. P., are herewith and hereby assessed a civil penalty in the amount of $50,472, which amount is equal to the minimum amount of unjust profit derived by Fred Heller, R. P., by means of grossly unprofessional conduct.
The following evidence taken at the administrative hearing (at which Heller did not testify but offered three “character” witnesses) was relied upon by the Board in its ultimate decision that Heller was guilty of “grossly unprofessional conduct.”
Heller Pharmacy is a relatively low-volume drug store, reporting only 10,582 prescription sales in 1973 and 9,536 in 1974. Located in a declining urban neighborhood in Newark, it experienced a 5,000 item drop in prescription sales from 1971 to 1974. In October 1974 a New Jersey Department of Health field representative conducted an accountability audit of Heller’s sales of Schedule Y cough preparations. The audit revealed that Heller had sold 18,766 four-ounce bottles of these cough preparations between May 1, 1973, and October 16, 1974. Heller had scrupulously maintained his “Exempt Narcotics” record and had observed the other formalities relevant to Schedule Y sales. He insisted on making all the sales personally, as well as meticulously recording them. He would not sell to a given customer more frequently than once every 48 hours.
The purchasers were primarily not regular prescription customers; a third of them lived outside the city; half of the purchasers bought these drugs on a regular basis, some buying a bottle every third day. They bought the cough syrup from Heller "because it was hard to get and not many other people sold it.” A former employee who had observed Heller making thousands of sales testified that Heller had indicated to him that people could get “high” (a slang term for drug intoxication) on the medication, although the witness quibbled as to Heller’s use of that [297]*297precise word. Heller rarely inquired about the purchaser’s health. He sold an equal volume of the medication in summer and winter months.
Several established pharmacists testified that they were much more guarded in such sales and made substantially fewer of them. They also testified that significantly more such medications were called for and dispensed in the winter months. As compared to Heller’s unit price of as high as $8, the other pharmacists sold at a range of $1.69 to $3. The wholesale cost to the pharmacy ranged from $1.20 to $1.75 per bottle.
On this factual base the Board determined that Heller had pandered to those intending an illicit and non-medical use1 of the medications, had realized unconscionable profits therefrom, and consequently had been guilty of grossly unprofessional conduct and was justly subjected to the sanctions imposed.
The appeal projects two basic issues: (1) Was the revocation of appellants’ professional licenses for “grossly unprofessional conduct” valid? (2) Was the imposition of a civil penalty in the amount of $50,472 a valid exercise of the Board’s remedial powers in these circumstances?
Appellants contend that they violated no specific statute or Board regulation concerning the manner in which nonprescription Schedule Y drugs may be sold. Because their conduct is neither expressly proscribed by the Pharmacy Act, nor included in the particularized definitions of “grossly unprofessional conduct” under N. J. S. A. 45:14-12(a)-(f), they question the authority of the Board to revoke their licenses. Innocence of intent to commit a wrongful act is apparent, say appellants, because Heller kept such a complete record of the sales of these substances.
[298]*298The last quoted statute empowers the Board to withhold, suspend or revoke a pharmacist’s license for specific acts or conditions, including conviction of violating certain laws, chronic inebriety, drug addiction, adulteration of drugs, and incompetency. In addition the law provides that the Board may
suspend .or revoke the certificate of a registered pharmacist * * * upon proof satisfactory to the board that such registered pharmacist * * * is guilty of grossly unprofessional conduct and the following acts are hereby declared to constitute grossly unprofessional conduct for the purpose of this act. [N. J. S. A. 45:14-12].
There follows a list of six types of activity which include (a) paying rebates to any person for recommending the services of another person; (b) providing physicians with prescription blanks bearing the pharmacist’s name; (c) advertising the sale of prescription drugs and narcotics at discount rates; (d) claiming professional superiority in the compounding or filling of prescriptions; (e) fostering the interests of one group of patients at the expense of another, and (f) distributing premiums or rebates in connection with the sale of drugs and medications.
The appellants assert that the Legislature intended this list to be exclusive and that since their conduct did not specifically fall within any of these categories, it may not be deemed “grossly unprofessional conduct” for purposes of a revocation proceeding. In that argument they roly heavily upon the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Cohen, 448 Pa. 189, 292 A. 2d 277 (1972), dealing with a similar statute. In that case the State Board of Pharmacy had suspended a pharmacist’s license after finding him guilty of “grossly unprofessional conduct.” He was found to have sold quantities of items used in connection with drug abuse. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the pharmacist’s conduct did not violate any of the 13 specific prohibitions delineated as constituting [299]*299grossly unprofessional conduct the State Board had exceeded its authority by suspending the license. 292 A. 2d at 280.
The rationale of the Pennsylvania decision was that the statutory scheme evinced a “legislative intention to provide clear advance notice of the enumerated grounds for imposition of sanctions by the Board” and that a contrary conclusion would render the entire statute constitutionally suspect on grounds of vagueness and failure to provide adequate notice and a clear description of the proscribed conduct. That court believed that the regulatory function of defining prohibited conduct may not be accomplished on an ad hoc basis but may only be achieved through formal rule-making procedures.
Other jurisdictions have taken a position contrary to the Cohen court. In Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P. 2d 828 (Sup. Ct. 1968), for example, a State Board had revoked a physician’s license by reason of his “extreme incompetence” despite the fact that extreme incompetence was not one of 15 specific acts constituting “unprofessional conduct” under the governing statute. In affirming the decision of the Board, the Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that the Board had unlawfully created an additional ground of revocation:
The objective always in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. In so doing, where police power is to be exercised, we must fairly read the entire context of legislation on the subject, rather than only an isolated section, and consider the object of that legislation and the evils or mischief sought to be prevented or remedied. * * *
The whole purpose and tenor of the healing arts act is the protection of the public against unprofessional, improper, unauthorized and unqualified practice of the healing arts. The goal is to secure to the people the services of competent, trustworthy practitioners. The act seeks to do this through licensure. * * * Considering the entire policy expressed in the act, we believe the legislature, by enumerating certain aets and classifying them as unprofessional conduct, did not thereby intend to exclude all other acts or conduct in the practice of the healing arts which by common understanding render the holder of a license unfit to practice. It would indeed he [300]*300difficult, not to say impractical, in carrying out the purpose of the act, for the legislature to list each and every specific act or course of conduct which might constitute such unprofessional conduct of a disqualifying nature. [436 P. 2d at 833 (emphasis added)].
In State ex rel. Lentine V. State Bd. of Health, 334 Mo. 320, 65 S. W. 2d 943 (Sup. Ct. 1933), a doctor’s license was revoked for his having participated in a scheme to sell medical licenses. Relying upon a Missouri statute similar to ours, the State Board of Health deemed this activity “unprofessional and dishonorable conduct” although the sale of medical licenses was not among the specifically enumerated acts of unprofessional conduct listed in the statute. 65 S. W. 2d at 945.
The Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the Board, noting that by particularizing certain acts the legislature did not intend
to thereby exclude all other acts or conduct, affecting the practice of medicine and the moral conduct of the physician, in that connection, which by common opinion and fair judgment are found to be in their very nature unprofessional and dishonorable, as grounds or cause for revocation of a license. Rather upon a showing of any of the things enumerated the board of health, and the court upon review, is not called upon in its sound discretion to determine whether such conduct is such as in common judgment is deemed unprofessional and dishonorable, for the statute has expressly declared it so to be. It would not be practicable to the carrying out of the wholesome purpose of the statute to undertake to catalogue, list, or specify each and every act or course of conduct which would, or under what circumstances, constitute bad moral character or unprofessional and dishonorable conduct, and we do not think the Legislature intended to do so. [65 S. W. 2d at 950].
See also Bell v. Board of Regents, 395 N. Y. 101, 65 N. E. 2d 184, 187 (Ct. App. 1946) (“It bas never been necessary for the Legislature * * * to define with particularity acts which would constitute unprofessional conduct”); State ex rel. Conway v. Hiller, 266 Mo. 242, 180 S. W. 538, 544 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
The Lentine court went on to state that the statutory terms “bad moral character” and “unprofessional and dis[301]*301honorable conduct” were not so vague as to render the statute unconstitutional. 65 S. W. 2d at 949. Cf. Morra v. State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 212 Kan. 103, 510 P. 2d 614, 621-22 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, supra, 436 P. 2d at 833; In re Hawkins, 17 N. C. App. 378, 194 S. E. 2d 540, 550-51 (Ct. App.), cert. den., 283 N. C. 393, 196 S. E. 2d 275 (Sup. Ct.), cert. den., 414 U. S. 1001, 94 S. Ct. 355, 38 L. Ed. 2d 237 (1973); Vivian v. Examining Bd. of Architects, 61 Wis. 2d 627, 213 N. W. 2d 359, 366-67 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
While there are no New Jersey eases dealing with this issue under N. J. S. A. 45:14-12, our case law in other areas seems to adopt the approach taken by the group of cases contrary to Cohen.
In In re Comm’r of Banking Insurance v. Parkwood Co., 98 N. J. Super. 263 (App. Div. 1967), it was held that the Commissioner of Banking and Insurance, having found that an insurance broker wrongfully withheld an insurance premium, could suspend the broker’s license on the general grounds of “incompeteney” and “unworthiness.” The court there noted the need for a liberal construction of the Commissioner’s powers:
An insurance broker acts in a fiduciary capacity and is held to a high standard of conduct. Close and continuous scrutiny of the licensee’s exercise of his license and the establishment of standards and guidelines are necessary to maintain the high standard of conduct and the degree of fidelity the statute envisions. As a means of accomplishing this objective, the Legislature has conferred on the Commissioner authority to suspend or revoke the license of a licensee if he has demonstrated unworthiness, bad faith, incompetency or dishonesty. [98 N. J. Super. at 268],
In Goodley v. New Jersey Real Estate Comm’n, 29 N. J. Super. 178, 181-82 (App. Div. 1954), the court recognized the appropriateness of “unworthiness” as a general standard for measuring the conduct of real estate brokers, and in Berardi v. Rutter, 42 N. J. Super. 39, 45-47 (App. Div. 1956), aff’d sub nom., In re Berardi, 23 [302]*302N. J. 485 (1957), the court upheld the power of the Superintendent of State Police to revoke the license of a private detective if there is sufficient evidence to show that the licensee lacked “good character, competency and integrity.” Cf. Burton v. Sills, 53 N. J. 86, 90-92 (1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U. S. 812, 89 S. Ct. 1486, 22 L. Ed. 2d 748 (196.9); Schierstead v. City of Brigantine, 20 N. J. 164, 169 (1955); Township of Cherry Hill v. New Jersey Racing Comm’n, 131 N. J. Super. 125, 137-39 (Law Div.), aff'd o. b., 131 N. J. Super. 482 (App. Div. 1974), certif. den., 68 N. J. 135 (1975).
It is thus apparent that with respect to certain professions, our courts have permitted regulatory agencies to take action based upon general statutes, without necessarily limiting their powers to the express provisions of a particular enabling statute. In the seminal case of Ward v. Scott, 11 N. J. 117 (1952), Justice Jacobs stated for this Court:
In dealing with the question of standards it is elementary that we are not confined to the specific terms of [the statute] but must examine the entire act in the light of its surroundings and objectives. See Carlson v. London, 342 U. S. 524, 72 S. Ct. 525, 96 L. Ed. 547 (1952). Nor are we restricted to the ascertainment of standards in express terms if they may be reasonably implied from the entire act. See Brandon v. Montclair, 124 (N. J. L. 135, 143, 11 A. 2d 304, 309 (Sup. Ct. 1940), affirmed 125 N. J. L. 367, 15 A. 2d 598 (E. & A. 1940), where Justice Heher rightly noted that “A statute often speaks as plainly by inference, and by means of the purpose which underlies it, as in any other manner. That which is clearly implied is as much a part of the law as that which is expressed.” [11 N. J. at 123].
See also Avant v. Clifford, 67 N. J. 496, 549-54 (1975); Schierstead v. City of Brigantine, supra, 20 N. J. at 169; In re Tenure Hearing of Grossman, 127 N. J. Super. 13, 28-29 (App. Div. 1974). But see State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Weiner, 68 N. J. Super. 468, 479-83 (App. Div. 1961).
[303]*303This conclusion is, to a large extent, a consequence of the exigencies and practicalities of the modern regulatory process. As stated in Ward v. Scott, supra:
It is settled that the Legislature may not vest unbridled or arbitrary power in the administrative agency but must furnish a reasonably adequate standard to guide it. * * * But the exigencies of modern government have increasingly dictated the use of general rather than minutely detailed standards in regulatory enactments under the police power. Thus, the Board of Public Utility Commissioners has been guided by simple standards of “public convenience and necessity” * * * and “just and reasonable.” * * * The Commissioner of Alcoholic Beverage Control, with authority to fix prices and promulgate regulations * * * has been guided by the general legislative pronouncement that the statute shall be administered in “such a manner as to promote temperance and eliminate the racketeer and bootlegger.” * * * And the Director of the Milk Control Board has been authorized to take such measures including the fixing of prices and the promulgation of regulations as may be “necessary to control or prevent unfair, unjust, destructive or demoralizing practices” * * *. [11 N. J. at 123-24 (citations omitted)].
See also Jansco v. Waldron, 70 N. J. 320, 326-27 (1976); Wagner v. Mayor, etc., Newark, 42 N. J. Super. 193, 213 (Law Div. 1956), rev’d on other grounds, 24 N. J. 467 (1957).
Eor this reason, courts have consistently held that
the powers of an administrative agency should be liberally construed to permit the agency to achieve the task assigned to it, and that such administrative agency has such implied incidental powers as may reasonably be adapted to that end. [In re Comm’r of Banking & Insurance v. Parkwood Co., supra, 98 N. J. Super. at 271-72],
Cf. New Jersey State AFL-CIO v. Bryant, 55 N. J. 171, 176 (1969); Shelton College v. State Bd. of Educ., 48 N. J. 501, 524 (1967); Allendale Field & Stream, Ass’n v. Legalized Games of Chance Control Comm’n, 41 N. J. 209, 217 (1963); Bechler v. Parsekian, 36 N. J. 242, 249-51 (1961); Cammarata v. Essex Cty. Park Comm’n, 26 N. J. 404, 411 (1958).
Where, as here, the task of the regulatory agency is “to protect the health and welfare of members of the public” [304]*304by assuring that all licensed practitioners are qualified, competent and honest, the grant of implied powers is particularly important. Rite Aid of N. J., Inc. v. Board of Pharmacy, 124 N. J. Super. 62, 66-68 (App. Div.), certif. den., 63 N. J. 503 (1973); cf. Abelson’s, Inc. v. New Jersey State Bd. of Optometrists, 5 N. J. 412, 418-21 (1950); Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, supra, 436 P. 2d at 833. The Board argues that to adequately fulfill its assigned task, it must be allowed to suspend or revoke a pharmacist’s license, where the continuation of his practice poses a threat to the public health and especially where, as here, his conduct appears to be considerably more egregious than conduct specifically proscribed by N. J. S. A. 45:14—12(a)-(f).
Corollary to appellants’ challenge to the Board’s adjudication of “unprofessional conduct” sans statute or regulation classifying the specific acts as such, is the argument that the Board could not in any event “add” to the statute, even by adopting such a regulation. Our cases, Rite Aid, supra, and others, have rejected such narrow interpretation as discordant with the legislative intent in its delegation of power. We reach the same determination in this ease.
As to the need for promulgation of regulations prior to imposing sanctions, the Board cites these passages from Securities and Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 201-02, 67 S. Ct. 1575, 1580, 91 L. Ed. 1995, 2002 (1947):
It is true that our prior decision explietly recognized the possibility that the Commission might have promulgated a general rule dealing with this problem under its statutory rule-making powers, in which case the issue for our consideration would have been entirely different from, that which did confront us. 318 U. S. at pages 92, 93, 63 S. Ct. 454, at pages 461, 462, 87 L. Ed. 626, [635, 636]. But we did not mean to imply thereby that the failure of the Commission to anticipate this problem and to promulgate a general rule withdrew all power from that agency to perform its statutory duty in this case. To bold that the Commission had no alternative in this proceeding but to approve the proposed transaction, while formulating any general rules it might desire for use in future cases of this [305]*305nature, would be to stultify the administrative process'. That we refuse to do.
* * * The function of filling in the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future. But any rigid requirement to that effect would make the administrative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized problems which arise. * * * Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should be east immediately into the mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its important functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity. [Citation omitted].
There is substantial authority in New Jersey supporting these general principles. Eor instance, in a line of cases construing the power of a municipality to discipline its police officers, our courts have consistently held that “a finding of misconduct against a police officer need not be predicated upon the violation of any particular regulation or rule.” Jansco v. Waldron, supra, 70 N. J. at 328. See City of Asbury Park v. Department of Civil Serv., 17 N. J. 419, 429-30 (1955); Sabia v. City of Elizabeth, 132 N. J. Super. 6, 11 (App. Div. 1975); In re Emmons, 63 N. J. Super. 136, 140 (App. Div. 1960). For comparable holdings in other areas see Data Access Systems, Inc. v. State, 117 N. J. Super. 95, 101-02 (App. Div. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 63 N. J. 158 (1973); R. H. Macy & Co. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 77 N. J. Super. 155, 180 (App. Div. 1962), aff’d o. b., 41 N. J. 3 (1963); Mitchell v. Cavicchia, 29 N. J. Super. 11, 14-15 (App. Div. 1953). Nevertheless, the issue is not always as clear cut as we find it to be in the instant case, and the decision as to whether an agency’s adjudicatory ruling is proper will vary from case to case and depend upon all the relevant circumstances. See, e. g., Boiler Beverages, Inc. v. Davis, 38 N. J. 138, 151-54 (1962).
[306]*306The fabric of the Heller argument rests upon the Qohen thesis, namely that no species of unprofessional conduct was intended by the Legislature to be punishable under the statute unless specifically proscribed on its face or delineated by regulation. Here it is instructive to consider the nature of the specific descriptions of unprofessional conduct in the statute. They deal with matters requiring special identification, being of a nature malum prohibitum rather than malum in se. These include, for instance, the ban on advertising at discount rates, a frequent and legal commercial practice in many other fields; claiming professional superiority in the compounding or filling of prescriptions, not unlike effusive claims of product excellence in advertising medicinal drugs in the television marketplace; or the offering of premiums or rebates, as practiced almost universally in the commercial supermarket world. This need for special identification does not exist in respect to conduct inherently wrong and obviously “unprofessional.” Assume, in the case of the pharmacist licensed to practice his profession (presumably honorably) that such a pharmacist made a practice of demanding, before dispensing a sensitive narcotic (even one dispensable, as in Section V substances, without prescription), that an “under the counter” dollar be paid in addition to the actual cost of the substance. (This seems not far from what Heller did by way of exorbitant pricing.) Or a pharmacist so bigoted as to refuse-lawfully prescribed medicines to members of a given race or religion. Or assume a pharmacist so forgetful or careless as to repeatedly mis-prepare dangerous medicinal drugs not called for, or in different proportions than called for, in the prescriptions. None of these misdeeds or aberrations are tabulated as acts of professional misconduct in the pharmacy statute or regulations, but that fact does not make them less so. And it is inconceivable to us that the Legislature intended the absurd result of immunizing such conduct from treatment by the Board as “grossly unprofessional conduct.”
[307]*307Heller can hardly claim that the statutory language led him to believe that his conduct was permissible. The malum in se nature of his activity belies this contention as does the entire statutory pattern which was clearly intended to insure that persons authorized to dispense dangerous drugs do so in a manner which is above reproach.
Furthermore, N. J. S. A. 24:21-15(c) specifically prohibits the dispensing of Schedule V drugs “other than for a valid and accepted medical purpose.” It is beyond contention that Heller was aware that the drugs he was selling were not being consumed for valid medical purposes.
We are clear, therefore, that we should not follow the Pennsylvania Cohen rule, but hold to the contrary, in harmony with the many precedents above cited. We determine that the Heller activities were classifiable as “grossly unprofessional conduct.”
A separate contention was made (on which, on appellants’ motion, supplemental briefs were filed) as to the significance of legislation adopted after Heller’s activities had ended. On March 3, 1976, the Legislature enacted as an additional ground for revoking a pharmacist’s license (as well as those of other health care professionals) the dispensing of a controlled dangerous substance
in an indiscriminate manner, or not in good faith, or without good cause, or where the licensee reasonably knows or should have known that the substance or substances prescribed are to be used for unauthorized or illicit consumption * * *. [N. J. S. A. 45:1-13 (L. 1975, c. 382, § 1)].
The argument is made that such “sharpening” of the statute demonstrates that the Legislature had not previously intended to proscribe the conduct involved here. The Board answers that for nearly 20 years the term “grossly unprofessional conduct” has been interpreted to include practices other than those enumerated previously in N. J. S. A. 45:14-12 and that the recent amendment simply clarified this prior law.
[308]*308It is often held that a change of language in a statute “ordinarily implies a purposeful alteration in the substance of the law.” William H. Goldberg & Co. v. Division of Employment Sec., 21 N. J. 107, 112-13 (1956). On the other hand, it is equally plausible, in a given instance, that the Legislature intended merely to clarify already existing law. Cf. Jersey City Chapt. of Prop. Owner’s Protective Ass’n v. City Council, 55 N. J. 86, 95 (1969); J. R. Christ Constr. Co. v. Willete Assocs., 47 N. J. 473, 480 (1966). Professor Sutherland states that:
If the amendment was enacted soon after controversies arose as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original act — a formal change — rebutting the presumption of substantial change. [1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 22.31, at 184 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1972) (footnote omitted)].
We find that the amendment language amounted to no more than a clarification of the statute as it existed during Heller’s alleged misconduct. To hold otherwise would be to suppose that the Legislature was previously unconcerned with the dispensing of controlled dangerous substances included in Schedule Y for other than valid and accepted medical purposes, a proposition surely untenable in view of N. J. S. A. 24:21-15(c), which was adopted in 1970.
A minor point is the appellants’ contention that the three pharmacists who testified before the Board were not qualified as experts to establish a standard of professional conduct. These pharmacists had 20, 24 and 49 years of experience respectively; no objection was made to their qualifications at the hearing; and the Board itself is comprised of five registered pharmacists whose presumed expertise is accorded great weight by an appellate court. Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. Sills, 93 N. J. Super. 326, 350 (Ch. Div. 1966); see In re Comm’r of Banking & Insurance v. Parkwood Co., supra, 98 N. J. Super. at 271. The instant case is a proceeding concerned with the revocation of a professional license and [309]*309not a civil action for malpractice, which would require expert testimony as to a standard of care, see 2 F. Harper & F. James, Torts § 17.1, at 96.6 (1956), and thus we reject this argument. These witnesses were properly heard by the Board.
On appeal from the decision of an administrative agency the standard of appellate review is to examine the proofs to determine whether there is sufficient or substantial credible evidence in the record to support the agency’s determination. Where such evidence appears, the determination should not be disturbed, absent some other defect such as discordance with legislative policy. Campbell v. Department of Civil Serv., 39 N. J. 556, 562 (1963); Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N. J. 143, 149 (1962); In re Comm’r of Banking & Insurance v. Parkwood Co., supra, 98 N. J. Super. at 268.
Under this standard of review we are bound to find that the Board’s determination as to the "grossly unprofessional conduct” of Heller was amply supported by the evidence. Por the reasons stated, we affirm the Appellate Division’s holding as to the validity of the revocations.
As to the "civil penalty” imposed by the Board, however, we reach a different result. The only provisions of the Pharmacy Act which deal with the imposition of monetary penalties are found in N. J. S. A. 45:14—37 and -38. Section 37 provides that any person who violates the act shall pay a "penalty” of from $25 to $50 for the first offense, from $50 to $100 for the second offense, and not less than $100 for each subsequent offense. Section 38 then provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any penalty imposed because of the violation of any provision of this chapter shall be collected and enforced by summary proceedings pursuant to the Penalty Enforcement Law (N. J. S. 2A:58-1 et seq.). Process shall issue at the suit of the board, as plaintiff, and shall be either in the nature of a summons or warrant.
In the present case it is obvious that the Board failed to follow the procedure prescribed by the statute in imposing this penalty, and failed as well to afford Heller notice, in [310]*310the complaint or otherwise, that it intended to consider such a penalty. Moreover, the Board made no attempt to follow the statutory schedule and impose separate penalties for each offense, but instead assessed the penalty based upon its own estimate of “the minimum amount of unjust profit” allegedly derived by Seller. For this there was no statutory warrant. Thus we need not pause to consider the propriety vel non of separate assessments, had they been made, on these multiple offenses. Kingsley v. Wes Outdoor Advertising Co., 55 N. J. 336, 340 (1970), supplemented, 59 N. J. 182, 189 (1971).
It is enough to repeat the language of the dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division:
This [the imposition of a civil penalty] was done without any notice to the licensee that a monetary penalty was contemplated. The complaint alleging unprofessional conduct sought no such relief nor was any mention of any intention to assess a penalty made during the proceedings before the Board. Under these circumstances the licensee could not reasonably have been expected to have anticipated the imposition of a monetary penalty. He was thus deprived of an opportunity to present evidence in mitigation or bearing on his ability to pay. [150 N. J. Super. at 30].
In this posture the lack of procedural due process is conclusive. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972), Mr. Justice Stewart recalled that :
For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: “Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.” [407 U. S. at 80, 92 S. Ct. at 1994, 32 L. Ed. 2d at 569, quoting from Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U. S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233, 17 L. Ed. 531, 534 (1864)].
The viability of such requirement in circumstances such as the present case was well described by the court in Department of Revenue v. Jamb Discount, 13 Ill. App. 3d 430, 301 N. E. 2d 23, 27 (Ct. App. 1973) :
[311]*311Procedural due process requires that notice be given of the claim asserted. The right to a hearing includes not only the right to present evidence but also a reasonable opportunity to know what claims must be defended against and what consequences are proposed. * * * In order to be effectual, notice should be so full and clear as to disclose to persons of ordinary intelligence what is proposed. * * *■ The test is whether the defendant should have anticipated the effects and orders possible. [Citations omitted].
Moreover, such procedural due process is mandated by our Administrative Procedure Act, N. J. S. A. 52:14B-9.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division validating the revocations imposed, but reverse it as to the “civil penalty” element and set aside that part of the Decision and Order of the Board.
Judgment modified, and as modified, affirmed.