In Re the Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority

2003 OK 59, 80 P.3d 109, 74 O.B.A.J. 1722, 2003 Okla. LEXIS 64, 2003 WL 21295711

• Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma
• Decided: June 3, 2003
• Docket: 97,936
• Status: Published

Opinions

BOUDREAU, Justice.

¶ 1 By amendment to 73 O.S.Supp.1999, § 301,¹ the second regular session of the 47th Oklahoma Legislature in 2000 authorized the Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority (OCIA) to issue the proposed State Facilities Revenue Bonds, Series 2002C, in an amount not to exceed $155 million, and Series 2002D (Taxable), in an amount not to exceed $20 million. The proposed $175 million bonds constitute the second half of the $325 million bonds authorized in § 301(C) for the purpose of “providing funding for the projects authorized in subsection A”. The proceeds from the proposed $175 million bonds are allocated to twenty-seven state agencies by § 301(A)(16). The OCIA initiated this original proceeding seeking approval of the proposed bonds.²

¶2 Three individuals, protestants John Cassidy, Jr. (Cassidy), Jerry R. Fent (Fent), and Edwin Kessler (Kessler), objected to the bond proposal. Protestants challenged both the authorizing statute, § 301, and the bond-approval process on several state constitutional grounds.

¶ 3 Upon considering the briefs and other filings by the parties and hearing oral argument en banc, we conclude that the deciding issue in this controversy is whether the authorizing statute satisfies the purpose-of-borrowing requirement in Okla. Const., art. 10, § 16.³ We find that § 301 as amended in 2000 does not specify the purposes for which the twenty-seven state agencies may use the bond proceeds. We determine that § 301 fails to satisfy the purpose-of-borrowing requirement in Okla. Const., art. 10, § 16. We hold that the proposed bonds are not properly authorized in 73 O.S.2001, § 301.

I. OCIA’s Application for Approval of the Proposed Bonds

¶4 In its application for approval of the proposed bonds, OCIA asserted there is no valid distinction between this bond proposal and the bond proposal previously approved by this Court in Fent v. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1999 OK 64, 984 P.2d 200. In Fent, we approved the first half of the bonds authorized in 73 O.S.Supp.1998, § 301, a $162,700,000 bond proposal, against an attack that the bonds would create a debt requiring voter approval pursuant to Okla. Const., art. 10, § 25.⁴

¶ 5 Anticipating protests to its application, OCIA argued that the proposed bonds do not violate either the separation of powers requirement in Okla. Const., art. 4, § 1, the appropriation requirements in art. 5, § 55, nor the purpose of borrowing requirement in art. 10, § 16. OCIA contended that by designating twenty-seven state agencies to participate in the bond program and the dollar amount for each agency “for the purpose of ‘capital projects which are important to the furtherance of state functions’ ” the statute passes constitutional muster for a self-liquidating revenue bond authorization statute.

II. The Protests to the Proposed Bonds

¶ 6 Cassidy challenged the constitutionality of the 2000 amendments to § 301. He contended that the statutory provisions, allocating the borrowed funds to various state agencies, including $51 million to the Department of Central Services to be expended as directed by the Governor, without specifying the purpose, result in a delegation of legislative power which offends the state constitutional separation of powers doctrine and also violates the appropriations and borrowing provisions in Okla. Const., art. 4, § 1, art. 5, § 55, and art. 10, § 16.

¶ 7 In response to Cassidy, OCIA contended that the authorizing statute requires that the bond proceeds be used for capital projects of the specified agencies and confers discretion on the various agencies in choosing the capital projects. OCIA argued that the Legislature sufficiently set out general standards and policies for the use of the bond proceeds to guide the state agencies in carrying out the delegated power, citing Okla. Const., art. 4, § 1 and Bailey v. State Board of Public Affairs, 1944 OK 301, 194 Okla. 495, 153 P.2d 235.

¶ 8 Cassidy and Fent filed documents showing that Governor Keating and members of the Legislature agreed that the bond proceeds will be allocated as follows: House members will decide how to spend $55 million of the bond proceeds, Senate members will decide how to spend $55 million of the bond proceeds, and the Governor will decide how to spend $51 million of the bond proceeds. The documents listed some 520 possible projects for the bond proceeds. Cassidy asserted that this agreement is not an official legislative act and does not satisfy the purpose-of-borrowing requirement of Okla. Const., art. 10, § 16 nor the separation of powers doctrine of nondelegation.⁵

¶ 9 OCIA also acknowledged the existence of one or more lists prepared by individual legislative members directing a range of uses of the bond proceeds by various state agencies from purchasing equipment for rural firefighters to completing the Capitol dome. OCIA took the position that these “wish lists” are not a result of any official action of the Legislature and are not binding on the state agencies. OCIA explained that it will, with the assistance of the Office of the Attorney General, ultimately oversee the expenditure of the bond proceeds to assure that each project fulfills a lawful public purpose and does not involve the unconstitutional or unlawful gift or loan of proceeds to any local or private entity.

III. The State Attorney General’s Position

¶ 10 The OCIA, a state entity,⁶ is represented in this proceeding by the Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma. Additionally, the Attorney General is ex officio Bond Commissioner of the State of Oklahoma, Okla. Const., art. 10, § 29, and tentatively approved the proposed bonds. However, because the protestants attack the constitutional validity of the statute authorizing issuance of the proposed bonds, this Court directed the Attorney General as Chief Law Enforcer to indicate whether his legal position with respect to the constitutional issues is reflected in the briefs filed by the Assistant Attorney General as attorney of record for the OCIA.⁷

¶ 11 The Attorney General took the position that the authorizing statute is not only presumed constitutional but is constitutional under this Court’s pronouncement in Fent v. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1999 OK 64, 984 P.2d 200, “which approved bonds issued under Section 301 of Title 73, which in part provided funding for unspecified projects in designating $45,000,000 for ‘Capitol projects at institutions of higher education which are part of the Oklahoma State System of Higher Education.’ ”

1112 Cassidy replied to the Attorney General’s position contending that a lump sum allocation of borrowed money to the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education for capital improvements sufficiently specifies the purpose for the borrowing. He referred to Okla. Const., art. 13-A, § 3, which requires the Legislature to appropriate funds to the Board of Regents in consolidated form without reference to a particular institution and requires the Board of Regents to allocate the appropriated funds to each institution.

IV. The Purpose-of-Borrowing Requirement in Okla. Const., art. 10, § 16

¶ 13 The Oklahoma Constitution, art. 10, § 16 requires the Legislature to specify the purpose for which borrowed money is to be used in a statute authorizing the State to borrow money. It also prohibits the use of the money so borrowed for any other purpose.

¶ 14 This constitutional purpose-of-borrowing requirement is a limitation on the Legislature. Protest of Reid, 1932 OK 711, ¶ 7, 160 Okla. 3, 15 P.2d 995, 997-98. Its objective is to require legislative bodies to reveal the true purpose for which the borrowed money is to be used. Borin v. City of Erick, 1942 OK 144, ¶ 13, 190 Okla. 519, 125 P.2d 768, 770.

¶ 15 Application of the constitutional purpose-of-borrowing requirement to a state statute is a matter of first impression. However, this Court has considered the application of art. 10, § 16 to proposed municipal bonds and uses of municipal bond proceeds. Our decisions have, for the most part, strictly applied the constitutional purpose-of-borrowing requirement to limit the use of the proceeds.

¶ 16 In Protest of Reid, supra., we concluded that the purpose-of-borrowing requirement limits not only the immediate use of money borrowed, but also limits any subsequent use of the proceeds from the sale of property purchased with money borrowed by a municipality. Similarly, in Borin v. City of Erick, supra., we invalidated proposed municipal bonds, finding that the ordinance did not specify the real purpose for borrowing money in that it failed to reveal the power plant would be constructed, partially with federal grant money.⁸ More recently, Quinn v. City of Tulsa, 1989 OK 112, ¶ 20, 777 P.2d 1331, 1336, reiterated the Borin rule that art. 10, § 16 prevents a municipality from using bond proceeds for a project¹ that is substantially different from the planned project.

¶ 17 Protest of Reid and Borin v. City of Erick utilized the word “purpose” in its ordinary meaning as “the thing to be accomplished.” See also, Barnes v. Barnes, 1955 OK 34, ¶ 5, 280 P.2d 996, 998 (defining “purpose” as “the thing to be accomplished”). This interpretation of “purpose” as used in art. 10, § 16 is consistent with the firmly established presumption that words in the constitution have been employed in their natural and ordinary meaning by the framers and the people who adopted it. Thomas M. Cooley, LL.D., A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, vol. 1, p. 130 (8th ed.1927).

¶ 18 While the analogy between the legislative authority of the sovereign state and the legislative authority of its municipalities is limited in its usefulness,⁹ the underlying goal of art. 10, § 16 is the same for state or municipal borrowing — to require our elected officials to specify the purpose for borrowing money. Accordingly, the provisions of Okla. Const., art. 10, § 16 require that the statutory provisions authorizing the borrowing of money, the 2000 amendments to § 301, must specify the legislative object or thing to be accomplished with the borrowed money, i.e., the legislative purpose for the borrowing of the money.

V. The 2000 amendments to 73 O.S.Supp.1999, § 301

¶ 19 Cassidy argues that § 301 does not reveal the purposes for which the borrowed money may be expended contrary to the purpose-of-borrowing requirement. On the other hand, OCIA argues that the legislative purpose of the borrowing authorized in § 301 is capital projects of listed agencies.

¶ 20 The arguments require us to examine the pertinent provisions of the 2000 amendments to § 301.¹⁰ In summary, these provisions:

1) increase the authorized amount from $320 million to $325 million bonds;

2) allocate proceeds of the second half of the $325 million bonds to twenty-seven state agencies and direct the Governor to determine the use of approximately one-third of the bond proceeds;

3) declare legislative intent “to appropriate to the agencies administering the projects sufficient monies to make rental payments for the purpose of retiring the obligations” for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2002, and thereafter; and,

4) make legislative findings that the use of bond proceeds by municipalities and counties will effectuate essential state governmental functions relating to the services of fire protection, roads and bridges, historic preservation, recreational facilities, air transportation, housing and care of elderly, juvenile delinquency prevention, agriculture, horticulture, health care, tourism, economic development, and public safety.

¶ 21 Central to the controversy sought to be resolved is whether the statute, § 301, sufficiently specifies the purpose for which the proceeds of the proposed bonds are to be used. Upon careful consideration of the text of the 2000 amendments to § 301,¹¹ we conclude it does not.

¶22 Subsection (A)(16) of § 301 states “The following capital projects to be funded by the obligations authorized herein”. However, a listing of projects does not follow. The subsection does not identify or otherwise describe a single “capital project” to be funded with the borrowed money. Rather, it sets forth a listing of the amounts of the borrowed money and identifies twenty-seven state agencies to which the various amounts are to be allocated. It does not, however, provide any description whatsoever of the projects to be accomplished by the twenty-seven state agencies with the borrowed money. This subsection does not reveal the purpose or the object of the borrowing.

¶ 23 While subsection (L) of § 301 identifies some twelve areas of services where the use of the borrowed money would effectuate the performance of essential state governmental functions, it is silent as to any description of any “capital project” that might be funded with the borrowed money. The listing of the twelve service areas, without more, simply does not disclose the projects to be accomplished with the borrowed money.

¶ 24 Subsection (M) of § 301 vests the identified state agencies with the authority as may be necessary to fully fund the projects for which the proceeds from the obligations authorized by this section are available. Although § 301(M) does not describe or otherwise identify a single project that the Legislature intended to be funded, OCIA argues that it sufficiently complies with the purpose-of-borrowing requirement. OCIA points out that § 301(M) requires the bond proceeds to be used for capital projects of the various state agencies and confers discretion in the agencies to select the capital project. While the Legislature undoubtedly may delegate to the agencies the task of implementing a declared policy under certain conditions,¹² the power to delegate is limited by the purpose-of-borrowing provision in art. 10, § 16. OCIA’s delegation argument reveals in itself that the specific projects to be accomplished with the borrowed money have not yet been determined.

¶ 25 The term “capital project” as used in § 301 is not a sufficiently descriptive designation of the things to be accomplished with the borrowed money to satisfy the purpose-of-borrowing requirement in Okla. Const., art.10, § 16. Oklahoma law provides no definition of the term. The word “capital” has different meanings when used in different connections.¹³ When used as an adjective in a financial sense, “capital” means having to do with wealth or financial resources or general assets, including investment and surplus.¹⁴ Imputing an unrestricted financial sense to the word “capital” as used in § 301, the agencies could expend the borrowed money for any “project” from the purchasing of dispensable supplies to the constructing of a building.

¶ 26 Realizing that the term “capital project” is imprecise in its meaning, the dissent looks to other Oklahoma law to define the term. The dissent, citing Oklahoma Public Employees Association v. Oklahoma Department of Central Services, 2002 OK 71, 126, 55 P.3d 1072, 1083, argues that “capital project” means the building or construction of a “capital improvement” because this Court discussed the meaning of such terms as “capital expenditure” and “capital outlay” and equated them to “capital improvement” in City of Sand Springs v. Department of Public Welfare, 1980 OK 36, 608 P.2d 1139.

¶ 27 The Public Employees case addressed the Department of Human Services’ authority to privatize one of its institutions for the mentally retarded and the Sand Springs case addressed that department’s authority to construct an institution for juvenile delinquents. Neither case made any attempt to define the term “capital project.” By way of obiter dicta, the Sand Springs case did equate “capital expenditure” with “capital outlay,” but did not equate either term with “capital improvement.” The dissent, in its strained effort to give meaning to the term “capital project,” overlooks the fact that none of the terms referred to in either case is used in the 2000 amendments to § 301.¹⁵

¶ 28 Relying heavily on Edwards v. Childers, 1924 OK 652, 102 Okla. 158, 228 P. 472, the dissent also complains that our reading of the purpose-of-borrowing requirement is overly restrictive and differs from the purpose requirement for legislative appropriations. We disagree. Edwards concerned the application of Okla. Const., art. 5, § 55, which requires an appropriation to “distinctly specify the sum appropriated and the object to which it is to be applied”.¹⁶ Ed-zvards unmistakably teaches that the Legislature must provide a “descriptive designation” for each appropriated sum in order to satisfy art. 5, § 55. Our opinion today requires no more of the Legislature when it authorizes the borrowing of money than Edwards requires of the Legislature when it appropriates money.¹⁷ Here, as in Edwards, the Legislature must provide descriptions of the projects for which the borrowed funds may be expended.

¶ 29 The Legislature has consistently provided descriptive designations of the projects to be funded in previous borrowing enactments, thereby recognizing the constitutional requirement to specify the purposes for which borrowed money will be expended.¹⁸ For instance, the Legislature recently an-thorized borrowing “to construct improvements and facilities upon property under the control of the Department of Corrections suitable for use as a district probation and parole office”.¹⁹ Heretofore, the Legislature has never just simply identified an agency to receive appropriated or borrowed moneys without providing a descriptive designation of the project to be funded.

¶ 30 The dissent correctly urges that the-purpose-of-borrowing provision must be harmonized with other constitutional provisions.²⁰ The power of the Legislature to authorize the issuance of state bonds is indeed subject to other restrictions in our state constitution. In addition to the purpose-of-borrowing requirement, the constitution also requires that no debts shall be contracted on behalf of the state unless submitted to a vote of the people. Okla. Const., art. 10, § 25.²¹ Like art. 10, § 16, art. 10, § 25 also requires that the work or object to be accomplished by the indebtedness be distinctly specified.

¶ 31 This Court has determined that the art. 10, § 25 requirement of an antecedent election does not apply where the bond or similar obligation does not constitute a debt of.the state payable out of state funds or property, such as a self-liquidating project.²² Because the specific projects to be funded by the proposed bonds have .not yet been determined and will be decided at a future date,²³ it is impossible from a reading of § 301 to determine whether the proposed bonds in question will fund self-liquidating projects not requiring a vote of the people.

¶ 32 If the election requirement in art. 10, § 25 is to have any meaning, then the specificity requirement in that section demands that a descriptive designation of the project be specified in the authorizing law. If we are to harmonize §§16 and 25 of art. 10, then the purpose-of-borrowing language in § 16 must require more than just the identity of the agency to receive the borrowed money.²⁴

VI. Allocation of Bond Proceeds to Higher Education

¶ 33 We recognize, as Cassidy pointed out, that appropriations for the institutions in the Oklahoma State System of Higher Education must be made in consolidated form without reference to any particular institution to be allocated by the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education according to the needs and functions of each institution. Okla. Const., art. 13-A, § 3.²⁵ Even if the allocation of some $30 million bond proceeds to the Oklahoma State Regents in § 301(A)(16)(m) satisfies the purpose-in-borrowing requirement in light of Article 13-A of the state constitution, that allocation cannot be saved.

¶ 34 The Legislature did not expressly provide for the severability of the 2000 amendments to § 301.²⁶ In the absence of a severability clause, the offending portion of a statute may be severed from the non-offending portion, if it appears that 1) the Legislature would have enacted the statute without the offending portion and 2) the non-offending portion is capable of standing alone. Application of Oklahoma Department of Transportation, 2002 OK 74, ¶ 27, 64 P.3d 546, 553.

¶ 35 The Oklahoma State Regents aside, our decision today determines that the 2000 amendments to § 301 do not satisfy the constitutional requirements for borrowing with respect to twenty-six of the identified twenty-seven state agencies. After severing the allocations to twenty-six of the identified twenty-seven state agencies, only saving that to the Oklahoma State Regents, not enough remains in the statute to carry out the legislative intent. Stated in another way, the unconstitutional portion of the 2000 amendments to § 301 are such a significant portion of the whole as to make it impossible to give effect to the legislative authorization for the borrowing by saving only the allocation to the Oklahoma State Regents. Accordingly, the allocation of bond proceeds to the Oklahoma State Regents in subparagraph (m) cannot stand alone in § 301(A)(16).

VII. Conclusion

V 36 The purpose-of-borrowing requirement in the Oklahoma Constitution, art. 10, § 16 requires that a statute authorizing the borrowing of money must include a descriptive designation of the projects to be accomplished with the borrowed money. We determine that the 2000 amendments to § 301 authorize the borrowing of money without specifying the purposes for which the bond proceeds may be used. We conclude that the 2000 amendments to § 301 do not satisfy the purpose-of-borrowing requirement of Okla. Const., art. 10, § 16.²⁷ We hold that the proposed bonds are not properly authorized in 73 O.S.2001, § 301.

APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF NOT TO EXCEED $155 MILLION OKLAHOMA CAPITOL IMPROVEMENT AUTHORITY STATE FACILITIES REVENUE BONDS, SERIES 2002C AND $20 MILLION, SERIES 2002D (TAXABLE) DENIED.

WATT, C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, and WINCHESTER, JJ., concur.

1 . 2000 Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 376, § 1.

2 . This proceeding is authorized in 73 O.S.2001, § 160.

3 . Article 10, § 16 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides: "All laws authorizing the borrowing of money by and on behalf of the State, county, or other political subdivision of the State, shall specify the purpose for which the money is to be used, and the money so borrowed shall be used for no other purpose."

4 .OCIA asserted that, as in Fent, the proposed bonds are self-liquidating; they will not be backed by the full faith and credit of the state; they will not create a legal obligation beyond the current appropriation; they create only appropriation-risk or moral obligations which are not legally enforceable except to the extent each legislature actually appropriates funds for their retirement.

5 .Protestants raised numerous other challenges. These include: 1) Cassidy's challenge to the agreement between the Legislators and the Governor on various other constitutional grounds, including Okla. Const., art. 10, § 14, which requires that taxes shall be levied and collected for public purposes, art. 10, § 15, which prohibits the use of the credit of the state for the benefit of individuals and cities, and art. 10, § 19, which requires that every measure levying a tax must specify the purpose of the tax; 2) Cassidy's challenge to the bond-approval process, asserting that OCIA approved only the five million dollar bond issue for the Capitol Dome project and that the Legislative Bond Oversight Commission coerced OCIA to seek approval of the $155,000,000 bond issue for "520 projects that were to be constructed on County, City, or Non Profit Corporation land"; 3) Fent’s challenge to the constitutionality of the bond-approval process, attacking the Legislative Bond Oversight Commission and the Council of Bond Oversight as violative of the separation of powers doctrine and the dual office holding prohibition; 4) Fent’s challenge to the bond obligation, arguing that payment of the bonds from future general appropriations violates Okla. Const., art. 10, §§ 23 and 25; and, 5) Kessler's objection to the proposed bonds under the Okla. Const., art. 10, § 25, which requires that the bond proposal specify the work to be funded and the tax to repay it and that it be approved by the electorate.

6 . The OCIA is created in 73 O.S.2001, §§ 151 el seq.

7 . 12 O.S.2001, § 1652 and Ethics Commission v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, ¶ 10, 850 P.2d 1069, 1074 (When the courts are asked to declare a statute unconstitutional, the Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma shall be served and is entitled to appear as the Chief Law Enforcer on behalf of the Legislature and the Governor.).

8 . City of Sallisaw v. Nesbitt, 1963 OK 59, 380 P.2d 954, approved proposed bonds where the authorizing municipal ordinance was challenged for failure to specify that the bond proceeds would be supplemented with federal grant money and in the supplemental opinion on petition for rehearing, distinguished Borin v. City of Erick on the facts, at ¶ 4, 956-57.

9 . A municipality can do only those things which are expressly authorized by the state constitution and statutes. On the other hand, the sovereign’s inherent legislative power is without restriction except those limitations expressly provided in the constitution. Graham v. Childers, 1925 OK 888, ¶ 11, 114 Okla. 38, 241 P. 178, 180.

10 . The text of the 2000 amendments is set out in full in the appendix to this opinion.

11 . When the validity of a state statute is drawn into question, the court approaches the subject with the greatest caution. The Legislature is presumed to have carefully observed the requirements of the constitution in enacting the statute. We indulge evety presumption in favor of the validity of a statute and the presumption of validity is overcome only where a constitutional violation is clear. Any doubt as to the validity of a statute will be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the legislation. If the statute is susceptible to a meaning that will remove the objections to its validity, such interpretation must be adopted. Way v. Grand Lake Ass'n, Inc., 1981 OK 70, ¶ 39, 635 P.2d 1010, 1016.

12 . Concerning the constitutional doctrine of non-delegation, Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep, 1982 OK 106, ¶ 16, 652 P.2d 271, 277, footnote 23, explained that "(w)hen the legislature sets the parameters of its policy and then delegates to some agency the task of implementing that policy under articulated safeguards, there is no violation of the doctrine.”

13 . 12A CJ.S. Capital, p. 913. On the other hand, the word "project” when used in reference to public or government works has a generally recognized meaning of a planned undertaking or definitely formulated proposal. 73 C.J.S. Project, p. 149.

14 . 12A CJ.S. Capital p. 913, see also 68 O.S. 2001, § 1203.

15 . The dissent also urges that we link "capital project” with "capital expenditure” as that term is used in the public finance statutes. The public finance statutes do utilize terms such as "capital project,” "capital outlay,” "capital expenditure,” "capital facilities,"and "capital improvement.” See, State Capital Improvement Act, 62 O.S. 2001, §§ 900 et seq. creating the Long-Range Capital Planning Commission and 73 O.S.2001, § 310 recreating the State Facility Capital Needs Committee. See also, 62 O.S.2001, § 41.9 requiring agencies to identify those items that are for "capital purposes” in keeping with the “definition of capital projects promulgated by the Long-Range Capital Planning Commission” and to malte requests for "capital appropriations” for "capital projects” that have been submitted to the Long-Range Capital Planning Commission. However, those statutes do not provide a certain meaning or definition to the term. "capital projects” but leave the definition to the Long-Range Capital Planning Commission. That Commission has defined "capital items” and "capital facilities” but it has not defined "capital projects.” Oklahoma Administrative Code, 428:10-1-3. In the Oklahoma Program Performance Budgeting and Accountability Act, 62 O.S.2001, §§ 45.1 et seq, the Legislature defined "capital improve-menfi'to mean any building or infrastructure project that will be 1) owned by the state, 2) built with direct appropriations or state-issued bond proceeds, 3) cost at least $25,000 and 4) have a life of at least five years, but § 301 does not refer to "capital improvements.”

16 . In Edwards v. Childers, supra., the court addressed whether statutes creating a special fund in the State Treasury, the State Highway Construction and Maintenance Fund, and dedicating gasoline excise tax revenues to the Fund constitute a valid appropriation. In resolving the issue, Edwards had to decide whether the statute "distinctly specified” the sum appropriated and the object to which it was to be used as required by art. 5, § 55.

As to the object or purpose of every appropriation, Edwards said that the general object for which moneys are to be expended must be designated. The earmarking statute considered in Edwards provided that the funds were to be expended on the construction of a primary system of highways and repair and maintenance of state highways. Edwards determined that this descriptive designation of the object or purpose for which the funds could be used satisfied the purpose requirement in art. 5, § 55. Edwards, 228 P. atp. 476.

17 . The dissent takes the position that we are requiring detailed statements of costs, item by item, of each project. That is simply incorrect. We do not read Okla. Const., art. 10, § 16 to require the Legislature to provide a detailed itemization of every minute cost in order to satisfy the purpose-of-borrowing requirement. Article 10, § 16 does, however, require more than the name of a state agency authorized to spend the money. As in Edwards, the intended use must be described.

18 . In its enactments before the 2000 amendments to § 301, the Legislature provided descriptive designations, in general rather than in minute detail, of the purposes to which borrowed money would be expended. In some sixteen measures authorizing the borrowing of a total of more than $265 million dollars, without a vote of the people, codified in Title 73, the Legislature described the purposes of the borrowings in general terms such as "to erect, operate and maintain a building or buildings for the use of the State Department of Public Safety, the place of erection to be upon the state-owned land at Northeast 36th Street and Eastern Avenue in Oklahoma City” in 1965 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 528, § 1, 73 O.S.2001, § 153-A; "to plan, acquire land for and erect, operate and maintain buildings for the use of the following state agencies” in 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 330, § 1, 73 O.S.2001, § 168; "to acquire for and to erect, operate and maintain a building or buildings for the use of the Department of Human Services for the operation of a rehabilitation facility ... in Okmulgee County” in 1985 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 312, § 49, 73 O.S.2001, § 168.2; and, "for the funding, construction and maintenance of a building or buildings for use by the Board of Trustees of the Oklahoma School of Science and Mathematics” in 1991 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 270, § 37, 73 O.S.2001, § 168.4. Other such statutes authorizing the borrowing of money that contain descriptions of the purpose in similar language include: 1994 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 277, § 16, 73 O.S.2001, § 177; 1996 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 294, § 1, 73 O.S.2001, § 168.5; 1997 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 329, § 7, 73 O.S.2001, § 168.6; 1999 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 277, § 1, 73 O.S.2001, § 168.7; 2000 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 136, § 16, 73 O.S.2001, § 184.

19 . 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 102, § 1, 73 O.S. 2001, § 185.

20 . Generally, constitutional provisions are construed as a consistent whole. Cowart v. Piper, 1983 OK 66, ¶ 4, 665 P.2d 315, 317.

21 . Okla. Const., art. 10, § 25 provides that no debts shall be hereafter contracted by or on behalf of this State, unless such debt shall be authorized by law for some work or object, to be distinctly specified therein and further provides that such law shall have no effect unless it receives a majority vote at a general election.

22 . This Court has approved bonds that provide funds — absent a general election — for acquisition or construction of self-liquidating projects. Application of Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 1945 OK 224, 195 Okla. 641, 161 P.2d 447, and Application of Board of Regents for Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges, 1946 OK 110, 196 Okla. 622, 167 P.2d 883 (bonds to be repaid from dormitory rents and fees paid by students); and, Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 1950 OK 208, 203 Okla. 335, 221 P.2d 795 (bonds to be repaid from tolls and fees paid by highway users). This kind of obligation does not create a debt because the bonds are repaid solely from revenue generated from the project itself.

23 . The dissent envisions that each state agency will decide how to expend its allocation of borrowed money, except the Governor will make the decision for the $51 million allocated to the Department of Central Services. The Bond Ad-visor, however, advised us that his office and the office of the Attorney General will make the decisions. Both the dissent and the Bond Advis- or seem to agree that the projects have not yet been determined, although it is not clear who would ultimately make those decisions.

24 . The Oklahoma Constitution does not place the expenditure of public funds absolutely in the Oklahoma Legislature. The Oklahoma citizenry reserved to itself legislative power over all rightful subjects in art. 5, §§ 1 and 2. The obvious goal of the purpose-of-borrowing requirement in art. 10, § '16 is to protect the Oklahoma citizenry from the Legislature's abuse of the state's credit and the consequent oppression of burdensome taxation. The Oklahoma Legislature must specify the purpose of the borrowing, i.e., describe the designated project or object to be accomplished with the borrowed money, otherwise the exercise by the Oklahoma citizenry of its reserved legislative power is stifled.

Application of the language in art. 10, § 16 that “laws authorizing the borrowing of money ... shall specify the purpose for which the money is to be used” so as to require a general description of the purpose is consistent with our application of the similar purpose requirements placed upon the raising, borrowing and spending of public money. See, Edwards v. Childers, supra., applying purpose requirement in Olda. Const., art. 5, § 55 that an "appropriation by law ... shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated and the object to which it is to be applied” and City of Oklahoma City v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1990 OK 27, 789 P.2d 1287 applying purpose requirement in art. 10, § 19 that an "act ... levying a tax shall specify distinctly the purpose for which said tax is levied”.

25 . This constitutional provision refers to appropriations by the legislature, it does not address the allocation of borrowed money.

26 . 2000 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch.376, consists of two sections, § 1 amends 73 O.S.Supp.1999, § 301, and § 2 provides an effective date of September 1, 2000.

27 . Because we determine that 73 O.S.2001, § 301 does not satisfy the purpose-of-borrowing requirement in Okla. Const., art. 10, § 16, we do not address the other constitutional challenges asserted by the protestants.

1 . Judicially using the same standard for defining "purpose” and "object" serves an important public policy when, for example, a capital project is funded from both appropriations and a separate bond issue, and each are thus able to constitutionally use the same language for stating the same object or purpose. See, e.g., Edwards v. Childers, 1924 OK 652, 228 P. 472, (recognizing that construction of highways may include both appropriated money and funds from other sources, including bonds).