Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Case No. 24CA1065
Attorney for Petitioner: Henry L. Solano
Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent:
KHM
Attorneys at Law
Alexander Masterson
Colorado Springs, Colorado
Law
Office of Joel M. Pratt
Joel
M. Pratt
Colorado Springs, Colorado
2
JUSTICE SAMOUR delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE MARQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, and
JUSTICE BLANCO joined. JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by
JUSTICE GABRIEL, concurred in the judgment.
OPINION
3
SAMOUR, JUSTICE.
¶1
Not all adjustments to parenting time rights are cut from the
same cloth -some modify those rights while others restrict
them. Colorado law distinguishes between modifications and
restrictions, and this case requires us to explore where the
difference lies.
¶2
The statute before us permits courts to "modify"
parenting time rights-including by reducing the quantity of
parenting time -if such modification is in "the best
interests of the child." § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I),
C.R.S. (2025). But there is a wrinkle: Courts may not
"restrict" parenting time rights unless they find
"that the parenting time would endanger the child's
physical health or significantly impair the child's
emotional development." § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I). Thus,
in the realm of parenting time rights, the legislature
separated modification from restriction,
assigning one standard to guide the former and another to
steer the latter-leaving no room for the two categories to
merge.[1]
¶3
Nicholas Jay Dale ("Father") nevertheless argues
that an order modifying parenting time rights by
substantially reducing the quantity of parenting
time drifts into the restriction zone and therefore
triggers the heightened endanger/impair
4
standard. But Father's contention runs headlong into a
fundamental barrier - the familiar principles of statutory
construction.
¶4
Those principles carry the day here. We conclude that a
purely quantitative reduction in parenting time
-i.e., a reduction unaccompanied by qualitative
constraints on the manner, location, or environment in which
a parent exercises parenting time-cannot amount to a
restriction of parenting time rights unless the reduction
eliminates parenting time altogether.[2] We further conclude that a
restriction of parenting time rights refers to the complete
elimination of any quantity of parenting time (i.e.,
zero parenting time) or to qualitative constraints
on the manner, location, or environment in which a parent
exercises parenting time.
¶5
This is not to say that placing any qualitative term or
condition on parenting time-including a minor
one-constitutes a restriction. To be clear, to constitute a
restriction, a qualitative adjustment must amount to a
qualitative constraint - an adjustment that
circumscribes the manner, location, or environment in which a
parent exercises parenting time, including, for example,
requiring that parenting
5
time be supervised, prohibiting overnight visits, or
specifying the location where parenting time may take place.
¶6
Thus, a restriction is either a quantitative reduction to
zero parenting time or the imposition of qualitative
constraints on parenting time; any other adjustment is merely
a modification. This reading of modification and
restriction exposes one of the insurmountable flaws
in Father's approach. Were we to agree with Father -and
accept that any substantial reduction in the quantity of
parenting time constitutes a restriction rather than a
modification -we would be required to find that the
legislature meant to allow courts to award some parenting
time free from any qualitative constraints, even after a
factual finding that such parenting time would endanger the
child's physical health or significantly impair the
child's emotional development. That would be absurd, and
we must sidestep interpretations that would lead a statutory
provision into absurdity. When a court makes a finding of
endangerment or impairment, there is no scenario in which
even a single day of parenting time free from qualitative
constraints is appropriate.
¶7
In this case, the district court reduced the quantity of
Father's parenting time by forty-five days, or 28.1%,
which we assume without deciding constituted a substantial
reduction. But because the court did not eliminate or
otherwise qualitatively constrain Father's parenting
time, it did not restrict it; instead, it
6
merely modified it. Accordingly, the court did not err in
applying the best-interests standard rather than the
endanger/impair standard.
¶8
A division of the court of appeals navigated to the same
pier. Accordingly, we affirm its judgment and remand the case
with instructions to return it to the district court.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶9
Father and Nicole Jehlicka Dale ("Mother") executed
a memorandum of understanding allocating parental
responsibilities for their young child. The district court
approved the memorandum and incorporated it into the decree
invalidating the parties' marriage. The decree allocated
parenting time to Mother during 205 overnights of the year
and to Father during the remaining 160 overnights of the
year. Thus, the decree designated Mother as the primary
residential parent.
¶10
Less than eighteen months later, Father's work
responsibilities changed, requiring him to stay overnight
more than 100 miles away from the child's primary
residence several days a week. To accommodate his new
schedule, Father filed a motion to modify parenting time: He
sought parenting time from Friday to Monday during the first
three weekends of every month plus an increase in his summer
parenting time. Father's proposed modification netted the
same number of overnights he already had with the child per
year (i.e., 160).
7
¶11
Mother objected to any modification. In the alternative, she
suggested adjustments to Father's parenting time during
the school year: every other weekend and a midweek overnight
every week.
¶12
At the end of a hearing, the district court made oral
findings applying the best-interests standard. The court
agreed with Father that a modification in parenting time was
necessary. It observed, however, that Father's distance
from the child during part of the workweek made its decision
challenging.
¶13
In a written order issued after the hearing, the court
changed Father's parenting time to the following: during
the school year, from Friday to Monday on alternating
weekends, from Friday to Monday on the fifth weekend of any
month with five weekends, and for the entire week of spring
break; and during the summer, on alternating weeks. The court
kept Father's holiday parenting time intact. Father's
new parenting time schedule totaled approximately 115
overnights with the child per year -about forty-five fewer
than the 160 originally allocated to him, a reduction of
28.1%.[3]
8
¶14
Father appealed, contending that such a substantial reduction
in the quantity of his parenting time constituted a
restriction and required a more exacting showing: a factual
finding that parenting time would endanger the child's
physical health or significantly impair the child's
emotional development. Because the district court had applied
the less rigorous best-interests standard instead, Father
urged that the judgment be reversed.
¶15
A division of the court of appeals affirmed in a published,
unanimous opinion. In re Marriage of Dale, 2025 COA
29, ¶ 36, 568 P.3d 1282, 1289. The division rejected
Father's position for several reasons.
¶16
First, the division determined that defining
"restrict" in section 14-10-129 to include
substantial reductions in the quantity of parenting time
would leave part of subsection (2) in the same statute with
little work to do, effectively turning it into a dead letter.
Id. at ¶ 20, 568 P.3d at 1287. As relevant
here, section 14-10-129(2) states that a court may not modify
an order granting parenting time rights in a way that both
"substantially changes the parenting time" and
"changes the [parent] with whom the child resides a
majority of the time" unless it makes one of four
possible findings, including one requiring satisfaction of
the endanger/impair standard governing restrictions of
parenting time rights.
9
§ 14-10-129(2)(d). The division reasoned there would be
no need to include this possible finding in subsection (2) if
the endanger/impair standard already applies whenever there
is a substantial reduction in the quantity of parenting time.
Dale, ¶ 21, 568 P.3d at 1287. Differently put,
the division perceived that applying the endanger/impair
standard as Father suggested would turn part of subsection
(2) into surplusage - a statutory decoration.
¶17
Second, the division explained that treating some reductions
in the quantity of parenting time as restrictions would leave
courts without a yardstick to determine when a reduction
becomes substantial enough to trigger the more rigorous
endanger/impair standard. Id. at ¶ 22, 568 P.3d
at 1287. The division noted that section 14-10-129 is mum on
this point. Id.
¶18
Third, the division observed that most states draw the
restriction line at denying parenting time altogether or
allowing only supervised parenting time. Id. at
¶ 26, 568 P.3d at 1288. In this regard, the division
underscored our legislature's directive to construe
section 14-10-129 with an eye toward staying in step with
other states that have also enacted the Uniform Dissolution
of Marriage Act. Id. at ¶ 23, 568 P.3d at
1287-88.
¶19
Lastly, the division discerned that when, as here, life
happens and family realities shift, a child's best
interests may call for a recalibration of the quantity of
parenting time, and the division saw no indication that the
legislature intended to
10
freeze a court's discretion by prohibiting a substantial
quantitative reduction in parenting time without satisfying
the endanger/impair standard. Id. at ¶¶
29-31, 568 P.3d at 1288-89.
¶20
The division ultimately concluded that a quantitative
reduction in parenting time is not a restriction on parenting
time rights. Id. at ¶ 32, 568 P.3d at 1289.
Instead, explained the division, a restriction on parenting
time rights concerns qualitative constraints on parenting
time - adjustments that circumscribe "the manner,
location, or environment in which the parent engages in
parenting time, such as a requirement that parenting time be
supervised, a prohibition of overnight visits with a
particular parent, or a limitation on the location where a
parent may exercise parenting time." Id.
¶21
The division acknowledged that another division, in In re
Marriage of West, 94 P.3d 1248, 1251 (Colo.App. 2004),
had earlier implied in dicta that a quantitative reduction-if
sufficiently substantial-could amount to a restriction and
thus implicate the endanger/impair standard. Dale,
¶ 19, 568 P.3d at 1287. To the extent West
could be read to suggest as much, the division in this case
plotted a different course. Id. at ¶ 32, 568
P.3d at 1289.
11
¶22
Father's petition for certiorari flagged this question
for our attention, and we responded by placing the case on
our docket.[4]
II.
Analysis
¶23
We embark on our analytical voyage by identifying the
standard of review and revisiting familiar principles of
statutory interpretation. From there, we sail to section
14-10-129, whose relevant provisions -properly construed -
compel us to reject Father's interpretation. We determine
that a quantitative reduction in parenting time-however
substantial-remains a modification and cannot be recast as a
restriction. In so doing, we reason that our General Assembly
carved two distinct channels-modifications governed by the
best-interests standard, and restrictions governed by the
more demanding endanger/impair standard -and just as two
channels cannot merge without losing their boundaries,
quantitative reductions cannot flow into the territory
reserved for restrictions. Accordingly, we ultimately hold
that a restriction arises only when a court either zeros out
12
parenting time altogether or places qualitative constraints
on how parenting time is exercised - constraints on the
manner, location, or environment of parenting time, such as
supervision requirements, prohibitions on overnight visits,
or limits on where parenting time may occur.
¶24
Applying this holding here, we conclude that, since the
district court neither eliminated nor qualitatively
constrained Father's parenting time, it did not restrict
his parenting time-it simply modified it. Therefore, the
district court properly applied the best-interests standard
rather than the endanger/impair standard. And because the
division sailed to the same harbor, we affirm.
A.
Standard of Review and Familiar Principles of Statutory
Interpretation
¶25
At bottom, this case rises or falls on our interpretation of
section 14-10-129. Statutory interpretation presents a
question of law that is subject to de novo review. In re
Marriage of Wollert &Joseph, 2020 CO 47, ¶ 20,
464 P.3d 703, 709.
¶26
When construing a statute, we strive to effectuate the
legislature's intent. Id. To discern that
intent, we examine "the entire statutory scheme,"
giving "consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to
all parts" and attributing the words and phrases
"their plain and ordinary meaning." Vallagio at
Inverness Residential Condo. Ass'n v. Metro. Homes,
Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶ 16, 395 P.3d 788, 792 (quoting
Pulte Home Corp. v. Countryside Cmty. Ass'n,
2016 CO 64, ¶ 24, 382 P.3d 821, 826). If a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the cardinal rule regarding plain and
ordinary
13
meaning is our first and final step -there is no need to
resort to additional interpretive instruments in the toolkit.
Wollert, ¶ 20, 464 P.3d at 709; see also
Carrera v. People, 2019 CO 83, ¶ 18, 449 P.3d 725,
729 (explaining that when we are able to give statutory
language its plain and ordinary meaning, we "look no
further" because "nothing more is required of the
judicial inquiry").
¶27
Still, there are companion principles in the
statutory-construction atlas that ferry alongside the rule of
plain and ordinary meaning. A couple of those are relevant
here. First, we will not adopt an interpretation that renders
any portion of a statute superfluous or meaningless.
Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 162 (Colo. 2005).
And second, we will not construe a statute in a manner that
yields absurd results. In re Marriage of Roosa, 89
P.3d 524, 528 (Colo.App. 2004) ("We presume that the
legislature intends a just and reasonable result when it
enacts a statute ....").
B.
Our Interpretation of the Relevant Provisions of Section
14-10-129 Requires Us to Reject Father's
Interpretation
¶28
Section 14-10-129(1)(a)(I) ("subsection (1)(a)(I)")
states that, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
subsection (1)(b)(I) . . ., the court may . . . modify an
order granting or denying parenting time rights whenever such
. . . modification would serve the best interests of the
child." In turn, section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I)
("subsection (1)(b)(I)") provides that "[t]he
court shall not restrict a parent's parenting time
14
rights unless it finds that the parenting time would endanger
the child's physical health or significantly impair the
child's emotional development."
¶29
Father maintains that a modification that substantially
reduces the quantity of parenting time spills over into
territory reserved for restrictions, thereby triggering the
stricter of the two standards - the endanger/impair standard.
In other words, Father posits that, in the quantitative
dimension of parenting time, there is no such thing as a
substantial modification because every substantial
modification crystalizes into a restriction. According to
Father, trial courts have two courses to choose from when
altering the quantity of parenting time: an insubstantial
reduction, which would count as a modification; or a
substantial reduction, which would count as a restriction.
Not so. As we demonstrate, Father's argument cannot
remain afloat.
¶30
Neither "modify" nor "restrict" is
defined in section 14-10-129, and consulting their dictionary
definitions doesn't move the needle. But that doesn't
leave us at a loss. We are able to discern the
legislature's intent by looking at the statutory scheme
as a whole and applying three interpretative commandments
that operate in tandem-thou shalt give effect to the plain
and ordinary meaning of words, thou shalt not render any term
superfluous, and thou shalt avoid absurd results.
15
¶31
Subsection (1)(a)(I) authorizes the court to modify
parenting time rights when doing so is in the child's
best interests, and subsection (1)(b)(I) empowers the court
to restrict those rights only upon finding that
parenting time would physically endanger the child or
emotionally impair the child's development. Giving the
words in these subsections their plain and ordinary meaning,
it becomes clear that the legislature laid out two different
pathways - modification and restriction -the former governed
by the best-interests standard and the latter governed by the
endanger/impair standard. A trial court must therefore choose
which pathway to take; it may not travel both at once.
¶32
Importantly, the statutory text telegraphs the
legislature's intent to permit substantial
modifications of parenting time, which necessarily
include substantial reductions in the quantity of parenting
time. Section 14-10-129(1.5) expressly refers to a
party's filing of "a motion for a substantial
modification of parenting time which also changes the
party with whom the child resides a majority of the
time." (Emphasis added.) Likewise, section 14-10-129(2)
("subsection (2)") prohibits the court from
modifying parenting time in a way that
"substantially changes the parenting time as
well as changes the party with whom the child resides a
majority of the time" unless the court makes one of four
possible findings. (Emphasis added.) These provisions show
that the legislature not only contemplated substantial
modifications but expressly labeled them as such. Father
is therefore
16
wrong in suggesting that substantial modifications to the
quantity of parenting time stand erased by virtue of
supposedly coalescing into restrictions. If the legislature
had meant to collapse all substantial reductions in the
quantity of parenting time from the domain of modifications
to that of restrictions, as Father urges, it would have
drafted the statute accordingly. It did not.
¶33
Moreover, had the legislature intended a substantial
reduction in parenting time to automatically harden from a
modification into a restriction, it presumably would have
provided a clear benchmark indicating where that shift
occurs. In the absence of such direction, Father's
construction would force courts to traverse in the dark,
guessing how substantial a reduction must be before it
crosses the unseen line into a restriction. Relatedly, how
would the substantial nature of a reduction be measured - by
the number of overnights lost, the percentage of the
reduction, or some other metric? Again, courts would be left
to fill the statutory gaps themselves. In any event, this
loosey-goosey approach would all but guarantee a patchwork of
outcomes among different judges, undermining the uniformity
the law generally strives to achieve.
¶34
The statutory architecture reveals yet another defect in
Father's interpretation. As the division observed,
Father's reading hollows out part of the language in
subsection (2). One of the four findings that can justify the
type of substantial modification set out in subsection (2) is
that "[t]he child's present
17
environment endangers the child's physical health or
significantly impairs the child's emotional development
and the harm likely to be caused" by the change is
outweighed by its benefits. § 14-10-129(2)(d). But if,
as Father suggests, the endanger/impair standard already
governs any substantial modification, what role is
the reference to that standard in subsection (2)(d) left to
play? None. Father's construction would drain that
language in subsection (2)(d) of operative force, leaving it
as an ornament on the statutory tree rather than a branch
carrying weight. We, however, may not adopt an interpretation
that strips any statutory words of meaning or leaves them
without a purpose to serve. See Spahmer, 113 P.3d at
162.
¶35
Perhaps most concerning, Father's interpretation would
steer the statute into truly absurd waters. And, as we
observed earlier, we may not embrace an interpretation of a
statutory provision that produces outcomes no rational
legislature could have intended. See Roosa, 89 P.3d
at 528.
¶36
Father theorizes that the district court could have charted
the very course it did - reducing his parenting time by about
forty-five overnights - so long as it had first found that
the endanger/impair standard was satisfied. In other words,
he asserts that the court could have substantially reduced
the quantity of his parenting time by treating his request to
modify as a request to restrict. But this would mean the
court could have awarded Father parenting time free of
any
18
qualitative constraints even after finding that such
parenting time would physically endanger the child or
emotionally impair the child's development. That is a
bridge too far. When a court finds that parenting time would
physically endanger the child or seriously stunt the
child's emotional development, no amount of parenting
time unburdened by qualitative constraints is appropriate -
not even a single day. And no sensible legislature could have
intended otherwise.
¶37
Notably, subsection 14-10-129(4) gives us a peek into the
legislature's concern with allowing parenting time
without qualitative constraints when the child's physical
or emotional well-being is at risk. Under that subsection,
even when a party moves to restrict by merely alleging that
the child faces "imminent physical or emotional
danger" from the parenting time at issue, the court must
order that, pending resolution of the motion, the parenting
time must be "supervised by an unrelated third party
deemed suitable by the court or by a licensed mental health
professional." § 14-10-129(4). Although the
imminent nature of the danger addressed in this subsection is
not present in the endanger/impair standard at play here, the
subsection still underscores a key legislative judgment:
parenting time that threatens to harm a child should not
proceed unchecked - i.e., without qualitative constraints.
And Father's reading of section 14-10-129 cannot be
reconciled with that judgment.
19
C.
The Framework That Emerges - and How It Resolves This
Case
¶38
Informed by the rule of plain and ordinary meaning and its
kindred principles of statutory construction, we conclude
that even a dramatic reduction in the quantity of parenting
time cannot prompt a modification to metamorphose into a
restriction. The General Assembly charted two distinct
navigational routes within the statutory scheme of parenting
time rights: modifications, governed by the best-interests
standard; and restrictions, governed by the endanger/impair
standard. And the two routes are designed to remain separate
at all times. Thus, contrary to Father's contention, a
quantitative reduction in parenting time - regardless of how
substantial -cannot be carried across the line into the
category the legislature marked as a restriction.
¶39
We now hold that a restriction materializes only when a court
either brings parenting time to a full stop or installs
qualitative constraints on the manner, location, or
environment of parenting time, including requiring supervised
parenting time, bans on overnight visits, or limits on where
parenting time may occur.[5] It scarcely bears stating -let alone
substantiating with legal
20
authority - that depriving a parent of all parenting time is
a restriction on parenting time rights.[6] And,
unsurprisingly, there is no dispute in this case -and courts
in other states have likewise recognized - that placing
qualitative constraints on the manner, location, or
environment in which parenting time occurs is also a
restriction.[7]
¶40
It follows that changes in parenting time constitute
modifications, not restrictions, so long as they do not
eradicate parenting time or otherwise impose qualitative
constraints on parenting time. For example, had the district
court adopted Father's suggestion, which would have
netted him the same number of overnights per year he was
already entitled to with the child, it still would have
modified rather than restricted his parenting time rights.
Similarly, had the court simply changed the location of the
parenting time exchange from one parent's house to the
other -a qualitative term or condition-it would have
modified, rather than restricted, the parents' parenting
time rights, because such an
21
adjustment would not have added qualitative constraints on
parenting time. On the other hand, if the court had required
Father to exercise parenting time only in a public space or
only in a therapeutic setting, that would have imposed a
qualitative constraint on his parenting time.[8]
¶41
We understand that the division in West came to rest
in an entirely different port. There, the division held that
whether to apply the best-interests standard or the
endanger/impair standard "may involve inquiry into both
the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of the proposed
change to parenting time, as well as the reason or reasons
advanced for the change." 94 P.3d at 1251. Because the
record did not reflect either a qualitative constraint on
parenting time or a reason for the change that implicated the
children's safety, that division confined its analysis to
"which standard applies to a purely quantitative change,
and one of relatively limited magnitude." Id.
The West division determined that the reduction in
parenting time from eight to six weeks did not constitute a
restriction and thus did not implicate the endanger/impair
standard. Id. As the division in this case noted, a
reasonable inference can be drawn that the division in
West was
22
of the view that a quantitative reduction in parenting time
could amount to a restriction. Dale, ¶¶
17-18, 568 P.3d at 1286-87 (citing West, 94 P.3d at
1251).
¶42
Father encourages us to follow in West's
footsteps. We, of course, are not bound by West. We
would be remiss, however, if we failed to note that the
division's analysis in that case suffers from the same
shortcomings as Father's contentions here.[9] For the same
reasons we have already rejected Father's position, we
now decline to adopt West's rationale.
Accordingly, to the extent West is inconsistent with
today's decision, it is overruled.
¶43
Here, the district court reduced the quantity of Father's
parenting time from 160 nights to approximately 115 nights.
Because the court neither extinguished the quantity of
parenting time nor placed qualitative constraints on the
exercise of parenting time, it did not restrict Father's
parenting time rights.[10] And because
23
the court simply modified Father's parenting time rights,
it correctly applied the best-interests standard rather than
the endanger/impair standard.
¶44
The division reached the same determination. We therefore
leave its judgment undisturbed.
III.
Conclusion
¶45
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the division's
judgment. We remand the case to the division with
instructions to return it to the district court.
¶46
To the extent anyone reading this opinion offers an
apocalyptic forecast, we note that the division's
decision, which we affirm, has been on the books for over a
year, and the sky has yet to fall. We are unmoved by
prognostications of dire consequences and see no basis to
expect havoc. We have full confidence in our trial court
judges; we have no doubt that they are capable of applying
the framework we endorse today in a balanced, common-sense
manner that ensures both consistency and fairness.
JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by JUSTICE
GABRIEL, concurred in the judgment.
24
JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER, joined by JUSTICE GABRIEL, concurring
in the judgment.
¶47
Today, the majority announces a rule that is as consequential
as it is absurd: A purely quantitative reduction in parenting
time, "however substantial," can
never constitute a restriction on parenting time
under section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2025)
("subsection (1)(b)(I)"). Maj. op. ¶ 23
(emphasis added). The majority then "clarifies"
that under its rule, if a mother's or father's
parenting time is reduced, for instance, from 270 overnights
each year to zero overnights, that is a restriction. See
id. But if a parent's overnights are reduced from
270 to one overnight, it is a modification, not a
restriction. See id. The majority never really
engages with the obvious question of why a 99.6% reduction in
parenting time would not amount to a restriction. On the face
of it, the majority's math isn't mathing. More
problematically, by declaring that the best interests of the
child standard applies to all quantitative constraints on
parenting time, however substantial, id., the
majority lowers the bar needed to restrict parenting time
under subsection (1)(b)(I).
¶48
Its interpretation also fails to square with common sense and
the practical and complex realities of family relationships.
Who wouldn't describe a 99.6% reduction in parenting time
as a restriction?
25
¶49
The majority's interpretation of section
14-10-129(1)(a)(I) ("subsection (1)(a)(I)") and
subsection (1)(b)(I) is also contrary to the plain language
of these provisions and to the General Assembly's intent
in adopting the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act
("UDMA"), §§ 14-10-101 to -133, C.R.S.
(2025). I am additionally concerned that in attempting to
simplify what can be very challenging decisions for our
courts, the majority sows havoc in those same courts. Why?
Beyond failing to account for the complex dynamics in
domestic relations cases - particularly in fractious ones -
the majority doesn't consider or explain how its new rule
will work going forward in the real world. I see a lot of
problems on the horizon.
¶50
The majority's interpretation will wreak further havoc
because it necessarily suggests that if a party seeks to
impose a qualitative constraint in a motion to
modify, the district court must treat the motion as one
seeking to restrict parenting time, no matter how the motion
is denominated or the reason for it. To the extent the
majority means that trial courts may no longer impose
"qualitative constraint [ s ],"
unless they are "qualitative term [ s
] or condition [ s ]" when modifying
parenting time, Maj. op. ¶ 5 (emphases in original),
this simply trades one line-drawing problem (the numerical
cutoff between a modification and a restriction) for another
(the difference between a qualitative constraint, a
qualitative term, and a qualitative condition). This is
especially so because none
26
of these terms - qualitative constraint, qualitative term, or
qualitative condition -are mentioned, let alone defined, in
the UDMA. This just seems to compound the problem the
majority is trying to solve in the first place.
¶51
What's worse, the majority's approach represents a
deeply troubling sea change in the law. In so holding, it
takes a critical tool away from courts charged with crafting
parenting plans that are in children's best interests. I
can't imagine this is what the General Assembly had in
mind, and I don't see how this will make the difficult
decisions judges have to make regarding parenting time any
easier.
¶52
I would instead adopt the more nuanced test articulated in
In re Marriage of West, 94 P.3d 1248, 1251
(Colo.App. 2004). It provides, "determining whether to
apply the best interests standard or the endangerment
standard may involve inquiry into both the quantitative and
the qualitative aspects of the proposed change to parenting
time, as well as the reason or reasons advanced for the
change." Id. True, this test is not mechanical.
See id. Nor should it be. Instead, it aligns with
the plain meaning of the UDMA, which firmly put the focus on
children, and it recognizes the sometimes complex and
endlessly varied circumstances that judges face in making
parenting time decisions and in resolving parenting time
disputes. Because the factual circumstances underlying every
parenting time decision are unique and must be decided on a
case-by-case
27
basis, the reasons advanced by parties for changes to
parenting time -not math - should also guide the court's
analysis.
¶53
That said, here, petitioner Nicholas Jay Dale's
("Father's") change in employment required him
to work in-person four days a week more than 100 miles away
from the child's primary residence. Applying
West, I would conclude that the district court's
decision - which reduced Father's parenting time by
forty-five days and imposed no qualitative constraints-did
not amount to a restriction and thus did not require the
court to find endangerment under subsection (1)(b)(I).
¶54
Because I disagree with the majority's interpretation of
subsections (1)(a)(I) and (1)(b)(I) but agree that the
district court did not err in modifying the parties'
parenting time, I concur in the judgment only.
I.
Analysis
¶55
First, I address the standard of review and discuss the
principles of statutory interpretation before turning to
subsection (1)(b)(I). By drawing upon statutory context,
common dictionary definitions, and relevant case law, see
Roup v. Com. Rsch., LLC, 2015 CO 38, ¶ 14, 349 P.3d
273, 277, I conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of
the words "restriction" and "modify" may
involve an evaluation of quantitative time. Therefore,
determining whether to apply the best interests standard or
the endangerment standard under subsection (1)(b)(I) may
28
involve inquiry into both the quantitative and the
qualitative aspects of the proposed change to parenting time,
as well as the reason or reasons advanced for the change.
This test - and not the majority's rule - aligns with the
plain meaning of subsection (1)(b)(I), ensures that the
proper legal standard applies to restrictions (i.e., it
doesn't lower the bar), more closely aligns with the
General Assembly's legislative intent, does not create a
new line-drawing problem for the courts, and avoids absurd
results.
A.
Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory
Construction
¶56
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that this
court reviews de novo. Colo. Med. Bd. v. McLaughlin,
2019 CO 93, ¶ 22, 451 P.3d 841, 845. When interpreting a
statute, we seek to ascertain and effectuate the intent of
the General Assembly. Cowen v. People, 2018 CO 96,
¶ 12, 431 P.3d 215, 218. When a term remains statutorily
undefined, we assume the legislature "intended to give
the term its usual and ordinary meaning." Roup,
¶ 8, 349 P.3d at 276. We may consult a recognized
dictionary to further discern a term's plain meaning.
In re Marriage of Zander, 2021 CO 12, ¶ 13, 480
P.3d 676, 680.
¶57
In interpreting the plain meaning of statutory language, we
must also give consistent effect to all parts of the statute.
Cowen, ¶ 13, 431 P.3d at 218. This means the
various provisions of the UDMA must be construed together and
harmonized with its overall legislative design.
Zander, ¶ 14, 480 P.3d at 680. Because there is
a
29
presumption that the General Assembly intends a just and
reasonable result when enacting a statute, a statutory
construction that defeats the legislative intent or leads to
an absurd result will not be followed. Ingram v.
Cooper, 698 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Colo. 1985); §
2-4-201(1)(c), C.R.S. (2025). If the statutory language is
clear and unambiguous, the statute is applied as written.
Cowen, ¶ 12, 431 P.3d at 218.
B.
The Plain Meaning of "Restrict" and
"Modify"
¶58
As with any issue of statutory interpretation, the starting
point is the text itself. Subsection (1)(a)(I), which governs
a party's request to modify parenting time, provides in
part: "Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(1)(b)(I) of this section, the court may make or
modify an order granting or denying parenting time
rights whenever such order or modification would serve the
best interests of the child." § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I)
(emphasis added).
¶59
Subsection (1)(b)(I), which addresses a party's request
to restrict parenting time, states:
The court shall not restrict a parent's
parenting time rights unless it finds that the parenting time
would endanger the child's physical health or
significantly impair the child's emotional development.
In addition to a finding that parenting time would endanger
the child's physical health or significantly impair the
child's emotional development, in any order imposing or
continuing a parenting time restriction, the court shall
enumerate the specific factual findings supporting the
restriction.
§ 14-10-129(1)(b)(I) (emphasis added).
30
¶60
The legislature has not defined the term "modify,"
nor has it defined the term "restrict." So I first
turn to the dictionary to further discern the plain and
ordinary meaning of these terms. See Zander, ¶
13, 480 P.3d at 680. "Modify" can mean "to
make minor changes." Modify, Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, https:// www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/modify [https: //perma.cc/UB3P-2PMJ].
"Restrict" can mean limit.
See Restriction, Black's Law Dictionary (12th
ed. 2024). I agree with the majority that a parent's time
with their child may be changed or limited by either (1)
duration or (2) the manner, location, or environment in which
the parent may exercise parenting time, or both.
See Maj. op. ¶ 40. A common sense reading of
these statutes thus indicates that courts may evaluate the
quantitative and qualitative impact of a proposed change to
parenting time when determining whether to apply the best
interests of the child standard or the endangerment standard
to a requested change in parenting time.
¶61
By drawing from the statutory context and common dictionary
definitions, see Roup, ¶ 14, 349 P.3d at 277,
the plain and ordinary meaning of "restrict" and
"modify" can be resolved with reasonable certainty.
Simply put, a "restriction" under subsection
(1)(b)(I) allows consideration of quantity or quality, or
both. Concluding otherwise lowers the bar so a restriction on
parenting time may be ordered based on the best interests of
the child rather than on the correct legal standard:
endangerment.
31
C.
The Majority's Rule Defeats Legislative Intent and Leads
to Absurd Results
¶62
As noted, we will not interpret a statute in a manner that
defeats its legislative intent or leads to an absurd result.
See Ingram, 698 P.2d at 1315; see also
§ 2-4-201(1)(c). The majority's new rule,
unfortunately, does just that.
¶63
Section 14-10-102, C.R.S. (2025), and section 14-10-104.5,
C.R.S. (2025), expressly declare the UDMA's purposes and
policy goals. Section 14-10-102(1) provides that the purposes
underlying the UDMA must be "liberally construed."
Section 14-10-102(2)(b), meanwhile, explains one of the
UDMA's purposes: "[t]o mitigate the potential harm
to the spouses and their children caused by the process of
legal dissolution of marriage." Section 14-10-104.5
provides additional insight. It states that "it is in
the best interests of the children of the marriage to have a
relationship with both parents . . . and that, in most cases,
it is the parents' right to have a relationship with
their children." § 14-10-104.5. This provision
squares with the repeated recognition by the United States
Supreme Court that the relationship between parent and child
is constitutionally protected. See Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000).
¶64
Despite the legislature's declaration, the majority
interprets subsection (1)(b)(I) so narrowly that a
quantitative reduction in parenting time -no matter how
substantial - can never amount to a
"restriction" requiring a
32
finding of endangerment unless it results in zero days of
parenting time. See Maj. op. ¶ 23.
¶65
This makes no sense.
¶66
What if a father seeks to modify the parties' existing
parenting plan so the mother's parenting time with the
parties' eleven-month-old son, who is still nursing, is
reduced from 270 overnights to one overnight. According to
the majority, the father is not seeking to restrict the
mother's parenting time. But if he asks the court to
reduce her parenting time to zero overnights, the trial court
must treat his motion to modify as a motion to restrict. That
logic doesn't add up. A 99.6% decrease in parenting time
would profoundly impact the child's relationship with his
mother. No worries, the majority suggests: A party seeking
this substantial a reduction in parenting time will always
ask the court to impose a qualitative constraint. See
id. at ¶ 36. Given the extraordinary number of
self-represented litigants in domestic relations cases in
Colorado, this seems like a very unrealistic expectation.
See Colo. Jud. Branch, Cases and Parties Without
Attorney Representation in Civil Cases: Fiscal Year
2025, at 4 (July 8, 2025), https://
www.coloradojudicial.gov/ sites/
default/files/2025-07/FY2025-Cases-and-Parties-without-Attorney-Representation.pdf
[https:// perma.cc/F2BA-3SJY].
¶67
And what if the father's motion to modify doesn't
seek to reduce the number of the mother's overnights, but
instead asks the court to impose a qualitative
33
constraint? Under the majority's apparent reasoning, the
court is required to treat the father's motion as a
motion to restrict regardless of the nature of the
qualitative constraint and even though the father is not
seeking to reduce the mother's parenting time.
See Maj. op. ¶ 40. The majority's reading
of these statutes leads to absurd results because it lacks
the nuance and discretion that the UDMA contemplates - nuance
which allows courts to consider and craft orders on a
case-by-case basis that focus on the needs of the children in
the cases before them.
¶68
The majority's rigid interpretation treats all
qualitative constraints the same. But in reality, there are a
multitude of reasons one parent may seek to impose a
qualitive constraint on the other parent. Some of the reasons
may arise out of concerns about endangerment, but many are
necessary to simply facilitate a parenting time schedule that
is in the best interests of the parties' children. For
instance, a mother may be concerned that the father's
serious health condition has advanced to the point that he
needs some additional help caring for the parties'
children in the evening after he has undergone treatment. The
mother doesn't want to reduce the father's parenting
time. To the contrary, she wants to support their
children's relationship with their father, but she wants
him to have some additional help from a family member of the
father's choosing. He, however, doesn't think he
needs help. Under the majority's interpretation, because
this is a qualitative constraint, the mother would have to
wait until the children are
34
physically endangered or emotionally impaired before seeking
relief through a motion to restrict, even though -if she is
correct -the constraint would be in the best interests of the
children.
¶69
Finally, what are courts to make of the majority's
interpretation when it comes to motions to modify that seek
to increase parenting time quantitatively, but with
a qualitative constraint. Often these motions are filed by a
parent who, having achieved a consistent, sustained level of
sobriety, seeks to increase their parenting time while
submitting to periodic urinalysis. Or this type of motion may
be filed by a sixteen-year-old parent of an infant who seeks
to increase their parenting time while offering to have their
parent present during that time. Under the majority's
reasoning, it appears that these motions -because they
include a qualitative constraint-must be treated as motions
to restrict even though they are motions to increase
parenting time. Again, this makes no sense.
¶70
I readily acknowledge that West does not provide the
bright-line rule that the majority seeks. Its test cannot be
mechanically or mathematically applied, but that is the
point. Put differently, the statutes' lack of bright
lines are a feature, not a bug. Formulaic rulings are not
what the UDMA requires, and they are not what children and
their parents need, particularly in high-conflict cases.
¶71
The majority declares that its interpretation will help
district court judges and avoid a patchwork of outcomes.
Id. at ¶ 33. Not so. We trust courts to make
35
these tailored decisions all the time and understand that
outcomes will necessarily and appropriately vary because no
two cases are exactly alike. But courts need the tools the
General Assembly has given them to craft orders that put the
best interests of children first when modification is sought
and to protect children via parenting time restrictions only
when parenting time endangers a child's physical health
or significantly impairs the child's emotional
development. The majority's opinion strips those tools
out of the hands of our courts and lowers the bar to restrict
parenting time. What's more, in trying to address one
line-drawing problem, it creates a new one that seems likely
to spawn much future litigation: What is the difference
between a qualitative constraint, a qualitative
term, and a qualitative condition?
Id. at ¶ 5. I'm not sure, in part because
none of these terms are used in the UDMA. But it seems -
ironically - that the reason a constraint, term, or condition
is sought is likely relevant to answering whether the best
interests or endangerment standard is triggered, meaning that
the test in West is well-suited to helping draw
these lines. Not mechanically, but on a case-by-case basis.
D.
The West Test Appropriately
Considers the Reason or Reasons for Changes to Parenting
Time
¶72
The test articulated in West aligns with the
UDMA's policy goals and its constitutional underpinnings
and does not lead to absurd results. By focusing on the
reason or reasons for the proposed change, the West
test avoids predetermined
36
calculations and conclusions and, instead, considers the
circumstances unique to each family - an analytical framework
common in family law jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
In re Marriage of Short, 698 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Colo.
1985) (determining that child custody requires "a broad
inquiry into all relevant factors bearing on the welfare of
the child"); In re Marriage of Capparelli, 2024
COA 103M, ¶ 9, 561 P.3d 417, 421 (concluding that the
equitable distribution of martial property involves a
consideration of a "variety of factors"); In re
Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 23, 292 P.3d
1214, 1219 (noting that determining maintenance entails a
"discretionary balancing of factors").
¶73
The wisdom of the test set forth in West is
illustrated in two cases decided by the Minnesota Court of
Appeals-applying a provision that is similar to subsection
(1)(b)(I). See Clark v. Clark, 346 N.W.2d 383, 386
(Minn.Ct.App. 1984); Anderson v. Archer, 510 N.W.2d
1, 5 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993).
¶74
In Clark, 346 N.W.2d at 384-85, the court considered
whether a gradual reduction of "reasonable and liberal
visitation" from fourteen weeks per year to 5.5 weeks
per year was a restriction. The court held that "the
trial court abused its discretion in allowing the slow
erosion of [the] appellant's rights without any showing
pursuant to the statute that reduced visitation would
endanger [the child's] emotional health or impair [the
child's] emotional development." Id. at
386.
37
¶75
In Anderson, 510 N.W.2d at 3, 5, the court
considered whether a modification to a parenting time plan,
which reduced the appellant's total visitation, amounted
to a restriction. Due to the appellant's out-of-state
employment, the original parenting time plan provided him
with visitation when he was "in Minnesota."
Id. at 2-3. However, the appellant later returned to
reside in Minnesota, which in combination with the
appellee's work schedule and the children's school
schedule, resulted in unbalanced parenting time. See
id. at 3. The trial court subsequently modified the
parenting time schedule and reduced the appellant's time
with the children. Id. at 3-4.
¶76
On appeal, the court held that the reduction was not a
restriction. Id. at 4. The court reasoned that
changed circumstances warranted the reduction in the
appellant's parenting time so the children's
relationships with both parents could be maintained. See
id. at 4-5. It added, "Even if the modification
reduced [the] appellant's visitation time from what the
parties intended when they entered the stipulation, in
light of the reason for the modification and the
substantial amount of visitation granted to [the] appellant,
the modification did not constitute a restriction of
visitation." Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
¶77
As Clark and Anderson both illustrate, the
reason or reasons for a proposed change in parenting time are
important considerations when determining whether a
quantitative reduction in parenting time constitutes a
restriction.
38
¶78
For these reasons, and because the majority's rule
disregards the plain meaning of subsection (1)(b)(I), lowers
the bar to restrict parenting time, conflicts with the
express policy goals of the UDMA, creates a whole new
line-drawing problem regarding the difference between a
qualitative constraint and a qualitative term, and leads to
absurd results, I would adopt the test as articulated in
West. That is, "determining whether to apply
the best interests standard or the endangerment standard may
involve inquiry into both the quantitative and the
qualitative aspects of the proposed change to parenting time,
as well as the reason or reasons advanced for the
change." West, 94 P.3d at 1251.
II.
Application of the West
Test
¶79
Despite my disagreement with the majority's
interpretation of section 14-10-129, I agree that the court
below did not "restrict" Father's rights
pursuant to subsection (1)(b)(I), and thus properly applied
the best interests of the child standard, but I do so by
applying the West test. Consistent with
West, 94 P.3d at 1250, I start with the reasons for
Father's request and the court's order.
¶80
Father accepted a new job that requires him to work in-person
more than 100 miles away from the child's primary
residence. He then sought to adjust the parties'
parenting time schedule to accommodate his new schedule.
While the proposed schedule would have better suited
Father's needs, the district court was not persuaded that
it was in the best interests of the parties' child.
39
¶81
In its ruling, the court acknowledged that the decision to
modify the original parenting schedule was "not an easy
[one]" and would "likely disappoint both
parties." In its order, the court found, "[T]he
distance between the parties based on [F]ather's
employment does impact the court's ability to fashion an
appropriate parenting plan. Likewise, the court finds the
lengthy travel does impact the child." In re
Marriage of Dale, No. 21DR32791, at 3 (Dist. Ct., El
Paso Cnty., Apr. 26, 2024) (unpublished order).
¶82
The district court further explained that the change would
reduce the number of parenting time exchanges -an important
consideration, it noted, because the child showed signs of
separation anxiety when parting with either parent.
Id. at 2. So, even though the court reduced
Father's parenting time, the reduction did not-in light
of the reasons for the modification and the otherwise
substantial parenting time granted to Father-constitute a
restriction under subsection (1)(b)(I).
III.
Conclusion
¶83
Because the majority's interpretation disregards the
plain meaning of subsection (1)(b)(I), lowers the restriction
bar, conflicts with the express policy goals of the UDMA,
creates a new line-drawing problem, and leads to absurd
results, I respectfully concur in the judgment only.
---------
Notes:
[1] For the sake of brevity, this opinion
sometimes refers to the modification standard as the
"best-interests standard" and to the restriction
standard as the "endanger/impair standard."
[2] To avoid repetition, moving forward,
unless we specify otherwise, when we refer to reductions in
the quantity of parenting time, we mean: reductions (1) that
are purely quantitative (i.e., free from qualitative
constraints on the manner, location, or environment in which
a parent exercises parenting time); and (2) that do not
eliminate parenting time altogether (i.e., reductions to
something other than zero days).
[3] The district court indicated that its
modification of parenting time would give Father 142
overnights with the child per year. Before us, counsel
disagree with that number but also with each other's
math. "Innumerable are the lawyers who explain that they
picked law over a technical field because they have a
'math block' . . . ." Jackson v.
Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting
David L. Faigman, et al., Modern Scientific Evidence:
Standards, Statistics, and Research Methods v (student
ed. 2008)); see also Owens v. Carlson, 2022 CO 33,
¶ 1, 511 P.3d 637, 639 ("[T]here is no question
that some lawyers and math just don't mix."). We
need not get in the middle of this arithmetic tug-of-war.
Instead, we assume for purposes of our analysis that
Father's calculations are correct.
[4] We agreed to review two
issues:
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that
quantitative reductions in parenting time regardless of
amount are not restrictions on parenting time rights under
section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2024).
2. Whether a forty-five-day (28.1%) reduction in
previously ordered parenting time is a restriction on
parenting time rights absent endangerment to the
child.
[5] The division reached a similar
holding. We observe, however, that it did not address the
possibility of reducing the quantity of parenting time by
snuffing it out altogether. Its reasoning suggests that such
a reduction would constitute a restriction, but it stopped
short of saying so explicitly. Today, we make express that
which the division merely implied.
[6] Zero days of parenting time marks the
only defensible line of demarcation. Recall that the
legislature furnished no barometer because it did not
contemplate that substantial quantitative reductions would
morph into restrictions in the first place.
[7] Courts outside Colorado addressing
restrictions on parenting time have focused on the
constraints placed on the exercise of parenting time rights,
such as requiring supervised parenting time, limiting
parenting time to a prescribed location, or outright denying
parenting time. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Gunter v.
Gunter, 471 P.3d 1024, 1027 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2020);
Fulton v. Fulton, 918 So.2d 877, 881 (Miss. Ct. App.
2006).
[8] It is not feasible to exhaustively
catalogue all qualitative constraints on parenting time. In
assessing whether an adjustment qualifies as such a
constraint, trial courts should ask whether it circumscribes
the manner, location, or environment in which parenting time
is exercised. Judicial officers must be mindful that
qualitative constraints are adjustments that can be justified
only by meeting the endanger/impair standard.
[9] By way of example, the West
division did not explain how trial courts are to determine
when a reduction in the quantity of parenting time becomes so
substantial that it is transformed into a restriction.
West's loosely constructed approach is as
shapeless as fog and amounts to a line drawn in water -
impossible to discern and incapable of uniform application.
It would place our trial courts in an untenable position and
lead to disparate results.
[10] We recognize, as did the division,
that a court could all but terminate a party's parenting
time without applying the endanger/impair standard by
reducing the quantity of parenting time to a single overnight
per year. But such a court would still have to apply the
best-interests standard, and it is difficult to conceive of
circumstances in which a single overnight of parenting time
would serve the child's best interests. Even so, we trust
our trial courts and have no reason to believe they will act
in bad faith. And it goes without saying that parties are
obviously free to appeal an order imposing such a
reduction.
---------