25CA1648 Parental Resp Conc RMC 06-18-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1648 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23DR1933 Honorable Adam J. Espinosa, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning R.M.C. and L.C., Children,
and Concerning Ashley N. Sullivan,
Appellant,
and
Peter M. Cumplido,
Appellee.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART AND ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Grove and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 18, 2026
Ashley N. Sullivan, Pro Se
No Appearance for Appellee ¶1 Ashley N. Sullivan (mother) appeals the district court’s order
modifying parenting time as to her children with Peter M. Cumplido
(father). We dismiss the appeal in part and otherwise affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In September 2024, the district court entered permanent
orders allocating parental responsibilities for the parties’ two
children. The court awarded father overnights on Sundays and
Mondays and parenting time on Thursday evenings, with mother
having all remaining parenting time. The parties were ordered to
exercise joint decision-making in all major areas except for
education, which was allocated to mother.
¶3 In May 2025, mother moved to modify parenting time. She
asserted that father was failing to consistently exercise his
parenting time and, accordingly, she sought to eliminate his
parenting time. Mother also filed a motion to modify decision-
making responsibility and a motion concerning parenting time
disputes based on similar allegations that father was ignoring the
parenting time schedule.
¶4 The district court denied mother’s motion to modify
decision-making without a hearing. The court then set a
1 consolidated hearing on mother’s motion to modify parenting time
and motion concerning parenting time disputes. At the conclusion
of that hearing, the court issued an oral ruling and modified
parenting time based on a finding that a modification would be
helpful to the parties and was in the children’s best interests.
¶5 The district court also issued a written order, which reiterated
that the prior parenting time schedule was no longer in the
children’s best interests. The written order detailed a new
parenting time schedule, which extended father’s overnights to
Sundays, Mondays, and Tuesdays, with mother having the
remaining four overnights per week.
II. Motion to Modify Decision-Making
¶6 As an initial matter, we dismiss mother’s appeal to the extent
that she challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to
modify decision-making responsibility.
¶7 A party must file a notice of appeal within forty-nine days of
the entry of the order the party seeks to appeal. C.A.R. 4(a); In re
Marriage of Roth, 2017 COA 45, ¶ 11. “The timely filing of a notice
of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review.” In re
Marriage of Buck, 60 P.3d 788, 789 (Colo. App. 2002).
2 ¶8 Here, the district court entered the order denying mother’s
motion to modify decision-making responsibility on June 5, 2025.
Yet, mother’s notice of appeal wasn’t filed until August 27, 2025,
which was well outside the forty-nine days for her to appeal that
order. Thus, we must dismiss those portions of mother’s appeal
challenging the district court’s denial of her motion to modify
decision-making responsibility. See Buck, 60 P.3d at 789.
III. Modification of Parenting Time
¶9 As best as we can discern, mother asserts that the district
court erred because it made insufficient and otherwise unsupported
findings when modifying parenting time. But given the state of the
appellate record, we are unable to fully review mother’s contentions
and must presume that the record supports the court’s order.
¶ 10 The district court generally may modify an order regarding
parenting time whenever the modification would serve the best
interests of the children. § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025. The
court “has broad discretion” to modify parenting time, “taking into
consideration the child[ren]’s best interests and the policy of
encouraging parent-child relationships.” In re Marriage of Barker,
251 P.3d 591, 592 (Colo. App. 2010). What serves the best
3 interests of the children is determined by considering the factors in
section 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S. 2025. In re Marriage of Stewart, 43
P.3d 740, 741-42 (Colo. App. 2002).
¶ 11 We review a court’s modification of parenting time for an
abuse of discretion. Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 161 (Colo.
2005); Barker, 251 P.3d at 592. A district court abuses its
discretion when it acts in a manner that is manifestly arbitrary,
unfair, or unreasonable, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the
law. In re Marriage of Fabos, 2022 COA 66, ¶ 16. The district court
must make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate
court a clear understanding of the basis of its order. In re Marriage
of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9.
¶ 12 Here, our review of mother’s contentions of error is
significantly hampered by the lack of a complete record. In
particular, we lack a transcript of the hearing on mother’s motions,
including the parties’ presentation of evidence and the district
court’s ruling from the bench modifying parenting time.
¶ 13 As the appellant, it was mother’s responsibility to designate
any transcripts necessary for the appeal and to ensure that any
designated transcripts were transmitted to the appellate court.
4 C.A.R. 10(d); People v. Wells, 776 P.2d 386, 390 (Colo. 1989); In re
Marriage of Tagen, 62 P.3d 1092, 1096 (Colo. App. 2002). An
appellant must “include in the record transcripts of all proceedings
necessary for considering and deciding the issues on appeal.”
C.A.R. 10(d)(3). Where the appellant fails to provide such a
transcript, we must presume that the record supports the order. In
re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 13.
¶ 14 We agree with mother that the written order resulting from the
hearing was conclusory and didn’t contain any findings explaining
how the modification of parenting time was in the children’s best
interest based on the section 14-10-124(1.5) factors. See Gibbs,
¶ 9. Yet without a transcript of the court’s initial oral ruling —
which may have included more detailed findings as to the best
interests of the children under section 14-10-124(1.5) — we are
unable to fully review mother’s contention that the court made
insufficient findings when modifying parenting time. Thus, we
must presume that the court made such findings. See Dean, ¶ 13.
¶ 15 Similarly, absent a transcript, we are unable to meaningfully
review mother’s assertion that the modification of parenting time
was unsupported by the record because the district court failed to
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25CA1648 Parental Resp Conc RMC 06-18-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1648 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23DR1933 Honorable Adam J. Espinosa, Judge
In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning R.M.C. and L.C., Children,
and Concerning Ashley N. Sullivan,
Appellant,
and
Peter M. Cumplido,
Appellee.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART AND ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ Grove and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 18, 2026
Ashley N. Sullivan, Pro Se
No Appearance for Appellee ¶1 Ashley N. Sullivan (mother) appeals the district court’s order
modifying parenting time as to her children with Peter M. Cumplido
(father). We dismiss the appeal in part and otherwise affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In September 2024, the district court entered permanent
orders allocating parental responsibilities for the parties’ two
children. The court awarded father overnights on Sundays and
Mondays and parenting time on Thursday evenings, with mother
having all remaining parenting time. The parties were ordered to
exercise joint decision-making in all major areas except for
education, which was allocated to mother.
¶3 In May 2025, mother moved to modify parenting time. She
asserted that father was failing to consistently exercise his
parenting time and, accordingly, she sought to eliminate his
parenting time. Mother also filed a motion to modify decision-
making responsibility and a motion concerning parenting time
disputes based on similar allegations that father was ignoring the
parenting time schedule.
¶4 The district court denied mother’s motion to modify
decision-making without a hearing. The court then set a
1 consolidated hearing on mother’s motion to modify parenting time
and motion concerning parenting time disputes. At the conclusion
of that hearing, the court issued an oral ruling and modified
parenting time based on a finding that a modification would be
helpful to the parties and was in the children’s best interests.
¶5 The district court also issued a written order, which reiterated
that the prior parenting time schedule was no longer in the
children’s best interests. The written order detailed a new
parenting time schedule, which extended father’s overnights to
Sundays, Mondays, and Tuesdays, with mother having the
remaining four overnights per week.
II. Motion to Modify Decision-Making
¶6 As an initial matter, we dismiss mother’s appeal to the extent
that she challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to
modify decision-making responsibility.
¶7 A party must file a notice of appeal within forty-nine days of
the entry of the order the party seeks to appeal. C.A.R. 4(a); In re
Marriage of Roth, 2017 COA 45, ¶ 11. “The timely filing of a notice
of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review.” In re
Marriage of Buck, 60 P.3d 788, 789 (Colo. App. 2002).
2 ¶8 Here, the district court entered the order denying mother’s
motion to modify decision-making responsibility on June 5, 2025.
Yet, mother’s notice of appeal wasn’t filed until August 27, 2025,
which was well outside the forty-nine days for her to appeal that
order. Thus, we must dismiss those portions of mother’s appeal
challenging the district court’s denial of her motion to modify
decision-making responsibility. See Buck, 60 P.3d at 789.
III. Modification of Parenting Time
¶9 As best as we can discern, mother asserts that the district
court erred because it made insufficient and otherwise unsupported
findings when modifying parenting time. But given the state of the
appellate record, we are unable to fully review mother’s contentions
and must presume that the record supports the court’s order.
¶ 10 The district court generally may modify an order regarding
parenting time whenever the modification would serve the best
interests of the children. § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025. The
court “has broad discretion” to modify parenting time, “taking into
consideration the child[ren]’s best interests and the policy of
encouraging parent-child relationships.” In re Marriage of Barker,
251 P.3d 591, 592 (Colo. App. 2010). What serves the best
3 interests of the children is determined by considering the factors in
section 14-10-124(1.5), C.R.S. 2025. In re Marriage of Stewart, 43
P.3d 740, 741-42 (Colo. App. 2002).
¶ 11 We review a court’s modification of parenting time for an
abuse of discretion. Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158, 161 (Colo.
2005); Barker, 251 P.3d at 592. A district court abuses its
discretion when it acts in a manner that is manifestly arbitrary,
unfair, or unreasonable, or when it misapplies or misconstrues the
law. In re Marriage of Fabos, 2022 COA 66, ¶ 16. The district court
must make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give the appellate
court a clear understanding of the basis of its order. In re Marriage
of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9.
¶ 12 Here, our review of mother’s contentions of error is
significantly hampered by the lack of a complete record. In
particular, we lack a transcript of the hearing on mother’s motions,
including the parties’ presentation of evidence and the district
court’s ruling from the bench modifying parenting time.
¶ 13 As the appellant, it was mother’s responsibility to designate
any transcripts necessary for the appeal and to ensure that any
designated transcripts were transmitted to the appellate court.
4 C.A.R. 10(d); People v. Wells, 776 P.2d 386, 390 (Colo. 1989); In re
Marriage of Tagen, 62 P.3d 1092, 1096 (Colo. App. 2002). An
appellant must “include in the record transcripts of all proceedings
necessary for considering and deciding the issues on appeal.”
C.A.R. 10(d)(3). Where the appellant fails to provide such a
transcript, we must presume that the record supports the order. In
re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 13.
¶ 14 We agree with mother that the written order resulting from the
hearing was conclusory and didn’t contain any findings explaining
how the modification of parenting time was in the children’s best
interest based on the section 14-10-124(1.5) factors. See Gibbs,
¶ 9. Yet without a transcript of the court’s initial oral ruling —
which may have included more detailed findings as to the best
interests of the children under section 14-10-124(1.5) — we are
unable to fully review mother’s contention that the court made
insufficient findings when modifying parenting time. Thus, we
must presume that the court made such findings. See Dean, ¶ 13.
¶ 15 Similarly, absent a transcript, we are unable to meaningfully
review mother’s assertion that the modification of parenting time
was unsupported by the record because the district court failed to
5 consider certain statutory factors and improperly relied on father’s
anticipated future compliance with court orders. See id. at ¶ 15
(“Without reviewing the transcripts, we are unable to evaluate the
evidence to determine whether it sufficiently supports the . . .
orders.”). Thus, we again must presume that the evidence
supported the district court’s decision. See id. at ¶ 13.
IV. “Sua Sponte” Modification of Parenting Time
¶ 16 Mother next asserts that the district court abused its
discretion because it “sua sponte” modified parenting time when,
instead of adopting her proposed modification, it increased father’s
parenting time. We disagree.
¶ 17 Under section 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), “the court may make or
modify an order granting or denying parenting time rights whenever
such order or modification would serve the best interests of the
child[ren].” (Emphasis added.) See also In re Marriage of Dale,
2025 COA 29, ¶ 31 (recognizing that the ongoing “division of
parenting time between the parents is a matter of identifying the
best interests of the child[ren]”), aff’d, 2026 CO 35. And mother
has not cited, nor are we aware of, any authority holding that when,
as here, a party has put parenting time at issue by filing a motion
6 to modify, the court must either adopt the movant’s proposed
modification or do nothing. Nor has mother at any point asserted
that other statutory provisions, such as those applying heightened
standards to the restriction of a party’s parenting time or a switch
of the majority-time parent, are applicable. See § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I),
(2). Thus, the district court could, as it did here, modify parenting
time “whenever” it determined that such a modification was in the
children’s best interests, see § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), even if that
specific modification wasn’t proposed by the moving party.
V. Appointment of a Child and Family Investigator
¶ 18 Lastly, we reject as unpreserved mother’s contention that the
district court erred by denying her request to appoint a child and
family investigator (CFI).
¶ 19 To start, mother has failed to identify in the record where she
requested the appointment of a CFI and where the district court
ruled on the issue. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A) (requiring the appellant to
identify “the precise location in the record where the issue was
raised and where the court ruled”). Nevertheless, from our review of
the record, it appears that mother first requested the appointment
of a CFI in a postjudgment motion she filed under C.R.C.P. 59. But
7 C.R.C.P. 59 may not be used to raise new issues that were not
presented at a trial or hearing, meaning that any issues raised for
the first time in such a motion are not preserved for our appellate
review. See In re Marriage of Lohman, 2015 COA 134, ¶ 22; cf.
Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. Hannon Law Firm, L.L.C., 2012
CO 61, ¶ 18 (“[I]ssues not raised in or decided by a lower court will
not be addressed for the first time on appeal.”). Thus, we decline to
further consider mother’s unpreserved contention that the court
erred by not appointing a CFI.
VI. Disposition
¶ 20 The order is affirmed. We dismiss those portions of mother’s
appeal challenging the district court’s denial of her motion to
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.