Marriage of Mill

Opinion

25CA0486 Marriage of Mill 07-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0486 Mesa County District Court No. 22DR30003 Honorable Daniel M. Garcia, Magistrate

In re the Marriage of

Allicia Anne Mill,

Appellee,

and

Brian K. Mill,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK Pawar and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 23, 2026

Price Family Law, LLC, Trista Price, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

The Harris Law Firm, PLLP, Katherine O. Ellis, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this proceeding concerning the dissolution of marriage

between Brian K. Mill (father) and Allicia Anne Mill (mother), father

appeals the district court’s permanent orders with regard to division

of the marital estate, child support, and parental responsibilities.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case to the

district court for additional proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 The parties were married in June 2011. Mother had an eight-

year-old son from a prior relationship. In 2013, the parties had a

daughter. Mother, who was a family nurse practitioner at Colorado

West Healthcare Center, formed a medical aesthetics business

during the marriage.

¶3 Mother filed for dissolution of marriage in January 2022. A

magistrate entered temporary orders in September 2022. During

this time, mother left her employment at the healthcare center and

began working at her business full time. The permanent orders

hearing was initially scheduled for April 2024.

¶4 Before the April permanent orders hearing, father filed a

motion to compel seeking copies of mother’s initial and

supplemental mandatory financial disclosures. After mother

1 provided many disclosures, father replied, alleging that more

documentation was outstanding. The court denied father’s first

motion to compel, agreeing with mother that father had failed to

confer in good faith. Father then filed a second motion to compel.

¶5 At the April permanent orders hearing, the court asked

father’s counsel to enumerate which disclosures remained

outstanding. Father’s counsel responded, “Most of [mother’s] debit

documentation related to her credit cards [is] incomplete”; and

counsel said that statements from mother’s “Bellco accounts” and

her monthly Square statements were missing — although her

annual Square statements were filed. The court then reset the

permanent orders hearing for July 2024. It extended discovery

deadlines and the exhibit submission deadline. And it set a status

conference to monitor discovery.

¶6 The minute order from the status conference indicated that

the parties needed to provide any outstanding discovery by the end

of that week. Father provided a list of outstanding discovery and

filed a motion asking the court to rule on his second motion to

compel. Later, during the permanent orders hearing, father

2 testified that he wanted the court to rule on the motion to compel.

The court never did.

¶7 Also during the permanent orders hearing, the court heard

testimony and considered a report from a child and family

investigator (CFI). The CFI made recommendations regarding

parenting time that the court adopted as part of its permanent

orders. The court issued written permanent orders in January

2025.

II. Motion to Compel Discovery

¶8 Father argues that, because the court didn’t rule on his

second motion to compel discovery, he “lacked information

necessary to evaluate the marital estate and calculate income for

purposes of support.” He asks us to treat the court’s failure to rule

as a denial and evaluate it for an abuse of discretion. We perceive

no basis for reversal.

3 A. Preservation

¶9 As an initial matter, we reject mother’s assertion that father’s

claim is unpreserved and we should therefore not review it.1

¶ 10 First, the record belies mother’s argument that the court fully

addressed father’s requests for discovery at the April permanent

orders hearing. To be sure, during that hearing, the court

repeatedly acknowledged the outstanding discovery. But after

asking father’s counsel to reiterate what remained outstanding, the

parties began arguing a subpoena issue and didn’t return to the

previous discussion. And the court ultimately continued the

hearing so that the parties could remedy discovery.

¶ 11 Second, as we have already discussed, the record shows that

father repeatedly brought to the court’s attention that it hadn’t

ruled on the second motion to compel. When a district court

doesn’t rule on a motion, it may be considered implicitly denied.

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Kobobel, 74 P.3d 401, 404 (Colo. App.

2002).

1 We disagree with mother’s argument that father’s second motion

to compel was untimely. See City of Aurora v. Colo. State Eng’r, 105 P.3d 595, 610 (Colo. 2005) (district court has discretion to exclude untimely disclosed evidence).

4 B. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶ 12 “Parties to domestic relations cases owe each other and the

court a duty of full and honest disclosure of all facts that materially

affect their rights and interests and those of the children involved in

the case.” C.R.C.P. 16.2(e)(1). If a party fails to make a disclosure

or fails to respond to discovery, the other party may move to compel

disclosure. C.R.C.P. 37(a).

¶ 13 “[A] motion to compel discovery is committed to the discretion

of the trial court and the court’s determination must be upheld on

appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Silva v. Basin W., Inc.,

47 P.3d 1184, 1188 (Colo. 2002). A district court abuses its

discretion if its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unfair. Sunahara v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2012 CO 30M,

¶ 19.

C. No Abuse of Discretion

¶ 14 The court didn’t abuse its discretion by denying father’s

second motion to compel because the record demonstrates that

mother made disclosures responsive to almost all requests made in

that motion.

5 ¶ 15 In addition, father hasn’t demonstrated prejudice from the

court’s presumed denial of his second motion to compel. See

C.R.C.P. 61 (“The court at every stage of the proceeding must

disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect

the substantial rights of the parties.”). Father didn’t proceed to the

July permanent orders hearing without first receiving relevant

financial information from mother. And while he asserts on appeal

that three of his trial exhibits didn’t contain all of the apparently

disclosed documentation, he didn’t assert at trial that these exhibits

were deficient. See Core-Mark Midcontinent Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp.,

2016 COA 22, ¶ 24 (“We do not consider ‘arguments never

presented to, considered or ruled upon by’ the district court.”

(citation omitted)).

¶ 16 Similarly, on appeal, father states that he couldn’t “obtain

from [mother] documentation of [her] debts and documentation

about her business,” but he didn’t specifically articulate — before

the district court or on appeal — how the provided information

didn’t satisfy his motion to compel or sufficiently inform him of

mother’s business debts and documentation. We therefore decline

to disturb the court’s denial on this basis. See Barnett v. Elite

6 Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010)

(acknowledging that appellate courts don’t address undeveloped

arguments).

D. Additional Arguments Regarding the Second Motion to Compel

1. Storage Unit

¶ 17 Father argues that, despite his “formal discovery requests”

regarding the contents of shared storage unit used during the

marriage, mother didn’t respond. But the record doesn’t support

father’s claim.

¶ 18 Father requested, as part of his nonpattern interrogatories

listed in his second motion to compel, that mother “account for the

marital assets from the storage unit . . . , including the location of

where the assets are located and a description of any assets

[mother] has sold to date.” The record shows that mother

responded, indicating that the belongings she removed from storage

after this case began belonged to her, her son, and the couple’s

daughter. She admitted that she had a “small amount of [father’s]

pictures, clothes, and documents” at her home.

7 ¶ 19 On this record, we can’t say that the court erred by effectively

denying father’s second motion to compel as it related to the

property in the storage unit.

2. Income for Child Support Determination

¶ 20 Father argues that the court erred by determining mother’s

income without the “documentation related to her business and

income from her business” that father had requested in his second

motion to compel. We disagree.

¶ 21 As previously discussed, the record indicates that mother

responded to almost all requests in the second motion to compel.

Father didn’t indicate before the district court, nor does he on

appeal, how the information that mother provided was insufficient

to “assess the nature of [her] debts, calculate a value of [her]

business, and determine [her] actual income from her business.”

Moreover, because the court’s conclusion that mother was able to

earn at least $11,100 in monthly income is supported by the

record, we perceive no abuse of discretion.

8 III. Division of Marital Estate

A. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶ 22 A district court has great latitude in equitably dividing a

marital estate in such proportions as it deems just. See § 14-10-

113(1), C.R.S. 2025; In re Marriage of Medeiros, 2023 COA 42M,

¶ 28.

¶ 23 Before dividing a marital estate, a court must determine

whether an asset is marital or separate. See § 14-10-113(1); In re

Marriage of Corak, 2014 COA 147, ¶ 9. Marital property is subject

to division and includes the appreciation of a spouse’s separate

property during the marriage. § 14-10-113(4); see In re Marriage of

Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 13. The court must value marital property as

of the date of the decree or the date of the hearing on disposition of

property if such hearing precedes the date of the decree. § 14-10-

113(5); see In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 4. It’s the

parties’ duty to present the court with the data to allow it to make a

sufficient valuation, and any failure by the parties in that regard

doesn’t provide them with grounds for review. In re Marriage of

Zappanti, 80 P.3d 889, 892 (Colo. App. 2003).

9 ¶ 24 Valuing property is within the district court’s discretion, and

the court’s determination will not be disturbed on appeal if it is

reasonable in light of the evidence as a whole. Krejci, ¶ 23. The

court may select the valuation of one party over that of the other

party, or make its own valuation, and its decision will be upheld on

appeal unless clearly erroneous. Id. “A court’s finding of fact is

clearly erroneous if there is no support for it in the record.” Gagne

v. Gagne, 2019 COA 42, ¶ 17.

B. Edward Jones Retirement Account

¶ 25 Father argues that the district court improperly set aside

mother’s Edward Jones portfolio, which was valued at $84,100, as

her separate property. We disagree.

1. Preservation

¶ 26 Mother argues that father didn’t preserve this issue for appeal.

But “a party is not required to object to the trial court’s findings in

the trial court to preserve a challenge to those findings.” People in

Interest of D.B., 2017 COA 139, ¶ 30.

2. Analysis

¶ 27 The record supports the court’s determination of mother’s

separate property. Mother’s Exhibit 28C indicates that four months

10 after the marriage, in October 2011, her retirement account

contained $84,100. In addition to statements for several accounts

within the portfolio showing balances as of the date of marriage, the

exhibit also includes documents that trace $50,000 from mother’s

pre-marriage retirement funds. And the court, which had great

latitude to do so, credited mother’s testimony that she believed that

the entire portfolio was her separate property. See Krejci, ¶ 23.

¶ 28 Because the record supports the court’s determination that

the portfolio was mother’s separate property, we will not disturb it

on appeal. Gagne, ¶ 17.

C. Valuation of the Storage Unit Property

¶ 29 Father asserts that the court erred when it “failed to value” the

property mother retrieved from the parties’ storage unit, arguing

that the property was marital. But the court “place[d] no value on

any marital items that may or may not have been located in the

storage unit” because “the items in [m]other’s possession are now

her . . . separate property, with zero value, and the items remaining

in the storage shed are the . . . separate property of [f]ather, also

with zero value.” The record supports the court’s determination

11 that the property mother retrieved from the storage unit was her

separate property and that it held no value.

¶ 30 First, the court relied on mother’s testimony regarding the

separate character of the property. The court found father

incredible when he claimed that mother destroyed property, took

marital property, and took his separate property from storage. The

court didn’t believe father that, after mother removed items, “most

of the belongings and assets” were no longer in storage. Instead,

the court credited mother’s testimony that the couple’s home goods

had been in the storage unit and that she removed only “[her] stuff

and the kids’ stuff,” leaving all other assets behind. And evidence

indicates that father considered the property to be mother’s — he

extolled her to pay the storage unit fee for “her stuff.”

Second, the record supports the court’s determination that the

property had no value. Although both father and mother valued the

property in the storage unit before mother’s removal at $80,000, the

court wasn’t obligated to accept this valuation. See In re Marriage

of Wenciker, 2022 COA 74, ¶ 26; see also In re Marriage of Lewis, 66

P.3d 204, 207 (Colo. App. 2003) (“[C]redibility determinations and

the weight, probative force, and sufficiency of the evidence, as well

12 as the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, are

matters within the sole discretion of the trial court.”). Father

admitted that what was left there was “garbage” and “nothing but

junk.”

¶ 31 Given this record evidence, the court’s valuation of this

property wasn’t clearly erroneous.

IV. Child’s Air Travel

¶ 32 Father argues that the court erred by ordering him to pay the

entire cost of the child’s air travel to facilitate parenting time

exchanges between the parties in violation of section 14-10-

115(11)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2025. We agree that the court’s child support

determination must be recalculated.

¶ 33 Under section 14-10-115(11)(a)(II), any expenses for

transporting a child, or a child and accompanying parent if the

child is under twelve years old, between the parents’ homes for

parenting time “must be divided between the parents in proportion

to their adjusted gross income.” See In re L.F., 56 P.3d 1249, 1250-

51 (Colo. App. 2002) (the statute’s provisions are mandatory).

These amounts are then added to the parents’ respective obligations

13 in computing child support. In re Marriage of Andersen, 895 P.2d

1161, 1163 (Colo. App. 1995) (interpreting an earlier version of

section 14-10-115(11)(a)(II)).

¶ 34 We review a court’s child support orders for an abuse of

discretion. In re Marriage of Tooker, 2019 COA 83, ¶¶ 12, 21, 27.

B. Analysis

¶ 35 At the time of the permanent orders hearing, father resided in

Texas and mother in Colorado. The court granted father parenting

time at his home out of state. The court then made father

“responsible for costs associat[ed] with air travel for the child.”

¶ 36 In the court’s final orders, it incorporated a child support

order filed in February 2025. That order required father to pay

mother $778 in monthly child support. But the court provided no

indication of how it applied section 14-10-115(11)(a)(II) when

considering child support. The court, therefore, abused its

discretion.

¶ 37 On remand, the court must apply section 14-10-115(11)(a)(II)

in conjunction with its child support determination. In doing so,

the court may, in its discretion, reconsider the overall child support

calculation.

14 V. Father’s Child Support and Parenting Time Overnights

¶ 38 Father argues that the court erred by ordering child support

using worksheet A without making findings as to how it calculated

overnight parenting time with father. We disagree.

A. Record on Appeal

¶ 39 Mother argues that, because the record doesn’t contain the

court-ordered parenting plan, we need not address father’s

contention and “must assume it supports the trial court’s findings

and orders.” See C.A.R. 10(b), (c); see also People v. Duran, 2015

COA 141, ¶ 12 (“If an appellant intends to urge on appeal that a

finding or conclusion is unsupported by or contrary to the evidence,

the appellant must include in the record a transcript of all evidence

relevant to such finding or conclusion.”). But the court-ordered

parenting plan is available on the judicial department database,

JPOD, and we take judicial notice of it. See Harriman v. Cabela’s

Inc., 2016 COA 43, ¶ 64 (court of appeals may take judicial notice of

its own records and the contents of court records in a related

proceeding).

¶ 40 In addition, the proposed parenting plan order, which is

included in the record before us, was later adopted in full by the

15 magistrate in a parenting order. This order uses language identical

to the CFI report adopted by the court in its permanent orders and

includes the number of overnights determined by the court. We

can, therefore, proceed to the merits of father’s argument.

B. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶ 41 “Shared physical care” means that each parent has the

children “for more than [ninety-two] overnights each year” and that

both parents contribute to the children’s expenses in addition to

paying child support. In re Marriage of Antuna, 8 P.3d 589, 596

(Colo. App. 2000). When the parties share physical care, an

adjustment is made to the basic support obligation because certain

basic expenses for the children will be incurred by both parents.

Id.; § 14-10-115(8)(b).

¶ 42 To account for this adjustment, worksheet B, rather than

worksheet A, is used to calculate child support when shared

physical care exists. Worksheet A is used when one parent is the

primary residential parent such that the other parent has ninety-

two or fewer overnight visits with the child each year. See Antuna,

8 P.3d at 596.

16 ¶ 43 We defer to the district court’s factual findings unless they are

clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9. The

district court must make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to give

us a clear understanding of the basis of its decision. Wright, ¶ 20;

see also In re Marriage of Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370, 1379 (Colo. 1997)

(reversing where the district court’s findings and “reasoning [were]

unclear and d[id] not permit meaningful appellate review”).

C. Analysis

¶ 44 The court found that father would have ninety-two overnights

per year and, therefore, used worksheet A to calculate child

support. According to the permanent orders, the court based this

calculation of overnights on the description of parenting time

parameters provided in the CFI report. The CFI recommendations

give us a clear understanding for the basis of the district court’s

determination, Wright, ¶ 20, and because these parameters resulted

in father having ninety-two nights of parenting time, the court

properly used worksheet A. See Antuna, 8 P.3d at 596.

VI. Parental Responsibilities

¶ 45 Father argues that the court abused its discretion when it

allocated mother sole decision-making responsibility despite

17 evidence that mother committed acts of domestic violence toward

father. We disagree.

¶ 46 In allocating parental responsibilities, a district court must

focus on the children’s best interests, prioritizing their safety and

physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. See §§ 14-

10-123.4(1)(a), -124(1.5), (1.7), C.R.S. 2025;2 In re Marriage of

Pawelec, 2024 COA 107, ¶ 43. For decision-making responsibility

specifically, the district court must consider the factors in section

14-10-124(1.5)(a), plus the three additional factors in section 14-

10-124(1.5)(b). In re Marriage of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, ¶ 21.

¶ 47 If the court has reason to believe that a party has committed

domestic violence, the court must follow section 14-10-124(4) when

allocating parental responsibilities. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a), (b). Under

this subsection, if the court finds by a preponderance of the

evidence that a party has committed domestic violence, it must

consider the children’s best interests under section 14-10-

2 The best-interests-of-the-child statute was recently amended. See Ch. 163, sec. 3, § 14-10-124, 2026 Colo. Sess. Laws 971. Throughout this opinion, we refer to the version of the statute in effect before the May 27, 2026, changes.

18 124(1.5)(a) and (b) in light of that finding. See § 14-10-124(4)(a)(II),

(b), (d). Domestic violence “means an act of violence or a threatened

act of violence upon a person with whom the actor is or has been

involved in an intimate relationship.” § 14-10-124(1.3)(b).

¶ 48 A district court has broad discretion in allocating parental

responsibilities, and we exercise every presumption in favor of

upholding its decision. See In re Marriage of Collins, 2023 COA

116M, ¶ 8 (parenting time); Morgan, ¶ 23 (decision-making

responsibility). We won’t disturb the court’s decision unless it

abused its discretion. See Collins, ¶ 8; Morgan, ¶ 26; In re Marriage

of Dale, 2025 COA 29, ¶ 7, aff’d, 2026 CO 35.

¶ 49 Each party argued that the other was abusive. The court

found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that father committed

domestic violence through acts of coercive control. § 14-10-

124(1.3)(a) (defining coercive control). Specifically, the court found

father’s communications to mother and his threat to have her

assets auctioned off were examples of coercive control. The court

did “not find that it has been proven by a preponderance of the

19 evidence that [m]other has committed acts of domestic violence

against [f]ather.” These findings are supported by the record.

¶ 50 The CFI report characterized father’s communications with

mother as “threat[ening], demeaning, and . . . intimidati[ng].” The

report differentiated between these communications and mother’s,

which were “uncivil, although to a lesser extent.” The CFI also

testified that father’s “poor ability to communicate” was more

pronounced than mother’s.

¶ 51 Because the evidence supports the court’s determination that

father had committed domestic violence but mother hadn’t, we

perceive no abuse of discretion with the court’s decision allocating

sole decision-making responsibility to mother.

VII. Mother’s Attorney Fees

¶ 52 Mother requests her appellate attorney fees under C.A.R. 38(b)

because father’s appeal was frivolous. An appeal may be frivolous

as filed or as argued. Calvert v. Mayberry, 2019 CO 23, ¶ 45. An

appeal “is frivolous as filed when there are no legitimately

appealable issues because the judgment below ‘was so plainly

correct and the legal authority contrary to the appellant’s position

so clear.’” Id. (citation omitted). If there are legitimately appealable

20 issues, then “an appeal may still be frivolous as argued if the

appellant ‘fail[s] to set forth . . . a coherent assertion of error,

supported by legal authority.’” Id. (citation omitted).

¶ 53 Though we have ruled, in part, against father, we don’t view

his appeal as frivolous, either as filed or as argued, so we deny

mother’s request. See Mission Denv. Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363,

365 (Colo. 1984) (“Standards for determining whether an appeal is

frivolous should be directed toward penalizing egregious conduct

without deterring a lawyer from vigorously asserting his client’s

rights.”); see also In re Marriage of Boettcher, 2018 COA 34, ¶ 38

(“Fees should be awarded only in clear and unequivocal

cases . . . .”), aff’d, 2019 CO 81.

VIII. Disposition and Remand Instructions

¶ 54 We affirm the judgment in part and reverse it in part. We

reverse the district court’s order regarding child support and

remand for the court to reconsider its child support ruling related to

travel expenses. The district court must allow the parties to present

evidence of their financial circumstances at the time of the remand

hearing, and if, in its discretion, it makes a new child support

determination, that determination must be based on the parties’

21 and the child’s present circumstances at the time it enters its

rulings on remand. See Wright, ¶ 24. The court must also follow

the procedures of section 14-10-115 and make the necessary

factual findings to provide an appellate court a clear understanding

of the basis of its determinations. See id. at ¶ 23.

¶ 55 In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.