In Re the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of R.S., (Minor Child), and R.S. (Father) v. Marion County Department of Child Services and Child Advocates, Inc.

56 N.E.3d 625, 2016 Ind. LEXIS 578, 2016 WL 4379527
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 16, 2016
Docket49S04-1606-JT-350
StatusPublished
Cited by90 cases

This text of 56 N.E.3d 625 (In Re the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of R.S., (Minor Child), and R.S. (Father) v. Marion County Department of Child Services and Child Advocates, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In Re the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of R.S., (Minor Child), and R.S. (Father) v. Marion County Department of Child Services and Child Advocates, Inc., 56 N.E.3d 625, 2016 Ind. LEXIS 578, 2016 WL 4379527 (Ind. 2016).

Opinion

DAVID, Justice.

This case involves the fundamental right of a parent to the.care, custody, and control of his or her child. Because this relationship should be severed only when all reasonable efforts to maintain the relationship have failed, we reverse the trial court’s order terminating the parental rights of Father to his son, R.S., II.

Facts and Procedural History

R.S.' (Father) and' L.H. (Mother) are the parents of ten-year-old R.S., II (R.S.). In December 2009, Father pled guilty to a Class B felony and a no contact order was entered between Father and Mother. During Father’s incarceration, Mother cared for R.S, but Father stayed in contact by writing letters to R.S. on a weekly basis and sending gifts. Father was released on probation in March 2013.

*627 In April 2014, the Department of Child Services (DCS) alleged that R.S. was a child in need of services (CHINS) because of Mother’s drug use and Father’s lack of involvement. R.S. was placed with his maternal grandmother (Grandmother). Father requested that R.S. be placed with him, but DCS objected based upon an alleged no contact order between Father and R.S. Father informed the court that there was not a no contact order between himself and R.S,, and he had documentation to support his claim. However, because the court and DCS believed otherwise, no parenting time was ordered for Father. In the meantime,' DCS took no action to assess whether there was a valid no contact order between Father and R.S. It was not until June 10, 2015, when the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) brought to the trial court’s attention that there was not a no contact order between Father and R.S., that Father was ordered parenting time. 1

'Subsequently, R.S. was found' to be a CHINS as to Mother and Father. Father was ordered to participate in various services, including parenting classes, parenting assessment, and a Father Engagement Program. Father did not attend the disposition hearing, and he claimed to be unaware of any order to participate in services. Father also failed to appear, for several of the subsequent court proceedings involving R.S. Thus, Father was largely absent during the CHINS action.

Despite his failure to complete the programs ordered by the court in relation to the CHINS proceeding, while incarcerated, Father completed- various parenting and self-improvement courses. 2 Father also successfully completed the Commercial Driver’s License Course and successfully completed probation as of March 30, 2015. As a condition of probation; Father completed substance, abuse evaluation and treatment, fifty-two weeks of domestic violence counseling, and a mental health evaluation.

On March 19, 2015, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. Even -after the termination petition .was filed, Father requested that he again be referred to services. His request for services was denied, but the court granted him supervised, visitation. Mother consented to R.S.’s adoption. Therefore, a termination hearing was held as to Father only.

At the termination hearing, it became apparent that while the CHINS action was pending, Father had, in fact, been seeing R.S. on a regular basis; despite Father’s absence from court proceedings and a couple of the court-ordered supervised visitations; Father had been visiting with R.S. two to three times a week, taking him swimming and paying for swimming activities, exercising overnights with R.S. on the weekends, and going to Grandmother’s house upon her request to help resolve issues Grandmother was having with R.S.’s behavior;

The DCS ease manager, the home-based therapist, and the GAL, all agreed that adoption by Grandmother was- in R.S.’s best interests. However, there was a gen *628 eral consensus that R.S. and Father shared a close bond. The GAL believed that continued visitation between R.S. and Father was in R.S.’s best interests. Nevertheless, the trial court concluded that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to R.S.’s well-being by depriving him of permanency, and that termination was in the best interests of R.S.

Father appealed the termination of his parental rights, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. R.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 49A04-1508-JT-1141, 2016 WL 1134570 (Ind.Ct.App. March 23, 2016). We now grant transfer and reverse the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights with R.S., thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. App. Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review

When reviewing the termination of parental lights, this Court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. In. re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind.2010) (citation omitted). When the trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, “we apply a two-tiered standard of review.” Id. “First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second we determine whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. The judgment will be set aside if found to be clearly erroneous. Id. However, this Court may also consider the statutory requirement that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Thus, “we review the trial court’s judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.” Id.

Discussion and Decision

As this Court and the United States Supreme Court have reiterated many times, “[a] parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” Bester v. Lake Co. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind.2005) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000)). Although parental interests are not absolute, “the parent-child relationship is ‘one of the most valued relationships in our culture.’ ” Id. at 147 (citing Neal v. DeKalb Cnty. Div. of Family & Children, 796 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind.2003)). Due to this, the Indiana statute governing termination of parental rights sets a high bar for severing this constitutionally protected relationship.

Under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b), a petition seeking to terminate the parent-child relationship must allege the following:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six
(6) months under a dispositional decree. ⅜¾ ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

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56 N.E.3d 625, 2016 Ind. LEXIS 578, 2016 WL 4379527, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-involuntary-termination-of-the-parent-child-relationship-of-rs-ind-2016.