MACY, Justice.
The State of Wyoming and non-Indian water users appeal from a judgment entered by the district court which (1) decreed that the Shoshone and Northern Arapaho ■ Tribes on the Wind River Indian Reservation may change the use of their reserved water right as they deem advisable without regard to Wyoming water law; and (2) substituted the tribal water agency for the state engineer as the administrator of both reserved and state-permitted water rights within the Wind River Indian Reservation.
We reverse.
The core issues stated in various ways by the several appellants are:
1. Whether the Tribes may change their right to divert future project water for agricultural purposes to a right to maintain an instream flow for fishery purposes without regard to Wyoming water law; and
2. Whether the Tribes have the right to administer all the water rights within the reservation to the exclusion of the Wyoming state engineer.
This is another appeal of an ongoing general adjudication of all water rights in the Big Horn River System, involving over 20,000 claimants. Because of its size and complexity, the adjudication is being conducted in phases. The dispute presently before this court relates to the interpretation of the amended judgment and decree entered on May 24, 1985, by Judge Alan B. Johnson (the 1985 decree) involving Phase 1, wherein the Tribes were granted the right to divert water for agricultural purposes on reservation land historically irrigated, as well as on reservation land included within certain future projects. In Big Horn 1,1 this court affirmed the 1985 decree, granting the Tribes the right to divert water from the Big Horn River System for agricultural purposes and subsuming livestock, municipal, domestic, and commercial uses within those purposes. This court also affirmed the district court’s finding that an instream flow right for fisheries was not a subsuming use. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Big Horn I decision in 1989.2 After the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision, the Tribes announced their intent to dedicate a portion of their reserved water right, which had been awarded for future projects, to in-stream flow for fisheries and other nonsub-sumed uses in the Wind River. To that end, the Tribes adopted a Wind River Interim Water Code, created the Wind River Water Resources Control Board, and, on April 12, 1990, granted themselves In-stream Flow Permit No. 90-001, which au[276]*276thorized the dedication for the 1990 irrigation season of up to 252 cfs of water in the Wind River for “fisheries restoration and enhancement, recreational uses, ground water recharge downstream benefits to ir-rigators and other water users.”
Shortly after the issuance of Permit No. 90-001, the Tribes complained to the state engineer that the diversion of water by holders of state-awarded water rights caused the Wind River flows to be less than that amount authorized by the permit. The state engineer informed the Tribes that their permit was unenforceable because the Tribes had been awarded only the right to divert water and that any change in the use of future project water covered by their reserved water right must be made following a diversion. The Tribes nevertheless thereafter requested that the state-awarded water rights of Midvale Irrigation District be curtailed so that the in-stream flows could be maintained. The state engineer refused to honor this request, which he viewed as being an unlawful selective call.
On July 30, 1990, the Tribes filed a motion in the district court for an order to show cause why the state engineer should not be held in contempt, why he should not be relieved of his duties, and why a special master should not be appointed to enforce the Tribes’ reserved water right. The State filed its own motion for a determination of certain administrative matters. The district court referred the motions to a special master for a report. The special master agreed to hear all the issues raised except for the contempt issue involving the state engineer.
The specific issues which the Tribes presented to the special master were: (1) Whether the Tribes were permitted to convert their water right reserved for future agricultural projects to an instream flow; (2) whether the Tribes properly accomplished the allocation of future project water to instream flow use pursuant to the Wind River Interim Water Code and Permit No. 90-001; and (3) whether the state engineer had an obligation to enforce the tribal instream flow permit. A partial list of the State’s issues presented to the special master included: (1) Whether the state engineer had the authority to administer the Tribes’ reserved water right; (2) whether, if the Tribes’ future project water may be changed to instream uses, the change must be made in accordance with Wyoming water law; and (3) whether a change in use of future project water may be made without consideration of injury to junior appropriators.
After hearing oral arguments on exceptions to the special master’s report, the district court entered its judgment and decree on March 11, 1991, declaring that the Tribes were entitled to use their reserved water right on the reservation as they deemed advisable, including instream flow use, without regard to Wyoming water law. The district court did not distinguish that portion of the Tribes’ reserved water right quantified on the basis of historical use from that portion quantified on the basis of future practicably irrigable acres when it issued its judgment and decree. The only issue properly before the district court was whether the Tribes could dedicate their future project water to instream flow for the purposes of maintaining fisheries, et cet-era, without regard to Wyoming water law. We limit the scope of review on appeal accordingly. The court also ordered the substitution of the Tribes for the state engineer as the administrator of Indian and non-Indian water rights within the Wind River Indian Reservation. On May 3,1991, this court stayed the judgment and decree from which this appeal is taken.
The Tribes interpret the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment entered on May 10, 1983, by Judge Harold Joffe (the 1983 decision), approving the master’s report which awarded them a reserved water right to irrigate practicably irrigable acres within the Wind River Indian Reservation, as not restricting the Tribes’ use of their future project water so long as consumptive use was not increased and the use was confined to the reservation. The Tribes contend that the agricultural purposes relied upon to quantify their water right do not limit their uses of [277]*277the water. They reason that Judge Joffe made it clear in his 1983 decision that the methodology used to quantify the Tribes’ reserved water right, whether by historical use or by practicably irrigable acreage, in no way limited their use of the water by stating:
This Court, thus, calculates the Tribes[’] entitlement to a reserved water right, with a priority date of 1868, based on the purpose of agriculture (which term includes livestock use and domestic use) and denies such reserved water right for other multi-purpose uses as claimed by the Tribes. The Court by such finding does not intend to dictate to the Tribes that they are restricted as to the use of said reserved water only for the purpose of agriculture, inasmuch as it recognizes that it cannot tell the Tribes how they must use water that comes under a reserved water permit. If the Tribes desire to use so much of their water for other purposes, they may do so.
1983 decision at 20.
The Court states again the premise that the determination of “historic” acreage and “practicably irrigable acreage” is used only as a measuring device to calculate the Tribes[’] present and future needs.... When the Tribes determine where and how they wish to use the water granted in this decree, they will inform the proper authorities who will then be able to make the specific determinations which are necessary for administration of a water right.
1983 decision at 36.
8. The Tribes are entitled to make such use of the water covered by their reserved water rights [as] they deem advisable but the use is confined to the reservation and in no event shall the consumptive use be increased.
1983 decision at 70. The Tribes also support their reasoning by pointing out that the order ruling on motions to alter or amend the 1983 decision entered on June 8, 1984, by Judge Johnson, denying the Tribes’ motion for an additional quantity of reserved water for instream flow, stated:
The reserved water right quantified by Judge Joffe does not deny the Tribes the ability to regulate in-stream flows in order to maintain what may be considered necessary water for optimum fish habitat, nor does the opinion limit any such power that may exist on the part of the Tribes. The Tribes may seek to dedicate their stream flows for fish habitat by using water reserved to them by the decision.
The State counters by declaring that the Tribes’ reliance upon the 1983 decision as being authority to permit them to use their future project water to maintain instream flows is remarkably misplaced. The State contends that the 1985 decree, which amended the 1983 decision, contained no possibility that the Tribes’ reserved water right was other than to actually divert water from the stream. The State buttresses this contention by reasoning that Judge Johnson discarded his previous views on instream flows when he entered his 1985 decree or he would have provided for such and that the Tribes were not awarded water rights which might or could have been included in the 1985 decree.
The parties’ reliances upon the 1983 decision or upon the 1985 decree to support their contentions are not justified. The issue of whether or not the Tribes have unlimited discretionary use of their quantified reserved water right was decided in Big Horn I. We qualified the Tribes’ use of their water right by stating:
The government may reserve water from appropriation under state law for use on the lands set aside for an Indian reservation....
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... Considering the well-established principles of treaty interpretation, the treaty itself, the ample evidence and testimony addressed, and the findings of the district court, we have no difficulty affirming the finding that it was the intent at the time to create a reservation with a sole agricultural purpose....
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[278]*278... The evidence is not sufficient to imply a fishery flow right absent a treaty provision.
Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 94-98 (emphasis added).
Our opinion clearly and unequivocally stated that the Tribes had the right to use a quantified amount of water on their reservation solely for agricultural and subsumed purposes and not for instream purposes. If we had intended to specify what the water could be used for merely as a methodology to determine the amount of water the Tribes could use for any purpose, we would have said so. The contrary is unmistakable. See the dissenting opinions of Justice Thomas and Judge Hanscum in Big Horn I, wherein they stated that they would have allowed the Tribes to use the water for any purpose appropriate to the progress and development of the reservation rather than limiting the uses to those mentioned in the majority opinion. It is not necessary for us to discuss the Tribes’ alternative contention that principles of federal law do not limit the uses to which they may put their water or the State’s contention that the 1983 decision and the 1985 decree are not final orders. Big Horn I, having been affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, is final and controlling. The Tribes do not have the unfettered right to use their quantified amount of future project water for any purpose they desire.
We must now consider whether the district court erred when it decreed that the Tribes may change the use of their reserved future project water right from agriculture to any other purpose, including instream flows, without regard to Wyoming water law. The Tribes' first contention is that judgment and decree no. 8 in the 1983 decision gave them the right to change the “use of the water covered by their reserved water rights” in any manner in which they deemed advisable. This position is simply not tenable. Our decision in Big Horn I is controlling. As we previously stated, the Tribes’ reliance upon the 1983 decision for this proposition is not justified. It makes no sense whatsoever for this court to limit the use of the water for agricultural purposes and then to permit the Tribes to unilaterally change that use.
The Tribes also contend that this court held that federal and not state law applied when we stated in Big Horn I, “The decree entered in the instant case does not require application of state water law to the Indian reservation.” 753 P.2d at 115. We do not disagree with this statement; however, the statement cannot be taken out of context. We made this statement in acknowledgment that the Tribes had a reserved right by treaty to the use of Wyoming water for agricultural purposes which was not dependent upon state law or procedures and which did not need to be adjudicated pursuant to our statutory scheme. We clearly stated, “Federal law has not preempted state oversight of reserved water rights.” Id. at 114.
The Tribes further contend that an unbroken chain of decisions exists in the United States determining that the Tribes’ water rights are governed by federal law. The Tribes, however, fail to direct us to any of these decisions. The Tribes’ additional reasoning that historical federal and tribal regulation of Indian water use is strong evidence that state control is federally preempted is not persuasive. We are persuaded by United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 98 S.Ct. 3012, 57 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1978), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that water is impliedly reserved only to the extent necessary to meet the primary purpose(s) for which a reservation is made and that, where water is valuable for a' secondary purpose, the inference arises that Congress intended for water to be acquired in the same manner as is employed by any other private or public appropriator. In United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252, 104 S.Ct. 3536, 82 L.Ed.2d 841 (1984), the United States attempted to convert Indian reserved water rights to forest and wildlife programs. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the attempt and stated:
The purpose of a federal reservation of land defines the scope and nature of impliedly reserved water rights. Because [279]*279the reserved rights doctrine is an exception to Congress’s explicit deference to state water law in other areas, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the limitation of such rights to only so much water as is essential to accomplish the purpose for which the land was reserved. We conclude that it would be inconsistent with the principles expressed in United States v. New Mexico to hold that the Government may “tack” a currently claimed Winters right to a prior one by asserting that it has merely changed the purpose of its previously reserved water right.
723 F.2d at 1419 (citations omitted). We see no reason why this rationale should not apply to a change of use of the future project water acquired by the Tribes solely for agricultural purposes. We hold that the Tribes, like any other appropriator, must comply with Wyoming water law to change the use of their reserved future project water from agricultural purposes to any other beneficial use. We leave for another day the question of whether the Tribes may dedicate their historically used water to instream flow, as that issue is not directly presented for our review by the facts of this ease.
The State contends that, even if the Tribes were to petition for a change of use, our statutory and case law would not permit them to change the use of their water right for instream flow purposes. The State reasons that the Tribes have been awarded only the right to make an actual physical diversion of water and that any change would be limited to a beneficial use which can be made of the water after such diversion is made. The district court stated unequivocally that the term “divert” was used generally to describe water use and was never used as a word of limitation.
Although our statutory scheme regulating the appropriation of water has contemplated an actual physical diversion of water, we have never said that a requirement to do so existed. This is understandable if we give consideration to the fact that, until passage of our instream flows act,3 it was necessary to actually divert water to put it to a beneficial use permitted by law in Wyoming. “Beneficial use” is, however, an evolving concept and can be expanded to reflect changes in society’s recognition of the value of new uses of our resources.4 Actual diversion is neither constitutionally required nor an essential element of our appropriation doctrine. Beneficial use is the key element. Wyo.Stat. § 41-3-101 (Supp.1991) provides in relevant part: “Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and limit of the right to use water.” We join the Idaho Supreme Court5 and hold that an actual diversion of water is not necessary to appropriate water for a beneficial use. This holding, however, is of no comfort to the Tribes or to the national and Wyoming wildlife federations which have filed an amicus curiae brief, as the appropriation of water for instream flow is not a beneficial use which is presently available to the Tribes. Wyo.Stat. § 41-3-1002(e) (Supp.1991) clearly provides: “No person other than the state of Wyoming shall own any instream flow water right.”
The Wyoming legislature has for good reason precluded water right holders from unilaterally dedicating water to maintain instream flows. Water is the lifeblood of Wyoming. It is a scarce resource which must be effectively managed and efficiently used to meet the various demands of society. Wyoming’s founding fathers also recognized the necessity of having state control over this vital resource. The convention journals reflect that a preliminary draft of Article 8, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution provided for state ownership of all waters “not heretofore appropriated.” Mr. Brown, a prominent member of the convention, objected by stating:
[280]*280As this bill reads as originally presented, it leaves the people who have appropriated a portion of the water as the absolute owners of it, and the state will declare that they have no ownership whatever to any of the waters that have been heretofore appropriated. If they so declare, it would be utterly impossible for the legislature, or any power of the state, to control, regulate, or in any manner interfere with its use. It is only by the declaration that we are to be the absolute owners of all the water that we may be enabled to control unreservedly the uses to which it may be put.
Journals and Debates of the Constitutional Convention, State of Wyoming 289 (1889). Article 8, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution was amended accordingly.6 Our decision today recognizes only that which has been the traditional wisdom relating to Wyoming water: Water is simply too precious to the well being of society to permit water right holders unfettered control over its use.7
We turn now to the State’s contentions regarding that portion of the district court’s March 11, 1991, judgment and decree which provided:
The Tribal agency which regulates reserved water matters shall have the authority to administer all water rights within the stipulated boundaries of the reservation. Non-Indian rights will be administered according to state water law by the Tribal agency, with appropriate judicial review in state district court pursuant to Title 41 of the Wyoming statutes.
The State argues, among other things, that the district court violated the Wyoming Constitution by removing the state engineer from being the administrator of state water within the reservation. The Tribes counter by contending that the constitutional issue should not be entertained on appeal as it was not raised before the trial court.
Regarding the Tribes’ contention, we have often stated that this court will not consider issues for the first time on appeal which have been neither raised in nor argued to the trial court, unless they go to jurisdiction or are otherwise of such a fundamental nature that we must take cognizance of them. E.g., Oatts v. Jorgenson, 821 P.2d 108 (Wyo.1991). We have previously recognized, however, that constitutional issues regarding possible violations of the separation of powers doctrine can be of such a fundamental nature as to require consideration and resolution by this court for the first time on appeal. White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102 (Wyo.1984); but see Nickelson v. People, 607 P.2d 904 (Wyo. 1980). In the instant case, the State raises the issue of whether the district court’s removal and replacement of the state engineer constituted an unlawful infringement by the judiciary on the rights, powers, and privileges reserved to the executive branch of government by the Wyoming Constitution. We believe that, in light of the ongoing nature of this case and of the need for certainty in future proceedings, it is necessary that we address the State’s constitutional issue at this juncture to further define the respective roles of the various branches of state government as they relate to this dispute.
[281]*281Article 2, § 1 of the Wyoming Constitution establishes the separation of powers doctrine:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
In Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. 1990), we rejected the “air tight compartment” view of the separation of powers doctrine and determined instead that our state’s framers intended to integrate dispersed powers into a balanced, workable government. 800 P.2d at 415. The Tribes argue that, under a “balanced, workable government” approach to the separation of powers doctrine, the district court was not foreclosed from assigning the duties of administering state water within the reservation to the tribal water agency. They contend that the remedial action undertaken in the instant case was within the district court’s broad equitable authority to see that its judgments and decrees are respected. We disagree.
Article 1, § 31 of the Wyoming Constitution recognizes that state control of water is essential to the development and prosperity of Wyoming.8 To this end, the constitution declares that “[t]he water of all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water” within the boundaries of Wyoming is the property of the state. Wyo.Const. art. 8, § l.9 The constitution provides for the administration of state water as follows:
There shall be constituted a board of control, to be composed of the state engineer and superintendents of the water divisions; which shall, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have the supervision of the waters of the state and of their appropriation, distribution and diversion, and of the various officers connected therewith. Its decisions to be subject to review by the courts of the state.
Wyo.Const. art. 8, § 2.
There shall be a state engineer who shall be appointed by the governor of the state and confirmed by the senate; he shall hold his office for the term of six (6) years, or until his successor shall have been appointed and shall have qualified. He shall be president of the board of control, and shall have general supervision of the waters of the state and of the officers connected with its distribution. No person shall be appointed to this position who has not such theoretical knowledge and such practical experience and skill as shall fit him for the position.
Wyo.Const. art. 8, § 5.
As is apparent from the text of the constitution, the state engineer is a constitutionally designated officer of the executive branch of government. He is appointed by the governor and must be approved by the senate as an individual who is qualified to fulfill the position’s requirements. The state engineer is responsible for generally supervising both the use of state water and such subordinate officers as are associated with its distribution.10
The constitution also addresses the removal of executive officers:
Except as hereafter provided, all officers not liable to impeachment shall be [282]*282subject to removal for misconduct or malfeasance in office as provided by law. Any person appointed by the governor to serve as head of a state agency, or division thereof, or to serve as a member of a state board or commission, may be removed by the governor as provided by law.
Wyo.Const. art. 3, § 19. The state engineer is not subject to impeachment. State ex rel. Hamilton v. Grant, 14 Wyo. 41, 81 P. 795 (1905). The law which has been provided by the Wyoming legislature relating to the removal of the state engineer and other governor appointees reads in pertinent part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person may be removed by the governor, at the governor’s pleasure, if appointed by the governor to serve as head of a state agency, department or division, or as a member of a state board or commission.
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(c) Reason for removal of appointed officers or commissioners shall be mailed or delivered to the person to be removed. Wyo.Stat. § 9-1-202 (1991).
Neither the constitution nor the statutes contemplate that a district court should have the authority to remove or replace the state engineer as the administrator of Wyoming water. Cf. Wyo.Const. art. 5, § 10 (powers of district court). The state engineer is an executive officer appointed by and subject to removal by only the governor of Wyoming. See People ex rel. Emerson v. Shawver, 30 Wyo. 366, 222 P. 11 (1924). The district court’s primary role in the instant ease was to adjudicate the nature, extent, and relative priority of competing water interests in the Big Horn River System. See Wyo.Stat. § 1-37-106 (1988). We hold that the district court had no “inherent equitable enforcement authority,” as argued by the Tribes, to effectuate a de facto removal and replacement of the state engineer as the administrator of state water within the reservation. A contrary position would result in a most unbalanced and unworkable form of govérnment. The district court’s action violated not only the separation of powers doctrine embodied in the Wyoming Constitution, but also the constitutional charge that the state engineer shall have “general supervision of the waters of the state.” Wyo.Const. art. 8, § 5.
As to the Tribes’ concern that the separation of powers doctrine should not be applied in such a manner as to make the state engineer immune from judicial enforcement of the 1985 decree, we agree. The state engineer is obligated by the Wyoming Constitution to “equally guard all the various interests” in the water of the State of Wyoming. Wyo.Const. art. 1, § 31; Big Horn /, 753 P.2d at 115. Of the various interests to be protected is the Tribes’ reserved water right. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 115. If the district court were to find in a future proceeding that the state engineer had shunned this constitutional mandate, then appropriate enforcement action should be undertaken. Our objection to the district court’s action in the instant case goes only to the method employed, not to the underlying principle that the court should have authority to compel compliance with its lawful judgments and decrees.
In addition to the constitutional arguments addressed above, the State contends that the district court’s action constituted an abuse of discretion, that it was contrary to the spirit of the McCarran Amendment,11 and that it violated the law of the case. While we find merit in each argument, we decline to address the arguments in detail in light of our determination that the district court’s action violated the Wyoming Constitution. Suffice it to say that it has been repeatedly recognized during the course of this adjudication that unified administration by the state engineer of both reserved and state-permitted rights to Wyoming water is essential to effective water management within the Big Horn River System. See Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 114-15, the 1985 decree, and the 1983 decision.
This court addressed the role of the state engineer as the administrator of the Tribes’ [283]*283reserved water right in Big Horn I. We limited the state engineer’s authority as the administrator in two respects. We initially acknowledged that the Indian reserved water right existed independent of state law and procedure regarding the perfection of usufructuary rights to Wyoming water. We then determined that the state engineer, as the monitor of the Indian reserved water right, could not shut down tribal headgates once he believed that the Tribes had exceeded either the nature or the extent of their decreed right. We explained that, assuming cooperative efforts were of no avail, the state engineer would have to seek judicial enforcement of the decree against the United States and the Tribes. Big Horn I, 753 P.2dat 114-15.
Our present decision is consistent with the duties and limitations imposed upon the state engineer in Big Horn I. The state engineer remains responsible to distribute the water within the Big Horn River System according to the nature, extent, and priority of right. When the nature, extent, and priority of the Indian reserved water right are clear and not respected by state appropriators, the state engineer must exercise his authority over the state appropriators to see that the tribal right is observed. When, on the other hand, it is impossible to determine if the tribal right is being violated because the right itself is in some respect ill-defined, the state engineer should promptly seek clarification from the district court so that appropriate remedial action, if needed, may be undertaken. See Wyo.Stat. §§ 1-37-106 & 1-37-110 (1988). Should the state engineer determine that the Tribes violated the decree, he should execute an enforcement action as outlined in Big Horn I and summarized in the preceding paragraph.
Reversed.
THOMAS and CARDINE, JJ., join on the first issue.
THOMAS and BROWN (Retired), JJ., join on the second issue.
THOMAS, J., files a specially concurring opinion.
CARDINE, J., files an opinion concurring on the first issue and dissenting on the second issue.
BROWN, J. (Retired), files an opinion dissenting on the first issue and concurring on the second issue, GOLDEN, J., joins in the part dissenting on the first issue.
GOLDEN, J., files a dissenting opinion, BROWN, J. (Retired), joins in the part dissenting on the first issue.