In re the Estate of Erlanger

145 Misc. 1, 259 N.Y.S. 610, 1932 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1279
CourtNew York Surrogate's Court
DecidedAugust 1, 1932
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 145 Misc. 1 (In re the Estate of Erlanger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Surrogate's Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Estate of Erlanger, 145 Misc. 1, 259 N.Y.S. 610, 1932 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1279 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1932).

Opinion

O’Brien, S.

This trial of the issue of the status of a contestant in the pending probate proceeding began on October 19, 1931, and with the exception of a recess of one day in November, and of three and a half days in Christmas week occasioned by the death of decedent’s sister, continued without interruption until Monday, January 11, 1932, at two p. m.; 149 witnesses were called in the trial, 834 exhibits were marked in evidence and the record fills 6,965 pages. The period of the cohabitation of the parties runs from [3]*3early in 1920 down to the date of decedent’s death on March 7, 1930. Practically every part of this period, and in the years 1927-1928-1929 practically every day up to March 7, 1930, when decedent died, is covered by the proofs. It seems not only logical but helpful to present in the first instance some of the landmarks of the law relating to common-law marriages. Parenthetically, it may be stated that while the trial developed many unique situations and individual features, it also disclosed many of the common characteristics of leading common-law marriage cases. With the following authorities before us, when we come to analyze the evidences adduced we will have a truer perspective of the proofs.

Chancellor Kent in his Commentaries (12th ed., edited by O. W. Holmes, Jr., part IV, lect. XXVI, pp. 87, 92, 93) declares: No peculiar ceremonies are requisite by the common law to the valid celebration of the marriage. The consent of the parties is all that is required; and as marriage is said to be a contract jure gentium, that consent is all that is required by natural or public law. The Roman lawyers strongly inculcated the doctrine, that the very foundation and essence of the contract consisted in consent freely given, by parties competent to contract. Nihil proderit signasse tabulas, si mentem matrimonii non fuisse constabit. Nuptias non concubitus, sed consensus facit. This is the language equally of the common and canon law and of common reason. If the contract be made per verba de prcesenti, and remains without cohabitation, or if made per verba de futuro, and be followed by consummation, it amounts to a valid marriage in the absence of all civil regulations to the contrary, and which the parties (being competent as to age and consent) cannot dissolve, and it is equally binding as if made in facie ecclesice. * * * As the law of marriage is a part of the jus gentium, the general rule undoubtedly is that a marriage, valid or void by the law of the place where it is celebrated, is valid or void everywhere.”

Chancellor Walworth declared in Rose v. Clark (8 Paige, 574, 579): “ For it is now a settled rule of the common law which was brought into this State by its first English settlers, and which was probably the same among the ancient Protestant Dutch inhabitants, that any mutual agreement between the parties to be husband and wife in praesenti, especially where it is followed by cohabitation, constitutes a valid and binding marriage; if there is no legal disability on the part of either to contract matrimony (2 Kent Com. 87). * * * That an actual marriage may be inferred in ordinary cases, from cohabitation, acknowledgments of the parties, etc., as well as by positive proof of the fact, there can be no room to doubt (see Math, on Pres. Evid. 283, and cases there cited). And the only [4]*4doubt in this case arises from the proof of the fact that the matrimonial cohabitation between these parties commenced, previous to the death of the first husband under a contract of marriage which was absolutely void previous to the revised statutes; although neither of them may have known at the time that Frink was still living (Valleau v. Valleau, 6 Paige’s Rep. 210). It appears, however, from decisions in our own courts, as well as in England, that a subsequent marriage may be inferred from acts of recognition, continued matrimonial cohabitation and general reputation; even where the parties originally came together under a void contract of marriage. The case of Wilkinson v. Payne (4 Durn. & East’s Rep. 468) carried the doctrine of presumption to a very great length on the subject. There the marriage was absolutely void under the English marriage acts, for the husband, whose parents were dead, was under age at the time the ceremony was performed and had no legal guardian to consent to the marriage. And when he after-wards became of age his wife was upon her deathbed and actually died in three weeks from that time. But upon proof that the father of the wife, who was the defendant in that suit, and the rest of his family, had always treated them as husband and wife, Justice Grose, before whom the cause was tried, left it to the jury to presume a legal marriage after the husband was of age; which they did. And the court of king’s bench refused to disturb their verdict.” (Citing Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52, and Jackson v. Claw, 18 id. 346.)

Bishop, an authority quoted in practically every State in the Union, declares (1 Bish. Mar. & Div. [6th ed.] § 457): Every intendment of the law is in favor of matrimony. When a marriage has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular) and whatever the form of the proofs, the law raises a strong presumption of its legality; not only casting the burden of proof on the party objecting, but requiring him throughout, and in every particular, plainly to make the fact appear, against the constant pressure of this presumption, that it is illegal and void. * * * Ana! the strength of the presumption increases with the. lapse of time through which the parties are cohabiting as husband and wife.”

The United States Supreme Court, 1907 (Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U. S. 423, 440), in a case where the parties had lived a few months in the State of New Jersey, held: “ We are of the opinion that even if the alleged marriage would have been regarded as invalid in Virginia for want of a license, had the parties remained there, and invalid in Maryland for want of a religious ceremony, had they remained in that State, it was to be deemed a valid marriage in New Jersey after James Travers and the woman Sophia, as husband [5]*5and wife, took up their permanent residence there and lived together in that relationship continuously, in good faith and openly, up to the . death of Travers — being regarded by themselves and in the community as husband and wife. Their conduct towards each other in the eye of the public, while in New Jersey, taken in connection with their previous association, was equivalent in law to a declaration by each that they did and during their lives were to occupy the relation of husband and wife. Such a declaration was as effective to establish the status of marriage in New Jersey as if it had been 'made in words of the present tense after they became domiciled in that State.” (Italics are writer’s.) (See also, Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S. 76.)

Judge Kellogg, in a recent decision, in which all concurred (Fisher v. Fisher, 250 N. Y.

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Bluebook (online)
145 Misc. 1, 259 N.Y.S. 610, 1932 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1279, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-estate-of-erlanger-nysurct-1932.