In re the Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97

6 A.3d 445, 416 N.J. Super. 462, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 201
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedOctober 8, 2010
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 6 A.3d 445 (In re the Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re the Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97, 6 A.3d 445, 416 N.J. Super. 462, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 201 (N.J. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SKILLMAN, P.J.A.D.

1. Introduction

This opinion addresses twenty-two appeals challenging the validity of revised rules of the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH), adopted under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), N.J.S.A. 52:27D-301 to -329.19, which establish the obligations of municipalities to provide affordable housing during the “third round” period from 1999 to 2018 and provide mechanisms for municipali[471]*471ties to achieve compliance with those obligations. In In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:9k and 5:95, 390 N.J.Super. 1, 914 A.2d 348 (App.Div.2007) (In re N.J.A.C. 5:9k), we invalidated substantial portions of COAH’s original third round rules and remanded to COAH for the adoption of revised rules in conformity with our opinion. We conclude that COAH’s revised third round rules suffer from many of the same deficiencies as the original third round rules. Therefore, we once again invalidate substantial portions of those rules and remand to COAH.

2. Background: Partial Invalidation by Appellate Division of Original Third Round Rules and Adoption by COAH of Revised Third Round Rules

The articulation in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dism. and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808, 96 S.Ct. 18, 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975) (Mount Laurel I), of the Mount Laurel doctrine, under which developing municipalities were held to have an obligation to provide a realistic opportunity through their zoning for the construction of affordable housing for lower income households, and the evolution of that doctrine in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel II), were discussed at length in our prior opinion, 390 N.J.Super. at 15-21, 914 A.2d 348, and therefore do not need to be repeated here.1

The Legislature enacted the FHA in 1985 to confer responsibility upon an administrative agency for the administration and enforcement of the Mount Laurel doctrine. See generally Hills Dev. Co. v. Twp. of Bernards, 103 N.J. 1, 19-23, 31-40, 510 A.2d 621 (1986). To accomplish this objective, the Legislature assigned [472]*472primary responsibility for the determination of municipal affordable housing obligations and the development of mechanisms for compliance with those obligations to COAH. Id. at 31-37, 510 A.2d 621. The FHA authorizes a municipality that has devised a plan for compliance with its affordable housing obligation to petition COAH for substantive certification of the plan. N.J.S.A. 52:27D-313. If COAH grants substantive certification, the municipality is insulated to a substantial extent from exclusionary zoning litigation for a period of what was previously six and is now ten years. N.J.S.A. 52:27D-313(a).2 A municipality’s participation in the administrative processes established by the FHA is purely voluntary; a municipality that chooses to litigate any exclusionary zoning actions in the courts, without petitioning COAH for substantive certification, may do so. Hills, supra, 103 N.J. at 35-36, 510 A.2d 621.

In Hills, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the FHA The Court stated that “[a]t this point, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail. The judiciary must assume, if the assumption is at all reasonable, that the [FHA] will function well and fully satisfy the Mount Laurel obligation.” 103 N.J. at 43, 510 A.2d 621. The Court cautioned, however, that “[i]f, ... as predicted by its opponents, the [FHA] ... achieves nothing but delay, the judiciary will be forced to resume its appropriate role.” Id. at 23, 510 A.2d 621.

In accordance with the FHA’s mandates that COAH “[d]eter-mine housing regions,” N.J.S.A. 52:27D-307(a); “[ejstimate the present and prospective need for low and moderate income housing at the State and regional levels[,]” N.J.S.A. 52:27D-307(b); [473]*473and “[a]dopt criteria and guidelines for [m]unicipal determination of its present and prospective fair share of the housing need in a given region,” N.J.S.A. 52:27D-307(e)(l), COAH adopted “first round” and “second round” substantive rules prescribing municipalities’ affordable housing obligations for the six-year periods running from 1987 to 1993 and 1993 to 1999 and the mechanisms for achieving compliance with those obligations. N.J.A.C. 5:92-1.1 to -18.20, and App. A to F; N.J.A.C. 5:93-1.1 to -15.1, and App. A to H. Those rules were described in detail in our prior opinion, In re N.J.A.C. 5:94, supra, 390 N.J.Super. at 23-25, 914 A.2d 348, and there is no need to repeat those descriptions here. Suffice it to note that COAH’s methodologies for determining municipal affordable housing obligations in the first and second round rules were quite similar to the methodologies that had been developed by trial courts before enactment of the FHA. See id. at 23-24, 914 A.2d 348.

In Township of Bernards v. State, Department of Community Affairs, 233 N.J.Super. 1, 12-22, 558 A.2d 1 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 118 N.J. 194, 570 A.2d 959 (1989), we rejected a series of challenges to parts of the COAH first round rules, except for one section dealing with the credits a municipality may claim in satisfying its affordable housing obligations. In Calton Homes, Inc. v. Council on Affordable Housing, 244 N.J.Super. 438, 446-53, 582 A.2d 1024 (App.Div.1990), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 326, 604 A.2d 601 (1991), we rejected challenges to other parts of the first round rules, except for a rule that established a 1,000-housing-unit cap on any municipality’s affordable housing obligation. In In re Township of Warren, 247 N.J.Super. 146, 179-83, 588 A.2d 1227 (App.Div.1991), rev’d, in part on other grounds, 132 N.J.

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6 A.3d 445, 416 N.J. Super. 462, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 201, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-the-adoption-of-njac-596-597-njsuperctappdiv-2010.