OPINION
BROWN, Judge.
MM. ("Grandfather") appeals the denial of his uncontested petition to adopt AM., Grandfather's biological granddaughter. Grandfather raises one issue, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred in denying Grandfather's uncontested petition to adopt A.M. We reverse and remand.1
The relevant facts ("Mother"), who is the daughter of Grandfather, and A.C. ("Father") are the biological parents of A.M., who was born on September 8, 2005. On April 24, 2009, Grandfather filed a petition for adoption of A.M. The petition stated in part:
[Mother] is the natural mother of said [A.M.] and she consents to said adoption and joins in this Petition for Adoption for purposes of maintaining her maternal rights and that she consents to said adoption by joining in this Petition for Adoption. [Mother] is not terminating or relinquishing her legal maternal rights.
Appellant's Appendix at 54. Father filed a consent to adoption.
On September 30, 2009, the trial court entered a decree of adoption which granted Grandfather's petition for adoption. The decree stated in part: "IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that the above-entitled petition for the adoption of [A.M.] is hereby approved and granted and that by this order, [Mother] is not divested of her maternal rights due to the fact that she and [Grandfather] are not married." Id. at 59. On October 26, 2009, the trial court entered an Order Vacating Decree of Adoption, which stated:
The Court, on its own motion, now finds that the Decree of Adoption signed September 30, 2009 purports to terminate the parental rights of the [Father] and to permit the maternal grandfather to adopt. This order was entered in error. [615]*615It is therefore Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the Decree of Adoption entered September 30, 2009 is vacated, and this matter is set for further hearing on the 7th day of January, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. [Father] is ordered to appear at this hearing. The Petitioner shall provide notice to [Father] of the hearing.
Id. at 60.
On November 17, 2009, Grandfather filed a motion to correct error and argued that Father's "attendance at any hearing under this cause is neither required nor necessary." Id. at 61. After a hearing on December 2, 2009, the trial court stated that there was one issue: whether or not the adoption could be done under Indiana law. The court stated that "if the Court finds that this is an acceptable practice under Indiana Law the Court will grant the adoption." Transcript at 48.
On December 28, 2009, the trial court denied Grandfather's motion to correct error and denied Grandfather's petition for adoption. The trial court's order stated:
4. [Grandfather] concedes that there is no statutory authority that would allow a biological parent to maintain their [sic] parental rights following the issuance of a decree of adoption by a grandparent. Indeed, I.C. 31-19-15-1 appears to preclude this outcome.
# % x # C #
5. However, [Grandfather] correctly notes that, in certain narrowly defined situations, a biological parent has been allowed to maintain their parental rights following an adoption by a third party. See [In re Adoption of K.S.P.], 804 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). See also [In re Adoption of M.M.G.C.], 785 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); [In re Infant Girl W.J, 845 N.E.2d 229 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) I, trans. denied ]; [Mariga v. Flint], 822 N.E.2d 620 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).
6. The above-cited cases are highly fact specific. They do share a common component: The adoptive parent and the consenting parent cohabi-tate. The adults and the child form a cohesive family unit. The adoptive parent provides primary, day-to-day care for the child.
7. [Grandfather] concedes that he does not live in the same house as [A.M.], but argues that he provides significant emotional and financial support for the child. [Grandfather] does see [A.M.] 3 to 4 times per week. The child regularly visits his home. [Grandfather] is the primary male figure in [A.M.]'s life. He also provides significant financial support for the child. However, it cannot be said that [Grandfather], [Mother], and [A.M.] form a family unit as contemplated by the Appellate Court in [K.S.P.].
8. [Grandfather] argues that the holding in [KS.P.] should be expanded to include grandparents who do not reside in the child's home and who do not provide primary care for the child on an everyday basis. This may indeed be desirable. However, it is beyond the authority of the trial court to grant this relief. Modification of the Indiana adoption statutes, as urged by the petitioner, requires legislative, and not judicial, action.
Appellant's Appendix at 5-6.
The issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Grandfather's petition to [616]*616adopt A.M.2 Grandfather argues that he and ML.M. "are not proposing a 'new adoptive family' for A.M. To the contrary, all the evidence showed that they fully intend that nothing at all should change in [A.M.'s] life." Appellant's Brief at 6. Grandfather also argues that "[fJrom the child-centric point of view of [A.M.], everything would go on as before in that both [Grandfather] and [Mother] will continue to act as [A.M.'s] parents." Id.
On review, we will not disturb a trial court's ruling in adoption proceedings unless the evidence would lead to but one conclusion and the trial court reached the opposite conclusion. Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses, and we will examine only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's decision. Id. We owe no deference, however, to a trial court's legal conclusions. Id.
The Indiana Supreme Court has held that the best interests of the child is the primary concern in an adoption proceeding. Adoptive Parents of M.L.V. v. Wilkens, 598 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (Ind.1992). "IT )the adoption statute creates a statutory proceeding unknown at common law," and we "must strictly construe the statute in favor of the rights of biological parents." In re B.W., 908 N.E.2d 586, 592 (Ind.2009) (citing Adoptive Parents of M.L.V., 598 N.E.2d at 1056). Although the adoption statute is to be strictly construed, the statute is not to be so strictly construed as to defeat its purposes. Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 260-261, 133 N.E.2d 56, 61 (1956).
[617]*617We will first consider In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), and In re Adoption of KS.P., 804 N.E2d 1253, 1256 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), which are cited by the trial court and by Grandfather.
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OPINION
BROWN, Judge.
MM. ("Grandfather") appeals the denial of his uncontested petition to adopt AM., Grandfather's biological granddaughter. Grandfather raises one issue, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred in denying Grandfather's uncontested petition to adopt A.M. We reverse and remand.1
The relevant facts ("Mother"), who is the daughter of Grandfather, and A.C. ("Father") are the biological parents of A.M., who was born on September 8, 2005. On April 24, 2009, Grandfather filed a petition for adoption of A.M. The petition stated in part:
[Mother] is the natural mother of said [A.M.] and she consents to said adoption and joins in this Petition for Adoption for purposes of maintaining her maternal rights and that she consents to said adoption by joining in this Petition for Adoption. [Mother] is not terminating or relinquishing her legal maternal rights.
Appellant's Appendix at 54. Father filed a consent to adoption.
On September 30, 2009, the trial court entered a decree of adoption which granted Grandfather's petition for adoption. The decree stated in part: "IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that the above-entitled petition for the adoption of [A.M.] is hereby approved and granted and that by this order, [Mother] is not divested of her maternal rights due to the fact that she and [Grandfather] are not married." Id. at 59. On October 26, 2009, the trial court entered an Order Vacating Decree of Adoption, which stated:
The Court, on its own motion, now finds that the Decree of Adoption signed September 30, 2009 purports to terminate the parental rights of the [Father] and to permit the maternal grandfather to adopt. This order was entered in error. [615]*615It is therefore Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the Decree of Adoption entered September 30, 2009 is vacated, and this matter is set for further hearing on the 7th day of January, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. [Father] is ordered to appear at this hearing. The Petitioner shall provide notice to [Father] of the hearing.
Id. at 60.
On November 17, 2009, Grandfather filed a motion to correct error and argued that Father's "attendance at any hearing under this cause is neither required nor necessary." Id. at 61. After a hearing on December 2, 2009, the trial court stated that there was one issue: whether or not the adoption could be done under Indiana law. The court stated that "if the Court finds that this is an acceptable practice under Indiana Law the Court will grant the adoption." Transcript at 48.
On December 28, 2009, the trial court denied Grandfather's motion to correct error and denied Grandfather's petition for adoption. The trial court's order stated:
4. [Grandfather] concedes that there is no statutory authority that would allow a biological parent to maintain their [sic] parental rights following the issuance of a decree of adoption by a grandparent. Indeed, I.C. 31-19-15-1 appears to preclude this outcome.
# % x # C #
5. However, [Grandfather] correctly notes that, in certain narrowly defined situations, a biological parent has been allowed to maintain their parental rights following an adoption by a third party. See [In re Adoption of K.S.P.], 804 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). See also [In re Adoption of M.M.G.C.], 785 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); [In re Infant Girl W.J, 845 N.E.2d 229 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) I, trans. denied ]; [Mariga v. Flint], 822 N.E.2d 620 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).
6. The above-cited cases are highly fact specific. They do share a common component: The adoptive parent and the consenting parent cohabi-tate. The adults and the child form a cohesive family unit. The adoptive parent provides primary, day-to-day care for the child.
7. [Grandfather] concedes that he does not live in the same house as [A.M.], but argues that he provides significant emotional and financial support for the child. [Grandfather] does see [A.M.] 3 to 4 times per week. The child regularly visits his home. [Grandfather] is the primary male figure in [A.M.]'s life. He also provides significant financial support for the child. However, it cannot be said that [Grandfather], [Mother], and [A.M.] form a family unit as contemplated by the Appellate Court in [K.S.P.].
8. [Grandfather] argues that the holding in [KS.P.] should be expanded to include grandparents who do not reside in the child's home and who do not provide primary care for the child on an everyday basis. This may indeed be desirable. However, it is beyond the authority of the trial court to grant this relief. Modification of the Indiana adoption statutes, as urged by the petitioner, requires legislative, and not judicial, action.
Appellant's Appendix at 5-6.
The issue is whether the trial court erred in denying Grandfather's petition to [616]*616adopt A.M.2 Grandfather argues that he and ML.M. "are not proposing a 'new adoptive family' for A.M. To the contrary, all the evidence showed that they fully intend that nothing at all should change in [A.M.'s] life." Appellant's Brief at 6. Grandfather also argues that "[fJrom the child-centric point of view of [A.M.], everything would go on as before in that both [Grandfather] and [Mother] will continue to act as [A.M.'s] parents." Id.
On review, we will not disturb a trial court's ruling in adoption proceedings unless the evidence would lead to but one conclusion and the trial court reached the opposite conclusion. Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses, and we will examine only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's decision. Id. We owe no deference, however, to a trial court's legal conclusions. Id.
The Indiana Supreme Court has held that the best interests of the child is the primary concern in an adoption proceeding. Adoptive Parents of M.L.V. v. Wilkens, 598 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (Ind.1992). "IT )the adoption statute creates a statutory proceeding unknown at common law," and we "must strictly construe the statute in favor of the rights of biological parents." In re B.W., 908 N.E.2d 586, 592 (Ind.2009) (citing Adoptive Parents of M.L.V., 598 N.E.2d at 1056). Although the adoption statute is to be strictly construed, the statute is not to be so strictly construed as to defeat its purposes. Emmons v. Dinelli, 235 Ind. 249, 260-261, 133 N.E.2d 56, 61 (1956).
[617]*617We will first consider In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), and In re Adoption of KS.P., 804 N.E2d 1253, 1256 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), which are cited by the trial court and by Grandfather. In In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., the court addressed whether a second adoptive parent may adopt a child without divesting the rights of the first adoptive parent. The court observed that the then existing Indiana statutory law did "not expressly divest the rights of an adoptive parent in the event of a second-parent adoption," and "neither [did] it expressly permit two unmarried adults to simultaneously exercise these rights with respect to an adopted child." 785 N.E.2d at 270. The court stated that "[hJaving determined that the adoption statutes do not specifically address the issue in this case, we must look to the common law." Id.
The court held:
The right of adoption was unknown at common law. In Re Perry, 83 Ind.App. 456, 464-65, 148 N.E. 163, 166 (1925). Our General Assembly has since enacted statutes permitting adoptions by married couples, stepparents, and single adults. With respect to these statutes, we have noted that the primary concern in every adoption proceeding is the best interest of the child. B.G. v. H.S., 509 N.E.2d 214, 217 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) [, reh'g demied ]. "The state has a strong interest in providing stable homes for children. To this end, early, permanent placement of children with adoptive families furthers the interests of both the child and the state." Id. A two-parent adoption enables a child to be raised in a stable, supportive, and nurturing environment and precludes the possibility of state wardship in the event of one parent's death. Such an adoption also legally entitles the child to both parents' employer-and/or government-sponsored health and disability insurance; education, housing, and nutrition assistance; and social security benefits. Undoubtedly, it would be in the best interest of the three children in the instant case to be entitled to the legal protections and advantages that a two-parent adoption provides.
"The strength and genius of the common law lies in its ability to adapt to the changing needs of the society it governs." Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 22-23, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1972). "We cannot close our eyes to the legal and social needs of our society, and this Court should not hesitate to alter, amend, or abrogate the common law when society's needs so dictate." Sandy Ridge Oil Co. v. Centerre Bank Nat'l Assoc., 510 N.E.2d 667, 670 (Ind.1987). We note, however, that "such determinations should be consonant with the evolving body of public policy adopted by the General Assembly." Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ind.1993). Consonant with our General Assembly's policy of providing stable homes for children through adoption, we conclude that Indiana's common law permits a second parent to adopt a child without divesting the rights of the first adoptive parent. Allowing a second parent to share legal responsibility for the financial, spiritual, educational, and emotional well-being of the child in a stable, supportive, and nurturing environment can only be in the best interest of that child.
Id. at 270-271 (emphasis added). The court expressly limited its holding by noting that it did not "reach the question of whether a second-parent adoption would divest all rights of a biological parent with respect to the child where the child's prospective adoptive parent and the child's biological parent are not married to each other," nor "the question of whether two [618]*618unmarried adults may adopt a child by filing a joint petition for adoption." Id. at 270 n. 1.
In In re Adoption of KS.P., the court squarely addressed one of the issues that was reserved in M.M.G.C., that is, whether a second-parent adoption would divest all rights of a biological parent with respect to the child where the child's prospective parent and the child's biological parent are not married to each other. 804 N.E.2d at 1256. In KS.P., J.P. and K.S.P. were the biological children of Linda Lutz and John Potat. Lutz and Potat were legally divorced in October 1994, and Lutz retained legal custody of the children since the divoree. Id. at 1254.
On March 5, 2008, Monica Polchert, Lutz's domestic partner, filed an adoption petition with the trial court. Id. Along with the petition, Lutz and Potat each filed written consents to the adoption. Id. After a hearing on the uncontested adoption petition, Polcehert and Lutz testified that they wished to share parental rights. Id. The trial court denied Polchert's petition based upon Ind.Code § 31-19-15-1 and Ind.Code § 31-19-15-2. Id. at 1255.
On appeal, the court examined Ind.Code § 31-19-15-1 and Ind.Code § 81-19-15-2. Id. at 1256-1257. Ind.Code § 31-19-15-1 (the divesting statute) at that time provided:3
Except as provided in section 2 of this chapter or IC-31-19-16, if the biological parents of an adopted person are alive, the biological parents are:
(1) relieved of all legal duties and obligations to the adopted child; and
(2) divested of all rights with respect to the child; after the adoption.
The court reasoned that "[tlhis statute provides two specific exceptions to the general rule that an adoption divests all parental rights of a living biological parent." Id. at 1256. The relevant exception, Ind.Code § 3$1-19-15-2, governed stepparent adoptions and provided at that time: 4
(a) If the adoptive parent of a child is married to a biological parent of the child, the parent-child relationship of the biological parent is not affected by the adoption.
(b) After the adoption, the adoptive father or mother, or both:
(1) occupy the same position toward the child that the adoptive father or the adoptive mother, or both, would occupy if the adoptive father or adoptive mother, or both, were the biological father or mother; and
(2) are jointly and severally liable for the maintenance and education of the person.
The court held that "[a] strict literal reading of these two statutes would seem to support the trial court's determination that if it were to grant Polchert's petition for adoption, [Lutz's] parental rights to her children would be divested, a consequence clearly unintended by the couple." Id. at 1257. The court held that "[in light of the purpose and spirit of Indiana's adoption laws, we conclude that the legislature could not have intended such a destructive and absurd result." Id.
The court observed that the guiding principle of statutes governing the parent-child relationship is the best interests of the child. Id. The court held:
[We have observed that the relationship between parent and child is a bundle of [619]*619human rights of such fundamental importance that adoption statutes, being in derogation of the common law, should be "strictly construed in favor of a worthy parent and the preservation of such relationship." Adoption of Thomas, 431 N.E.2d 506, 512 (Ind.Ct.App.1982). "Thus the liberal construction rule must be tempered by a counterbalancing rule, that is, neither should the adoption statute be so liberally construed that it would destroy the safeguards erected for preservation of family relationships." Id. at 512-18; see also Paternity of Baby Girl, 661 N.E.2d 873 [ (Ind.Ct.App.1996) ].
The only immediate threat to preservation of family relationships in the instant case is the harsh application of the divesting statute. The obvious purpose of the divesting statute is to shield the adoptive family from unnecessary instability and uncertainty arising from unwanted intrusions by the child's biological family. See Adoptive Parents of M.L.V. v. Wilkens, 598 N.E.2d 1054, 1056 (Ind.1992) (in addition to protecting the rights of natural parents to be with their children, Indiana's adoption statutes "operate to protect the children and to shield all involved parties from unnee-essary instability and uncertainty"). This objective, however, is not advanced by application of the divesting statute in situations imvolving stepparent adoptions or second-parent adoptions, where the biological parent and proposed adoptive parent are both integral members of the proposed adoptive family. In such instances, it would be absurd to fear that the biological parent, here Mother, could "intrude" into her own fomily. As an oft cited trial court in New York has emphasized regarding this issue, termination of parental rights in the circumstances of this case "would be an absurd outcome which would nullify the advantage sought by the proposed adoption: the creation of a legal family unit identical to the actual family setup." Adoption of Evan, 153 Misc.2d 844, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (Sur.Ct.1992). It is clear that the divesting statute, designed as a shield to protect new adoptive families, was never intended as a sword to prohibit otherwise beneficial intrafamily adoptions by second parents. See In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716, 660 N.E.2d 397 (1995).
Id. at 1257-1258 (emphasis added). The court ultimately concluded that "where, as here, the prospective adoptive parent and the biological parent are both in fact acting as parents, Indiana law does not require a destructive choice between the two parents." Id. at 1260. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's denial of Pol-chert's petition to adopt as a second parent and remanded for further proceedings. Id.
With M.M.G.C. and KSP. in mind, we turn to the issue presented in this case. This case requires us to interpret Ind. Code § 31-19-15-1 and Ind.Code § 31-19-152, When interpreting a statute, we independently review a statute's meaning and apply it to the facts of the case under review. Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind.2002). "The first step in interpreting any Indiana statute is to determine whether the legislature has spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question." St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Steele, 766 N.E.2d 699, 703-704 (Ind.2002). If a statute is unambiguous, we must give the statute its clear and plain meaning. Bolin, 764 N.E.2d at 204. A statute is unambiguous if it is not susceptible to more than one interpretation. Elmer Buchta Trucking, Inc. v. Stanley, 744 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ind.2001).
If a statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations, we must try to ascertain [620]*620the legislature's intent and interpret the statute so as to effectuate that intent. Bolin, 764 N.E.2d at 204. We presume the legislature intended logical application of the language used in the statute, so as to avoid unjust or absurd results Id. The best evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, and courts strive to give the words in a statute their plain and ordinary meaning. Mayes v. Second Injury Fund, 888 N.E.2d 773, 776 (Ind.2008). A statute should be examined as a whole, avoiding excessive reliance upon a strict literal meaning or the selective reading of individual words. Id. We presume that the legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute's underlying policy and goals, Id.
At the time Grandfather filed his petition, Ind.Code § 31-19-15-1 provided in part: 5
(a) Except as provided in section 2 of this chapter or IC 31-19-16, if the biological parents of an adopted person are alive, the biological parents are:
(1) relieved of all legal duties and obligations to the adopted child; and
(2) divested of all rights with respect to the child; after the adoption.
As to Ind.Code § 31-19-15-2, the legislature amended the statute in 1995 by adding subsection (b) as set forth below and redesignating former subsection (b) as present subsection (c). See Pub.L. No. 130-2005, § 9 (eff. July 1, 2005). The current version of the statute reads:
(a) If the adoptive parent of a child is married to a biological parent of the child, the parent-child relationship of the biological parent is not affected by the adoption.
(b) If the adoptive parent of a child is married to a previous adoptive parent, the parent-child relationship of the previous adoptive parent is not affected by the adoption.
(c) After the adoption, the adoptive father or mother, or both:
(1) oceupy the same position toward the child that the adoptive father or the adoptive mother, or both, would occupy if the adoptive father or adoptive mother, or both, were the biological father or mother; and
(2) are jointly and severally liable for the maintenance and education of the person.
Ind.Code § 81-19-15-2.
As previously mentioned, the Indiana Supreme Court has held that the best interests of the child is the primary concern in an adoption proceeding. Adoptive Parents of M.L.V., 598 N.E.2d at 1058. Further, although the adoption statute is to be strictly construed, the statute is not to be so strictly construed as to defeat its purposes. Emmons, 235 Ind. at 260-261, 133 N.E.2d at 61.
[621]*621Ind.Code § 31-10-2-1 is titled "Policy and purpose" and provides:
It is the policy of this state and the purpose of this title to:
(1) recognize the importance of family and children in our society;
(2) recognize the responsibility of the state to enhance the viability of children and family in our society;
(3) acknowledge the responsibility each person owes to the other;
(4) strengthen family life by assisting parents to fulfill their parental obligations;
x * sp x s x
(6) remove children from families only when it is in the ehild's best interest or in the best interest of public safety;
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(10) provide a judicial procedure that:
(A) ensures fair hearings;
(B) recognizes and enforces the legal rights of children and their parents; and
(C) recognizes and enforces the accountability of children and parents[.]
While the legislature did not define "family," Ind.Code § 31-9-2-44.5 provides that "(aln individual is a 'family or household member' of another person if the individual ... is related by blood or adoption to the other person." Thus, Grandfather is considered family under the statute. Further, Grandfather is the biological grandfather of A.M. We also observe that the record reveals that, while Mother and Grandfather are not living together, they live only fifteen minutes apart, and that A.M. stays overnight with Grandfather almost every weekend and that Grandfather has contact with A.M. about three or four times a week. Grandfather takes A.M. to church, dance class, and the park. Grandfather provides discipline and financial support. In summary, the record reveals that Grandfather and Mother are both acting as parents. 4
Based upon the reasoning in KS.P., the idea that the best interests of the child is the primary concern in an adoption proceeding, the purposes of the adoption statutes as stated by the legislature, and the trial court's initial determination that adoption was in the best interests of A.M., we conclude that preventing the adoption in this specific case on the basis of Ind. Code § 31-19-15-1 and Ind.Code § 31-19~15-2 would cause an absurd result not intended by the legislature. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Grandfather's uncontested petition to adopt A.M. and reverse the trial court's denial of Grandfather's petition to adopt A.M. and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, we instruct the trial court to insure that all statutory requirements for adoption are met.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court's denial of Grandfather's uncontested petition to adopt A.M.
Reversed and remanded.
VAIDIK, J. coneurs.
NAJAM, J., dissents with separate opinion.