In Re Texas Gulf Sulphur Securities Litigation
This text of 344 F. Supp. 1398 (In Re Texas Gulf Sulphur Securities Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION AND ORDER
The complaint filed by plaintiff Fox in the District of Utah is the latest action to be brought against Texas Gulf Sulphur Company (“TGS”) and its officers arising from the dissemination of news and information with respect to that company’s major mineral discovery in Canada in 1963 and 1964. At present 69 private damage actions against TGS alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder are pending in the Southern District of New York. Defendants have moved the Panel to transfer the Fox action to the Southern District of New York for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings with those cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. All responding parties, except plaintiff Fox, favor transfer. We find that transfer of this action will prevent inconsistent class action determinations, avoid duplicative discovery and in general promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation.
This litigation began in 1965 when the Securities and Exchange Commission filed an action against TGS and its officers in the Southern District of New *1399 York alleging violations of the federal securities laws. A wave of private damage actions followed in various jurisdictions in both state and federal courts, although the bulk of the litigation was commenced in the Southern District of New York. Where possible, state cases were removed to federal courts and cases pending in the federal courts were transferred to the Southern District of New York pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Honorable Dudley B. Bonsai was appointed to coordinate the proceedings in the SEC action and in all of the private damage actions in that district. In addition, eighteen private damage actions arising from the same facts are pending in New York state court and are being coordinated, so far as pretrial proceedings are concerned, with the cases in the Southern District of New York.
In 1966 an individual action (hereinafter Reynolds) was commenced by plaintiff Reynolds in the District of Utah against TGS and its officers. Defendants’ motion to have that case transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the Southern District of New York was denied by the district court. 1 Subsequent to this ruling three more actions against TGS were filed in the District of Utah and consolidated with the Reynolds action for trial.
Meanwhile, in the New York proceedings Judge Bonsai established the so-called Cannon class, which consists of all persons who sold TGS stock between April 12, 1964, and 10:55 a. m. on April 16, 1964, at a price of $33 per share or less, in alleged reliance on the press release issued by TGS on April 12, 1964. 2 Subsequent to the establishment of the Cannon class, Judge Willis W. Ritter announced his decision on the merits in favor of plaintiffs in the Reynolds case. 3 Counsel for Reynolds, now representing Fox, filed a post-trial motion to have the Reynolds case declared a class action on behalf of a class that encompassed both the Cannon class and persons who sold TGS stock after 10:55 a. m. on April 16, 1964. Judge Ritter denied the motion and that decision was affirmed on appeal. 4
During the course of this appeal, Reynolds and Fox sought to intervene in the New York proceedings. Judge Bonsai denied the application of Reynolds to intervene on the ground that he had already recovered judgment in Utah on the claim that he sought to make in New York. He also denied both applications on the ground that Reynolds and Fox were not members of the Cannon class as previously defined. Reynolds and Fox then moved to expand the Cannon class action definition to include a class as broad as the one defined in the Fox complaint. This motion and similar motions by New York plaintiffs were denied. 5
Following these setbacks, Fox filed his complaint in the District of Utah. The action is brought as a class action alleged to consist of persons who sold TGS stock after 10:55 a. m. on April 16, 1964, on April 17,1964, and persons who sold during an undetermined period thereafter.
The movants assert that the Fox action is the only TGS securities action pending in a federal court other than the Southern District of New York. A settlement agreement has been reached between plaintiffs and defendants in 63 of the 69 private damage actions pending *1400 in the New York federal court, and in thirteen of the eighteen cases pending in the New York state court. But the parties favoring transfer point out that even if the proposed settlement is approved 6 there will remain before Judge Bonsai cases in which pretrial proceedings will have to be conducted. And it is asserted that absent transfer of the Fox action there will certainly be overlapping and duplicitous discovery. The major thrust of movants’ argument, however, is that transfer is necessary to prevent conflicting class action determinations.
Fox opposes transfer to the Southern District of New York. He argues that all of the discovery that resulted in the Reynolds judgment and that is pertinent to his action is available to him in the District of Utah and that only factual questions of an individual nature remain to be discovered. Fox also asserts that transfer will effectively preclude him from establishing his class action claims.
In order to promote the just and efficient conduct of multidistriet litigation and to avoid duplication in discovery, we have consistently transferred cases that involve common questions of fact to a single district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. See, e. g., In re Hotel Telephone Charge Antitrust Litigation, 341 F.Supp. 771 (J.P.M.L. March 30, 1972). It is clear that even though Fox is not a member of the Cannon class the facts that he would have to prove as an individual litigant will involve much of the same discovery applicable to the nonsettling cases in the Southern District of New York. Furthermore, we are not persuaded of the sincerity of counsel’s arguments opposing transfer especially since he tried before, albeit unsuccessfully, to have his client included in the proceedings in the Southern District of New York.
From the papers filed and the arguments presented at the hearing, it is obvious that the crux of the opposition to transfer centers on the ability of Fox, if transferred, to act as the representative of a class. The New York court has already ruled that there is not sufficient numerosity under Rule 23 to justify setting up the class alleged by Fox. 7 We have frequently held that the possibility of inconsistent class action determinations is an important factor favoring transfer. See, e. g., In re Career Academy Antitrust Litigation, 342 F.Supp. 753 (J.P.M.L.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
344 F. Supp. 1398, 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12812, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-texas-gulf-sulphur-securities-litigation-jpml-1972.