In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001

454 F. Supp. 2d 220, 66 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 496, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71940, 2006 WL 2827639
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 3, 2006
Docket03 MDL 1570(RCC)
StatusPublished
Cited by62 cases

This text of 454 F. Supp. 2d 220 (In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 454 F. Supp. 2d 220, 66 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 496, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71940, 2006 WL 2827639 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

Opinion

*221 MEMORANDUM & ORDER

CASEY, District Judge.

The Defendants’ Executive Committee (“Defendants’ Committee”) makes an application for an umbrella protective order covering all materials produced during discovery in the above-captioned case. Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that upon motion a court may grant a protective order “which justice requires to protect a party or person from. annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” provided that the party or person requesting the protective order has demonstrated that good cause exists for its issuance. The Plaintiffs’ Executive Committee opposes the instant application for a protective order on the grounds that the Defendants’ Committee has not adequately demonstrated good cause, particularly in light of the intense public interest surrounding this litigation. Because the Court finds that the Defendants’ Committee has demonstrated sufficient good cause to warrant a limited protective order, the Defendants’ Committee’s application is GRANTED IN PART.

I. MEMORANDUM

“The unique character of the discovery process requires that the trial court have substantial latitude to fashion protective orders.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984). But courts also must be mindful that protective orders implicate a litigant’s First Amendment right to speak, see id. at 34, 104 S.Ct. 2199, as well as the public’s common law and “likely constitutional” right of access to the courts, Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir.2004). Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure accommodates these important rights by requiring the party or person seeking a protective order to demonstrate good cause for its issuance. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 37, 104 S.Ct. 2199; In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig. (“In re Agent Orange”), 821 F.2d 139, 145 (2d Cir.1987) (“[T]he party seeking a protective order has the burden of showing that good cause exists for issuance of that order ... [and] if good cause *222 is not shown, the discovery materials in question should ... be open to the public for inspection.”).

The specificity required in a showing of good cause varies with the scope and complexity of a case. Ordinarily, good cause exists “when a party shows that disclosure will result in a clearly defined, specific and serious injury.” Shingara v. Skiles, 420 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir.2005); see also Havens v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 94 Civ. 1402(CSH), 1995 WL 234710, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. April 20, 1995) (“[Djefendant fails to specify the nature or extent of injury [that] it contemplates release of the sealed documents would bring about, and accordingly fails to establish good cause.”). But see Topo v. Dhir, 210 F.R.D. 76, 77-78 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (holding that while the “specificity requirement” of the good cause standard applies to companies, it does not apply to private individuals). In cases of unusual scope and complexity, however, broad protection during the pretrial stages of litigation may be warranted without a highly particularized finding of good cause. See In re Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 148. Instead, a court may impose an initial protective order based upon a general showing of good cause, and may modify that order at a later time if more specific grounds for its continuance remain indiscernible. . Id. (explaining that although the district court made no finding of good cause, the court “properly entered the [protective] orders initially as temporary measures, and properly lifted them thereafter”).

In addition, the public’s right of access to discovery materials depends on the type of materials and the stage of the litigation. A court considering whether to issue a protective order must consider the public interests at stake. Shingara, 420 F.3d at 308; Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir.1999) (Posner, J.) (noting that “[t]he judge is the primary representative of the public interest in the judicial process”). But, as the Second Circuit indicated in United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir.1995), public interest in particular litigation does not generate a public right of access to all discovery materials. Indeed, no public right of access exists with respect to materials produced during the initial stages of discovery. Id. The Second Circuit in Amodeo explained that while a presumption of public access exists as to documents filed with the court, “[d]ocuments that play no role in the performance of Article III functions, such as those passed between the parties in discovery, lie entirely beyond the presumption’s reach and stand on a different footing than a motion filed by a party seeking action by the court, or, indeed, than any other document which is presented to the court to invoke its powers or affect its decisions.” Id. (internal quotations, citations, and alteration omitted).

Thus, the public’s right of access to discovery material only encompasses access to “judicial documents,” that is, such “items filed with the court that are relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process.” SEC v. TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 231 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.1995) (alterations omitted)). This “presumptive right to public observation is at its apogee when asserted with respect to documents relating to matters that directly affect an adjudication. Such documents include those relating to the decision of a motion for summary judgment. ...” Gambale, 377 F.3d at 140 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Accordingly, a party seeking a protective order sealing trial, other court hearings, or motions and accompanying exhibits filed with the court must satisfy a more *223 demanding standard of good cause. See id. (noting that “documents used by parties moving for, or opposing, summary judgment should not remain under seal absent the most compelling reasons”); Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 98 Civ. 8520(BSJ), 2000 WL 60221, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.25, 2000).

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454 F. Supp. 2d 220, 66 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 496, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71940, 2006 WL 2827639, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-terrorist-attacks-on-september-11-2001-nysd-2006.