In Re: Term Commodities Cotton Futures Litigation

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 17, 2022
Docket1:12-cv-05126
StatusUnknown

This text of In Re: Term Commodities Cotton Futures Litigation (In Re: Term Commodities Cotton Futures Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re: Term Commodities Cotton Futures Litigation, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

USDC SDNY DOCUMENT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOE RN eho SOUTHERNDISTRICTOF NEW YORK are CRD: Sa — IN RE: TERM COMMODITIES COTTON : FUTURES LITIGATION, : : OPINION & ORDER THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO ALL MEMBER : CASES OF THIS ACTION: : MASTER DOCKET 12-CV-5126 : 12-CV-5126 (ALC)(KNF) 12-CV-5269 : 12-CV-5334 : 12-CV-5380 : 12-CV-5470 : 12-CV-5563 : 12-CV-5732 : --------------------- +--+ +--+ +--+ +--+ + +--+ + +--+ ---- FX ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., District Judge: Plaintiffs Mark Allen and Brian Ledwith (together, “Plaintiffs”) bring this putative class action on behalf of a proposed class of traders who lost money when prices in the cotton futures market increased unexpectedly in 2011. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants, Louis Dreyfus Commodities B.V., Louis Dreyfus Commodities Cotton LLC (a/k/a Allenberg Cotton Company), LDC Holdings Inc., Term Commodities, Inc., Louis Dreyfus Commodities LLC, and Joseph Nicosia (collectively, “Defendants”) unlawfully manipulated the price of cotton futures by unreasonably and uneconomically demanding delivery of certificated cotton in fulfillment of futures contracts in conjunction with other manipulative behavior. As a result of Defendants’ market conduct, Plaintiffs argue they suffered losses in liquidating their positions in the May and July 2011 Cotton No. 2 futures contracts. Plaintiffs now move for class certification. Both parties move to seal documents filed in connection with the motion for class certification. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the proposed class meets the requirements of Rule 23(a) and the relevant requirements of Ruel 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs’ motion is granted.

BACKGROUND A. Factual Background The Court assumes familiarity with the particularities of this dispute and briefly recites facts relevant to the pending motion. These facts are taken directly from the Court’s prior ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.1

Plaintiff Mark Allen was hired by Glencore Grain B.V. (“Glencore”) in 2009. UMF ¶1. Mr. Allen was the head cotton trader at Glencore during the period from March 2011 through July 2011. UMF ¶2. Glencore was one of the world's largest commodities firms during the period from March 2011 through July 2011 but was a relatively small player in the cotton market at the time. UMF ¶3. While Mr. Allen was trading futures on behalf of Glencore, he was also trading using his personal account, and his claims in this case arise from his personal transactions. UMF ¶4–5.

Plaintiff Brian Ledwith was a derivatives trader at Omog Trading during the period from March 2011 through July 2011. UMF ¶7. Mr. Ledwith traded in both the May and the July 2011 ICE Cotton No. 2 futures contracts. UMF ¶8.

Defendant Louis Dreyfus Commodities B.V. “trades and markets commodities, including cotton, on an international basis.” Third Consolidated Amended Complaint (“TCAC”) (ECF No. 484) at ¶12. The remaining corporate Defendants are all subsidiaries, affiliates, or clearing members for Louis Dreyfus Commodities B.V. Defendant Louis Dreyfus Company Cotton LLC (known during 2011 as LD Commodities Cotton LLC) (a/k/a Allenberg Cotton Co.) was one of, if not the, largest cotton merchants in the United States and throughout the world during the relevant time period from March 2011 through July 2011. UMF ¶24. Defendant Joseph Nicosia was Executive Vice President of Louis Dreyfus Commodities LLC and Chief Executive Officer of Allenberg Cotton Company. UMF ¶25. Ruling at 13.

The crux of Plaintiffs’ allegations is that Defendants intentionally and uneconomically took the largest ratio of deliveries of physical cotton to the amount of certificated supplies in the history of ICE cotton futures trading, which exacerbated existing market congestion and caused the contract prices to climb—i.e., Defendants “squeezed” the market. As part of this alleged scheme, Defendants acted uneconomically by (1) failing to re-tender cotton, which further depleted deliverable supplies and further inflated prices, TCAC at ¶42; (2) decertificating all of the cotton they received delivery on in the May 2011 Contract, id.; and (3) refusing cheaper cotton from the cash market, id. ¶¶61. The culmination of this uneconomic activity was that the deliverable supply was too low to satisfy Defendants’ positions through delivery, which resulted in shorts having to liquidate their positions at prices greater than what physical cotton could be sold for in the cash market. Id. ¶¶ 51, 61(e).

1 For a more detailed recitation, see generally In re Term Commodities Cotton Futures Litig., No. 12-CV-5126 (ALC), 2020 WL 5849142 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020). According to Plaintiffs, Defendants knew that lengthy warehouse loadout delays would impact market participants who sought to purchase cotton stored in cash market warehouses for delivery to ICE warehouses to satisfy May 2011 cotton futures contracts. UMF ¶280. Indeed, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants themselves claimed that “we are only able to find very limited amounts of cotton in the cash market” in their request to ICE for a notice period exemption for the March 2011 Contract. UMF ¶¶ 273, 283. Accordingly, Defendants knew that it would be difficult to make a large number of deliveries on the May 2011 Contract, and thus that a large stopper in the May 2011 Contract could increase the inversion between the May Contract price and the July Contract price. UMF ¶287.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants manipulated the market by making large additions to their May Contract long positions and July Contract short positions to hold an approximately balanced bull spread position. UMF ¶295. 6 These additions peaked with a 3,093,200 bale long position in the May Contract. UMF ¶296. Defendants made these purchases when the rest of the long side of the open interest in the May Contracts was, on the other hand, generally decreasing their long positions. UMF ¶298. This, along with Defendants’ slower rate of liquidation, caused their percentage market share of the May Contract long positions to grow from 25.7% on March 30 to 99.4% on April 25. UMF ¶299. As Defendants’ percentage market share of the open interest in the May Contract increased to the point where Defendants held more than 99% of the long open interest, the spread between the price of the May Contract and the price of the July Contract generally tended to increase as well. UMF ¶300. Defendants’ large late buying deprived the shorts of liquidity to exit the positions at market balanced prices. UMF ¶334. During the delivery period for the May Contract, Defendants took 99%+ of the deliveries made on the May Contract. UMF ¶348. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants made approximately $55.1 million in trading profits from March 30 to May 6, 2011 as a result of Defendants’ spread position that was long the May 2011 Contract and short the July 2011 Contract. UMF ¶350.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ conduct during the July 2011 contract was substantially similar to their conduct during the May 2011 contract. Between May 23 and June 20, Defendants were net buyers of 1,797,700 bales of July Contracts. UMF ¶407. Between June 6 and June 20, Defendants were net buyers of 1,054,200 bales of July contracts. UMF ¶408. Defendants’ share of the long open interest in the July Contract increased from -.10 percent on June 3 to 72.19 percent on June 24, 2011. UMF ¶409. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ large late buying deprived shorts of liquidity to exit/buy out of the contract. ¶415. Between June 3 and June 24, 2011, the inversion between the July Contract price and the October Contract price increased from 14.03 cents per pound to 38.3 cents per pound. UMF ¶416.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Myers v. Hertz Corp.
624 F.3d 537 (Second Circuit, 2010)
In Re Flag Telecom Holdings Securities Litigation
574 F.3d 29 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo
577 U.S. 442 (Supreme Court, 2016)
Mazzei v. Money Store
829 F.3d 260 (Second Circuit, 2016)
Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co.
67 F.3d 1072 (Second Circuit, 1995)
Savino v. Computer Credit, Inc.
164 F.3d 81 (Second Circuit, 1998)
In re Libor-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig.
299 F. Supp. 3d 430 (S.D. Illinois, 2018)
Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG
443 F.3d 253 (Second Circuit, 2006)
Newsday LLC v. County of Nassau
730 F.3d 156 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp.
778 F.3d 401 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Associates LLC
780 F.3d 70 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Johnson v. Nextel Communications Inc.
780 F.3d 128 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Yong Soon Oh v. At & T Corp.
224 F.R.D. 357 (D. New Jersey, 2004)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
In Re: Term Commodities Cotton Futures Litigation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-term-commodities-cotton-futures-litigation-nysd-2022.