In Re Stephenson

262 B.R. 871, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 477, 37 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 231, 2001 WL 476387
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Oklahoma
DecidedApril 27, 2001
Docket19-10723
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 262 B.R. 871 (In Re Stephenson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Stephenson, 262 B.R. 871, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 477, 37 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 231, 2001 WL 476387 (Okla. 2001).

Opinion

ORDER DENYING DEBTOR’S MOTION TO DISMISS

RICHARD L. BOHANON, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Debtor’s motion to dismiss *873 the petition. The Trustee objected, 1 and the Court heard arguments from both sides and took the matter under consideration. For reasons outlined below, the Court denies the Debtor’s motion.

FACTS

The meeting of creditors held pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341 was conducted, and at that meeting, the Trustee learned that the Debtor was to receive a federal tax refund of approximately $4,000 and a state tax refund of about $ 1,600. When the Trustee demanded that these refunds be turned over to him, the Debtor filed his motion to dismiss, which contained no supporting authority.

DISCUSSION

The Debtor’s motion states that he wishes to seek “an alternative method to resolve his current financial status thus attempting to satisfying [sic] his debts with all creditors.” The Trustee argues that dismissal would prejudice the creditors for they will receive some distribution from the tax refunds if the case is administered. Conversely, the creditors are not assured any distribution if the petition is dismissed. 2

This case represents a current objectionable trend in bankruptcy cases in this district where debtors initially seek the benefits of the Bankruptcy Code but later move to dismiss their petitions when an asset, usually valuable, is discovered. Debtors should be cautioned that although they have an absolute right to file a bankruptcy petition, there is no absolute right to dismiss it. See Laura A. Pawloski. The Debtor Trap: the Ironies of Section 707(a), 7 Bankr.DevJ. 175, 180-81 (1990). See also, In re Blackmon, 3 B.R. 167, 169 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1980) (“While the debtor may choose to place himself in bankruptcy by voluntarily filing a petition with this Court to commence his case, he does not have the same degree of discretion in deciding whether he will terminate the proceedings once they are started.”); In re Klein, 39 B.R. 530, 532 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1984) (“A debtor who has filed a petition under Chapter 7 does not have an absolute right to dismiss his petition.”); In re Schwartz, 58 B.R. 923, 925 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1986) (quoting In re Klein).

The applicable section provides: a) The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a hearing and only for cause, including—
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees or charges required under chapter 123 of title 28, and
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen days or such additional time as the court may allow after the filing of the petition commencing such case, the information required by paragraph (1) of section 521, but only a motion by the United States trustee.

11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (emphasis added). While the Bankruptcy Code does not specify who may move to dismiss a petition under § 707(a), most courts allow a debtor to move to dismiss only where “cause” *874 exists. See In re Schwartz, 58 B.R. at 925. The situations listed in § 707(a)(l)-(3) are only illustrative, and a court may dismiss a petition on other grounds where cause exists. See Collier on Bankruptcy, supra, ¶ 707.03[1] at 707-7. See also, 11 U.S.C. § 102(3).

What constitutes “cause” within the meaning of § 707(a) has been the source of much judicial opining and scholarly debate. See generally, Pawloski, supra, at 180-93 (discussing how courts have developed different tests to determine dismissal under § 707(a)). The predominant approach, at a minimum, requires that dismissal not cause prejudice to the creditors. See Collier on Bankruptcy, supra, ¶ 707.03[3] at 707-13. See also, In re Schwartz, 58 B.R. at 925 (“[T]he test is whether dismissal is in the best interest of the debtor and his creditors.”); In re Klein, 39 B.R. at 531 (stating that the applicable test is whether “dismissal will cause no legal prejudice to interested parties.”)

Hence, the core issue here is whether dismissal would cause the creditors prejudice. The Debtor made the motion and, accordingly, has the burden of proof to show that dismissal would not prejudice the creditors.

Generally, a debtor’s interest is in securing a fresh start through a discharge. See In re Schwartz, 58 B.R. at 925. On the other hand, creditors may suffer prejudice in many forms. Prejudice has been defined as an “injury, detriment, or damage, caused by judgement or action in which his rights are disregarded.” Oxford English Dictionary. http://dictio-nary.oed.com. Thus, it can be said that dismissal is not appropriate where a creditor will suffer some legal harm or injury.

Debtors may have several reasons for asking that their petitions be dismissed. They may wish to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy; they may wish to avoid harm to credit reports; or they may have received poor advice from counsel. They may also wish to take advantage of some newly discovered asset or to refile later so as to receive a discharge for additional debt. 3 See Pawloski, supra, at 179-80.

Regardless of a debtor’s intent, dismissal is not proper where harm will befall the creditors. See In re MacDonald, 73 B.R. 254, 256 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1987) (denying debtor’s motion to dismiss where creditors would be forced to exercise their rights in state court anew after imposition of the automatic stay); In re Bryant, 28 B.R. 362, 366 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1983) (denying the debtor’s motion to dismiss when the debtor wished to pursue a cause of action against a defendant in state court because the debtor believed his claim was worth more than what the trustee settled for and noting that there was no assurance the debtor would win any award).

In the case at bar, the Trastee correctly asserts that the creditors will suffer prejudice if the petition is dismissed because it is uncertain they would receive any distribution. The Debtor claims he intends to use the tax refunds to pay his creditors in full, but he is not specific about any plan to honor this commitment. *875 The Debtor could fail to repay his creditors, spend his tax refunds, and later refile for bankruptcy. In that case, the creditors would suffer even further prejudice and delay.

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Bluebook (online)
262 B.R. 871, 2001 Bankr. LEXIS 477, 37 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 231, 2001 WL 476387, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-stephenson-okwb-2001.