Bartee v. Ainsworth (In Re Bartee)

317 B.R. 362, 2004 WL 2709481
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedNovember 19, 2004
DocketBAP No. EC-03-1399-PMaMo. Bankruptcy No. 03-23700-C-7
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 317 B.R. 362 (Bartee v. Ainsworth (In Re Bartee)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bartee v. Ainsworth (In Re Bartee), 317 B.R. 362, 2004 WL 2709481 (bap9 2004).

Opinion

OPINION

PERRIS, Bankruptcy Judge.

This is an appeal from an order denying debtors’ motion to dismiss their voluntary chapter 7 1 bankruptcy case. We AFFIRM.

FACTS

Lin M. Bartee and Christine J. Wenger-Bartee (“debtors”) filed a chapter 7 petition. The § 341(a) meeting was set for May 12, 2003, but debtors failed to appear.

On June 2, 2003, Gerald I. Ainsworth (“the trustee”) filed an Initial Report of Asset Case. Four days later, debtors filed a Request for Dismissal. Debtors requested that their case be dismissed to allow them to make repayment arrangements with their creditors outside of bankruptcy. They stated that, “[ujpon auditing of Debtor Lin Bartee’s company, errors in bookkeeping were found and funds are available to assist in repayment to creditors.” Request for Dismissal, ¶ 3. The bankruptcy court declined to process the Request for Dismissal, because debtors filed it on their own behalf even though they were represented by counsel at the time.

Shortly after debtors’ rescheduled § 341(a) meeting, debtors filed a Motion to Dismiss Chapter 7 Bankruptcy (“the motion to dismiss”). Debtors suggested in the motion that they had received bad legal advice to file their bankruptcy petition. Debtors also stated their intent to pay their creditors outside of bankruptcy, and that “Lin Bartee’s business partner has agreed to let Mr. Bartee sell his share of the business for an estimated sum of $92,000.00.” Motion to Dismiss Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, ¶ 4. According to debtors, this sum would be sufficient to pay their creditors in full. Debtors did not support any *365 of these assertions with documentary evidence or affidavits.

The trustee opposed the motion to dismiss, stating that “the debtors have been less than candid about their financial affairs and can not [sic] be counted upon to follow through with the promises made in them motion.” Trustee’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case, at 1. The trustee filed a declaration in support of his opposition, describing numerous apparent discrepancies in debtors’ bankruptcy schedules and statement of financial affairs. The trustee also stated that debtors had not complied with his request for additional information about their assets, income, prepetition transfers and alleged gambling losses.

On the day of the hearing on the motion to dismiss, debtors filed Debtors’ Planned Course of Action. Debtors repeated that Mr. Bartee’s business partner was willing to buy Mr. Bartee’s share of the business and stated that Mr. Bartee had returned to work full-time. Debtors also maintained that Mr. Bartee had spoken with debtors’ unsecured creditors and that those creditors had agreed to “reaffirm their debts.” Debtors’ Planned Course of Action, ¶ 5. Finally, debtors stated that

[a]s a recovering gambler, Debtor Lin M. Bartee requests this court for the opportunity to cure these debts on his own accord. The ability to do this is instrumental in his rehabilitation. Debt- or Lin Bartee is attending as many Gamblers Anonymous meetings as his work schedule will permit.

Id. at ¶ 6. None of the assertions made in Debtors’ Planned Course of Action was supported by documentary evidence or affidavits. The bankruptcy court took the matter under advisement.

Two days later, the court entered an order denying the motion to dismiss. The court stated as follows in its memorandum decision:

Upon review of the record, and of the “Debtors’ Planned Course of Action,” the court is persuaded that this bankruptcy case should continue. The debtors’ financial circumstances are primarily in chaos. The chaos affects their creditors. The proposed course of action to be followed if the case is dismissed is too speculative to give this court confidence that the interests of all pertinent parties would be served with dismissal.

Memorandum Decision on Motion to Dismiss Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Case, at 1.

Debtors appealed. Debtors’ appeal was not timely under Rule 8002, but the bankruptcy court granted debtors’ motion to extend time to file a notice of appeal. This Panel has entered an order stating that debtors’ appeal from the order denying their motion to dismiss “is sufficiently final for purposes of an immediate appeal.” March 23, 2004 Order.

ISSUE

Whether the bankruptcy court erred in denying debtors’ motion to dismiss their chapter 7 bankruptcy case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the denial of debtors’ motion to voluntarily dismiss their chapter 7 bankruptcy case for an abuse of discretion. See In re Leach, 130 B.R. 855, 856 (9th Cir. BAP 1991). Under this standard, we cannot reverse unless we have a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon weighing the relevant factors. United States v. Finley, 301 F.3d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir.2002).

*366 DISCUSSION

Dismissal of a voluntary chapter 7 case is governed by § 707, which states that a court may dismiss a chapter 7 case “only for cause[.]” § 707(a). Debtors argue they have an absolute right to dismissal of their chapter 7 case. This is plainly wrong. A debtor must establish cause to obtain dismissal of a voluntary chapter 7 case. See, e.g., In re Leach, 130 B.R. 855, 857 n. 5 (9th Cir. BAP 1991); In re Stephenson, 262 B.R. 871, 873 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.2001); 3 Noeton BANKRUPTCY Law and Practice 2d § 67:4 (2004).

In the Ninth Circuit, “a voluntary Chapter 7 debtor is entitled to dismissal of his case so long as such dismissal will cause no ‘legal prejudice’ to interested parties.” Leach, 130 B.R. at 857. Debtors bear the burden of proving that dismissal would not prejudice their creditors. Stephenson, 262 B.R. at 874. Debtors failed to meet that burden, and the bankruptcy court did not err in refusing to dismiss debtors’ case.

This is an asset case. The trustee anticipates that there will be funds available to pay unsecured creditors. Dismissal of debtors’ case would have prejudiced their creditors, because there is no guarantee that debtors will pay their debts outside of bankruptcy. See Stephenson, 262 B.R. at 874-75; In re Wilde, 160 B.R. 625, 627 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1993).

We agree with the bankruptcy court that debtors’ plan for liquidating assets was too speculative to establish the lack of prejudice that is a prerequisite to dismissal. While debtors insist that they had arranged to sell Mr. Bartee’s interest in his business, the record is devoid of any evidence of this arrangement. Moreover, debtors did not offer any evidence that they would be bound to use the sale proceeds to pay their creditors if such a sale came to pass. For example, there was no evidence that creditors would be paid from an escrow or a trust before debtors were given unfettered access to the sale proceeds.

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Bluebook (online)
317 B.R. 362, 2004 WL 2709481, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bartee-v-ainsworth-in-re-bartee-bap9-2004.