In Re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2009-01

27 So. 3d 640, 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 2, 2010 WL 26546
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJanuary 7, 2010
DocketSC09-622
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 27 So. 3d 640 (In Re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2009-01) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2009-01, 27 So. 3d 640, 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 2, 2010 WL 26546 (Fla. 2010).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (Committee) has submitted proposed changes to the standard jury instructions, seeking authorization for publication and use. 1 The Committee proposes new instruction 3.3(g), Bifurcated Trial Instruction — Phase Two, as well as amendments to the following instructions: 3.6(f), Justifiable Use of Deadly Force; 3.6(g), Justifiable Use of Non-deadly Force; 3.6(h), Justifiable Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officer; and 11.14(e), Failure to Register as a Sexual Offender. The Committee published the proposals for comment in The Florida Bar News prior to submission to the Court. Upon review of the Committee’s proposals and comments received, we authorize the instructions for publication and use as proposed.

New jury instruction 3.3(g), Bifurcated Trial Instruction — Phase Two, is based upon the Court’s decision in State v. Harbaugh, 754 So.2d 691 (Fla.2000). In Harbaugh, a felony DUI case, we held that a bifurcated proceeding was necessary when the defendant is convicted of a substantive offense and prior convictions create a reclassification of the statutory penalty, thereby requiring a jury finding. In such a bifurcated proceeding, the jury must make the finding that the defendant had previously been convicted of the qualifying offenses for reclassification of the current offense. Id. at 694. Instruction 3.3(g) is intended to ensure that a jury makes the findings required by Harbaugh.

We amend instruction 3.6(f), Justifiable Use of Deadly Force, and instruction 3.6(g), Justifiable Use of Non-deadly Force, to conform with statutory changes brought about by the Legislature’s amendment to section 776.051, Florida Statutes (2008). See Ch. 2008-67, § 1, Laws of Fla. That legislation was in response to Tillman v. State, 934 So.2d 1263 (Fla.2006). In Tillman, the Court held that the offense of using force to resist an arrest was limited to situations where the law enforcement officer was effecting an arrest, and not to other types of police-citizen encounters. Id. at 1266. The plain language of section 776.051 dictated such limited results, particularly since sections 784.07 and 843.01, Florida Statutes (2005), which defined the offenses of battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting an officer with violence, respectively, included the alternative language that the state must prove the officer was “engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties” or “in the lawful execution of any legal duty.” Tillman, 934 So.2d at 1266 (quoting §§ 784.07(2), 843.01). Without such alternative language that appears in sections 784.07 and 843.01, section 776.051 could not be extended to those situations where a law enforcement officer was not in the process of making an actual arrest. In chapter 2008-67, section 1, the Legislature *641 expanded section 776.051(1) to include as the nonjustifiable use of force resisting a law enforcement officer who is engaged in the execution of a legal duty where the officer was acting in good faith. The amendments to instructions 8.6(f) and 3.6(g) include that new language reflecting amended section 776.051(1). Instructions 3.6(f) and 3.6(g) are further amended to include citations to Novak v. State, 974 So.2d 520 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), clarifying that the “no duty to retreat” rule applies to situations where the defendant was not engaged in unlawful conduct beyond that for which he asserts justification.

In addition, instruction 3.6(f) is also amended to include the statutory exceptions in section 776.013(2), Florida Statutes (2008), which may preclude giving the instruction on justifiable use of deadly force.

Instruction 3.6(h), Justifiable Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officer, is amended to reflect that force by a law enforcement officer or person assisting him or her is prohibited both in the case of making an unlawful arrest and in the unlawful execution of a legal duty. See § 776.051(2), Fla. Stat. (2009).

Instruction 11.14(e), originally authorized in 2008, see In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases -Report No. 2007-4, 983 So.2d 531 (Fla.2008), is based upon section 943.0435(7), Florida Statutes (2009). Subsection (7) requires, in pertinent part, that

[a] sexual offender who intends to establish residence in another state or jurisdiction other than the State of Florida shall report in person to the sheriff of the county of current residence within 48 hours before the date he or she intends to leave this state to establish residence in another state or jurisdiction. The notification must include the address, municipality, county, and state of intended residence.

The amendment to instruction 11.14(e) clarifies that an offender may commit the offense by either reporting to the sheriff but failing to provide an address, or by failing to report at all and leaving the jurisdiction of the State of Florida.

Having considered the Committee’s report and comments, we hereby authorize the publication and use of the instructions as they appear in the attached appendix. 2 In authorizing the publication and use of these instructions, we express no opinion on their correctness and remind all interested parties that this authorization forecloses neither requesting additional or alternative instructions nor contesting the legal correctness of the instructions. We further caution all interested parties that any comments associated with the instructions reflect only the opinion of the Committee and are not necessarily indicative of the views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability. New language is indicated by underlining, and deleted language is struck through. The instructions as set forth in the appendix shall be effective when this opinion becomes final.

It is so ordered.

QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

*642 APPENDIX

3.3(g) BIFURCATED TRIAL INSTRUCTION — PHASE TWO

Give in phase two of a bifurcated jury trial in which the State alleges the Defendant is guilty of a felony based upon a second, or subsequent conviction, (e.g. Felony Battery; Felony DUI-BUI; Felony Driving with License Cancelled, Revoked, or Suspended; Felony Petit Theft; Felony Voyeurism; etc.)

Note to Judge: Review relevant statutes to determine whether an adjudication of guilt is necessary to constitute a conviction.

You have found (defendant) guilty of (insert name of charged offense). You must now determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether:

Give a orb as applicable.
a. (Defendant) was previously convicted of (insert name of charged offense) prior to (insert date of charged offense in this case).
b.

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27 So. 3d 640, 35 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1, 2010 Fla. LEXIS 2, 2010 WL 26546, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-standard-jury-instructions-in-criminal-cases-report-no-2009-01-fla-2010.