In Re Sandifer

448 B.R. 382, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1410, 2011 WL 1428258
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedApril 13, 2011
Docket19-00801
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 448 B.R. 382 (In Re Sandifer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Sandifer, 448 B.R. 382, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1410, 2011 WL 1428258 (S.C. 2011).

Opinion

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

DAVID R. DUNCAN, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Dismiss Case (“Motion”) filed by AgSouth Farm Credit, ACA (“AgSouth”) on March 8, 2011. An Objection to the Motion was filed on March 29, 2011 by Steven Rhett Sandifer and Cynthia M. Sandifer (“Debtors”). AgSouth filed a supplemental memorandum in support of its Motion on March 23, 2011. A hearing was held on March 30, 2011. AgSouth’s Motion is denied.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Debtors filed for chapter 12 protection on January 6, 2011. Mr. Sandifer and his son Steven Jeffrey Sandifer (“the Sandi-fers”), who also filed a chapter 12 bankruptcy case on the same day, conduct a farming operation. Steven Jeffrey Sandi-fer testified at the March 30 hearing that he and Mr. Sandifer have been farming together full-time since 2002. The farming operation consists of several hundred acres of farmland, part of which is leased and part of which is owned by one or both of *384 the Sandifers. The Sandifers plant numerous crops, including soybeans, corn, peanuts, and watermelon. They also have a poultry house and a breeder poultry operation under a contract with Amick Farms.

In January 2008, the Sandifers formed a limited liability company for their farming operation in the name of Sandifer & Son Farms, LLC (“LLC”). Prior to the formation of this entity, the Sandifers did business under their individual names or under the name Sandifer & Son Farms. Beginning in about 2007, the Sandifers took out multiple loans with multiple creditors, including AgSouth, to finance their farming operation. All of these loans are in the individual name of either Debtors, Steven Jeffrey Sandifer, or Sandifer & Son Farms. 1 Debtors’ Schedule D shows secured debt in the total amount of $1,073,682.10. 2 Debtors’ Schedule F shows unsecured debt in the total amount of $371,438.23. This amount includes $133,723.33 owed to AgSouth.

Following the formation of the LLC, farm income was reported by the LLC, but was held in a bank account in the Sandifers’ names. In 2008, the LLC had gross income of $588,045 and deductions of $727,136. In 2009, gross income totaled $481,380 and deductions totaled $555,548. The LLC made $193,683.57 of debt payments on behalf of the Sandifers in 2008 and $94,904.57 of debt payments on the Sandifers’ behalf in 2009.

In addition to his work as a farmer, Mr. Sandifer was previously employed with SCANA and earns retirement in the amount of $34,749.96. 3 Mrs. Sandifer is employed as a teacher in Barnwell, South Carolina and earned $44,299.64 in 2008 and $47,947.04 in 2009. With other minimal amounts of income, Debtors’ total non-farm income was $83,296.60 for 2008 and $85,511.00 for 2009. Debtors’ Objection to AgSouth’s Motion states that in 2010, farm income equaled $486,900. For 2011, the Sandifers project farm income of $564,019 and operating expenses of $274,125.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In its Motion, AgSouth argues that Debtors do not meet the eligibility requirements for chapter 12 relief for two reasons. First, AgSouth argues that Debtors do not receive more than 50 percent of their income from farming and therefore do not meet the chapter 12 income requirement. AgSouth’s second argument is that because Debtors have operated at a loss for the last three years, Debtors do not have “regular annual income,” which is required for a chapter 12 debtor.

I. 50 Percent Income Requirement

11 U.S.C. § 109(f) provides, “Only a family farmer or family fisherman with regular annual income may be a debtor under chapter 12 of this title.” “Family farmer” is defined in section 101(18). That section states:

The term “family farmer” means—
(A) individual or individual and spouse engaged in a farming operation whose aggregate debts do not exceed $3,792,650 and not less than 50 percent of whose aggregate noncontin-gent, liquidated debts (excluding a *385 debt for the principal residence of such individual or such individual and spouse unless such debt arises out of a farming operation), on the date the case is filed, arise out of a farming operation owned or operated by such individual or such individual and spouse, and such individual or such individual and spouse receive from such farming operation more than 50 percent of such individual’s or such individual and spouse’s gross income for—
(i) the taxable year preceding; or
(ii) each of the 2d and 3d taxable years preceding;
the taxable year in which the case concerning such individual or such individual and spouse was filed.

There is no dispute that Debtors meet the debt requirements set forth in section 101(18) or that Debtors are “engaged in a farming operation”; as a result, the only issue is whether more than 50 percent of Debtors’ gross income was “receive[d] from [a] farming operation.”

Gross income is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Generally, when interpreting statutes, courts should adhere to the plain meaning of the statute, except in the unusual situation that “‘“the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.” ’ ” In re Lamb, 209 B.R. 759, 760 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1997) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1031, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989)). See also Hillman v. I.R.S., 263 F.3d 338, 342 (4th Cir.2001) (discussing two “extremely narrow exceptions to the Plain Meaning Rule,” the first of which is “when literal application of the statutory language at issue produces an outcome that is demonstrably at odds with clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary,” and the second of which applies “when literal application of the statutory language at issue ‘results in an outcome that can truly be characterized as absurd, i.e., that is so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense....’”) (alteration original); Matter of Schafroth, 81 B.R. 509, 511 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 1987) (“[T]his court cautioned that ‘a strict tax code approach should be modified or abandoned in those cases in which a tax code solution would be absurdly irreconcilable with the Chapter 12 statutory provisions and legislative history.’ ”) (quoting Matter of Faber, 78 B.R. 934, 935 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 1987)). Many courts considering the issue have concluded that “gross income” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code should be defined using the Internal Revenue Code definition of “gross income.” One such court stated,

[TJhis Court concludes that Congress intended the term “gross income” to have its ordinary Tax Code meaning.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
448 B.R. 382, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1410, 2011 WL 1428258, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-sandifer-scb-2011.