Matter of Schafroth

81 B.R. 509, 18 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 149, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 2101, 1987 WL 34577
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Iowa
DecidedDecember 23, 1987
Docket19-00189
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 81 B.R. 509 (Matter of Schafroth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Schafroth, 81 B.R. 509, 18 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 149, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 2101, 1987 WL 34577 (Iowa 1987).

Opinion

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

LEE M. JACKWIG, Bankruptcy Judge.

On April 9, 1987 motions to dismiss filed by the Okey Vernon First National Bank (Bank) on March 19, 1987 and the trustee on March 31, 1987 came on for hearing in Des Moines, Iowa. Steven H. Krohn appeared on behalf of the Bank, Elizabeth A. Nelson, the Chapter 12 trustee, was present and Mark S. Lorence appeared on behalf of the debtors. The case has been submitted on a stipulation of facts and briefs.

FACTS

1. The debtors filed petitions for relief under Chapter 12 on February 2, 1987.

2. The debtors are officers, directors and shareholders of Bluridg Farms, Inc., a corporation that has filed for protection under Chapter 12 in this district (Case No. 87-251-C).

3. The debtors own no real estate except for small parcels upon which they reside. Likewise, the debtors own no machinery, equipment, livestock or crops or any other personal property used in farming.

*510 4. The debtors operate Bluridg Farms, Inc. They manage and provide labor for the corporation.

5. The debtors have not received any income from the sale of livestock, grain or any other agricultural commodity during the last three years.

6. There is no indication that the debtors have received wages or dividends from the corporation in 1986.

DISCUSSION

The sole issue before the court is whether the debtors qualify as “family farmers” for purposes of Chapter 12. Only family farmers with regular income are eligible for protection under Chapter 12. 11 U.S.C. section 109(f). A family farmer is defined, in part, as follows:

[An] individual or individual and spouse engaged in a farming operation whose aggregate debts do not exceed $1,500,000 and not less than 80 percent of whose aggregate noncontingent, liquidated debts (excluding a debt for the principal residence of such individual or such individual and spouse unless such debt arises out of a farming operation), on the date the case is filed, arise out of a farming operation owned or operated by such individual or such individual and spouse, and such individual or such individual and spouse receive from such farming operation more than 50 percent of such individual’s or such individual and spouse’s gross income for the taxable year preceding the taxable year in which the case concerning such individual or such individual and spouse was filed....

11 U.S.C. section 101(17)(A). The trustee and the Bank contend that the debtors fail to meet any of the statutory criteria.

The Bank maintains that the debtors are not engaged in a farming operation. Specifically, the Bank contends that being employed by a corporation is not enough— that the debtors, as employees, are not subjected to the risks inherent in farming. 11 U.S.C. section 101(20) defines farming operation as including “farming, tillage of the soil, dairy farming, ranching, production or raising of crops, poultry, or livestock, and production of poultry or livestock products in an unmanufactured state.” There is no dispute that the debtors actually perform farming activities such as tilling the soil and raising livestock. The question is whether the debtors’ status as employees removes them from the ambit of section 101(20) and, concomitantly, of section 101(17)(A).

A number of cases have examined the meaning of “farming operation” in general and as it relates to the income test found in section 101(17)(A). This court in Matter of Burke, 81 B.R. 971 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 1987) reviewed some of those cases and determined that the decisions generally have fallen along two lines. One line of cases, represented by Matter of Armstrong, 812 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 287, 98 L.Ed.2d 248 (1987), views “farming operation” narrowly. For the Armstrong majority, a critical question is whether the activity under consideration exposes the debtor to the risks inherent in agricultural production. The other line of cases interprets “farming operation” in a broader fashion. Those courts look to the “totality of the circumstances” in determining whether the debtors or the family members or relatives in the case of a corporation or partnership are engaged in farming and whether, in the case of an individual or an individual and spouse, the income test is met. This court adopted the latter approach in the Burke decision.

The record in this case indicates that the debtors are engaged in a farming operation. The debtors operate and manage the debtor corporation. The debtors perform traditional farming activities for Bluridg Farms, Inc. They are the officers, directors and shareholders of the debtor corporation.

The trustee and the Bank contend that the debtors did not receive more than 50 percent of their gross income from a farming operation for the taxable year preceding the taxable year in which their case was filed. The debtors argue that even though they have no reportable gross in *511 come from farming for the relevant year, the corporate income should be attributed to them for purposes of section 101(17)(A) since the corporation qualifies for Chapter 12. 1

The term “gross income” is not defined in the Code. The trustee asserts that “gross income” should be given the same meaning that it has under federal tax law. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Matter of Wagner, 808 F.2d 542 (7th Cir.1986) defined “gross income” as set out in former 11 U.S.C. section 101(17) 2 in such a manner. The issue before the Wagner court was whether a debtor was a “farmer” under section 101(17) and thus was immune from being forced into involuntary bankruptcy by virtue of 11 U.S.C. section 303(a). The court found that an $18,000.00 withdrawal from an IRA account was not farm income but was includable in the debt- or’s “gross income”. Consideration of the $18,000.00 in nonfarm income put the debtors below the statutory 80 percent threshold and thus they were denied farmer status.

This court has utilized a tax law meaning of “gross income” in determining Chapter 12 eligibility. Matter of Faber, 78 B.R. 934 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 1987). However, this court cautioned that “a strict tax code approach should be modified or abandoned in those cases in which a tax code solution would be absurdly irreconcilable with the Chapter 12 statutory provisions and legislative history.” Id. at 935.

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Bluebook (online)
81 B.R. 509, 18 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 149, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 2101, 1987 WL 34577, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-schafroth-iasb-1987.