In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation

129 F.R.D. 424, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16546, 1989 WL 164148
District Court, D. Puerto Rico·Decided October 10, 1989·No. No. MDL-721·Published·Cited by 8 cases

Opinion

COURT MARGIN ORDER NO. 548 ORDER REGARDING THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE VIA SATELLITE TRANSMISSIONS ■

RAYMOND L. ACOSTA, District Judge.

Before the Court is the plaintiffs (PSC’s) Motion Requesting Leave To Telecast Live Testimony Of Witnesses From Various States To The Court In San Juan, docket No. 12557, filed September 7, 1989. Certain defendants have filed their opposition to the PSC’s petition. See docket No. 12627, filed September 11, 1989. This mat[425] ter has also been argued by the parties during the course of the current trial phase of this litigation.

The PSC’s request is simple but innovative. It wants the Court to order certain witnesses employed and/or otherwise under the control of defendants and who are beyond the 100 mile trial subpoena power of this Court to testify in these proceedings via a satellite hookup between their place of residence and this courtroom.1 The main purpose of the satellite transmission option is to provide the jury and this Court with live testimony rather than with the droning recitation of countless transcript pages of deposition testimony read by stand-in readers in a boring monotone. The reading of depositions also gives rise to ludicrous objections concerning whether the reader may interpret the tone and mood of the questions and answers and whether the reader may or may not give inflection to certain words or passages. The PSC argues that live testimony as opposed to deposition readings will facilitate more comprehensive factual determinations by the jury as well as help it assess the credibility of witnesses. Defendants counter that the PSC’s proposal is “untried, unauthorized, and unworkable.” They also accuse the PSC of unreasonable delay and charge that the jury will be confused with a change of process in the middle of trial.

First of all, we are not convinced that the PSC has acted in a dilatory fashion in this matter; it was only a short time ago that the defendants announced that they would not voluntarily produce a large number of witnesses even though that decision automatically precludes them from presenting these particular witnesses in person during their case-in-chief. See Pretrial Order No. 203 (Docket No. 11691, filed June 27,1989). Nor do we find any merit in the argument that the jury would be confused by the use of satellite transmissions rather than deposition readings, especially when the procedure will only involve a limited number of witnesses and will not preclude the use of deposition evidence altogether in this litigation.

Secondly, the futuristic aspects of the PSC proposal need not be perceived as a threat. It is a well-known aphorism that “professions are the enemy of change”.2 Yet no profession can remain indefinitely sheltered from the maelstrom of modernism that in recent years has completely changed the communications landscape. One need only consider that computers were once thought to be strictly secretarial tools, yet now many lawyers carry their stylish lap-top computers in addition to their briefcases. With this increased acceptance and personalized use of sophisticated technology has come the belated realization that just because some mechanism or process is “untried” does not mean that it should be disregarded; rather, it should be used if it contains at least a well-founded promise of some important benefit and causes little or no prejudice. In short, the use of this type of technology in the courtroom, as with other types already in use,3 will not create a sort of “brave new world” as feared by defendants. The Court has little doubt that the presentation of live testimony by satellite is a viable, and even refreshing, alternative to the deadening recitation of numerous depositions. It would also be most helpful to the jury in the fulfillment of their sworn duties. After all, the purpose of a trial is precisely to ensure the truth-seeking process which, to a great extent, is based on the demeanor of witnesses. In addition, the use of satellite transmitted testimony avoids the burdens and problems inherent [426] in the arranging'of travel schedules, conflicting obligations, and extended stays in the transferee district because of the uncertainties of trial schedules.

It is important to note that it appears that at least one state court has successfully used this procedure recently. As reported in the March 13, 1989 edition of The National Law Journal, and submitted to the Court by defendants in a supplement to their opposition, see docket no. 12704, filed September 26, 1989, a Wisconsin Circuit Court judge allowed the use of the satellite transmitted testimony of witnesses located in London.

Finally, defendants’ main contention is that this court lacks any authority whatsoever to order witnesses outside this jurisdiction to submit themselves to questioning via satellite. Although Rule 45(e)(1) does not explicitly permit this approach, neither does it expressly prohibit it. We find compelling the reasoning used by U.S. District Judge William Browning when he allowed the use of satellites to examine distant witnesses in MDL-551 (In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation).4

Speaking to the scope of Rule 45(e)(1), Judge Browning correctly asserted that the Rule simply “restricts the reach of subpoenas to prevent undue inconvenience to witnesses not to confer advantages on parties.” Order dated August 9, 1988 at 5. (Emphasis in the original. Citing Notes of Advisory Committee re: 1980 Amendment to Rule 45(e)(1).) We echo Judge Browning’s conclusions that a court has authority to ensure that a jury is provided with “the best and most complete basis to evaluate evidence and witness credibility.” Id. at 5. In supporting the exercise of his discretion in employing the satellite communication procedure, Judge Browning listed, inter alia, the following factors: (1) the control defendants had over the witnesses in question; (2) the complex, multi-party, multistate nature of the litigation; (3) the apparent tactical advantage, as opposed to any real inconvenience to the witnesses, that the defendants were seeking by not producing the witnesses voluntarily; (4) the lack of any true prejudice to the defendants; and (5) the flexibility needed to manage a complex multi-district litigation. These factors and the rationale of the MDL-551 order are all directly applicable to the case at bar. We can only conclude that the satellite telecasts will provide a myriad of benefits to the jury and this Court which far outweigh the tactical advantage that defendants may lose from the implementation of this procedure. Principles of fairness and efficiency weigh heavily on the side of plaintiffs’ request. The Court, however, is not entirely satisfied with the procedure set forth by the PSC5 and would like more information from the PSC on the possibility of having two-way transmissions and for the parties to examine the protocol fashioned by Judge Browning regarding satellite transmissions6 and to submit any proposals on the subject they would like the Court to consider no later than October 18, 1989.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 129 F.R.D. 424, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16546, 1989 WL 164148 (prd 1989).

129 F.R.D. 424 (In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Untitled Case
D. Puerto Rico, 2026
In Re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation
439 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. Louisiana, 2006)
Barnett v. Merck & Co.
439 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. Louisiana, 2006)
Air Turbine Technology, Inc. v. Atlas Copco AB
217 F.R.D. 545 (S.D. Florida, 2003)
United States v. Shabazz
52 M.J. 585 (Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals, 1999)
Harrell v. State
689 So. 2d 400 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1997)
Sowers v. Middletown Hospital
626 N.E.2d 968 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 1993)