In Re Sadala

294 B.R. 180, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 135, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 595, 41 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 128, 2003 WL 21383319
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedJune 2, 2003
Docket02-07006-OJ3
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 294 B.R. 180 (In Re Sadala) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 135, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 595, 41 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 128, 2003 WL 21383319 (Fla. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING SUNTRUST BANK’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY AND GRANTING DEBTORS’ MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

KAREN S. JENNEMANN, Bankruptcy Judge.

This case came on for hearing, on March 11, 2003, on the Motion for Clarification (Doc. No. 39) filed by Thomas and Barbara Sadala, the Chapter 13 debtors in this case. The debtors seek clarification on whether they can value and strip off a second unsecured mortgage encumbering their homestead by motion, or, instead, whether an adversary proceeding is required. The dispute over whether the debtors are required to file an adversary proceeding to value and to strip off a second unsecured mortgage arose at a preliminary ■ hearing held on November 19, 2002, on SunTrust’s Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay (Doc. No. 26) and the debtors’ Response (Doc. No. 34). SunTrust sought relief from the automatic stay because the debtors’ Chapter 13 plan (Doc. No. 6) valued SunTrust’s secured claim at zero, included no payments to SunTrust as a secured creditor under the plan, and proposed to avoid SunTrust’s second mortgage. Because SunTrust was not being treated as a secured creditor, they asked this Court to modify the automatic stay to allow the bank to pursue their state court rights against the debtors’ home.

The debtors value their home at $81,000. SunTrust holds both the first and second mortgages encumbering the debtors’ home. The first mortgage has a balance of $83,321.62; the second mortgage has a balance of $16,610.60. In addition, Household Finance holds a third mortgage encumbering the debtors’ home in the amount of $26,503.36. Because the value of the home, as asserted by the debtors, was less than the balance due on Sun-Trust’s first mortgage, the debtors intend to value SunTrust’s second mortgage and Household Finance’s third mortgage at zero and extinguish, or strip off, the respective liens pursuant to In re Tanner, 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir.2000). Consistent with this intention, the debtors filed an Objection to SunTrust’s Proof of Claim (Doc. No. 16) and an Amended Motion for Valuation of Homestead Property and Strip Off of SunTrust’s Lien (Doc. No. 25).

In response, SunTrust filed an Objection (Doc. No. 22) to the Motion for Valuation and Strip Off, an Objection to the debtors’ Objection to Proof of Claim (Doc. No. 23), and a Motion for Relief from Stay (Doc. No. 26). In all of these pleadings, Sun-Trust argued that both its first and second mortgages were secured, at least in part, because the debtors’ valuation of the home was inaccurate. SunTrust asserts the actual value of the home is $127,640, an amount in excess of the combined balance due under all three mortgages encumbering the property. Therefore, SunTrust argues that the debtors cannot strip off the second or third mortgage because the mortgages are fully secured and that Sun-Trust is entitled to payment under the debtors’ Chapter 13 plan, or in the alterna *182 tive, to enforce its rights under the second mortgage. A separate evidentiary hearing is needed to resolve these disputed valuation issues. 1

However, at the preliminary hearing on the Motion for Relief from Stay, SunTrust also objected to the debtors’ valuation motion on procedural grounds. SunTrust argued that the debtors could not strip off its second mortgage by motion. Rather, Bankruptcy Rule 7001(2) required the debtors to institute an adversary proceeding. The debtors then filed their Motion for Clarification, arguing that a motion to value was proeedurally sufficient. This opinion only addresses this one issue: can a debtor value a claim arising from an unsecured mortgage encumbering a homestead by motion or is an adversary proceeding required?

Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code 2 allows a debtor to value a claim to determine if the claim is secured or unsecured and to declare void a lien for a totally unsecured claim. Section 506(a) provides that collateral, which secures an allowed claim, may be valued to ascertain what portion of the claim is secured and what portion is unsecured. To the extent the lien exceeds the amount of the allowed secured claim, Section 506(d) provides that the lien is void.

Bankruptcy Rule 3012 specifically permits 506(a) collateral valuations to be requested on motion provided notice and an opportunity for hearing is given to the affected party. Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3012. Although the rule does not specifically address whether an adversary proceeding is needed to extinguish an unsecured lien under 506(d), the Official Committee Notes provide some guidance:

An adversary proceeding is commenced when the validity, priority, or extent of a lien is at issue as prescribed by Rule 7001. That proceeding is relevant to the basis of the lien itself while valuation under Rule 3012 would be for the purposes indicated above [e.g., to determine the issue of adequate protection, impairment, or treatment of a claim in a plan.]

11 U.S.C. § 506 advisory committee’s notes. Interpreting this comment, it appears that an adversary proceeding is only needed when the basis of the lien itself is in dispute and that no adversary proceeding is needed simply to value and to declare void a totally unsecured claim. Developing case law supports this conclusion.

The bankruptcy rules create two different types of proceedings for resolving disputes — contested matters and adversary proceedings — presumably because the drafters of the rules deemed certain matters of sufficient consequence to the affected party that the party deserved something more than a motion and an accelerated hearing. In reality, the differences often are blurred.

In a contested matter, the creditor receives a motion. Typically, no filing fee is required. Because many contested motions are not opposed, the responding party is given an opportunity to file a response or objection within a certain period of time. If a response is filed, the court will set a hearing. Often, the creditor will not dispute the relief requested in the motion, files no response, and the motion is granted upon notice but without the need for any hearing after the response period *183 passes. The process provides due process in a streamlined and efficient manner.

In contrast, in an adversary proceeding, the debtor must file and formally serve a complaint upon the creditor, which identifies the party that is the object of the debtor’s action, the specific relief sought, and the basis for such relief. Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7003 and 7008. Filing fees associated with adversary proceedings are substantial. Additionally, the debtor must serve a summons accompanied with the complaint directed to the named defendant which states, among other things, that if the party does not appear and defend, a judgment for the relief sought will be entered against it. Fed. R. Bankr.P.

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Bluebook (online)
294 B.R. 180, 16 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 135, 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 595, 41 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 128, 2003 WL 21383319, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-sadala-flmb-2003.