In Re Bennett

312 B.R. 843, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1187, 2004 WL 1801039
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky
DecidedJuly 26, 2004
Docket19-30641
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 312 B.R. 843 (In Re Bennett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Bennett, 312 B.R. 843, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1187, 2004 WL 1801039 (Ky. 2004).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM ON MOTIONS TO AVOID

DAVID T. STOSBERG, Chief Judge.

These cases came before the Court on the motions to avoid liens filed by the debtors in the above-named cases. In each of the motions, the debtors seek to strip off the lien of the second lienholder by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 1322. “Stripping off’ a lien is a variant of “stripping down” a lien. The distinguishable characteristic is that in a strip off, the entirety of the lien is negated while in a strip down, the partially secured lien is bifurcated and only the unsecured portion is removed. In these cases, no creditor objected to the proposed strip off. While the authority to strip off wholly unsecured second lienhold-ers is undisputed, some question remains as to the methodology. If either the procedural mechanism used is defective, or the notice to the creditor is inadequate, the property will remain subject to the lien for the entire amount rather than vesting free and clear after the plan is completed and the debtors receive their discharge. There are at least four methods in which the liens in question could be stripped off: 1) through plan provisions; 2) through an adversary proceeding; 3) through a claim objection; and 4) through motion practice. Having compared and analyzed the separate methods, as set forth infra, the Court has elected to adopt motion practice.

Several of the debtors argue that they should be able to accomplish lien stripping through the provisions of a Chapter 13 plan. Debtors used this method in the Lane case. In re Lane, 280 F.3d 663 (6th Cir.2002). In Lane, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the debtors’ rights to strip off wholly unsecured junior lien interests. Unfortunately, the Lane decision did not specifically address the propriety of the procedural mechanism utilized by the debtors. The debtors in the current cases argue that service of a copy of the Chapter 13 plan or reorganization which proposes to strip off a lien at confirmation is sufficient to protect the due process rights of the junior lienholders, citing In re King, 290 B.R. 641 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.2003) and In re Hill, 304 B.R. 800, 805 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2003). These courts hold that since the operative Code section involved with lien stripping is § 1327(c), which is effective only upon confirmation, debtors may accomplish the stripping of the unsecured liens through a plan provision and confirmation. Other courts have reached the same result by treating the proposed plan as a de facto motion. In re Hoskins, 262 B.R. 693 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.2001); In re Fuller, 255 B.R. 300, 306 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.2000).

While not all courts agree on the correct procedure, there does seem to be some consensus that an adversary proceeding is not required. See, e.g., In re Sadala, 294 B.R. 180, 183-85 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2003); Dickey v. Beneficial Fin. (In re Dickey), 293 B.R. 360, 362-63 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.2003); King, 290 B.R. at 645-47; In re Nowling, 279 B.R. 607, 609-11 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.2002); In re Hoskins, 262 B.R. 693, 696-97 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.2001); In re Hudson, 260 B.R. 421, 433 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.2001); In re Fuller, 255 B.R. 300, 305-06 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.2000) (all holding an adversary proceeding is not required to strip off wholly unsecured liens). But see In re Pierce, 282 B.R. 26, 28 (Bankr.D.Utah 2002); In re Kressler, 252 B.R. 632, 634-35 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2000) (all requiring an adversary proceeding).

*847 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(2) requires an adversary proceeding if a party wishes “to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien or other interest in property.” “Validity” for purposes of Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7001(2) means the existence or legitimacy of the lien itself. “Priority” means the lien’s relationship to other claims or interests in the collateral. Finally, “extent” means the scope of the property encompassed by or subject to the lien. In re Millspaugh, 302 B.R. 90 (Bankr.D.Id.2003) citing In re King, supra. See also In re Hoskins, 262 B.R. 693, 696-97 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.2001) and In re Hudson, 260 B.R. 421, 433 (Bankr.W.D.Mich.2001).

Under these definitions, clearly “validity” and “priority” are not implicated by the debtors’ proposed strip off. Hoskins, 262 B.R. at 696 (lien stripping “has nothing to do with the ‘validity’ or ‘priority’ of [the mortgage]”); Hudson, 260 B.R. at 433. While an argument could be made that lien stripping requires a determination of the extent of the lien, this Court joins the majority of courts in rejecting such a broad interpretation. Lien stripping requires a valuation determination of the subject property. As discussed in greater detail infra, valuation matters are designed to be addressed under motion practice via Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3012. “Extent,” as used in Rule 7001(2), does not refer to collateral valuation, but rather concerns identification of the collateral to which a lien attaches. Hudson, supra at 429 (wherein Judge Gregg held the “extent” of a lien is not synonymous with the value of collateral). Accordingly, no adversary proceeding is required and Rule 7001(2) is not triggered when a debtor seeks to value an allegedly wholly unsecured claim against a residence for the purpose of stripping off a lien. An adversary proceeding would be required, however, if a debtor also sought to contest the validity, extent, or priority of the lien.

As with an adversary proceeding, an argument could be made that any attempt to strip off an allegedly wholly unsecured hen also requires a claim objection pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3001(f) which provides that a properly filed proof of claim constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim. We note, however, that the claims resolution process outlined in § 501 and Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3001 concerns only the amount of the allowed claim under § 502. It does not address the extent an allowed § 502 claim is an allowed secured claim under § 506(a). In re Hill, 304 B.R. 800, 804 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 2003). While Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3001(f) does grant prima facie status as to the validity and amount of a claim, it does not grant prima facie status as to the value of a particular piece of collateral. The claims allowance process gives prima facie proof only to the amount of the entire claim, but does not determine the amount of the secured portion of a claim under § 506(a). In re Duggins, 263 B.R. 233, 238 (Bankr.C.D.Ill.2001) (“The bifurcation or valuation process contemplated by 11 U.S.C.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
312 B.R. 843, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1187, 2004 WL 1801039, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-bennett-kywb-2004.