NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED MAR 3 2021 SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: BAP Nos. CC-20-1029-FLG RONALD A. NEFF, CC-20-1030-FLG Debtor. (Related)
DOUGLAS JOHN DENOCE, Bk. No. 1:11-bk-22424-GM Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM * RONALD A. NEFF, Appellee.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California Geraldine Mund, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
Before: FARIS, LAFFERTY, and GAN, Bankruptcy Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Creditor Douglas John DeNoce argues that the bankruptcy court
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1. erred in determining after an evidentiary hearing that chapter 7 1 debtor
Ronald A. Neff was disabled and thus entitled to claim an enhanced
homestead exemption in his real property. The bankruptcy court gave
Mr. DeNoce ample opportunities to conduct discovery, properly excluded
certain expert testimony, and made appropriate findings of fact. It also
properly denied Mr. DeNoce’s motion for reconsideration. We AFFIRM.
FACTS 2
A. Prepetition events
Dr. Neff was a practicing dentist, and Mr. DeNoce was his patient. In
2007, Dr. Neff performed multiple surgical procedures on Mr. DeNoce, but
he botched the procedures. Mr. DeNoce sued Dr. Neff in state court for
medical malpractice and recovered a judgment of $310,000.
When he treated Mr. DeNoce, Dr. Neff had a long history of drug
and alcohol abuse, which led to a criminal conviction and the eventual
revocation of his dental license. In March 2010, he applied for disability
benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). The SSA
1Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and all “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 We borrow portions of the factual background from our prior decision in this case. See Neff v. DeNoce (In re Neff), BAP No. CC-12-1664-KiTaD, 2014 WL 448885 (9th Cir. BAP Feb. 4, 2014). We exercise our discretion to review the court’s docket, as appropriate, see Woods & Erickson, LLP v. Leonard (In re AVI, Inc.), 389 B.R. 721, 725 n.2 (9th Cir. BAP 2008), but we have not “scour[ed] the record to try to make [appellant’s] case of clear error[,]” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Loop 76, LLC (In re Loop 76, LLC), 465 B.R. 2 determined that he had become disabled on January 30, 2007 and awarded
him payments from March 2009.
B. Dr. Neff’s bankruptcy cases
After two unsuccessful chapter 13 filings, Dr. Neff filed a chapter 7
petition in 2011. He claimed a disability homestead exemption of $175,000
against his real property under California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”)
section 704.730(a)(3)(B), rather than the standard homestead exemption of
$75,000.
Mr. DeNoce objected to the enhanced homestead exemption
(“Exemption Objection”). He contended that Dr. Neff was able to work and
was not disabled.
Dr. Neff opposed the Exemption Objection and requested an
evidentiary hearing. The bankruptcy court declined to hold an evidentiary
hearing. It determined that Dr. Neff was able to engage in “substantial
gainful employment” under CCP section 704.730(a)(3)(B) and sustained the
Exemption Objection on that basis, allowing only the standard homestead
exemption. The parties cross-appealed the order to this Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel (“BAP”).
C. The first BAP appeal
On appeal, the BAP held that Dr. Neff “was entitled to a presumption
that he was disabled and unable to engage in substantial gainful
525, 545 (9th Cir. BAP 2012), aff’d, 578 F. App’x 644 (9th Cir. 2014).
3 employment within the meaning of the statute [CCP § 704.730(a)(3)(B)].” In
re Neff, 2014 WL 448885, at *9. The panel concluded that Mr. DeNoce had
not produced evidence to rebut the presumption, let alone carried his
ultimate burden of proof and persuasion. Thus, the BAP vacated that part
of the bankruptcy court’s order and remanded.
D. Evidentiary hearings on remand
On remand, the bankruptcy court scheduled an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether Dr. Neff was entitled to the enhanced homestead
exemption. The court allowed Mr. DeNoce extensive discovery
opportunities over several years.
Mr. DeNoce tried to obtain Dr. Neff’s SSA claims file. In 2017 (three
years after remand), he submitted to the SSA a request for all records and
reports regarding the disability determination and included Dr. Neff’s
consent authorizing release of the records. 3
After much delay, Mr. DeNoce received some records from the SSA.
He initially told the bankruptcy court that written discovery was complete.
However, he later changed his story: he told the court that he had obtained
a disc from the SSA with only incomplete records and that he had
destroyed the disc.
3The bankruptcy court stated in its decision that Mr. DeNoce prepared the consent that Dr. Neff signed. Mr. DeNoce argues on appeal that Dr. Neff’s counsel prepared it, so any deficiency in the production of records is Dr. Neff’s fault. But for the reasons we give below, this is irrelevant: Mr. DeNoce subsequently failed to take appropriate action to obtain the SSA file and support his objection.
4 The court held a two-day evidentiary hearing in November 2017, at
which Dr. Neff testified at length. The bankruptcy court overruled the
objection to the enhanced objection, finding that Dr. Neff could not earn
more than $7,200 annually and therefore would not have “substantial
gainful employment.”
Mr. DeNoce filed a motion for a new trial. The court granted the
request in part and allowed Mr. DeNoce to call Dr. Neff and four doctors
whom Mr. DeNoce said had relevant information: Dr. Goldsmith (the
SSA’s examining psychiatrist), Dr. Bilik (the SSA’s review psychologist),
and two of Dr. Neff’s treating physicians, Dr. Okhovat and Dr. Hersel.
The bankruptcy court heard extensive testimony from Drs. Hersel
and Okhovat over three days in early 2019. Mr. DeNoce had subpoenaed
records from Drs. Bilik and Goldsmith, but Dr. Bilik refused to comply, and
Dr. Goldsmith had passed away. An attorney representing the SSA
explained that SSA regulations protect its consultants such as Dr. Bilik
from testifying. 4 She also explained that Mr. DeNoce could obtain
documents from Dr. Neff’s SSA file if Dr. Neff signed a consent. Dr. Neff
agreed to sign a consent, but he later changed his mind. Mr. DeNoce
apparently took no further steps to obtain the SSA documents.
In lieu of Dr. Bilik’s testimony, the bankruptcy court allowed
4Mr. DeNoce claims that this proves that the court misled him, because it had previously instructed him to proceed by subpoena. But it was not the court’s job to give Mr. DeNoce legal advice.
5 Mr. DeNoce to “hire another psychiatrist to conduct the review of the
Goldsmith and Bilik reports.” It referred to this expert as a “review
psychiatrist” 5 who would be limited to reviewing the reports by
Drs. Goldsmith and Bilik.
Mr. DeNoce sought to call John Meyers as his expert witness.
Mr. Meyers was neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist. In fact, he was
not a doctor at all. Rather, he had experience reviewing SSA disability
submissions and had provided expert opinion testimony at administrative
hearings. At a status hearing, the court addressed the scope of Mr. Meyers’
testimony. It again ordered that Mr. Meyers would be limited to Dr. Bilik’s
role (i.e., as the SSA’s review psychologist/psychiatrist).
On the morning of Mr. Meyers’ scheduled testimony, Dr. Neff filed a
bare-bones motion to exclude Mr. Meyers’ testimony. He argued that
Mr. DeNoce was belatedly trying to introduce expert testimony as to
Dr. Neff’s employment capacity.
The bankruptcy court agreed that Mr. Meyers’ proposed testimony
was beyond the scope of what it had allowed. It held that Mr. Meyers did
not meet the requirements of its order concerning Dr. Bilik’s replacement,
so it did not allow him to testify. It only admitted portions of Mr. Meyers’
report that concerned his analysis of Drs. Goldsmith’s and Bilik’s reports
and excluded the portions of the report about Dr. Neff’s ability to work.
5 The court apparently thought that Dr. Bilik was a psychiatrist, but he was actually a psychologist.
6 E. Memorandum opinion
The bankruptcy court overruled the Exemption Objection
(“Exemption Objection Order”).
Based on the evidence, the court found that Dr. Neff was “seriously
physically disabled at the time that the bankruptcy was filed . . . . He is
suffering from a degenerative condition and . . . there is no possibility of
substantial improvement.” It found Dr. Neff credible and stated that his
testimony was bolstered by Drs. Okhovat and Hersel.
Next, the court considered whether Dr. Neff could engage in
substantial gainful employment on the bankruptcy petition date. Because
the SSA had awarded Dr. Neff disability benefits, Mr. DeNoce had to
overcome the presumption of an inability to engage in substantial gainful
employment. However, the court held that Mr. DeNoce had failed to offer
any competent evidence to overcome the presumption, largely due to his
failure to obtain the SSA records. It accepted Dr. Neff’s testimony that he
could only earn $7,200 per year as a part-time dental assistant.
As to the lack of the SSA records, the bankruptcy court placed the
blame squarely on Mr. DeNoce. It found his explanations contradictory
and not credible.
The bankruptcy court thus concluded that Dr. Neff was physically
disabled on the petition date and could not engage in substantial gainful
employment.
7 F. Motion for reconsideration
Mr. DeNoce timely filed a motion for relief from the Exemption
Objection Order (“Reconsideration Motion”). He focused on the prior bad
behavior of Dr. Neff and his attorney. He also argued that the court should
have admitted Mr. Meyers’ report in full and allowed Mr. Meyers to opine
as to whether the SSA properly determined that Dr. Neff was disabled. The
court rejected Mr. DeNoce’s arguments without a hearing.
Mr. DeNoce timely appealed from the Exemption Objection Order
and order denying the Reconsideration Motion.
JURISDICTION
The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and
157(b)(2)(B). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the bankruptcy court erred in overruling Mr. DeNoce’s
Exemption Objection.
(2) Whether the bankruptcy court erred in denying the
Reconsideration Motion.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The right of a debtor to claim an exemption is a question of law we
review de novo. Kelley v. Locke (In re Kelley), 300 B.R. 11, 16 (9th Cir. BAP
2003). The bankruptcy court’s findings of fact with respect to a claimed
exemption are reviewed for clear error. Id.
“De novo review requires that we consider a matter anew, as if no
8 decision had been made previously.” Francis v. Wallace (In re Francis), 505
B.R. 914, 917 (9th Cir. BAP 2014).
Factual findings are clearly erroneous if they are illogical,
implausible, or without support in the record. Retz v. Samson (In re Retz),
606 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010). If two views of the evidence are
possible, the court’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985).
We review for an abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s decision
on a motion for reconsideration. See Carruth v. Eutsler (In re Eutsler), 585
B.R. 231, 235 (9th Cir. BAP 2017) (citations omitted). Similarly, we review
evidentiary rulings on the admissibility of expert witness testimony for an
abuse of discretion. Kelly v. MTS Inc., 5 F. App’x 755, 756 (9th Cir. 2001). A
bankruptcy court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal
standard or if its factual findings are illogical, implausible, or without
support in the record. TrafficSchool.com v. Edriver, Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th
Cir. 2011).
DISCUSSION
A. The bankruptcy court did not err in overruling Mr. DeNoce’s Exemption Objection. Mr. DeNoce argues that the bankruptcy court erred in denying him
the opportunity to obtain the SSA claim file and introduce evidence from
his expert, Mr. Meyers. The bankruptcy court did not err.
1. The court properly stated the law.
9 California permits its domiciliaries to claim only the exemptions
allowable under state law. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 703.130. While “the
federal courts decide the merits of state exemptions, . . . the validity of the
claimed state exemption is controlled by the applicable state law.” In re
Kelley, 300 B.R. at 16. California exemptions are to be broadly and liberally
construed in favor of the debtor. In re Gardiner, 332 B.R. 891, 894 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 2005). Eligibility for the California homestead exemption is
determined as of the petition date. In re Rostler, 169 B.R. 408, 411 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1994).
When Dr. Neff filed his petition, California’s standard homestead
exemption was $75,000. That amount increases to $175,000 if the debtor
qualifies for an enhanced homestead exemption, including if the debtor is:
(B) A person physically or mentally disabled who as a result of that disability is unable to engage in substantial gainful employment. There is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof that a person receiving disability insurance benefit payments under Title II or supplemental security income payments under Title XVI of the federal Social Security Act satisfies the requirements of this paragraph as to his or her inability to engage in substantial gainful employment.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.730(a)(3)(B). 6
Under this provision, the court engages in “a two-part test to
determine if a debtor is eligible for the disability exemption: the debtor
This section was amended effective January 1, 2021 to increase the exempt 6
amounts. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.730(a) (enacted Jan. 1, 2021).
10 must (1) have a physical or mental disability; and (2) as a result of that
disability, be unable to engage in substantial gainful employment.” In re
Neff, 2014 WL 448885, at *8.
The bankruptcy court stated that the party objecting to a claimed
exemption has the ultimate burden of persuasion. This is not entirely
correct. While Rule 4003 provides that a claimed exemption is
“presumptively valid,” “where a state law exemption statute specifically
allocates the burden of proof to the debtor, Rule 4003(c) does not change
that allocation.” Diaz v. Kosmala (In re Diaz), 547 B.R. 329, 337 (9th Cir. BAP
2016) (construing Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000)). In
general, California law “has placed the burden of proof on the party
claiming the exemption.” Id. But a debtor who is receiving certain disability
benefits enjoys a presumption on one of the two elements of entitlement to
the enhanced homestead exemption. The bankruptcy court’s statement
thus slightly oversimplified the allocation of the burden of proof. The
bankruptcy court’s error was harmless, however, because the evidence and
the presumption overwhelmingly supported the claimed exemption.
2. The court properly found that Dr. Neff was disabled.
The first prong of the statutory test asks whether Dr. Neff suffered
from a mental or physical disability. It is undisputed that the SSA
determined that Dr. Neff was disabled. The bankruptcy court determined,
after evidentiary hearings spanning approximately two years, that Dr. Neff
was physically disabled. We discern no reversible error.
11 Mr. DeNoce’s opening brief does not clearly challenge the court’s
determination that Dr. Neff was “seriously physically disabled” and
showed “no possibility of substantial improvement.” We do not consider
issues that an appellant does not clearly and distinctly raise in the opening
brief. See Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182, 1193
(9th Cir. 2006); Price v. Lehtinen (In re Lehtinen), 332 B.R. 404, 410 (9th Cir.
BAP 2005). But even if Mr. DeNoce had challenged these findings, we
would find no error. The extensive testimony from Dr. Neff 7 and his
treating physicians amply supports these findings.
3. The court properly found that Dr. Neff could not engage in substantial gainful employment.
Mr. DeNoce instead focuses on the second prong: whether Dr. Neff
could engage in substantial gainful employment. He argues that the
bankruptcy court unfairly prevented him from obtaining and introducing
evidence to support his case on this issue. We discern no reversible error.
In our earlier decision in this case, we held that, “to satisfy the second
element of CCP § 704.730(a)(3)(B), the debtor must have been, at the time of
petition, unable to ‘(1) perform meaningful mental or physical work-
related activity; (2) in a competitive or self-employed position; (3) that
normally results in pay or profit.’” We also observed that, “‘any work’ or
7 The bankruptcy court heard Dr. Neff testify for two days in November 2017. Mr. DeNoce did not provide us a copy of these transcripts, so we are entitled to presume nothing in them would help his arguments on appeal. See Gionis v. Wayne (In re Gionis), 170 B.R. 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. BAP 1994).
12 ‘part-time work’ may not necessarily rise to the level of ‘substantial’ or
‘gainful’ employment,” and that “the debtor must be physically, mentally
and emotionally able to work enough hours, at a high enough net wage, to
contribute materially to his or her support.” In re Neff, 2014 WL 448885, at
*9-10 (citations omitted).
Based on Dr. Neff’s testimony, the bankruptcy court found that he
could only earn $600 per month as a dental assistant, or $7,200 per year.
The bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding these facts.
a. The SSA claim file
Mr. DeNoce argues that the court should have given him more
opportunities to obtain the SSA claim file. We disagree.
The bankruptcy court gave Mr. DeNoce years to gather evidence to
overcome the presumption in favor of Dr. Neff on the second prong.
Mr. DeNoce says that his failure to obtain the SSA records was Dr. Neff’s
fault because Dr. Neff’s counsel prepared the 2017 consent that proved
insufficient. Even if he is correct, this does not explain or justify his
decision to destroy the records that the SSA did produce or his failure to
follow up promptly after the SSA refused to produce additional documents
in reliance on the consent. If the initial consent form did not work,
Mr. DeNoce should have promptly asked the court to compel Dr. Neff to
sign a proper form or grant other appropriate relief. Instead, he did
nothing for about two years.
We also reject Mr. DeNoce’s attempt to excuse his failure to obtain
13 the SSA file when he eventually renewed his attempt to obtain that file in
2019. He claims that Dr. Neff at first agreed to sign a new release, then
changed his mind. We do not approve of Dr. Neff’s gamesmanship. But it
was nonetheless Mr. DeNoce’s responsibility to take prompt action after
Dr. Neff reversed himself. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion when it rejected Mr. DeNoce’s tardy effort to conduct discovery.
b. Mr. Meyers’ report and testimony
Mr. DeNoce argues that the court erred in excluding Mr. Meyers’
testimony and part of his report. He contends that, with Mr. Meyers’
evidence, he would have established that Dr. Neff was capable of gainful
employment, earning up to $51,000 per year.
The court did not err. The court granted Mr. DeNoce’s motion for a
new trial and permitted him to offer testimony from four specified doctors
whose testimony Mr. DeNoce had failed to secure in the first evidentiary
hearings in 2017 (as well as additional testimony from Dr. Neff).
Mr. DeNoce does not challenge the bankruptcy court’s decision to limit the
additional witnesses he could present at the new trial. When it turned out
that two of those doctors (Dr. Bilik and Dr. Goldsmith) could not be
compelled to testify, the court gave Mr. DeNoce another accommodation. It
allowed him to offer expert testimony from a psychiatrist to interpret
Drs. Bilik’s and Goldsmith’s reports and to fill the role that Dr. Bilik would
have played as the review expert. Mr. DeNoce simply ignored the
limitations: he offered Mr. Meyers as a witness, even though he was neither
14 a psychiatrist nor a psychologist, and he offered Mr. Meyers’ analysis of
Dr. Neff’s earning capacity, even though Dr. Bilik did not even mention
that issue. It is important to note that the court entered these orders
approximately a year and a half after the first session of the evidentiary
hearing. The bankruptcy court was within its discretion, at such a late stage
in the proceedings, to limit the new expert testimony it would receive and
exclude Mr. Meyers’ testimony that exceeded those limits.
Mr. DeNoce claims that he was ambushed by the motion to exclude
on the morning of Mr. Meyers’ testimony and that it violated his due
process rights. He argues that the court should have given him time to
conduct research, brief the issue, and be heard. There was no ambush; as
the bankruptcy court explained in its decision, Dr. Neff’s counsel objected
to Mr. Meyers’ testimony at a status conference held about three months
before the trial. Mr. DeNoce’s argument also ignores the elementary fact
that courts regularly (and properly) decide evidentiary issues during trials
and evidentiary hearings based solely on oral presentations, without any
written briefing. Further, in this case, the bankruptcy court heard nearly
two hours of oral argument on the issue. Mr. DeNoce does not identify any
argument that he could have made in a written response that he did not or
could not have made during the extensive oral argument.
Mr. DeNoce was long aware of the limitations on the scope of
Mr. Meyers’ report and testimony. Those limitations were reasonable. The
bankruptcy court did not deny Mr. DeNoce due process when it enforced
15 its prior orders.
c. New evidence
Mr. DeNoce also contends that he introduced evidence at the
evidentiary hearing that established that Dr. Neff was abusing prescription
drug Versed, which would disqualify him from receiving SSA benefits and
invalidate the SSA disability determination. Dr. Hersel testified that
Dr. Neff “has told me recently that he was [using Versed], not back then.”
Mr. DeNoce summarily concludes that Dr. Neff “was shooting up Versed
when he applied for SSA disability benefits.”
However, Dr. Hersel’s testimony does not establish when Dr. Neff
was using Versed. Based on the record before us, Dr. Hersel’s testimony
did not discuss a timeframe for the drug use, and Mr. DeNoce was unable
to elicit any definitive dates. This argument does not undermine the SSA
disability determination.
Mr. DeNoce argues that Dr. Neff admitted that he could perform
work as a dental assistant. However, this testimony merely suggests that
Dr. Neff could perform some type of work in the dental field, not that it
would be “substantial gainful employment.” It does not establish how
many hours per week Dr. Neff could work or how much money he could
earn, given his disability. 8 Further, the bankruptcy court, as the trier of fact,
8 Mr. DeNoce also argues that the bankruptcy court improperly penalized him for innocently referring to Mr. Meyers as “Dr. Meyers” and erroneously claiming that he had retained Mr. Meyers in 2017. While the bankruptcy court did point to these statements as examples of Mr. DeNoce’s disingenuousness, we have found no 16 was free to give this evidence whatever weight it thought appropriate. We
find no clear error.
Therefore, the bankruptcy court did not err in overruling the
B. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Reconsideration Motion.
Mr. DeNoce argues that the court should have reconsidered the
Exemption Objection Orders. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its
discretion.
Because Mr. DeNoce filed the Reconsideration Motion within the
fourteen-day period after the entry of the Exemption Objection Order, we
examine his arguments under Civil Rule 59, made applicable in bankruptcy
by Rule 9024. See Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248
F.3d 892, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A ‘motion for reconsideration’ is treated
as a motion to alter or amend judgment under [Civil Rule] 59(e) if it is filed
within [fourteen] days of entry of judgment. Otherwise, it is treated as a
[Civil] Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a judgment or order.” (citation
omitted)). The Ninth Circuit has stated that, “[u]nder [Civil] Rule 59(e), a
motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual
circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered
evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the
indication in the record that this issue affected the court’s decision. It excluded Mr. Meyers’ testimony because his opinions exceeded the scope of the court’s orders, 17 controlling law.” 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th
Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
Mr. DeNoce argues that he did not realize that the expert to replace
Dr. Bilik was supposed to be a psychiatrist. But the court’s orders said
exactly that; no literate person could have misunderstood them. 9 More
importantly, the orders made clear that the expert was merely a “review
expert” who would interpret and explain Drs. Bilik’s and Goldsmith’s
reports; the court did not permit independent analysis of earning capacity
or any other issue. Mr. DeNoce’s failure to read and follow the court’s clear
directives is not excusable.
Mr. DeNoce also argues that the court improperly blamed him for the
ineffective SSA release. As we stated above, he had years to obtain the
records, and he squandered his chances.
Finally, he complains that Dr. Neff “ambushed” him on the morning
of trial. As we explained above, the court properly limited Mr. Meyers’
testimony and report in accordance with its earlier orders.
In short, Mr. DeNoce did not offer any newly discovered evidence,
clear error, or a change in law warranting reconsideration. The bankruptcy
court did not err in summarily denying the Reconsideration Motion.
and not because of Mr. DeNoce’s representations. 9Although the court later acknowledged that it had not realized that Dr. Bilik was a psychologist and not a psychiatrist, Mr. Meyers was neither a psychiatrist nor a psychologist.
18 CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the bankruptcy court did not err in
overruling the Exemption Objection and denying the Reconsideration
Motion. We AFFIRM.