FARRIS, Circuit Judge:
Robert T. Gustafson appeals a summary contempt order entered against him by the district court. A divided panel of this court reversed. See 619 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1980). Because proper resolution of the principal issue presented — the conditions under which a federal court may summarily impose criminal contempt — is important to just and orderly administration of the courts in the fifteen districts embraced by this circuit, we granted rehearing by this limited en banc panel, see 9th Cir.R. 25. We now affirm.
I. GUSTAFSON’S CONDUCT
Gustafson represented one of six criminal defendants charged with conspiring to smuggle aliens. On December 6,1978, after more than twelve days of jury trial, closing arguments began. Gustafson, representing the first defendant to argue, read his presentation from a prepared text. He read it so fast that the trial judge or the court reporter requested that he repeat words or slow down at least nineteen times. On some of these occasions, he continued at so rapid a pace that he was almost immediately cautioned again. After it became apparent .that Gustafson could not be slowed down, the trial judge stopped the court reporter and relied solely on a tape recording for transcription.
After Gustafson summarized the evidence, he began his conclusion, still reading from his prepared text. The prosecution made a series of objections to Gustafson’s line of argument, arguing principally that he was seeking the jury’s sympathy and that he was leading the jury to believe that it would be asked to impose punishment on the defendants. These objections were all sustained. On several occasions Gustafson’s response to these objections was to pause, skip the remainder of the offending sentence, and return to his prepared text.1 Several times his line of argument continued and another objection on the same grounds was almost immediately made and sustained.
At the close of Gustafson’s argument, the following exchange occurred:
[GUSTAFSON]: Now I must close, but before I do, I want you to know that Julio Zamora feels strongly about this case and his prayers have been that you will render a just and merciful verdict. For his wife and his children, too—
MRS. WITTMAN: Objection, your honor—
THE COURT: Mr. Gustafson — you cannot, ladies and gentlemen, base a verdict based on any sympathy whatsoever. The case, and the verdict you render must be based on the facts and only the facts, nothing else.
MR. GUSTAFSON: I was just trying to say, your honor, and I’d like to have a ruling on it — for his wife and his two children, too—
[1019]*1019MRS. WITTMAN: Same objection, your honor.
THE COURT: That has nothing to do with it. His wife, his two children, nothing. It’s the facts of the case.
MR. GUSTAFSON: Thank you. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I have just presented you, or you have been presented, with an example of the operation between the bench and the prosecutor in quashing and quelling this evidence of a defense counsel trying to do his level best for his client, and I am going to have to rely upon you to give him every benefit of every doubt to my client, despite those efforts.
Thank you, and I hope you have a ' Merry Christmas.
Following Gustafson’s final remark, the court excused the.jury and recessed the trial for the day. After the jury left the courtroom, the court summarily held Gustafson in contempt and imposed a fine of $250. Gustafson paid the fine. At the beginning of the next day, counsel for all the remaining defendants moved for a mistrial, contending that Gustafson’s argument had “hopelessly alienated” the jury against their clients. The motion was denied. We upheld that denial in United States v. Ayala-Ayala, 610 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1979) (mem.); United States v. Ayala-Carapia, 610 F.2d 822 (9th Cir. 1979) (mem.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1089, 100 S.Ct. 1051, 62 L.Ed.2d 776 (1980); and United States v. Carapia, 610 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1979) (mem.).
The district judge prepared a certificate of contempt stating that he had seen and heard courtroom misconduct by Gustafson. See generally Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a). The certificate provides in part:
I find that the [misconduct] constituted contempt of this court and was of such an accusatory nature as to directly affront the decorum and dignity of the United States District Court. I firmly believe that if this court cannot require those who are in its courtroom to obey the court, and if this court is required to sit idly by when accusations of misconduct and conspiracy are made by defense counsel in closing argument without any basis whatsoever, this court would lose any control it has over the participants in a trial as well as the courtroom in general. Such behavior, such misconduct will not be tolerated by the court, and under the circumstances. I do not think it should be tolerated by any court.
Accordingly, I adjudge that attorney Robert T. Gustafson is guilty of criminal contempt as described below. I further state that a reading of this record cannot and does not adequately reflect the true intensity of the hostility and discourteousness displayed by this attorney during his closing argument to the jury in the above entitled case all in the court’s presence.
The certificate then describes the particulars of Gustafson’s disobedience to the court’s rulings and his closing allegation of judicial misconduct. It continues:
I further find that summary vindication for said misbehavior in the actual presence of five other defense counsel and two prosecutors left the court no alternative but to summarily punish said attorney by the imposition of a fine of $250.00 or three days in jail.
Gustafson appeals, contending that his conduct was not contemptuous and that, even if it was contemptuous, the district court improperly used a summary procedure to find him in contempt. The United States disputes both contentions. The panel avoided ruling on the contemptuousness of the conduct, holding that summary adjudication of contempt was'inappropriate.
II. CONTEMPTUOUSNESS OF GUSTAFSON’S CONDUCT
Section 401 of the Criminal Code provides:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as—
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice;
[1020]*1020(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command.
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). Because lawyers are not court “officers” within the meaning of section 401(2), Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 404-05, 76 S.Ct. 456, 458-59, 100 L.Ed. 474 (1956), only the first category of conduct is at issue here. This category is limited to behavior that in some manner “actually obstruct[s] the district judge in ‘the performance of judicial duty.’” In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 234, 82 S.Ct. 1288, 1291, 8 L.Ed.2d 434 (1962) (quoting Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383, 39 S.Ct. 337, 339, 63 L.Ed. 656 (1919)) (summary exercise of § 401(1) power). Moreover, to be punishable as criminal contempt, the misbehavior must be willful. United States v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 627 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Farquhar, 492 F.2d 561, 564 (D.C.Cir. 1973); see also United States v. Marx, 553 F.2d 874, 876 (4th Cir. 1977) (§ 401(3) contempt); In re Floersheim, 316 F.2d 423, 428 (9th Cir. 1963) (same).
Tested against this standard, Gustafson’s behavior was contemptuous. He repeatedly ignored objections sustained by the court to the speed and content of his argument. He disregarded the judge’s instructions as to permissible argument. Although he attempts to rationalize his behavior by collaterally challenging the judge’s rulings, his remedy for error by the district judge was by mandamus or appeal from final judgment in the case being tried, not by disobedience. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9, 72 S.Ct. 451, 455, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952). The judge acted in the performance of his judicial duty to ensure an unbiased jury and an accurate record. Where, as here, an attorney disobeys the court’s rulings and instructions, he or she" commits “misbehavior” within the meaning of section 401(1). See Pennsylvania v. Local 542, 552 F.2d 498, 509 (3d Cir.) (“We have not the slightest doubt that flouting a trial judge’s commands is the essence of obstructing the administration of justice.”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822, 98 S.Ct. 67, 54 L.Ed.2d 79 (1977); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 371 (7th Cir. 1972) (“The unmistakable implication of [In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 82 S.Ct. 1288, 8 L.Ed.2d 434 (1962),] is that defiance of the court’s order to cease questioning would have actually obstructed the proceedings.”); see also United States v. Afflerbach, 547 F.2d 522, 525 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1098, 97 S.Ct. 1118, 51 L.Ed.2d 546 (1977); In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 399 (7th Cir. 1972).
Moreover, at least some of Gustafson’s disobedience was willful beyond a reasonable doubt. Considering only his persistently rapid pace, it is difficult to quell reasonable doubts that Gustafson intended to disobey. His pace, however, was not his only disobedience. When his persistent argument on prohibited topics is also considered, an unmistakable pattern of deliberate disobedience emerges. The record satisfies us that the district court properly found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gustafson acted willfully.
Gustafson’s closing remark was also contemptuous. He asserted that the judge had conspired with the prosecution to destroy his client’s case. His assertion was made to the jury and in the presence of spectators and counsel. This charge of judicial bias inherently obstructed the judicial function by undermining the court’s ability to regulate trial. It was plainly contemptuous. See Barnes v. United States, 241 F.2d 252, 254 (9th Cir. 1956) (dictum) (“Any lawyer would know that a charge made to a judge in open court that the judge had made up his mind before the case started ... was flagrant contempt of court.”); see also In re Buckley, 10 Cal.3d 237, 248-49, 255, 514 P.2d 1201, 1207-08, 1213, 110 Cal.Rptr. 121, 127-28, 133 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 910, 94 S.Ct. 3202, 41 L.Ed.2d 1156 (1974); Hume v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.2d 506, 513, 110 P.2d 669, 673-74 (1941); Alexander v. Sharpe, 245 A.2d 279, 281, 283-84 (Me.1968).
III. APPROPRIATENESS OF SUMMARY PROCEDURE
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42, which governs the method of adjudicating criminal contempt, provides:
[1021]*1021(a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record.
(b) Disposition upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant’s consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.
The certificate prepared by the district judge here meets the two requirements explicitly set forth in Rule 42(a). The principal issues in this case are whether there are other prerequisites to summary adjudication of contempt and, if so, whether they were met here.
In United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975), the Supreme Court upheld a district court’s summary contempt order directed against two witnesses who refused to testify when ordered to do so by the trial judge. The Court began its analysis by noting that the requirements of Rule 42(a) were met:
Respondents’ refusals to answer, although not delivered disrespectfully, plainly fall within the express language of Rule 42(a), and constitute contemptuous conduct. Rule 42(a) was never intended to be limited to situations where a witness uses scurrilous language, or threatens or creates overt physical disorder and thereby disrupts a trial. All that is necessary is that the judge certify that he “saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court.” Respondents do not contest that these requirements are met here.
Id. at 314-15, 95 S.Ct. at 1805 (footnotes omitted). After concluding that the witnesses’ acts were intentional and obstructed the judicial duty, id. at 315-16 & n. 7, 95 S.Ct. at 1806 & n. 7, the Supreme Court held that summary adjudication was proper:
The face-to-face refusal to comply with the court’s order itself constituted an affront to the court, and when that kind of refusal disrupts and frustrates an ongoing proceeding, as it did here, summary contempt must be available to vindicate the authority of the court as well as to provide the recalcitrant witness with some incentive to testify. Whether such incentive is necessary in a particular case is a matter the Rule wisely leaves to the discretion of the trial court.
Id. at 316-17, 95 S.Ct. at 1806-07 (citation and footnote omitted).
Under Wilson, the only absolute prerequisites to summary punishment of contempt are the requirements in Rule 42(a) that the contemptuous behavior be seen or heard by the judge and be committed in the actual presence of the court. When these requirements are satisfied, the trial court is empowered, in its discretion, to invoke summary procedures. This discretionary power is not to be exercised by the district court except in limited circumstances after dispassionate consideration.
After holding that summary contempt was appropriate, the Court in Wilson distinguished the case before it from Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 86 S.Ct. 352, 15 [1022]*1022L.Ed.2d 240 (1965). In Harris, a witness before a grand jury refused to answer certain questions after a grant of immunity. The witness was then brought before a district court judge and summarily held in contempt for refusing to answer the same questions. In Wilson, the Court noted that, when confronted by the refusal to testify, the grand jury in Harris could “rather easily suspend action on any one [inquiry], and turn to another while [plenary contempt] proceedings under Rule 42(b) are completed.” 421 U.S. at 318, 95 S.Ct. at 1807. In contrast, the Court deemed refusal of a trial witness to testify a much more serious threat to orderly procedure. Id. at 319, 95 S.Ct. at 1808. Thus, the Wilson Court considered the need for immediate action to be a crucial factor in distinguishing Harris. The Court’s summary of its holding in Wilson reflects the importance of this factor in the trial court’s discretionary determination of the propriety of summary punishment:
In an ongoing trial, with the judge, jurors, counsel, and witnesses all waiting, Rule 42(a) provides an appropriate remedial tool to discourage witnesses from contumacious refusals to comply with lawful orders essential to prevent a breakdown of the proceedings. Where time is not of the essence, however, the provisions of Rule 42(b) may be more appropriate to deal with contemptuous conduct. We adhere to the principle that only “ ‘[t]he least possible power adequate to the end proposed’ ” should be used in contempt cases.
Id.
We review the trial court’s decision to invoke summary contempt procedures, including its consideration of the need for immediate action, for an abuse of discretion:
As with all power, the authority under Rule 42(a) to punish summarily can be abused; the courts of appeals, however, can deal with abuses of discretion without restricting the Rule in contradiction of its express terms, and without unduly limiting the power of the trial judge to act swiftly and firmly to prevent contumacious conduct from disrupting the orderly progress of a criminal trial.
Id. We review for such abuse of discretion in light of the fundamental principles underlying the contempt power. “Rule 42(a) was reserved ‘for exceptional circumstances,’” Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. at 164, 86 S.Ct. at 353 (quoting Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 54, 79 S.Ct. 539, 548, 3 L.Ed.2d 609 (1959)). The rule is to be applied when the contemnor’s conduct is “such an open, serious threat to orderly procedure that instant and summary punishment, as distinguished from due and deliberate procedures . . ., [is] necessary.” Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. at 165, 86 S.Ct. at 354 (citation omitted). Rule 42(b) is to be applied “except [in] those unusual situations envisioned by Rule 42(a) where instant action is necessary to protect the judicial institution itself.” Id. at 167, 86 S.Ct. at 355.
Summary contempt proceedings are unique to criminal procedure: the otherwise inconsistent functions of prosecutor, jury, and judge are united in one individual. Courts have long noted the manifest potential for abuse. E. g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1484, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313, 9 S.Ct. 77, 82, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888). Where courtroom misconduct carries special personal insult to the trial judge, we are watchful for distortion of the judge’s sound discretion.
Moreover, summary contempt dispenses with the usual guarantees of notice and hearing. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 502, 92 S.Ct. 582, 586, 30 L.Ed.2d 632 (1972). We therefore must take special care to ensure that trial judges invoke summary contempt only with careful consideration and good reason.
On the other hand, we recognize that the determination to impose summary contempt, assuming that the requirements are met, is wisely left primarily to the trial judge. See Wilson, 421 U.S. at 316-17, 95 S.Ct. at 1806-07. Trials are by their nature contentious. See generally Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 8, 72 S.Ct. 451, 454, 96 [1023]*1023L.Ed. 717 (1952). As contention begins to develop into disobedience or disorder, the trial court is in the best position to judge whether there exists a need for immediate penal vindication of the dignity and authority of the court. In carrying out their heavy responsibility of ensuring fair trial, district judges must have the ability to quickly and authoritatively act to halt incipient disorder.
Where the record demonstrates that the trial judge did not fully consider the relative appropriateness of summary and plenary adjudication of contempt, we must independently evaluate the need for summary procedures. At the same time, we give great deference to a trial judge’s explicit determination that plenary procedures are inadequate and summary procedures are necessary.
Here, the trial judge realized that summary contempt is only appropriate when needed to promote the judicial function. He specifically found that the misbehavior left him no alternative but to summarily punish. This finding is supported by both the record and the circumstances. Throughout his closing argument, Gustafson had openly disregarded the Court’s rulings and directives. He had just closed that argument with a charge of judicial bias. Although the day’s proceedings had concluded, counsel for five codefendants had yet to give their closing arguments, the prosecution had yet to give its rebuttal, and the judge had yet to instruct the jury. Gustafson’s contempt, if left unpunished, might have spawned other misconduct. This provides a sound basis for the immediate and temperate action that was taken by the court here.
The fact that the district judge excused the jury before imposing contempt does not render summary action inappropriate. Exercise of the summary contempt power need not be immediate. See Pennsylvania v. Local 542, 552 F.2d 498, 512-14 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822, 98 S.Ct. 67, 54 L.Ed.2d 79 (1977); MacInnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952); Hallinan v. United States, 182 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 952, 71 S.Ct. 1010, 95 L.Ed. 1375 (1951). The avoidance of further jury bias against Gustafson’s client was a good reason for the brief delay. Further, the delay did not prevent the summary adjudication from deterring further contempt by Gustafson or the other counsel. When trial continued the next morning, proper decorum had been reestablished.
The opinion of the panel filed on May 30, 1980, is withdrawn and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.