THOMPSON, J.
By means of habeas corpus the defendant seeks to obtain his release from custody after having been convicted of violating an initiative ordinance of the city of Redding prohibiting soliciting, for compensation, without a license, memberships in organizations requiring the payment of dues.
It is contended the ordinance is void for the reason that it violates the right of freedom of speech guaranteed by the federal and state Constitutions, and because it discriminates against labor organizations. It is also asserted the petitioner did not engage in the business of soliciting memberships, and that the ordinance therefore has no application to his activity in that regard.
A complaint was filed in the City Court of Redding March 10,1942, charging petitioner with violating sections 2, 4 and 7 of said ordinance, by wilfully and unlawfully engaging in soliciting, for compensation, without procuring a license therefor, in said city on the last mentioned date memberships in Construction and General Laborers Union, Local 961, which organization requires the payment of dues from all members.
Upon trial he was convicted of that offense, and sentenced [522]*522to pay a fine of twenty-five dollars, or upon failure to do so, that he be imprisoned in the' county jail one day for each unpaid two dollars of said fine. No part of the fine was paid. The petitioner applied to the Superior Court of Shasta County for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied. The petition was then filed in this court.
At the trial the defendant failed to take the witness stand in his own behalf. It satisfactorily appears, without conflict, that he was the business agent of the labor organization mentioned in the complaint, and that it was a part of his duties “to solicit members” therefor; that he was not paid a separate fee or commission for such solicitations, but was paid a stipulated salary for the performance of all of his duties, including the soliciting of memberships in the organization; that he did solicit in the city of Redding, on March 10, 1942, at least one man by the name of Shaw, to join his labor organization, without securing a license as required by the ordinance in question, and that, upon request by an officer of that city, he refused to apply for a license, stating that he did so on advice of his attorney.
The ordinance reads in part:
“ORDINANCE NO. 251
“AN ORDINANCE REQUIRING ANY PERSON SOLICITING MEMBERSHIP IN ANY ORGANIZATION FOR COMPENSATION TO OBTAIN A LICENSE THEREFOR, AND FORBIDDING THE USE OF CORRUPT MEANS IN SUCH SOLICITATION IN THE CITY OF REDDING.
“The people of the City of Redding do ordain as follows, to-wit:
“Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation, whether as principal, clerk, servant, agent, or employee, inside of the city limits of the City of Redding, by force, violence, menaces, threat, intimidation, coercion or corrupt means, either directly or indirectly, to seek, solicit, induce, or attempt to seek, solicit or induce, any person to join or take membership in any organization, or by force, violence, threat, intimidation, coercion or corrupt means, either directly or indirectly, to seek, solicit or induce, or attempt to seek, solicit or induce, any employer or other person to compel or induce any employee or any other person to join or take membership in any organization.
[523]*523“Section 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, inside of the city limits of the City of Redding, to solicit or obtain membership for compensation in any organization which requires the payment of dues by such members without first having procured a license so to do, as in this ordinance provided. . . .
“Section 4. Any person desiring a license to engage in or carry on the work of soliciting membership as herein provided shall make application in writing to said City Council upon such forms as may be provided by said City Council, a copy of which shall at all times be attached to said license. . . .
“Section 6. Upon said hearing the said City Council shall receive evidence and determine whether said applicant is of good moral character, and is likely to use force, violence, threats, menace, coercion, intimidation or corrupt means in his proposed work of solicitation. If the City Council is satisfied that said applicant is of good moral character and will not resort to force, violence, threat, menace, coercion, intimidation or corrupt means in his proposed work of solicitation, it shall direct the issuance of a license to said applicant for said purpose of solicitation upon payment of the license fee herein provided for.
“Section 7. Each person to whom a license is issued hereunder shall pay to the City of Redding for each period of three months a license fee in the sum of $5.00.
“Section 8. Any license to be issued hereunder shall be issued by the Chief of Police of said City of Redding, upon payment to him in advance of the license fee hereinabove set forth. All money received in payment of said license fee shall be paid into the General Fund of the City of Redding by the Chief of Police.”
The constitutionality of a city ordinance may be properly challenged and determined by means of habeas corpus. (In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488 [122 P.2d 22]; In re Vitalie, 117 Cal.App. 553 [4 P.2d 171]; 13 Cal.Jur. 225, sec. 8.) The office of the writ of habeas corpus is confined to the question of the jurisdiction of the court or officer to render the judgment or order by means of which the petitioner is restrained of his liberty. When the jurisdiction of a court depends on adjudicated facts, the determination of the court in that regard is ordinarily conclusive on the hearing of a writ of habeas corpus. The writ is not designed to serve the purpose of an appeal or to retry issues of fact. (In re Connor, [524]*52416 Cal.2d 701, 705 [108 P.2d 10]; 13 Cal.Jur. 223, sec. 7.) Pursuant to that well established rule, this court may not determine on this proceeding whether the evidence adequately shows that the petitioner was engaged in soliciting within the city of Redding, memberships in his labor organization, as a business, without a license to do so. As the Supreme Court says in the Connor case, supra, with respect to an alleged failure of the trial court to inform the defendant of his right to be represented by counsel:
“This contention cannot at this late date be made the basis of a successful collateral attack by habeas corpus upon the validity of the judgment. The point could have been urged by petitioner on an appeal from the judgment, but none was taken. ... It is not a good ground for discharge in this proceeding. In this state a defendant is not permitted to try out his contentions piecemeal by successive proceedings attacking the validity of the judgment against him. (In re Drew, 188 Cal. 717 [207 P. 249]; In re Connor, supra.) Neither may the writ of habeas corpus be employed to serve the purposes of an appeal. (In re Leonardino, 9 Cal.App. 690 [100 P. 708].) The function of the writ, as described in the case last cited, ‘is to determine the legality of one’s detention by an inquiry into the question of jurisdiction and the validity of the process upon its face, and whether anything has transpired since it was issued to render it invalid. It is not designated to retry issues of fact or to answer the purpose of an appeal.’ ”
We must therefore assume that if the ordinance is a valid exercise either of the police power of the city of Redding to regulate reasonably a specified business within its limits, in the interest of peace, health or general welfare of its citizens, or of the power to license such business for the purpose of revenue, and that it is not discriminatory in its application, the writ should be denied. We may not be permitted, on this proceeding, to weigh the evidence adduced at the trial to determine whether the court erred in determining that the petitioner was engaged in the business of soliciting memberships, as distinguished from a single effort, since it does appear that business was a part of his duties and that hé did actually solicit at least one member without a license.
Redding is a city of the sixth class. Section 764, subdivision 10, of the Municipal Corporations Act of California (Stats. 1927, p. 503; 2 Deering’s Gen. Laws of 1937, p. 2513, Act 5233) provides that:
[525]*525“The board of trustees of such city shall have power: . . .
“10. To license, for purposes of regulation and revenue, . all and every kind of business, including the sale of intoxicating liquors, authorized by law and transacted or carried on in such city, ... to fix the rates of licenses upon the same, and to provide for the collection of the same by suit or otherwise.”
The ordinance appears to be a valid and uniform exercise of the police power of the city to reasonably regulate by means of licensing all persons who engage in the business of solicting for compensation within the city limits, memberships in all organizations which require the payment of dues. It was enacted in the interest of peace, the general welfare and for the purpose of raising revenue. It was evidently intended to protect the citizens against dishonest and unreliable solicitors, and from the annoyance, detriment and injury •resulting from the use of force, violence or coercion in securing members of organizations. The ordinance authorizes the city council to issue such licenses upon a showing of “good moral character” on the part of applicants, and upon a showing that they are not “likely to use force, violence, threats, menace, coercion, intimidation or corrupt means” of procuring members. A license fee of $5 per quarter is required to be paid by each solicitor.
The ordinance does not prohibit the soliciting of memberships in any organization. It merely requires the procuring of a license, under reasonable specified circumstances, as a prerequisite to engaging in that pursuit. It is uniform in its application to all organizations requiring the payment of dues. The reasonableness of the amount of the license tax is conceded. Nor is the requirement to establish “good moral character” of the applicants challenged. The good moral character of the petitioner is acknowledged. The question as to whether he was eligible to receive a license is not involved in this proceeding. He deliberately solicited at least one membership in his labor organization without a license. It was a part of his business to solicit memberships. He refused to apply for a license on the advice of his attorney. He assumed that the ordinance was void, and that he did not require a license. The only excuse which the petitioner offers for violating the ordinance is that it is unconstitutional and void. Evidently the petitioner deliberately solicited memberships in his organization without a license to test the validity of the ordinance.
[526]*526The business of soliciting memberships in organizations for pay, as well as the business of soliciting sales of goods, is commercial.in its nature, and therefore susceptible of valid uniform regulations under the police power. (Riley v. Chambers, 181 Cal. 589 [185 P. 855, 8 A.L.R. 418]; 16 Cal.Jur. 206, sec. 14; 37 C.J. 214, secs. 69, 70.)
The Redding ordinance appears on its face to be a valid police regulation of the business of soliciting for compensation memberships in organizations which require the payment of dues. (Art. XI, sec. 11, Const, of Cal.; Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 [88 A.L.R. 177]; Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 412 [44 P. 725 32 L.R.A. 527]; E. A. Hoffman Candy Co. v. City of Newport Beach, 120 Cal.App. 525 [8 P.2d 235] ; In re Hartmann, 25 Cal.App.2d 55, 60 [76 P.2d 709].) In the Green River case, supra, an ordinance prohibiting peddlers from vending or soliciting sales of merchandise within that city was held to be a valid exercise of police powers. The court said:
“It has been uniformly held that while legislative authority may not arbitrarily interfere with private affairs by imposing unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon a lawful business, yet a considerable latitude of discretion must be accorded to the law making power, and . if the regulation operates uniformly upon all persons similarly situated and it is not shown that it is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary, it cannot be judicially declared to be in contravention of constitutional right. ’ ’
Many federal authorities are cited in support of the preceding quotation.
The right to determine the necessity fob local legislation regulating businesses of specified classes under the police power rests with the legislative authority. On habeas corpus, a court may not interfere with that determination in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary. The court says in the Green River case, supra, in that regard, quoting from Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 [33 S.Ct. 182, 57 L.Ed. 364]:
‘ ‘ 'This court has frequently affirmed that the local authorities intrusted with the regulation of such matters, and not the courts, are primarily the judges of the necessities of local situations calling for such legislation, and the courts may only interfere with laws or ordinances passed in pursuance of the police power where they are so arbitrary as to be palpably [527]*527and unmistakably in excess of any reasonable exercise of the authority conferred. ’ ”
In the present case the ordinance appears to be fair and impartial in its application, and we must assume the local situation reasonably justified the necessity for the regulatory ordinance in question. It was an initiative ordinance adopted at the instance of electors of the city of Redding, which shows some public demand for the regulation to protect the inhabitants against unreliable solicitors.
It is true that a single transaction or the soliciting of but one individual to become a member of an organization does not necessarily constitute a business. (In re Smith, 33 Cal.App. 161 [164 P. 618] ; Merced County v. Helm & Nolan, 102 Cal. 159 [36 P. 399] ; 16 Cal.Jur. 193, sec. 6.) But in the present case it sufficiently appears that the petitioner was regularly employed as agent of the labor union upon a fixed salary, and that a part of his duties was to solicit memberships in the organization. It was therefore a part of his business to solicit members. He was charged and convicted of violating the ordinance in pursuance of that business.
The ordinance makes it unlawful for any person within the city of Redding to solicit members- “for compensation” in any organization which requires “the payment of dues.” The language of the ordinance covers any person who solicits for pay members in such an organization, whether he is compensated with a stipulated sum for each member secured, or is paid a salary for services, including his duty to solicit members. Either method of payment constitutes compensation for the services, and falls within the inhibition of the ordinance.
The evidence in this case shows that it was a part of the duties of the petitioner to solicit members-. He was paid a stipulated salary for his services, which included the duty of soliciting members. It is true that his salary was due regardless of whether he was successful in securing new members. But his duties did require him to solicit for members. The evidence shows the following testimony in that regard: “ Q. That salary was the same whether he got any members or not? A. I believe that’s correct. Q. But that part of his duties was to solicit members from time to time? That was part of his work? A. Yes, sir.” It thus appears the petitioner’s [528]*528salary did not depend on his success in securing members, but it did depend on his efforts at least to seek for members.
The ordinance is not invalid because it confers upon the council unrestricted authority arbitrarily to grant or deny licenses. It provides for hearings by the council to determine the fitness of applicants for licenses to solicit for memberships in organizations. The standard of qualifications is prescribed. The applicants are required to furnish evidence of their good moral character, and that they are not likely tti resort to force, violence, coercion, etc., in soliciting for memberships. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it may not be presumed the councilmen will act arbitrarily, oppressively or unfairly in granting or refusing to grant licenses. If in fact the council does abuse its discretion in that regard the applicant has his remedy against the members of the board. In California the presumption that licensing boards or officers will act fairly and impartially in the performance of their lawful duty is in accordance with the federal rule in that regard. A grant of authority to a municipality carries with it the presumption that the council will perform its duty lawfully without discrimination. (People v. Globe Grain & Milling Co., 211 Cal. 121, 126 [294 P. 3] ; In re Flaherty, 105 Cal. 558, 562 [38 P. 981, 27 L.R.A. 529] ; People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N.Y. 96 [133 N.E. 364, 25 A.L.R. 107] ; 16 Cal.Jur. 213, sec. 19; 37 Am.Jur. 782, sec. 161; 19 Cal.L.Rev. p. 448.) In the Doyle case, supra, Mr. Justice Pound says:
“This court has casually said in People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden, 144 N.Y. 529, 27 L.R.A. 718, 39 N.E. 686, 689: ‘Nor is the constitutionality of an act to be determined by the manner in which its provisions may be carried out by those upon whom devolved the duty of acting as examiners [of applicants for plumbers’ licenses]. If they act unfairly or oppressively, as alleged by the relator in the petition, that is conduct which may call for a remedy against the persons who compose the board; but it does not furnish ground for assailing the validity of the statute. ’ ”
In the Globe Grain & Milling Co., case, supra, it is said, at page 126 thereof:
“The essential requirement of due process is merely that the administrative officer or body be required to determine the existence or nonexistence of the necessary facts before [529]*529any decision is made. If the statute requires this, it does not vest an uncontrolled discretion, and the officer or body may not act arbitrarily. (Riley v. Chambers, 181 Cal. 589 [8 A.L.R. 418, 185 P. 855]; Doble Steam Motors Corp. v. Daugherty, 195 Cal. 158 [232 P. 140] ; Ex parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331 [90 P. 702].)”
To the same effect it is stated in the excellent note upon that subject found in 19 California Law Review, at page 449:
“The California case under discussion fortifies previous holdings in this state, and is in accord with the federal rule, that a grant of authority carries the implication that it will be exercised reasonably, fairly, and lawfully, See People ex rel. Liebermann v. Van De Carr (1905), 199 U.S. 552, 26 Sup.Ct. 144 [50 L.Ed. 305]; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177, 30 Sup.Ct. 356 [54 L.Ed. 435] ; Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. (1916), 242 U.S. 539, 37 Sup.Ct. 217 [61 L.Ed. 480]; Ex parte McManus (1907), 151 Cal. 331, 90 P. 702. The court expressly declares that ‘the statute will be construed together with the constitutional provisions against discrimination. ’ 80 Cal.Dec. at 628 [211 Cal. 121], 294 P. at 5.
“. . . But in jurisdictions like California, where such enactments are upheld through reading in constitutional limitations, a complainant may only have relief under the statute by proving discriminatory action against himself. In the instant case, the plaintiff set up no facts proving discrimination, but alleged that since the statute on its face did not preclude unfair action, it was invalid. The court asserts that the remedy for a person injured, in view of the validity of the act, consists in an application for a review of particular orders or rules of the commission, to determine whether the administrative agency is acting in excess of the powers delegated to it. . . .
“. . . The case seems rather to be decided upon the sensible theory that administrative officers granted wide powers are sufficiently limited by reading into their authority constitutional limitations, and that in proper eases an adequate remedy against their misuse of discretion is provided by a review of their orders and rules.”
In this case the petitioner refused to apply for a license to solicit memberships. The members of the council were not asked to pass upon his qualifications for a license. [530]*530Under the preceding authorities, in the absence of evidence of an abuse of discretion, it will not be presumed the ordinance is void merely because the statutory authority to enact ordinances for “regulation and revenue” does not prescribe limitations of discretion on the part of the council.
The petitioner claims on the asserted authority of In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488 [122 P.2d 22], that the ordinance is uncertain because it seeks to prohibit the soliciting of members by the exercise of “force, violence, menace, threat, intimidation, coercion or corrupt means” since it may be lawful to resort to compulsion, coercion, intimidation or threat to secure members, provided such means amount only to “economic, moral or social pressure.” That is a strained construction of the language. The fair import of the language employed is to prohibit the securing of members of any organization included in the ordinance against the will of a person solicited, induced by means of physical violence, threat, menace, coercion, intimidation or fraud, whether they are economic, moral, social or any other type of compulsion. None of those terms fairly comes within the scope of legitimate persuasion. (Lisse v. Local Union No. 31, 2 Cal.2d 312, 317 [41 P.2d 314].) They all savor of unfair and unwarranted means of forcing one to join an organization against his will. The application of petitioner’s construction would result in depriving one of his inalienable right to determine for himself what association, group or organization he wished to join. The use of force to procure members would seem to fall within the totalitarian methods so scathingly denounced by the petitioner. We think the language is not reasonably susceptible of the distinction urged by petitioner. .
In support of his contention that the Redding ordinance violates the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, the petitioner relies on the following cases: In re Campbell, 64 Cal.App. 300 [221 P. 952]; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 [63 S.Ct. 870, 891, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 146 A.L.R. 81]; Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 [60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155]; Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 [60.S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093]; Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496 [59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423]; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 [57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278]; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 [57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066]; Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. [531]*531697 [51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357]; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 [6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220]; Pittman v. Nix-Fla.- [11 So.2d 791, 144 A.L.R. 1341].
None of the foregoing cases is authority for holding that the Redding ordinance is unconstitutional and void for the reason that it is discriminatory or oppressive or because it violates the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. Those cases involved statutes or ordinances absolutely prohibiting the distribution of handbills or pamphlets to disseminate religious or other legitimate views, and absolutely forbidding the organization of labor unions. Some of them involved participation in public meetings held under the auspices of the Communist Party, regardless of unlawful utterances or conduct in opposition to organized government, or clear discriminations of either the ordinances or their enforcement against such businesses as laundries. Several of those eases clearly distinguish between statutes or ordinances adopted under the police power to regulate businesses or to secure revenue and those which are clearly intended actually to prohibit lawful businesses or pursuits. Several of those cases specifically recognize the right to regulate by license such enterprises as soliciting for compensation subscriptions to newspapers, magazines or books, since that occupation is deemed to be commercial in its nature. None of the foregoing cases cited by the petitioner involved the licensing of solicitors who engaged in that pursuit for compensation. In that respecit the present proceeding is radically different from the cases relied upon by the petitioner. They are therefore not in point.
It would be useless to attempt to analyze in detail each of the numerous cases relied upon by the petitioner. We shall attempt only to point out the chief distinctions in the leading cases. In the Campbell case, a Eureka ordinance which made it unlawful to belong, under any circumstances, to the organization of the Industrial Workers of the World, or to circulate printed propaganda advocating membership therein, regardless of proof of subversive activity or unlawful conduct on its part was held to be discriminatory and void. The court properly said regarding that ordinance, that it was an “invidious discrimination as against a particular organization” without proof of its asserted unlawful tendencies.
In the recent Murdock case, supra, it was held on certiorari, [532]*532an ordinance of the city of Jeannette, Pennsylvania, which required a license for the distribution of goods or pamphlets regardless of payment therefor was in conflict with the guarantee of freedom of speech, and therefore void. Murdock, as a member of “Jehovah’s Witnesses” was convicted of circulating pamphlets advocating the religious beliefs of that sect. The court held that the voluntary payment of small sums of money for the books and pamphlets constituted mere contributions and did not bring the transaction within the class of commercial business; that the requirement to pay a license tax was a mere subterfuge to disguise the attempt to abridge unlawfully the guarantee of freedom of religion. Recognizing the right to regulate the business of selling books, magazines or pamphlets for profit, even when that is done by agents for the benefit of religious organizations, quoting with approval from the case of Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 [62 S.Ct. 1231, 86 L.Ed. 1691, 1702, 141 A.L.R. 514], the court said:
“When a religious sect uses ‘ordinary commercial methods of sales of articles, to raise propaganda funds, ’ it is proper for the state to charge ‘reasonable fees for the privilege of canvassing. ’ ”
Four justices of the Supreme Court dissented to the Murdock opinion. There is, however, nothing in that decision in conflict with what we have said regarding the validity of the ordinance in the present case.
In Schneider v. Irvington, supra, which was combined with three other cases, the United States Supreme Court, in a proceeding in certiorari, held that city ordinances of Los Angeles, Cal., Milwaukee, Wis., Worcester, Mass., and Irvington, New Jersey, which prohibited by the distribution of hand bills on the streets or in the parks of the respective cities, without first procuring permits from the chiefs of police, or the city authorities, were in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution and void as abridgments of the freedom of speech. The court said with respect to one case:
“It [the ordinance] bans unlicensed communication of any views or the advocacy of any cause . . ., and permits canvassing only subject to the power of a police officer to determine, as a censor, what literature may be distributed . . . and who may distribute it.”
In distinguishing those cases from valid ordinances affect[533]*533ing commercial enterprises, adopted for the purpose of regulation and revenue, the court further said:
‘ ‘ The ordinance is not limited to those who canvass for private profit; nor is it merely the common type of ordinance requiring some form of registration or license of hawkers or vendors. ’ ’
In the Thornhill case an Alabama statute which absolutely prohibited any individual from entering on the premises or going near to another person’s business property to induce others to refrain from trading with that enterprise, or to picket the works to the detriment of the business was held to be unconstitutional. The court said:
“The group in power . . . may not impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public interest. ’ ’
That statute failed to recognize the right of peaceful picketing and private communications to persuade others, without force, violence or coercion, to recognize or accept the doctrine of the right of laboring men to organize for collective bargaining and mutual benefit and lawfully to promulgate their views in that regard. That statute had no application to the regulating of commercial enterprises. It is not in point.
The Hague case, upon which the petitioner in this case strongly relies, held that an ordinance of Jersey City which prohibited the holding of public parades or assembly of persons on the streets, in the parks or in public buildings of that city, without a permit therefor from the Director of Public Safety was unconstitutional and void. On certiorari the United States Supreme Court said with relation to the rights of freedom of speech and of peaceable assemblies that: “The bill alleges, and the findings sustain the allegation, that the respondents had no other purpose than to inform citizens of Jersey City by speech, and by the written word, respecting matters growing out of national legislation. . . .
“... It is clear that the right peaceably to assemble and to discuss these topics, and to communicate respecting them, whether orally or in writing, is a privilege inherent in citizenship of the United States which the Amendment protects.” That ordinance gave the Director of Public Safety arbitrary power to grant or refuse, without evidence, permission to hold public meetings or parades. The court said the director was empowered to withhold his permission on the mere assump[534]*534tion, without evidence thereof, that the meetings might result in “riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.” That ordinance did not purport to regulate commercial business. It fixed no standard of fitness. It merely authorized the director, ‘ ‘ after investigation, ’ ’ to arbitrarily refuse permission to hold public parades or public meetings, when “he believes it to be proper.” The ordinance declared that it was enacted to prevent “riots and disturbances.” That case is not determinative of the invalidity of the Eedding ordinance which is involved in this proceeding.
In the eases of Herndon, supra, and De Jonge, supra, judgments of convictions were reversed, which were secured under statutes of the states of Georgia and Oregon, respectively, making it unlawful for any person to participate in or attend any meeting of the Communist Party, regardless of the purpose of the meetings., In each case it was found that the meetings which were attended by the defendants were conducted in peaceful and orderly manner and that there was no evidence of the purpose or intent thereby to incite insurrection, riots, disturbances or opposition to organized government. It was said that in the absence of evidence to the contrary it must be assumed public meetings are held for lawful purpose, and that the statutes in question prescribed no standards of guilt. Those cases did not involve the regulation or licensing of businesses under the police power or otherwise. They are not in point.
In the Pittman ease, an ordinance of the town of Perry, in Florida, was held to be unconstitutional and void. That ordinance made it unlawful “to organize or attempt to organize within the Town any labor union or other labor organization,” or for any person to solicit memberships in labor organizations. Clearly that ordinance was discriminatory and void. It did not attempt to regulate businesses or authorize the licensing thereof.
In the Near case, a statute of Minnesota which outlawed and by means of injunction authorized the abatement as a public nuisance'of any newspaper, magazine or. periodical which published “malicious, .scandalous or defamatory” statements regarding public officers was held to be void. Without proof that the editor of the “Saturday Press” intended to repeat the scurrilous publications, and regardless of the truth of the charges, the publication of. the. newspaper, was [535]*535suppressed. That injunction was held to be an invasion of the right of the freedom of the press.
In the Yick Wo case an ordinance of the city of San Francisco, which prohibited the maintaining of a laundry without the consent of the board of supervisors, “except the same be located in a building constructed either of brick or stone” was held to be discriminatory and void. The court said:
“No reason whatever, except the will of the supervisors, is assigned why they [the petitioners] should not be permitted to carry on, in the accustomed manner, their harmless and useful occupation, on which they depend for a livelihood. And while this consent of the supervisors is withheld from them and from two hundred others who have also petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects, eighty others, not Chinese subjects, are permitted to carry on the same business under similar conditions. The fact of this discrimination is admitted. No reason for it is shown. ’ ’
From the record in that case it is quite evident that, in the guise of regulation of a business for pretended protection against fire hazard, clear discriminations against discredited Chinese laundrymen were continuously practiced. No such showing is made in the present proceeding.
The other cases relied upon by the petitioner may be likewise distinguished from the facts of the present proceeding. No similar case is cited, and we have been unable to find one which holds that an ordinance adopted under police power which requires a license based on a showing, after hearing, of reasonable qualifications, to engage in a commercial business of soliciting, for compensation, either the sale of goods or magazines or the securing of memberships in organizations requiring the payment of dues is unconstitutional and void. There appears to be no valid distinction between the conducting of the business of canvassing for subscriptions for magazines and books, or merchandise, and soliciting for memberships in organizations, provided those pursuits are engaged in for personal profit. The present ordinance appears to be a reasonable and uniform method of attempting to regulate by license a business affecting all organizations of a specified class. There is nothing in the ordinance which appears to be discriminatory, or to indicate that it is aimed toward labor unions alone. It may not reasonably be said from either the language of the ordinance or from the evidence of its enforce[536]*536ment, that it was adopted as a subterfuge to conceal a secret purpose to discriminate against labor unions. The ordinance will not bear that construction.
The applicant for a license is required to furnish evidence of good moral character. Certainly that is reasonable and valid. Numerous cases so hold. (Fernel v. Board of Medical Examiners, 91 Cal.App. 712 [267 P. 561]; Riley v. Chambers, 181 Cal. 589, 594 [185 P. 855, 8 A.L.R 418]; 37 C.J. 239, sec. 93.) The applicant is also required to furnish evidence that he is not likely to resort to force, violence or coercion in soliciting memberships. We observe slight distinction between those qualifications. Both refer to the character of a man. Good moral character is indicative of honesty and reliability. The tendency of one to resort to force, violence or coercion in soliciting sales of goods or memberships in organizations, indicates that he may be lawless, tyrannical and dangerous. Those traits may be refuted by evidence of general reputation as a peaceable, trustworthy man. If it be assumed that the latter qualification with relation to the use of force, violence or coercion be deemed to be unreasonable and uncertain because it involves speculation as to what one might do in the future, which conclusion we think is not warranted, then the provision of the ordinance with respect to the showing regarding the use of force, violence or coercion, may be eliminated. The balance of the ordinance, including sections 2, 4 and 7, under which the petitioner was convicted, may still stand as valid. The ordinance contains a saving clause.
Every presumption is in favor of the validity of the ordinance. It is a well settled general rule that where an ordinance or a statute is adopted with relation to a matter which is within the legislative power to enact, all presumptions are in favor of its validity, constitutionality and reasonableness. (People v. Globe Grain & Milling Co., supra; Ex parte Haskell, 112 Cal. 412 [44 P. 725, 32 L.R.A. 527]; 16 C.J.S. 234, sec. 98.) In the authority last cited it is said:
“It is a cardinal rule of construction that when reasonably possible, a statute must be so construed as to uphold its validity, and not so construed as to endanger its validity, either in whole or in part. Indeed, a statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts on that score. In [537]*537other words, in testing the constitutionality of a statute, the language must receive such construction as will conform it to any constitutional limitation or requirement, if it is susceptible of such interpretation; and the statute and constitutional provisions must be read together and so harmonized as to give effect to both when this can be consistently done. If a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other of which will render it unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise grave and doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt that construction which, without doing violence to fair meaning of language, will render it valid, in its entirety, or free it from doubt as to its constitutionality, even though the other construction is equally reasonable, or seems the more obvious, natural, and preferable, interpretation.”
A multitude of authorities support the foregoing text. That presumption applies to both statutes and ordinances. Pursuant to that rule there is no difficulty in determining from the initiative ordinance in this case that it was adopted for revenue and to regulate the business of soliciting memberships in all organizations of a designated class and to protect the inhabitants of the city of Redding against dishonest, fraudulent and oppressive means of solicitation.
But, as hereinbefore pointed out, petitioner may not complain of the possibility of arbitrary or discriminatory conduct on the part of the council in passing upon applications for licenses or that it might deny such applications on the ground that the applicant was likely to resort to force, violence, etc., in his proposed work of solicitation, and thereby deny to him some right guaranteed by the Constitution, since petitioner made no application for a license and gave the council no opportunity to determine his qualifications. Also, he is not charged with violating section 1 of the ordinance which makes it unlawful to solicit memberships by force, violence, etc. The charge against him is that he violated section 2 thereof in that he solicited membership for compensation in an organization which requires the payment of dues by such members, without having first procured a license so to do. If that section of the. ordinance is valid, which we hold that it is, petitioner’s conviction must be upheld.
The writ is discharged.
Adams, P. J., concurred.