In re Petters Co.

494 B.R. 413, 2013 WL 3120220, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2523, 58 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 53
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Minnesota
DecidedJune 19, 2013
DocketNos. 08-45257, 08-45258(GFK), 08-45326(GFK), 08-45327(GFK), 08-45328(GFK), 08-45329(GFK), 08-45330(GFK), 08-45331(GFK), 08-45371(GFK), 08-45392(GFK)
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 494 B.R. 413 (In re Petters Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Petters Co., 494 B.R. 413, 2013 WL 3120220, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2523, 58 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 53 (Minn. 2013).

Opinion

FIRST MEMORANDUM ON “CONSOLIDATED ISSUES” TREATMENT OF MOTIONS FOR DISMISSAL IN TRUSTEE’S LITIGATION FOR AVOIDANCE AND RECOVERY: STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND TIMELINESS OF SUIT

GREGORY F. KISHEL, Chief Judge.

PREFACE

These bankruptcy cases were commenced after the collapse of the enterprise structure of Thomas J. Petters, a Minnesota-based business promoter. In early October, 2008, Tom Petters was arrested and charged with multiple fraud-based federal criminal offenses. The United States District Court for this district (Montgomery, J.) appointed Douglas A. Kelley, Esq. as receiver, to take control of the assets of Tom Petters. Those assets included exclusive ownership interests in numerous artificial business entities that Tom Petters had controlled, most of whiclr'he had created himself. Between October 11, 2008 and October 19, 2008, the Receiver filed petitions to commence cases under Chapter 11 for the debtor-entities named above. Kelley was later appointed as Trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) for all of these cases.1

After the arrest of Tom Petters, the complicated activity that he had purveyed through his enterprise structure was termed a “Ponzi scheme” in local and national media. That nomenclature carried into the array of legal proceedings that were brought under federal jurisdiction (criminal, civil, and bankruptcy) to address the consequences of the downfall.2

In the late summer and early fall of 2010, the Trustee commenced over 200 adversary proceedings in these cases. In almost all of them, he sought to avoid transfers of property that the Debtors had made to the defendants before the bank[418]*418ruptcy filings. He sought judgments for recovery of money to effectuate the avoidance. His requests for relief were framed under various legal theories, most prominently federal and state fraudulent-transfer statutes.

The commencement of this litigation was part of the Trustee’s general strategy in the bankruptcy process: to rectify the de facto outcomes that otherwise would have resulted from the status quo as it lay when the Petters enterprise structure collapsed. Over a period of more than two decades, the Petters-controlled entities had made tens of thousands of transfers, almost all in the form of money, to a large number and variety of lenders, “investors,” charitable donees, and other parties.

By the time of the bankruptcy filings, the status quo had three salient features. First, the debt structures in the bankruptcy cases included a much smaller number of late investors into the Petters operation, that were left unsatisfied on very large and late-created debt obligations. In the pre-bankruptcy operation of the debtor-entities, a much greater number of lenders and other creditor-participants had been repaid earlier. They had the benefit of earlier satisfaction of the debts owing to them. Finally, there was a huge, and sad, insolvency; by the time of the bankruptcy filings, very little money was left in the coffers of the business entities involved, and there were relatively few hard assets to show for all of the pre-petition activity.

This sort of litigation-undertaking by a receiver, trustee, or other appointed fiduciary is made to address the large imbalance between the positions of those who got out, versus those who were still in at the collapse. It bears the unfortunate name of “clawback” in lawyers’ jargon and in media reportage. In the law, however, there is no specific, dedicated set of legal remedies to address the failure of a Ponzi scheme, as such. The inequities in a post-failure status quo seem obvious; but how to gauge and prioritize those inequities, and how to redress them, in a fashion that is procedurally regular, transparent, and substantively principled?

The federal processes of receivership, bankruptcy, and other court-supervised liquidation measures have been the resort taken, as the phenomenon of failed investment schemes has burgeoned in recent years.3 Intuitively, this is appropriate given the baseline circumstance: the deep, fundamental insolvency of the persons and entities involved in the purveying, by the time of collapse. However, the progress of all such cases has been difficult. The reason is the patchy and incomplete match between the phenomenon at issue and the existing state of the law.

Ultimately, the shortfalls of existing statutory remedies highlight the deep underlying tensions in any legal response to failed, large-scale, and long-term fraudulent schemes.4 The uncertainty is high[419]*419lighted by the subject matter of this memorandum: if, indeed, existing bankruptcy remedies are to be used to recapture ill-gotten gains earlier paid out, and all who transacted with a fraud are to be put onto a parity through the administration of an estate that is funded by recaptured as well as relict value, what should be recaptured and how far back should the process go?

It obviously cannot be a matter solely of “fairness,” gauged subjectively and judicially imposed long after the fact. Our legal system is structured to protect seated property rights and to promote the reliance that underpins free commerce and the ready flow of capital. A deal is a deal, presumptively final as made; and transfers of property regular on their face are to be treated as final unless there is a specific basis, justified in established law, to disturb and reverse them.5 Particularly when a recapture in “clawback” would ensnare unwitting recipients of past payment — those who transacted with the fraud’s purveyor without knowledge of the wrongdoing — the need for definitive, principled, and limiting substantive rules is obvious. And yet there is that nagging point under it all: the money given to earlier recipients was likely mulcted from later-coming investors and lenders; so how “just” is it to allow earlier participants to keep the benefit of funds that had been “stolen” from others before they received them?

Limited as they are to the structures of preexisting general law, serving as they do the interests of a defined group of unpaid and unsatisfied creditors, those charged with unraveling failed Ponzi schemes have resorted to the existing law of fraudulent transfer and related creditors’ remedies for the authority to recapture value from those who got clear of the purveyor before the downfall.

THIS LITIGATION, AND ITS MANAGEMENT

The Trustee in these cases has done just that. The law of fraudulent transfer is the centerpiece theory of most of his “claw-back” litigation. That structure comes with benefit for its invoker, but it is also subject to its original internal limitations. The exercise at bar is an effort to outline part of the extent and some of the limitations, against the incomplete state of the underlying law.

After the Trustee served complaints in the 200-odd adversary proceedings, he proposed a coordinated treatment of this large docket of litigation. He acknowledged that every proceeding had its own distinct facts. Tom Petters had transacted in a large variety of ways with a wide array of individuals, business entities, and organizations, through the vehicles of the debtor-entities. Nonetheless, as the Trustee correctly noted, there were several issues common to blocks of the adversary proceedings, that could be framed for broader rulings on the governing law.

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Related

Douglas A. Kelley v. Gus Boosalis
974 F.3d 884 (Eighth Circuit, 2020)
Kelley v. Kanios
383 F. Supp. 3d 852 (D. Maine, 2019)
Kelley v. Kanios
D. Minnesota, 2019
Weintraut v. Comm'r
2016 T.C. Memo. 142 (U.S. Tax Court, 2016)
Kelley v. Associated Bank (In re Petters Co.)
548 B.R. 551 (D. Minnesota, 2016)
Manty v. Bougie (In re Bougie)
510 B.R. 606 (D. Minnesota, 2014)
In re Petters Co.
499 B.R. 342 (D. Minnesota, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
494 B.R. 413, 2013 WL 3120220, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2523, 58 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 53, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-petters-co-mnb-2013.