In Re Penick

170 B.R. 914, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1208, 1994 WL 446048
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Michigan
DecidedAugust 9, 1994
Docket19-01905
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 170 B.R. 914 (In Re Penick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Penick, 170 B.R. 914, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1208, 1994 WL 446048 (Mich. 1994).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING APPROPRIATE VALUATION STANDARD FOR REDEMPTION

JO ANN C. STEVENSON, Bankruptcy Judge.

Emma Marie Penick (“Debtor”) filed her voluntary Chapter 7 petition on March 8, 1994. On April 25, 1994 the Debtor filed her motion to redeem a 1989 Geo Spectrum on which General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) is owed $4,465.07. Debtor claims that the vehicle is only worth $800 and seeks to redeem it for that amount. GMAC asserts that $800 is not a fair price for the car and asks this Court to determine that the fair market value of the vehicle falls somewhere between its wholesale and retail price. A hearing was held on the Debtor’s motion to redeem on July 21, 1994 and the Court took the matter under advisement. The following constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

This proceeding arises in a ease referred to this Court by the Standing Order of Reference entered in this district on July 24, 1984 and is determined to be a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E) and (O). Accordingly, this Court is authorized to enter final judgment subject to the right of appeal provided by 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).

The issue presented is one of first impression for this Court: to wit, the value of Debtor’s vehicle for redemption purposes under 11 U.S.C. Sections 506(a) and 722. Unaware of a controlling standard or methodology for determining such valuation, the Court will consider those methods employed by courts in other jurisdictions.

Section 722 allows an individual debt- or to redeem certain tangible personal property from liens securing dischargeable consumer debts if the property is exempted under section 522 or has been abandoned under section 554, by paying the lienholder the amount of the allowed claim secured by the lien. 1 The sole method of redemption *917 available to the Debtor is lump-sum redemption. In re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053, 1055 (6th Cir.1983). Redemption of secured collateral may not be achieved through installment payments. Id.

Although Section 722 is facially silent as to the mechanics of redemption, it provides some guidance as to how to value a redemption claim. For instance, it allows for redemption of an “allowed secured claim,” which is defined in § 506(a) as “the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in .. property.” The determination of that value is to be made “in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of’ the property. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). Determining this purpose is essential to ascertaining a fair price for the vehicle in question.

The Court realizes that value is not a narrow term which can rigidly be applied under the same standard in all cases for all purposes. In re Damron, 8 B.R. 323, 325 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1980). Rather, courts are called upon to determine value on a case-by-case basis in light of the purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use of the subject property. H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5787, 6312. This expansive language allows the Court the latitude to look at a variety of methods for valuing property in redemption proceedings.

When valuing the retention of assets, the Court believes it must consider both the interests of the debtor and the creditor. Redemption permits the Debtor to retain consumer goods while implementing her fresh start by reducing burdensome debt to one payment of something less than the contractual amount owed. Concomitant with this privilege is the protection of GMAC’s security interest in its collateral. The proper standard of valuation must weigh each of these concerns.

The Court found the analysis in In re Waters, 122 B.R. 298 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1990) particularly helpful. The Waters court divided the different approaches to valuation into the following three categories: 1) the lesser of the secured claim or the fair market value of the collateral (greatest return to the creditor); 2) the liquidation value (fire sale standard); and 3) the value yielded by a commercially reasonable disposition of the property. 122 B.R. at 300. The Waters court concluded that the reasonable commercial disposition standard was preferable. We concur with this conclusion and reasoning.

Few courts have endorsed the liquidation standard for valuing redemption claims. In In re Walsh, 5 B.R. 239 (Bankr.D.C.1980) the Court determined that “value” should be assessed by the fair market value of the asset. Taking into consideration the usual and accepted meaning of fair market value in the liquidation context and the goals of the Code as a whole, Walsh held that the fair market value term in § 522 is the equivalent of the liquidation value. This method relies on the equitable notion that if the value is set at a price that the debtor cannot reach then the right to redeem becomes meaningless. In re Carroll, 7 B.R. 907, 909 (Bankr.D.Ariz.1981). While it is true that the purpose of § 722 is to allow the debtor to avoid having to pay the replacement cost, i.e., the retail value, of the property subject to the creditor’s lien, 2 Courts have considered the liquidation approach unacceptable since it creates a new “bankruptcy market” specifically for purposes of exemption or redemption. Having a separate market for valuation would encourage individuals to use bankruptcy specifically to write down consumer debts and could make consumer debt prohibitively expensive. In re Mitchell, 103 B.R. 819 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1989). 3 Like the Waters *918 court, this Court believes that Walsh inequitably favors the interest of the debtor, ignoring the balancing of interests contemplated by § 722.

The analysis in Walsh also reveals the weakness of valuing redemption claims under a fair market standard, to wit, how is the Court to determine fair market value? The Sixth Circuit, in dicta, has endorsed the fair market value standard. In In re Bell, supra, Judge Krupansky wrote that § 722 “[generally permits a debtor to redeem personal property by paying the creditor the approximate fair market value of said property, or the amount of the claim, whichever is less.” 700 F.2d at 1055. In a footnote, the Court focused on the language in § 506(a) that says a secured creditor’s claim should be determined by looking at the proposed disposition or use of the property.

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Bluebook (online)
170 B.R. 914, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 1208, 1994 WL 446048, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-penick-miwb-1994.