In Re King

75 B.R. 287, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 1105
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio
DecidedFebruary 25, 1987
DocketBankruptcy 2-86-01503
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 75 B.R. 287 (In Re King) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re King, 75 B.R. 287, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 1105 (Ohio 1987).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER ON APPLICATION FOR REDEMPTION

B.J. SELLERS, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon an application filed by Nadir and Bouquet King seeking to redeem a 1979 Chrysler New Yorker pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 722. The application was opposed by General Motors Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC”) and was heard by the Court.

The Court makes the following findings of fact. Nadir King (“the debtor”) owns a 1979 Chrysler New Yorker (“the Chrysler”) which, according to the certificate of title, was purchased on March 8,1985 for $3,535. On April 18, 1986 the debtor and his wife filed a joint petition under the provisions of Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The schedule of creditors filed in their case included GMAC for an obligation evidenced by a note remaining unpaid in the amount of $1,943.20. In connection with that obligation, the debtor granted GMAC a security interest in the Chrysler, and GMAC’s lien is noted on the certificate of title for the vehicle. On August 18,1986 the debtor filed his application to redeem the Chrysler, and while that application was pending, the debtors’ discharge was issued by the Court.

The debtor’s application, as initially filed, seeks to redeem the Chrysler from GMAC’s lien by making a $500 lump sum payment to the creditor. The amount of that proposed redemption payment was orally reduced to $200 during the hearing. The decrease in the debtor’s opinion of the Chrysler’s value from the $2500 amount reflected in the bankruptcy schedules to the $200 figure currently proposed is attributed to events occurring after the bankruptcy filing. GMAC contests not only the *289 value attributed to the Chrysler by the debtor, but also the appropriateness of using the date of the redemption request or the date of the hearing on that request as the relevant date for determining the value of the vehicle. GMAC’s position is that redemption pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 722 can be accomplished only if the lienholder receives the value of its collateral as of the date the bankruptcy petition was filed.

The legal issues before the Court are two-fold: determination of the' date for measuring the value of the creditor’s collateral for purposes of redemption in a pending Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, and adoption of the appropriate standard for such valuation. Once those legal issues have been resolved, the Court will find, as a matter of fact, the value of the Chrysler.

A debtor’s right to redeem collateral under the Bankruptcy Code is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 722 which states:

An individual debtor may, whether or not the debtor has waived the right to redeem under this section, redeem tangible personal property intended primarily for personal, family, or household use, from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer debt, if such property is exempted under section 522 of this title or has been abandoned under section 554 of this title, by paying the holder of such lien the amount of the allowed secured claim of such holder that is secured by such lien.

It is not contested in this case that the Chrysler is tangible personal property upon which GMAC has a lien. It also has been established by evidence that the vehicle is used primarily for the debtors’ personal or family use. It is unchallenged that whatever obligation remains owing to GMAC on the underlying note in excess of the value of the Chrysler has been discharged, and that neither the debtor nor his wife have any post-bankruptcy personal liability thereupon. The dispute, however, centers upon the additional statutory requirement that the debtor pay GMAC, as the holder of the lien, the amount of its allowed secured claim.

Determination of the amount of an allowed secured claim is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) which states in pertinent part:

(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest, ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property, ... Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.

GMAC’s claim in this case, $1,943.20, is the amount asserted to be owing on the underlying note for which the Chrysler serves as security. That claimed amount, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 502(a), is deemed allowed unless objected to during the case. A debtors’ request to redeem collateral, however, challenges the extent of that claim which will be allowed as secured for the limited purpose of redemption.

Valuation of security in the bankruptcy context within the meaning of § 506(a) is a flexible concept which varies with the purpose for which the valuation is intended. Where the focus is retention of an asset, the valuation process should be consistent with the policy underlying such retention. This Court believes that redemption is provided to enable a debtor, who has the ability to make a lump sum payment, to retain consumer goods which will enable him to implement his fresh start, free from burdensome debt, but equipped with necessary goods. At the same time, the right granted to the debtor to fulfill that purpose must preserve the constitutionally protected property rights of the secured creditor.

Property rights, protected in this country primarily through the substantive due process concepts of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, include the ability of a secured creditor to repossess and sell its security pursuant to an underlying agreement governed by state law. When a bankruptcy case is filed, exercise of that right is constitutionally delayed un *290 til the automatic stay against such action is lifted by specific order, the discharge is granted or denied, or the case is dismissed or closed. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 55 S.Ct. 595, 79 L.Ed. 1110 (1935); 11 U.S.C. § 362(c). However, that relief does not occur simultaneously with the filing of the case, and, realistically, the secured creditor incurs significant delay before it is able to exercise its right to recover and dispose of its collateral. It follows, therefore, that only the value of the collateral, measured by its return on the date of that disposition, is effectively protected as a property right. See Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.Doc. 93-137, Part II, 131 (1973) (“Commission Report”).

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Bluebook (online)
75 B.R. 287, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 1105, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-king-ohsb-1987.