In Re: Paulsboro Derailment Ca v.

704 F. App'x 78
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedAugust 28, 2017
Docket15-4039, 16-1654, 16-1655
StatusUnpublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 704 F. App'x 78 (In Re: Paulsboro Derailment Ca v.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re: Paulsboro Derailment Ca v., 704 F. App'x 78 (3d Cir. 2017).

Opinion

OPINION ***

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

On November 30, 2012, several train cars derailed while crossing Mantua Creek on a swing bridge near Paulsboro, New Jersey. One of the cars released over 20,-000 gallons of vinyl chloride, creating an airborne chemical cloud. Plaintiff-appellants Alice Breeman and her children drove through the cloud repeatedly on the day of the spill. The other plaintiff-appellants are first responders who arrived on the scene shortly after the spill.

In several separate suits, the plaintiffs sued numerous parties, including Consolidated Rail Corporation (“Corn-ail”), the owner of the bridge. The plaintiffs sought compensation for alleged physical injuries, ongoing medical monitoring, emotional distress due to fears of increased cancer risk, and punitive damages. The district court consolidated cases for pretrial matters, ruled on several motions in limine regarding expert witnesses, granted summary judgment against the first responders, and granted partial summary judgment against the Breemans. In doing so, the district court noted that the amount in controversy for the Breemans appeared insufficient to reach the $75,000 threshold for diversity jurisdiction. The district court ordered briefing on the issue and later concluded punitive damages were unavailable. The district court accordingly dismissed the Breemans’ complaint, concluding the Bree-mans’ alleged compensatory damages fell short of the jurisdictional threshold.

We need not discuss most of the issues addressed by the district court. Rather, as to the Breemans' and two of the first responders, we conclude the allegations of injury fail to satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy threshold for establishing federal diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, we will dismiss their appeals without prejudice. We reach our conclusion without reference to the district court’s underlying evidentiary and summary judgment rulings and rely, instead, on the plaintiffs’ own allegations of injury as initially pleaded and as later clarified by the plaintiffs themselves. The third first responder, Mario Johnson, did not timely file his appeal, and thus, we granted the motion to dismiss his appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

I.

The swing bridge at the center of this case could be positioned “open” to permit boat traffic along the creek or “closed” to permit train traffic across the creek. From March through November, the default position for the bridge was open; from December through February, the default position was closed. When not closed and locked for the winter, the bridge could be moved as needed to permit rail traffic.

In the past, Conrail had employed a person to control the bridge and visually ensure the rails were locked for crossing. *81 In 2003, however, Conrail changed to a computerized locking and signal system to indicate to approaching trains whether the bridge was properly aligned and locked for crossing. When functioning properly, the locking system used four slide locks, two on each side of the bridge. A proximity detector would sense when the locks were fully extended and generate a green signal. When the slide locks were one-half inch or more away from the detectors, the signal system would generate a red signal and audibly announce, “Paulsboro moveable bridge failed to operate.”

In general, if a train approached the bridge and did not receive a green signal, the train would stop and an engineer or conductor would visually inspect the bridge to determine if the rails were in place and locked. If these persons were unable to obtain a green signal, they would call a dispatch control center to report their observations and obtain permission to cross. This procedure was set forth in a Conrail operating rule, providing that no trains were to cross a moveable bridge through a red signal unless a “qualified” employee ensured the bridge was fully locked and safe to cross. Northeast Operating Rules Advisory Committee Rule 241(d).

In the year prior to the derailment, thousands of trains passed over the bridge, and there were approximately two dozen reports of signal problems. Half of these reports came after Hurricane Sandy struck in October 2012. In response to each report, Conrail employees conducted investigations and either addressed the problem or were unable to determine the cause of the problem.

On at least one occasion, Conrail hired a consultant, Hans Heidenreich, to inspect and diagnose the signal error at the bridge. Heidenreich was the designer of the programmable logic controller at the heart of the bridge’s locking and signal system. He inspected the system on November 13 and 20, 2012. He was unable to diagnose the problem, but he was aware that the bridge was scheduled to be locked into the default, closed position on December 1. As such, he recommended to Conrail’s Supervisor of Structures that Conrail seek permission to lock the bridge early for the winter to permit further inspection of electrical wiring. The Supervisor of Structures elected not to lock the bridge early. Heidenreich indicated his recommendation to close the bridge was related to functionality not safety. The Supervisor indicated he did not believe the recommended closure was a safety recommendation and believed continued use of the bridge would allow diagnosis of the intermittent signal failure.

Then, on November 30, a train approached the bridge. The bridge was in the closed position, but the signal system generated a “red” signal. Train engineer Mark Mather and conductor Wilbert den Ouden stopped the train. The conductor inspected the bridge and reported the rails were lined and locked. The engineer called a Conrail dispatch center to report the situation, explaining that the conductor had walked the rails and confirmed the rails were “locked and lined.” The dispatch center gave permission for the train to proceed across the bridge. When crossing the bridge, seven cars derailed, one of which ruptured and spilled 20,000 gallons of vinyl chloride into the creek, creating a vapor cloud.

The plaintiffs were near the bridge on the day of the derailment. New Jersey State Police Trooper Bryan Everingham worked near the bridge on the day of the derailment. He does not allege he experienced any adverse health effects on the day of the derailment. Rather, he alleges he developed headaches and sleeplessness *82 in December 2012 or January 2013, and does not allege he sought medical treatment for these issues.

Officer Ryan Ragone helped evacuate residents from their homes immediately following the derailment. He alleges he developed severe watery eyes and nasal discharge at that time and later that day developed a cough that lasted through one night. He described these symptoms as having subsided and does not allege he sought medical treatment for these symptoms. He does not allege ongoing symptoms related to vinyl chloride exposure.

On the day of the derailment, Alice Breeman left her home with her three children to take them to a school and a day-care center. On her way, she drove through the cloud of vinyl chloride and its degradation products only to discover the school was closed. She drove back through the cloud to reach a different day-care provider nearer to the site of the derailment only to find that location also closed.

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704 F. App'x 78, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-paulsboro-derailment-ca-v-ca3-2017.