In re New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation

903 So. 2d 9, 2000 La.App. 4 Cir. 1919, 2005 La. App. LEXIS 1318, 2005 WL 1118728
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 20, 2005
DocketNo. 2000-CA-1919
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 903 So. 2d 9 (In re New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re New Orleans Train Car Leakage Fire Litigation, 903 So. 2d 9, 2000 La.App. 4 Cir. 1919, 2005 La. App. LEXIS 1318, 2005 WL 1118728 (La. Ct. App. 2005).

Opinions

| MAMES F. McKAY III, Judge.

In September of 1987, a tank car leaking butadiene caught fire and burned for three days while the car was parked on the CSX tracks in the Gentilly area. Several thousand residents in the area were exposed to the effects of this fire and were forced to evacuate from their homes. A large number of residents brought actions against a number of defendants due to this event.

The case was certified as a class action and went to trial in the summer of 1997; this trial (phase I) concerned the issue of damages as to twenty “bellwether” plaintiffs as well as the class wide issues of compensatory and punitive liability of the defendants. Phase I resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff class on the common issues with damages being awarded to the twenty plaintiffs. In phase II, the quantum of damages was tried as to those defendants that the jury found to have punitive liability.

In late 1998, the phase III trial commenced. Phase III involved a second flight of twenty plaintiffs; the issues involved in phase III were whether these twenty plaintiffs were entitled to damages and if so what the quantum of those | ¡.damages were. Of the twenty plaintiffs, eighteen were found to have some damages; Kristina Cash and Jewel Franklin were found to have suffered no damages. The jury made the following awards: Johnny Brown was awarded $10,000.00 for physical pain and suffering, $5,000.00 for mental anguish and $2,000.00 for evacúa[14]*14tion/inconvenience; Regina Mercadel was awarded $2,500.00 for mental anguish; Gregory Atkinson was awarded $10,000.00 for pain and suffering, $5,000.00 for mental anguish and $3,000.00 for evacuation/inconvenience; Jeanette Barden was awarded $10,000.00 for physical pain and suffering, $2,500.00 for mental anguish, $17,850.00 for property damage, $1,500.00 for evacuation/inconvenience, and $2,000.00 for medical expenses; Myrtle Tucker was awarded $20,000.00 for physical pain and suffering, $2,000.00 for mental anguish, $3,000.00 for evacuation/inconvenience, and $2,500.00 for medical expenses; Andrew Rondeno was awarded $10,000.00 for physical pain and suffering, $5,000.00 for mental anguish, $2,000.00 for property damage, $500.00 for past lost wages, and $2,000.00 for medical expenses; Shunta Dickerson was awarded $500.00 for physical pain and suffering, $100.00 for evacuation/inconvenience, and $500.00 for medical expenses; Cleveland Bethley was awarded $20,000.00 for physical pain and suffering, $5,000.00 for mental anguish, and $2,500.00 for medical expenses; Joseph Hunter was awarded $10,000.00 for physical pain and suffering, $6,000.00 for mental anguish, $1,500.00 for evacuation/inconvenience, and $500.00 for past lost wages; Deborah Grant White was awarded $2,000.00 for mental anguish, $500.00 for property ^damage, and $1,500.00 for evacuation/inconvenience; Sandra August was awarded $200.00 for pain and suffering and $500.00 for evacuation/inconvenience; LaShann Freeman was awarded $15,000.00 for physical pain and suffering, $2,000.00 for mental anguish, $2,000.00 for evacuation/inconvenience, and $4,000.00 for medical expenses; Calvin McGee was awarded $15,000.00 for physical pain and suffering, $2,000.00 for evacuation/inconvenience, $500.00 for past lost wages, and $200.00 for medical expenses; Glenda Bell was awarded $10,000.00 for physical pain and suffering, $2,000.00 for mental anguish, and $1,500.00 for evacuation/inconvenience; David Strong was awarded $100.00 for physical pain and suffering, $200.00 for past lost wages, and $150.00 for medical expenses; Dana Paul was awarded $5,000.00 for physical pain and suffering and $3,000.00 for mental anguish; Breionne Robinson was awarded $10,000.00 .for physical pain and suffering, $500.00 for mental anguish, and $1,500.00 for evacuation/inconvenience; and Jacqueline Thomas was awarded $60,000.00 for physical pain and suffering, $25,000.00 for mental anguish, and $15,000.00 for evacuation/ineonvenience. The defendants filed several motions which the trial court denied. On July 9, 1999, the trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict. The defendants now appeal the awards made to Jacqueline Thomas, Joseph Hunter, Cleveland Bethley, Jr., Myrtle Tucker, LaShann Freeman, Calvin McGee, Gregory Atkinson, Jeanette Bar-den, Glenda Bell, Johnny Brown, Andrew Rondeno, Breionne Robinson and Dana Paul.

|4The defendants raise the following assignments of error on appeal: 1) the trial judge erred in failing to reduce the jury’s award to Jacqueline Thomas when there was no evidence introduced to support that award; 2) the trial judge erred in failing to reduce the jury’s physical pain and suffering award to Joseph Hunter when there was no evidence introduced to support that award; 3) the trial judge erred in failing to reduce the jury’s awards for physical pain and suffering and medical damages for eleven other plaintiffs; and 4) the trial court should vacate and/or reduce the phase III punitive damage allocations depending upon the disposition of this appeal or of the pending phase I and II appeal.

A court of appeal may not set aside a trial court’s or a jury’s finding of fact in absence of “manifest error” or unless it is [15]*15clearly wrong. The appellate court must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the finding of the trial court and the appellate court must further determine that the record establishes that the finding is clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous). The issue to be resolved by a reviewing court is not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a reasonable one. Cormier v. Comeaux, 98-2378 (La.7/7/99), 748 So.2d 1123, 1126-1127. The reviewing court must give great weight to factual conclusions of the trier of fact; where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its evaluations and inferences are as reasonable. The reason for this well settled principle of review is based not only upon the trial court’s better 1 r,capacity to evaluate live witnesses (as compared with the appellate court’s access only to a cold record), but also upon the proper allocation of trial and appellate functions between the respective courts. Courteaux v. State, DOTD, 99-0353 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/22/99), 745 So.2d 91, 98.

The standard for appellate review of general damage awards is difficult to express and is necessarily non-specific, and the requirement of an articulated basis for disturbing such awards gives little guidance as to what articulation suffices to justify modification of a generous or stingy award. Nevertheless, the theme that emerges from Gaspard v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239, 158 So.2d 149 (1963) through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1976), and through Reck to the present case is that the discretion vested in the trier of fact is “great,” and even vast, so that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages in a particular case. It is only when the award is, in either direction, beyond that which a reasonable trier of fact could assess for the effects of the particular injury to the particular plaintiff under the particular circumstances that the appellate court should increase or reduce the award. Youn v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 623 So.2d 1257, 1261 (La.1993).

A JNOV should be granted only where the “facts and inferences point so overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict.

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903 So. 2d 9, 2000 La.App. 4 Cir. 1919, 2005 La. App. LEXIS 1318, 2005 WL 1118728, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-new-orleans-train-car-leakage-fire-litigation-lactapp-2005.