Adams v. CSX Railroads

80 So. 3d 1160, 2011 La.App. 4 Cir. 0286, 2011 La. App. LEXIS 1541, 2011 WL 6225172
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 14, 2011
Docket2011-CA-0286
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 80 So. 3d 1160 (Adams v. CSX Railroads) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adams v. CSX Railroads, 80 So. 3d 1160, 2011 La.App. 4 Cir. 0286, 2011 La. App. LEXIS 1541, 2011 WL 6225172 (La. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge.

l,The Louisiana Bar Foundation (“LBF”) appeals from a trial court judgment denying the Special Master’s recommendation for distribution of a Cy Pres 1 *1162 award to the LBF. The trial court, Honorable Robert J. Burns, Judge Ad Hoc, determined that in view of his position as a Fellow 2 with the LBF, his approval of a Cy Pres distribution to the LBF would be a violation of Canon 2B of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in In re: Morvant, 2000-0747 (La.6/26/09), 15 So.3d 74. For these reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and award the LBF 10% of the unused funds available as a Cy Pres distribution for efforts solely within the boundaries of Orleans Parish, as recommended by the Special Master.

|2After the original nine class action defendants had settled and the class members and attorneys had been paid, the only issue left for the trial court to consider was the Cy Pres distribution of the remaining settlement money. Thus, on March 10, 2010, the trial court directed the Special Master to implement a protocol for consideration of prospective Cy Pres awards, stipulating that the residual funds could only be used for the benefit of the community adversely affected by the train car leakage, the event resulting in the class action herein. The Special Master promulgated a notice for submission of applications for Cy Pres distribution. After considering eleven applications received from individuals and interest groups, including Succor, Inc. (“Succor”), the appel-lee herein, the Special Master submitted his report to the trial court, recommending that the residual funds be distributed as follows: 65% to New Orleans Recreation Department (“NORD”); 25% to Ozanam Inn; and 10% to LBF.

Succor objected to the Special Master’s recommendation. Following a contradictory hearing on September 24, 2010, the trial court adopted the Special Master’s recommendation, in part, awarding 65% of the residual funds to NORD and 25% to Oza-nam Inn. The court held in abeyance a final decision on awarding 10% of the residual funds to the LBF, and ordered the LBF to file a post-trial memorandum addressing the propriety of any award to the LBF in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in In re: Morvant.

After considering the post-trial memorandum, the trial court rendered a judgment on October 28, 2010, denying the Special Master’s recommendation to award a Cy Pres distribution to the LBF. The LBF filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration of the October 28, 2010 order, which the trial court denied. The LBF appealed.

[sCanon 2B of the Code of Judicial Conduct states, in relevant part:

A judge shall not allow family, social, political, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interest of the judge or others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge ...

In In re: Morvant, supra, the Supreme Court upheld a finding of the Louisiana Judiciary Commission (“the Commission”) that Judge William A. Morvant, of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, violated Canon 2B of the Code of Judicial Conduct and *1163 Article V, § 25(C) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. 3 Judge Morvant’s misconduct consisted of imposing fines, payable to the East Baton Parish “I Care” program, as a condition to probation in 1,052 drug cases decided between January 1997 and July 2001. “I Care” was a program whose mission was to provide substance abuse prevention education for children in the East Baton Rouge School System. The fines were assessed in the amounts of $50.00 and $100.00 for misdemeanor and felony offenses. In re: Morvant, supra, at p. 2, 15 So.3d at 75-76. Significantly, during the period Judge Morvant was imposing monetary assessments as terms of probation, he was a member of the “I Care” Advisory Council. Id. at p. 2, 15 So.3d at 76.

|4The Court found that Judge Morvant “readily conceded” that he had performed the “underlying misconduct,” i.e., assessed the probationary fines while a member of the “I Care” Advisory Council. Id. at p. 7, 15 So.3d at 79. Further, the Court noted that “the ease of association between the monetary assessments and his council position leads to the perception that Judge Morvant misused the prominence of his judicial office to further his personal interests.” Id. at pp. 7-8, 15 So.3d at 79.

In In re: Johnson, 08-2397, (La.1/21/09), 1 So.3d 425, a case factually-similar to In re: Morvant, the Supreme Court upheld a finding by the Commission that Judge Donald Johnson, also a judge on the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, had violated Canons 1, 2A, 3A(1) and 5(B)(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as La.C.Cr.P. arts. 895 and 895.1. Judge Johnson’s misconduct involved the ordering of criminal drug offenders to pay fines to various non-profit and charitable entities. The recipient organizations were not qualified to receive funding through probationary sentencing because they were not involved in any respect with the prevention and treatment of drug abuse permitted under La.C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(B)(7). Id. at pp. 9-10, 1 So.3d at 431-32.

The case before us is distinguishable from both In re: Morvant and In re: Johnson. In those cases, the trial judge, either misapplied (Judge Morvant) or violated (Judge Johnson) a specific statute, La.C.Cr.P. art. 895.1(B)(7), by imposing judicial fines on defendants and directing those fines, independently, to entities that advanced the judge’s own private interests. Here, the Cy Pres doctrine is valid means of distributing residual damages in a class action lawsuit. See Cavalier v. Mobil Oil Corporation, supra, n. 1. The trial court neither used his position to generate the funds to be distributed nor acted independently in | ¡¡¡assessing the worthiness of the entities applying for the award. Rather the Special Master assessed each applicant and made a recommendation to the trial court. Additionally, the Special Master certified that his selection was based in accord with the Court’s guidelines, as outlined in Cavalier v. Mobil Oil Corporation, supra.

Another distinction, albeit minor, is that the trial court here is as an ad hoc appointment of the Supreme Court, rather than an elected judge. The Supreme Court, in concluding Judge Morvant had *1164

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Related

Adams v. CSX Railroads
84 So. 3d 1289 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2012)

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80 So. 3d 1160, 2011 La.App. 4 Cir. 0286, 2011 La. App. LEXIS 1541, 2011 WL 6225172, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adams-v-csx-railroads-lactapp-2011.