IN RE NAMENDA INDIRECT PURCHASER ANTITRUST LITIGATION

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 12, 2021
Docket1:15-cv-06549
StatusUnknown

This text of IN RE NAMENDA INDIRECT PURCHASER ANTITRUST LITIGATION (IN RE NAMENDA INDIRECT PURCHASER ANTITRUST LITIGATION) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
IN RE NAMENDA INDIRECT PURCHASER ANTITRUST LITIGATION, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN RE NAMENDA INDIRECT PURCHASER No. 1:15-cv-6549 (CM) (RWL) ANTITRUST LITIGATION

DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO EXCLUDE THE OPINIONS OF LAURA R. CRAFT. McMahon, C.J.: Presently before the Court is Defendant’s motion to exclude the opinions of Plaintiff expert Laura R. Craft, which Plaintiff offers in support of class certification. For the reasons set forth below, that motion is denied. I. BACKGROUND This case’s factual background and relevant regulatory scheme have been recounted at length in other opinions. See New York v. Actavis, PLC (“Namenda I”), No. 14-cv-7473, 2014 WL 7015198 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Schneiderman ex rel. New York v. Actavis, PLC (“Namenda II”), 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015); Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Health & Welfare Fund v. Actavis, PLC (“Namenda III”), No. 15-cv-6549, 2016 WL 4992690 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss in this litigation); In re Namenda Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation (“Namenda IV”), No. 15 Civ. 7488 (CM), 2017 WL 4358244, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2017) (granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs’ motion for collateral estoppel and partial summary judgment); In re Namenda Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation (“Namenda V”), 331 F. Supp.3d 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (certifying class of direct purchasers of Namenda, and granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ motions to exclude expert opinions and for summary judgment). Thus, only facts relevant to the current motions are summarized below. Unless otherwise mentioned, the facts detailed are not in dispute.

A. The Parties Plaintiff Sergeants Benevolent Association Health & Welfare Fund (“SBA”) is a fund that administers the prescription drug benefit plan for active and retired New York City Police Department sergeants and their dependents. It represents a class of “end payors” of Namenda, which includes – subject to some exceptions – “All Third-Party Payors who indirectly purchased, and/or paid, and/or provided reimbursement for, some or all of the price for Namenda IR 5 or 10 mg tablets . . . and/or Namenda XR capsules[.]” (ECF 489). These end payors include entities like insurers and welfare plans like SBA. Defendant Forest Laboratories is a limited-liability company incorporated in Delaware that manufactures and sells branded pharmaceutical products. Forest is a wholly owned subsidiary of

Defendant Actavis PLC (now known as Allergan PLC). Defendants Merz GmbH & Co. KGaA.; Merz Pharma GmbH & Co. KGaA; and Merz Pharmaceuticals GmbH (collectively “Merz”) are headquartered in Germany and are also engaged in the development, production, and distribution of pharmaceutical products. B. The Hatch-Waxman Act and Generic Competition Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., a pharmaceutical company must file a New Drug Application (“NDA”) with the FDA any time it wishes to market a new brand-name drug. The NDA must provide the agency with scientific data demonstrating that the new drug is safe and effective. Namenda II, 787 F.3d at 643; 21 U.S.C. § 355. The process is often very costly and time consuming, but once a patented drug is approved, it enjoys a period of exclusivity on the market (generally twenty years) – effectively, a government- sanctioned monopoly. During this exclusivity period, the drug’s developer can recoup its investment into the drug, as it faces no competition. However, once the exclusivity period ends

and generic versions of the drug enter the market, it generally results in the brand-name drug losing more than 80% to 90% of its market share within six months – a process known in the industry as going off the “patent cliff.” Namenda II, 787 F.3d at 647. In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (the “Hatch-Waxman Act”), Pub. L. No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585. Hatch-Waxman attempted to serve a dual purpose: to lower drug prices for consumers by encouraging generic competition with brand-name drugs; and to incentivize innovation from branded drug manufacturers by providing for patent extensions beyond the standard 20-year patent term. Namenda II, 787 F.3d at 644. As to the first goal – encouraging generic competition – Hatch-Waxman permitted generic manufacturers to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”), which allows a generic

manufacturer to “piggy-back” on an already-approved branded drug’s NDA information to show that the generic is safe and effective. Ibid. The ANDA requires the generic manufacturer to certify that the generic has the same active ingredients as, and is “bioequivalent” to, the already-approved brand-name drug. Ibid; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). A generic is “bioequivalent” to a brand-name drug if “the rate and extent of absorption of” the two drugs are not significantly different. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B)(i). In other words, two drugs are “bioequivalent” if they deliver the same amount of an active ingredient over the same amount of time. By allowing generic drug manufacturers to “piggy-back” their ANDAs on the scientific studies of already-approved drugs, Hatch-Waxman reduced the development costs of lower-priced generics, speeding their introduction to the market. Namenda II, 787 F.3d at 644. Apart from the federal regulatory landscape, many states also encourage generic competition through drug-substitution laws. These laws either permit or require pharmacists to

replace a prescribed brand-name drug with a “therapeutically equivalent,” lower-priced generic if there is no express direction from the prescribing doctor that the prescription must be filled with the brand-name drug. Id. at 645. Whether a generic is “therapeutically equivalent” to the brand- name drug is state-dependent, but at least thirty states follow the FDA’s guidance and will only allow a generic substitution if the FDA designates the generic as “AB-rated” in a publication known as the “Orange Book.” Ibid. An AB-rated generic is one that is both “bioequivalent” to the brand-name drug and pharmaceutically equivalent in that it has the “same active ingredient, dosage form, strength, and route of administration[.]” Ibid. However, the AB-rating requirement provides brand-name drug manufacturers with an opportunity to game the system by “product hopping” – developing a new version of the drug with

a later patent expiration date, and then encouraging patients to switch to the new version before the original version goes off the “patent cliff.” Because an AB-rating requires the generic to deliver an identical amount of the drug in the same way and over the same amount of time, a brand-name manufacturer can develop a new version of the drug with a different rate of delivery that would preclude the generic to the original version from being rated as AB-equivalent to the new version. This is what SBA alleges occurred with the two versions of Namenda at issue in this lawsuit. See infra, Section I.D. C. Generic Exclusivity and the Generic Settlements Another way Hatch-Waxman furthers generic competition is by allowing the FDA to grant a 180-day exclusive marketing period to the first generic manufacturer to successfully file an ANDA. This period of exclusivity can be extremely profitable for whichever company successfully files first, because the FDA is prohibited from granting approval to any other generic

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IN RE NAMENDA INDIRECT PURCHASER ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-namenda-indirect-purchaser-antitrust-litigation-nysd-2021.