[Cite as In re M.W.H., 2026-Ohio-1558.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE M.W.H. : No. 115498 A Minor Child :
[Appeal by Mother] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 30, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. CU-16101300
Appearances:
Ann S. Vaughn, for appellant.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J.:
Appellant Mother (“Mother”) appeals from the decision of the
juvenile court denying her motions to terminate a shared-parenting agreement and
suspend overnight parenting time with Father and the decision holding Mother in
contempt of court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part. Factual and Procedural History
In April 2016, the juvenile court approved and entered an agreed
shared-parenting order executed by the parties. As a result, the juvenile court
designated them both as legal custodians of MWH (the “minor child”) (d.o.b.
4/10/2012), and Mother was designated as the residential parent. Pursuant to the
agreement, Father’s parenting time was weekly from Thursday at 5:30 p.m. to
Sunday at 12:00 p.m.
In October 2022, Father filed a motion to modify the shared-
parenting agreement, which the juvenile court granted. In January 2023, the
juvenile court accepted the parents’ shared-parenting agreement, which designated
both parents as residential and custodial parents of the minor child. Mother was
designated the residential parent for school purposes only. The juvenile court’s
order also set Mother’s parenting time from Sundays at 3:00 p.m. to Thursdays at
3:00 p.m., and Father’s parenting time from Thursdays at 3:00 p.m., to Sundays at
3:00 p.m.
On November 17, 2023, Mother simultaneously filed motions to
terminate shared parenting, suspend overnight parenting time with Father, order
Father to submit to drug and alcohol testing, and appoint a guardian ad litem
(“GAL”) for the minor child. Mother asked the court to order supervised visits and
to suspend Father’s parenting time. In her motion to terminate shared parenting,
Mother asked the court to designate her as the minor child’s sole legal custodian. Mother attached an affidavit, in which she alleged that she, her
husband, and the minor child had observed Father intoxicated on several occasions
at the minor child’s sporting events. Further, Mother averred that the minor child
told her that he had observed Father drinking and intoxicated. She expressed that
multiple family members had raised concerns that Father was drinking, and she
believed Father was driving the minor child while intoxicated. The minor child also
reported to Mother there was no heat in Father’s home and he was unable to bathe
there because the water was off. Further, per Mother, the minor child reported that
the home was “filthy.” Mother claimed she saw the conditions of the home in the
background during FaceTime calls with the minor child. Finally, Mother averred
that the minor child wanted to discontinue visits because Father’s home was “dirty,
his dad drinks, and it’s depressing.”
On November 27, 2023, Father filed a motion to show cause alleging
that Mother had violated the shared-parenting agreement by interfering with his
parenting time with the minor child during the month of November.
The juvenile court appointed a GAL, and over the next several months
conducted several pretrials. The juvenile court granted Mother’s request for drug
and alcohol testing and ordered Father to obtain the same within 30 days of the
journalization of its March 4, 2024 order.
In May 2024, the GAL issued her initial report. She noted that she
had reviewed the court’s records; the minor child’s school attendance and report
card from the past two years; and Father’s bill payments for heat, water, and sewer. She was able to speak to relevant parties and determined that the minor child had a
decent relationship with both parents. However, the minor child expressed
concerns about Father’s living conditions and his drinking. The GAL attempted to
schedule a visit to Father’s home to assess the conditions, providing dates and times;
however, at the time of her report, Father had not responded to her request.
The GAL spoke to both Mother and Father. Mother reiterated her
concerns as expressed in her affidavit. She also alleged that multiple family
members of hers and Father’s had reported concerns regarding Father’s drinking.
Finally, she alleged that Father’s home had been foreclosed and sold.
Father denied drinking, claiming he had a medical condition that
prevented him from drinking. Father expressed concerns for the minor child’s
school attendance, calling it “atrocious” and alleging that the minor child had been
reported to the state for truancy twice. When asked about the heating in his home,
Father alleged that a thermocouple on his heater “went bad” and that the situation
lasted for a little over a week. Subsequently, Mother took the minor child for a
Halloween event. Shortly thereafter, the Cuyahoga County Department of Children
and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) began an investigation. Per Father, they
conducted a home inspection and checked the gas, hot water, and living conditions
and found the allegations “unsubstantiated.” Two days later, Father went to get the
minor child at school and was told Mother had pulled the minor child out of school
early. He called the next day and was told the minor child was not in attendance.
Subsequently, Father alleged that Mother interfered with his ability to attend parent/teacher conferences, telling the school that they were to deal exclusively with
her and no longer interact with Father.
Based on the circumstances at the time, the GAL withheld her
recommendation, indicating that she would reserve her conclusions until she had
obtained additional information.
Later that month, May 2024, the juvenile court determined that
Father had not complied with its order to obtain a drug and alcohol assessment. The
juvenile court reissued the order and gave Father another 30 days to comply. The
juvenile court also granted the motion to suspend overnight visits at Father’s home.
In the alternative, the juvenile court noted that the parties could arrange for Father’s
parenting time to occur in the community, under supervision at a visitation center,
or at the home of an appropriate adult known to the child.
In January 2025, the GAL issued a second report. On speaking to the
minor child this time, the minor child reported that he regularly visits with Father
on the weekends and enjoys those visits. He did not report any present concerns
regarding Father; however, he had not been to Father’s home in “a long time” and
did not know the current condition of the home.
Mother reported to the GAL that she was aware that recent visits
between Father and the minor child were appropriate. She acknowledged that they
loved each other. She also noted that Father had been driving the minor child to
various locations and there were no concerns. However, she disapproved of the
minor child resuming overnight visits until Father proved he had appropriate and stable housing. She reported that she had not received any recent reports from
family members regarding Father’s substance use or abuse.
The GAL and Father corresponded by phone and email. Father
emailed her a copy of a notice of bankruptcy dated September 2023, a copy of his
drug screen results in May 2024, and results of a urine and toxicology screen
conducted by the Cleveland Veteran Affairs Medical Center (the “VA”) from August
2024. The VA reported negative results and did not recommend treatment.
Although the GAL provided multiple days and times for a prospective home visit,
Father did not make his home available to the GAL and she was unable to report on
Father’s living conditions. The GAL recommended that it was in the best interest of
the minor child to continue visits with his Father “as ordered by the Court.” The
GAL reserved any additional recommendations until after the trial of the matter.
Trial commenced in May 2025. The issues remaining were Father’s
motion to show cause and Mother’s motion to terminate shared parenting.
Additionally, Mother asked the court to continue its order forbidding overnight
visits until Father addressed his housing issues.
Father proceeded pro se and presented narrative testimony. He
testified that after Mother picked up the minor child to take him to a Halloween
event in 2023, Mother did not return him to Father’s care. After that, Father alleged
that Mother kept the minor child from him. In early November, Father filed a police
report regarding the matter. Subsequently, Father and Mother were at the school
for parent/teacher conferences and had to be separated. Father testified that school officials were told he was no longer in the minor child’s life and all communication
was to go through Mother. Father had to bring copies of the custody orders to the
school in order to rectify the matter. Ultimately, Father alleged that his parenting
time was interrupted from October 26, 2023, through May 2024.
Father also challenged Mother’s claims that he had alcohol, drug, and
mental-health issues when he had never been convicted of operating a vehicle while
intoxicated (“OVI”) or disorderly conduct or had any other legal issues in that vein.
Nevertheless, Father acknowledged he was charged with a misdemeanor for
growing marijuana in 2007. For reasons that Father did not explain, Father was
ultimately convicted of arson.
Father did not go into detail about his relationship with the minor
child but noted that he was concerned about the minor child’s grades and school
attendance and had hired a tutor to help him. Finally, Father sought to introduce
five exhibits: three affidavits from family members to attest to his character and the
minor child’s attendance records and test scores.
On cross-examination, Father claimed that the minor child was
unable to bathe for one day because a thermocouple in the water heater went out.
Father explained that CCDCFS investigated his home and found everything
acceptable. He also claimed that Mother was aware of the results of the
investigation. Father admitted that he did not allow the GAL to inspect his home.
He claimed that there was a scheduling conflict. Father further admitted that he had lived in the same home since
2004, but that it was foreclosed and sold in a sheriff’s sale in September 2023.
Nevertheless, Father claimed he was still the owner of the home. He acknowledged,
however, that the county lists a different owner and that listed person is the legal
owner. When asked if Mother should be concerned about the minor child staying
with Father at a home owned by another person, Father replied “no” and indicated
there was still a “process” pending. He pointed out that he has lived in the home for
the past two years since the foreclosure, and he stated that “we” were in the process
of figuring something out with respect to the house.
Father then sought to call his fiancée, Ericka Reynolds (“Reynolds”)
to the stand. Mother objected, noting Father failed to file a witness list. The juvenile
court overruled the objection and allowed the testimony.
Reynolds testified that she had known Father for over 30 years and
they began dating in March 2023 and became engaged in February 2025. She
described the relationship between Father and the minor child as “best friends” and
said that they have a relationship she admires. Reynolds testified that she owned
her own home and had been to Father’s home several times. They were discussing
consolidating their lives to accommodate themselves, the minor child, and
Reynolds’ six-year-old son.
With respect to Father’s lifestyle, she testified that she would not
describe him as someone with mental-health issues. She noted that Father did drink
alcohol, but was imbibing less since he was prescribed blood pressure medication, usually drinking nonalcoholic beer. She further noted that she had never seen
Father smoke marijuana; however, she noted that she hated the smell and he would
not smoke around her.
Reynolds testified that she has spent time with the minor child.
Specifically, he attended a family day celebration at her job. Later she was with
Father when he bought the minor child a suit for his junior prom. Reynolds helped
by hemming the minor child’s pants. At the conclusion of her testimony, Father
rested his case.
Mother then took the stand. She testified that the minor child had
just turned 13 years old. She and the minor child lived with her husband, Darren
Wilder (“Wilder”), and her daughter. Mother admitted that the shared-parenting
agreement had existed since 2016 and was modified in 2023. Although she had
concerns about parenting time with Father, she did not act until October 2023, when
the minor child raised some concerns.
In October 2023, Mother picked up the minor child to take him to a
Halloween event downtown and the minor child smelled “horrendous.” She
described the minor child smelling as if he had not bathed in days. She called Father
to address the minor child’s cleanliness and his drinking, which had been mentioned
by the minor child and other members of both her and Father’s families. She also
tried to talk to him about not having hot water or gas and the home being in disarray
and filthy. Finally, she told Father that because of those conditions, she would not
bring the minor child back to his home. Father demanded that she return the minor child, and she declined. She later texted Father, telling him that she was not taking
the minor child to his home given the conditions and he could contact her lawyer if
he had questions. The texts were entered as an exhibit during Mother’s case-in-
chief.
Mother did not find out about the foreclosure of Father’s house until
later. Father did not respond to her questions about the foreclosure. Mother
testified that the only thing that would satisfy her and alleviate her concerns about
overnight visits was if he allowed the GAL to complete a home inspection. She also
expressed concern about what might happen if the new owner attempted to evict
Father from the home while the minor child was present.
Mother testified that Father did not communicate with her about the
minor child or ask her about his well-being. Further, Mother indicated that Father
had not engaged in coparenting with her in the prior six months. On the current
visitation schedule, Mother complained that Father was usually late. Father would
communicate when he needed to cancel a visit, however.
Finally, although Mother had indicated recent interactions with
Father had been fine, she testified that he was noticeably intoxicated at the minor
child’s junior prom a week prior to trial. She noted that he was in a “wobbly state,”
could not get up or stand-up straight, and was moving slow and slurring his words.
These new observations left her with renewed concern about allowing Father to
drive with the minor child. Nevertheless, she testified that she would be agreeable
to overnight visits as long as they did not occur at “that house.” While she wanted the minor child to have a relationship with Father, she wanted Father to be a good
role model, sort out his housing “situation,” and take care of his health.
Next, Wilder testified and agreed that Father was inebriated at the
junior prom the week prior. He described Father as sluggish and aggressive. The
last time he was at Father’s house was in 2022 or 2023. At that time, Wilder claimed
that Father asked him to install a straight pipe for his gas line; he claimed it was a
way to illegally access gas. Wilder testified he could not do it. At that time, Wilder
entered the home and noticed that it was very cold. He also observed a vodka bottle
in the middle of the basement floor and that the gas meter had been removed. On
cross-examination, Wilder testified that he smelled alcohol on Father while at the
junior prom. Further he acknowledged that he did not see Father drink from the
vodka bottle and that it could belong to someone other than Father.
At the close of testimony, the juvenile court addressed exhibits and
asked Mother if she objected to the affidavits and records Father sought to admit.
Mother objected to all of Father’s exhibits. The juvenile court sustained the
objections as to the affidavits Father obtained and the minor child’s test scores but
overruled the objection as to the minor child’s attendance records. Father also
objected to Mother’s exhibits, which included the text messages she exchanged with
Father about his living conditions and the docket of Father’s foreclosure. The
juvenile court overruled Father’s objections.
The GAL then gave her recommendation. She testified that it was in
the best interest of the minor child for Father’s motion for parenting time to be denied.1 With respect to shared parenting, she indicated that “this parent” cannot
coparent. The GAL did not give a recommendation but stated that she did not
believe shared parenting was working.
When questioned by the parties, the GAL acknowledged that Father
had completed the court-ordered drug and alcohol testing although he did so outside
of the juvenile court’s deadline. With regard to overnight visits, she believed that
Father should have a home or lease in his name and the minor child should not stay
in a home that does not legally belong to Father. Nevertheless, she admitted that in
May 2024, Father provided her with water and sewer bills and receipts that he paid
them.
The juvenile court denied Mother’s motions to terminate the shared-
parenting agreement and suspend overnight visits and granted Father’s motion to
show cause, finding Mother in contempt of court. The juvenile court ordered that
Mother serve three days in jail; however, the sentence was suspended and could be
purged “by strictly complying with the terms of the shared-parenting plan of
January 12, 2023 as ordered, and with daily school attendance, including
educational supports such as tutoring and other extracurricular activities in the
[minor child’s] best interest.”
Mother appeals raising the following assignments of error for our
review.
1 The record reflects that the motion the GAL referenced was granted by the
juvenile court in January 2023 and was not the subject of the hearing. Assignment of Error No. 1
The [juvenile] court erred in finding that no substantial change of circumstances had occurred in the life of a child, the child’s residential parent, or either of the parents subject to a parenting decree.
Assignment of Error No. 2
The [juvenile] court erred in finding that a modification was not necessary to serve the best interests of a minor child.
Assignment of Error No. 3
The [juvenile] court erred in denying [Mother’s] motion to terminate the parties’ shared-parenting [agreement].
Assignment of Error No. 4
The [juvenile] court abused its discretion in disregarding the recommendations of a [GAL] appointed to conduct an investigation and make recommendations about a minor child’s best interest.
Assignment of Error No. 5
The [juvenile] court abused its discretion in finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother was in contempt of court (pursuant to [Father’s] motion to show cause).
Assignment of Error No. 6
The [juvenile] court erred in finding that Mother was in contempt of court (pursuant to [Father’s] motion to show cause).
Assignment of Error No. 7
The [juvenile] court abused its discretion when giving self-represented Father leniency in overlooking his failure to meet the standards held to an attorney.
For ease of analysis, we will address the assignments of error in
combination or out of order. Law and Analysis
Termination of the Shared-Parenting Agreement
In the third assignment of error, Mother argues that the juvenile court
abused its discretion when it denied her motion to terminate the shared-parenting
agreement. Mother argues that she established that she and Father were unable to
effectively communicate regarding joint parenting decisions, primarily because of
Father’s unwillingness to converse with her, and therefore the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied her motion. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s best-interest determination for an abuse of
discretion. In re J.R.P., 2026-Ohio-827, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the court’s conduct is “‘unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’”
State v. Hill, 2022-Ohio-4544, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Beasley, 2018-Ohio-16, ¶ 12,
citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). Furthermore,
“[t]his highly deferential standard of review rests on the premise that the trial judge is in the best position to determine the credibility of witnesses because he or she is able to observe their demeanor, gestures and attitude.”
J.R.P. at id., quoting In re L.S., 2003-Ohio-2045, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing Seasons
Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984).
A court of appeals is not permitted to substitute its judgment for the
judgment of the trial court, where that judgment is supported by competent,
credible evidence. Bertalan v. Bertalan, 2025-Ohio-1443, ¶ 70 (8th Dist.), citing
Hunter v. Troutman, 2025-Ohio-366, ¶ 64 (8th Dist.). Our review of a motion to terminate a shared-parenting agreement is
governed by R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c), which states:
The court may terminate a prior final shared parenting decree that includes a shared parenting plan . . . upon the request of one or both of the parents or whenever it determines that shared parenting is not in the best interest of the children . . . .
In making the decision whether to terminate a shared-parenting
agreement, the sole concern of the trial court is the best interest of the child. Bruns
v. Green, 2020-Ohio-4787, ¶ 20. The trial court need not find that there was a
change of circumstances in order to make a ruling under R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c). In
re J.R.P., 2026-Ohio-827 at ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing Bruns at id.
In examining whether shared parenting is in the best interest of the
child, R.C. 3109.04(F)(2) instructs the juvenile court to consider “all relevant
factors, including, but not limited to,” the factors enumerated in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1),
the factors enumerated in R.C. 3119.23, and all of the following: 2
(a) The ability of the parents to cooperate and make decisions jointly, with respect to the children;
(b) The ability of each parent to encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact between the child and the other parent;
(c) Any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, other domestic violence, or parental kidnapping by either parent;
(d) The geographic proximity of the parents to each other, as the proximity relates to the practical considerations of shared parenting;
2 R.C. 3119.23 applies to deviations in child-support orders and does not apply to
the facts of this case. (e) The recommendation of the guardian ad litem of the child, if the child has a guardian ad litem.
R.C. 3109.04(F)(2).
The factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) include:
(a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care;
(b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant to division (B) of this section regarding the child’s wishes and concerns as to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning the child, the wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the court;
(c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest;
(d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community;
(e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation;
(f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights;
(g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that parent pursuant to a child support order under which that parent is an obligor;
(h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an abused child or a neglected child; whether either parent, in a case in which a child has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected child, previously has been determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or neglectful act that is the basis of an adjudication; whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section 2919.25 of the Revised Code or a sexually oriented offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the current proceeding; whether either parent or any member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any offense involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family or household that is the subject of the current proceeding and caused physical harm to the victim in the commission of the offense; and whether there is reason to believe that either parent has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused child or a neglected child;
(i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the other parent’s right to parenting time in accordance with an order of the court;
(j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is planning to establish a residence, outside this state.
The sole factor Mother raises in this assignment of error is the
inability of Father and Mother to communicate effectively and make joint decisions
regarding the minor child under R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(a). Nevertheless, the juvenile
court’s entry reflects that it considered all the factors listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)
and (2). Additionally, the GAL’s final report noted that
[Mother] indicated that she is aware that her son has been having appropriate visits with his father. She said that her son loves [his] father and father loves the child. She said that the father has been driving the child around and no concerns were reported.
Mother’s only concern, as discussed with the GAL, was her desire to
continue the suspension of overnight visits at Father’s home until he establishes
appropriate and stable housing.
With respect to the remaining factors under R.C. 3109.04(F)(2), i.e.,
the ability of each parent to encourage the sharing of love, affection and contact
between the child and the other parent; any history of abuse; and the geographic
proximity of the parents to one another; neither party alleged that the other parent interfered with their having a loving relationship with the minor child; there was no
history of child abuse, parental abuse, domestic violence, or parental kidnapping;
and the parents both resided within the Cuyahoga County area.
R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(b)-(d). Finally, the GAL encouraged a continued relationship
between Father and the minor child but noted that there was no communication
between the parents and that she did not believe “this parent” could coparent. The
GAL did not believe shared parenting was working. However, neither in her report
nor during her testimony did the GAL give examples of the parents’ lack of
communication and inability to make joint decisions regarding the minor child.
Rather, the GAL offered testimony about the lack of communication between the
GAL and Father. R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(e).
Regarding the R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) factors, at the trial Father indicated
he wanted to continue the shared-parenting agreement. Mother indicated that she
was satisfied with the juvenile court’s decision to suspend overnight visits and would
leave the determination regarding her motion to terminate shared parenting to the
court. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a). The GAL represented that the minor child wished to
continue visiting with Father and loved Father; however, the GAL did not make any
representation regarding how the minor child felt about the shared-parenting
agreement. The court did not independently interview the minor child. R.C.
3109.04(F)(1)(b). The GAL reported that the minor child is well adjusted and seems
to get along with Mother and Father. The GAL did not opine about the minor child’s relationship with Father’s fiancée, her son, or the minor child’s stepfather or
siblings. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(c) and (d).
Finally, with respect to R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(e), the GAL did not report
any issues with Mother’s mental or physical health. The GAL noted that she had
received documents from Father, establishing that he had completed drug and
alcohol assessments, and no further treatment was recommended. Relating to
either parent honoring the juvenile court’s parenting order, the testimony
established that Mother claimed Father failed to inform her if he could not get the
minor child on time. Father testified that Mother withheld the minor child from his
parenting time during November 2023. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(f). Neither party raised
issues with child-support obligations. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(g). Neither party raised
issues regarding prior criminal history nor claimed that either had acted in a manner
that resulted in a child being an abused or a neglected child.3 R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(h).
With respect to interference with parenting time, Father alleged that Mother
interfered with his parenting time between October 2023 and May 2024. Mother
did not make similar accusations. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(i). Neither party indicated
they intended to establish a residence outside of this state. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(j).
It was clear from the record that Father did not always respond to
Mother’s questions about conditions at his home, refusing to answer questions
about the gas service per Mother’s testimony. However, Wilder testified that Father
3 Arguably, Mother alleged that Father’s failure to have working utilities caused the
minor child to be dependent while in his care; however, the GAL testified that Father showed bills and established he had working utilities as of May 2024. sought his help with that issue and he visited the home. While Father was not
forthcoming with Mother, he did not hide the condition of his home. Additionally,
it was readily apparent from the record that visitation was going well since the
juvenile court suspended overnight visits and the parties jointly attended the minor
child’s sporting events and major social events, like the minor child’s junior prom.
Mother testified that at the time of trial Father had not cooperated with her in any
joint decisions in the prior six months but did not indicate what those decisions were
and how they impacted the minor child.
Based on the foregoing, we cannot find that the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied the motion to terminate shared parenting. The third
assignment of error is overruled.
Modification of the Shared-Parenting Agreement
Next, we consider Mother’s first, second, and fourth assignments of
error, which challenge the juvenile court’s denial of her motions to suspend Father’s
parenting time. Mother initially requested the juvenile court suspend parenting
time, or in the alternative, allow supervised visits until Father addressed her claims
regarding drug and alcohol abuse and lack of utilities in his home. After the trial
court suspended overnight visits, Mother requested that the juvenile court continue
suspending overnight visits until Father established that he had a safe and
appropriate place to live.
Changes to the terms of a shared-parenting order are governed under
R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b), which provides, in pertinent part: The court may modify the terms of the plan for shared parenting approved by the court and incorporated by it into the shared parenting decree upon its own motion at any time if the court determines that the modifications are in the best interest of the children or upon the request of one or both of the parents under the decree. Modifications under this division may be made at any time. The court shall not make any modification to the plan under this division, unless the modification is in the best interest of the children.[4]
Similar to a ruling regarding the termination of shared parenting, the
juvenile court bases the decision to modify a shared-parenting agreement on
whether the modification is in the best interest of the child. In re G.B., 2022-Ohio-
382, ¶ 55 (8th Dist.). The court is not required to find that there was a change in
circumstances. Id. See Bruns, 2020-Ohio-4787, ¶ 11 (Comparing R.C.
3109.04(E)(2)(a) and (b) with R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c) and stating, “Subsection
(E)(2)(b) authorizes the trial court — on its own initiative or at the request of one or
both parents—to modify the terms of the shared-parenting agreement when
modification is found to be in the best interest of the child.”).
In her first assignment of error, Mother argues that the juvenile court
erred when it found that there was no substantial change in circumstances in the
lives of the child, the child’s residential parent, or either of the parents subject to the
parenting decree. However, whether there was a change in circumstances is only
relevant when there is a request to change the residential parent under
R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(a). In this case, where Mother is the residential parent and she
is making a request to modify the terms of the shared-parenting agreement under
4 Ramsey v. Ramsey, 2014-Ohio-1921, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.) (finding that a request to
modify parenting time is a request to modify the terms of a shared-parenting order). R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b), the juvenile court was not required to consider changed
circumstances. G.B. at ¶ 55. We are mindful that Mother’s argument is based on
the juvenile court’s finding, that
based on facts that have arisen since the prior decree, that a change in circumstances has not occurred in the [minor child’s], the [minor child’s] residential parent, or either of the parents subject to a parenting decree . . . .
(July 30, 2025 Journal Entry.)
However, the juvenile court was not required to make this finding
under R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b). Accordingly, Mother’s first assignment of error is
overruled.
In the second assignment of error, Mother argues that the juvenile
court’s ruling was not in the best interest of the minor child. Specifically, she argues
that the juvenile court’s decision to “overlook” Father’s failure to cooperate with the
GAL’s investigation was an abuse of discretion. Mother also alleges her request was
reasonable, and the juvenile court erred when it denied the motion. In the fourth
assignment of error, Mother claims that the trial court erred in disregarding the
GAL’s recommendations regarding what would be in the minor child’s best interest.
Again, our review of a trial court’s best-interest determination is for
an abuse of discretion. J.R.P., 2026-Ohio-827 at ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing In re N.J.V.,
2025-Ohio-375, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.). The party seeking a modification of the parenting
time schedule has the burden of establishing that the change is in the best interest of the child. Nungester v. Nungester, 2017-Ohio-6935, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.); Rankin v.
Rankin, 2021-Ohio-1967, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.)
For the motion to modify, the question was whether it was in the best
interest of the child to allow overnight visits based on Father’s living conditions.
During the trial, Mother submitted evidence that Father’s home had been foreclosed
and sold to a third party. Father admitted as much but alleged that the proceedings
were “illegal” and that there were other legal proceedings pending to address the
issue. Father did not submit any evidence to support these contentions.
The GAL reported that Father impeded her ability to investigate his
living conditions. She emailed Father on two occasions for a potential home visit.
Father did not respond to the first email. With respect to the second, Father emailed
the GAL a list of dates and times that he would be available. The GAL went to
Father’s home on one of those dates during a time Father said he would be available.
Father was not home and he did not respond to the GAL’s phone calls. When the
GAL emailed Father to inquire about what happened, she did not get a response.
The GAL noted that she did not know Father’s living conditions inside the house,
and testified that “outside, the grass and objects were around, so it didn’t look like
somebody was living there.” Nevertheless, the GAL acknowledged that Father
showed her utilities bills in his name as of May 2024, which was after the home’s
foreclosure and sale.
There was no testimony presented regarding the current condition of
Father’s home. The minor child had regular visits after juvenile court suspended overnight visits but informed the GAL that he had not been to Father’s home in
several months. Mother did not testify about the current conditions. She testified
regarding what she observed while on FaceTime calls with the minor child during
Father’s parenting time. Those observations occurred prior to and in October 2023.
Mother testified that the minor child would wander around the house when they
talked and the house was “dirty.” Nevertheless, Mother also testified that her main
objection to overnight visits was that Father no longer owned the home. She was
worried that the minor child would witness or experience an eviction or some action
to remove Father from the home.
Despite concerns about Father’s drinking, Mother testified that she
would be comfortable with overnight visits if they occurred in someone else’s home,
such as Father’s cousin’s home. Father’s fiancée, Reynolds, testified that she had
been to Father’s home several times, but she did not address the conditions. She
informed the court that she owned her own home, and she and Father were talking
about how to consolidate their lives now that they were engaged to be married.
Father attempted to ask Reynolds about the conditions of his home on redirect
examination, but the juvenile court stopped him, explaining that he could not raise
new issues on redirect examination.
While we understand Mother’s concerns about Father’s living
conditions, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
her motion. Mother did not object to overnight visits with Father; she objected to
the location. Further, Mother’s fears stemmed from speculation about what might happen at Father’s residence. Mother did not have any specific concerns except
events that had happened prior to October 2023. While Mother had present
concerns about Father’s drinking, the GAL noted that the VA report indicated
substance-abuse treatment was not recommended.
Finally, a trial court is not bound by a GAL’s recommendation. In re
A.B.M., 2019-Ohio-3183, ¶ 48 (8th Dist.) (finding “a trial court determines the
guardian ad litem’s credibility and the weight to be given to any report”). The
juvenile court was free to accept, reject, or modify the GAL’s recommendation and,
like any other witness, was in the best position to determine the credibility of the
GAL because of its ability to observe her demeanor, gestures, and attitude. Id., citing
In re A.M.S., 2012-Ohio-5078, ¶ 18, citing Seasons Coal Co., 10 Ohio St.3d at 80
(1984). Accordingly, the second and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
Pro Se Practice
In her seventh assignment of error, Mother argues that the juvenile
court did not hold Father to the same standard as an attorney because it did not
apply the juvenile rules and court’s standing rules to Father. Specifically, she argues
that the juvenile court should have granted her motion to deny Father’s motion to
show cause because Father failed to attach a copy of the order he alleged Mother
violated. Further, Mother alleges that the juvenile court erred when it allowed
Father to present Reynolds’ testimony despite the fact that he had failed to file a
witness list or otherwise notify Mother that he intended to present her testimony. While Mother cites the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure and the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Standing Orders to support her
argument, she does not cite any cases that support her argument that the failure of
a court to enforce these rules is an abuse of discretion. Further, she does not cite
any case law to support her argument that these acts, if improper, would warrant a
reversal of the juvenile court’s decision. “An appellant has the duty to construct the
arguments necessary to support the assignments of error; an appellate court will not
construct those arguments for the appellant.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Kessler,
2015-Ohio-5085, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.).
Accordingly, Mother’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.
Contempt Finding
Finally, in the sixth assignment of error, Mother argues that the
juvenile court erred in finding her in contempt of court. Although the assignment
of error states that the juvenile court’s finding was not supported by clear and
convincing evidence, Mother admits that she interfered with Father’s parenting
time. Instead, she alleges that she was justified in preventing Father’s parenting
time because of the conditions at Father’s home and because Father failed to
communicate with her. Mother’s arguments are well taken.
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s finding of contempt for an
abuse of discretion. In re J.A.P., 2022-Ohio-613, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing In re
Contempt of Morris, 110 Ohio App.3d 475, 479 (8th Dist. 1996), citing Dozer v.
Dozer, 88 Ohio App.3d 296 (4th Dist. 1993). A juvenile court’s authority to impose contempt stems from R.C. 2151.21 and 2705.031(B). The moving party must
establish (1) the existence of a court order, (2) that the party was aware of the order,
and (3) that the party violated the order. In re K.B., 2012-Ohio-5507, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.),
citing Arthur Young & Co. v. Kelly, 68 Ohio App.3d 287, 295 (10th Dist. 1990);
Pendergraft v. Watts, 2011-Ohio-5649.
A party establishes a prima facie case for contempt where the order is
before the court along with proof of the nonmoving party’s failure to comply with it.
Bridgeland v. Bridgeland, 2021-Ohio-2587, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing DeMarco v.
DeMarco, 2010-Ohio-445, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.), citing Dzina v. Dzina, 2004-Ohio-4497,
¶ 63 (8th Dist.). “Proof of a purposeful, willful or intentional violation of a court
order is not a prerequisite to a finding of contempt.” Id., citing Collins v. Collins,
2018-Ohio-1512, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing Pugh v. Pugh, 15 Ohio St.3d 136, 142 (1984).
Once the prima facie case of contempt is established, the burden shifts to the
contemnor to “either rebut the initial contempt showing or establish an affirmative
defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” Combs v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
2026-Ohio-562, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), citing S.R. v. S.R., 2023-Ohio-531, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.).
Courts have found that an affirmative defense may exist in a contempt
proceeding when a residential parent interferes with parenting time when the parent
establishes they had a reasonable, good-faith belief that they must deny visitation to
protect the safety of the child. Thompson v. Thompson, 2023-Ohio-667, ¶ 57 (12th
Dist.), citing Brennan v. Brennan, 2021-Ohio-1865, ¶ 37 (5th Dist.); Steele v. Steele,
2013-Ohio-3655, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.). The “‘trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying the good-faith defense when the trial court properly exercises its discretion
to consider all surrounding circumstances and weigh all factors in deciding whether
a parent is in contempt.’” Id., quoting In re J.H.P., 2015-Ohio-548, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.);
Hensley v. Hensley, 2009-Ohio-1738, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.). In determining the
reasonableness of the parent’s good-faith belief, courts often look at the residential
parent’s attempts to access remedies. Hensley at ¶ 28. For example, in one case,
the court found the parent’s decision to immediately terminate visits based on
accusations of sexual abuse unreasonable where they waited two months to file a
motion in court to terminate visits. Id., citing Bardenhagen v. Bardenhagen, 1990
Ohio App. LEXIS 3703 (12th Dist. Aug. 27, 1990). In another case, the court of
appeals found that the trial court, who was the sole arbiter of the credibility of the
witnesses, properly weighed testimony regarding the child’s trauma by noting that
the parent’s expert witness only interviewed the custodial parent and the child, but
did not interview the noncustodial parent and there was competent credible
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the custodial parent did not have a
good-faith basis for suspending visits. Brennan at ¶ 38 (5th Dist.).
In the instant case, Mother testified that the shared-parenting
agreement had been in place since 2016 and was modified in 2023 to allow Father
to get the minor child directly from school rather than from Mother’s home. On
Friday, October 27, 2023, Mother got the minor child from Father to take him to a
Halloween event. We can infer from the testimony that because it was Father’s
parenting time, the plan was to go to the event and return the minor child to Father’s care. When Mother got the minor child, she noticed that he smelled “horrendous.”
Mother testified that the minor child told her that Father did not have water or gas,
so he could not bathe and it was cold in Father’s home. Mother called Father to
discuss the issues, but he refused to talk to her about the conditions of his house.
Based on what she learned, Mother refused to return the minor child to his custody.
Mother admitted into evidence text messages between herself and Father where she
refused to return the minor child and informed Father to contact her attorney if he
had any questions. Mother filed her motion to suspend parenting time
approximately three weeks later at which time she also raised concerns about
Father’s alcohol and substance use.
Father testified that Mother withheld parenting time until May 2024.
Additionally, Father admitted that his gas was off, though he claimed the outage
lasted for one week. Nevertheless, he did not provide any proof to Mother and he
did not submit proof to the GAL regarding the utilities until May 2024. Further,
Father did not submit a substance-abuse assessment to the GAL until May 2024, as
well. Mother learned of the foreclosure and sale later. Father admitted his home
had been sold. While Father claimed that there were further proceedings, he did not
support his contentions beyond his testimony. There was no testimony regarding
the present conditions of Father’s home at trial, and Father never allowed the GAL
to inspect his home to determine the conditions.
The juvenile court did not address its findings on Mother’s contempt
during the trial or in its entry. The record establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that Mother had a good-faith basis for suspending visits. She had multiple
concerns and attempted to address them with Father, but he refused to address
them with her. She immediately filed motions to allow the juvenile court to review
her concerns. Throughout the proceedings, Mother noted that she wanted the
minor child to have time with his Father and she only wanted confirmation that his
living conditions were safe before returning the minor child to his care.
Based on the foregoing, we find that Father established a prima facie
case for contempt. However, Mother also met her burden, establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence an affirmative defense to the charge of contempt.
Therefore, the portion of the juvenile court’s July 30, 2025 entry that found Mother
in contempt of court is unenforceable. Accordingly, we sustain the sixth assignment
of error.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Mother’s first
through fifth, and seventh assignments of error are overruled and her sixth
assignment of error is sustained.
It is ordered that appellee and appellant split the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
________ EMANUELLA D. GROVES, PRESIDING JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR