[Cite as Nungester v. Nungester, 2017-Ohio-6935.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MARION COUNTY
KATE NUNGESTER, CASE NO. 9-16-64 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
ROBERT NUNGESTER, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court Family Division Trial Court No. 13-DR-044
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: July 24, 2017
APPEARANCES:
Ted Coulter for Appellant
Nathan Witkin for Appellee Case No. 9-16-64
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Robert D. Nungester (“Robert”) brings this appeal
from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Marion County, Family
Division, denying his motions to allocate parental rights and responsibilities and his
motion to modify parenting time. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is
reversed.
{¶2} Robert and plaintiff-appellee Kate Nungester (“Kate”) were divorced
on August 23, 2013. Doc. 58. At that time, they entered into an agreed parenting
plan for their three minor children, Katlyn, Roston, and Kareston. Id. The
agreement designated Kate as the residential parent and gave visitation to Robert
with the intent to increase his visitation over time to equal that set forth in Marion
County Local Rule 32(A). Id. The visitation was to be increased at the
recommendation of the children’s counselor with overnight visits occurring when
Robert had appropriate housing. Id.
{¶3} On March 20, 2015, Robert filed a motion to modify the agreement and
to be named the residential parent of the children. Doc. 60. That same day Robert
also filed a motion to modify his parenting time. Doc. 61. On April 3, 2015, Kate
filed a motion to show cause alleging that Robert had failed to pay her funds as
required in the divorce decree. Doc. 75. Robert then filed a motion to show cause
alleging that Kate had failed to allow him access to the barn on the property as
required by the court order and for removing him from the medical insurance before
-2- Case No. 9-16-64
authorized to do so by the court order. Doc. 87. On March 23, 2016, Robert and
Kate resolved these issues in an agreement and stipulation of the parties. Doc. 113.
The agreement also provided a modification of the visits from being supervised by
the Marion County’s Supervised Visitation Agency (“CAREFIT”) to occurring in a
public place and being supervised by Kate. Id. The agreement also provided that
Robert would meet with the children at counseling sessions at the discretion of the
counselor. Id. Another provision was that the parties could “mutually agree to
progression to periods of unsupervised parenting time with [Robert] and the minor
children before the next evidentiary review hearing.” Id. at 4.
{¶4} On October 18, 2016, a hearing was held on Robert’s motions. Doc.
127. Robert indicated at the hearing that he merely wanted to expand his visitation
rights to match the default visitation schedule of the court. Tr. 4. No argument was
made as to a change of circumstance that would support the motion to change the
residential parent from Kate to Robert. On November 23, 2016, the trial court
entered judgment denying Robert’s motions. Doc. 127. The judgment specified
that Robert was seeking more specific parenting time “in accordance with Local
Rule 32A”. Id. at 2. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by the trial
court on December 5, 2016. Doc. 129. Robert filed his notice of appeal on
December 22, 2016. Doc. 132. On appeal, Robert raises the following assignments
of error.
-3- Case No. 9-16-64
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred as a matter of law by requiring there be proven a change of circumstances of the children of residential parent before there was a modification of the parenting time (visitation order) of [Robert].
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred as a matter of law, abused its discretion and erred against the weight of the evidence by determining it was not in the best interests of the parties’ children to have Local Rule 32(A) parenting time with [Robert] and therefore denying [Robert’s] motion to modify parenting time.
{¶5} The establishment of a non-residential parent’s visitation rights is left
to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent a
showing that an abuse of that discretion has occurred. Cichanowicz v. Cichanowicz,
3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-13-05, 2013-Ohio-5657, ¶ 71. “The term ‘abuse of
discretion’ means more than a mere error; it implies that the court's attitude is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Hay v. Shafer, 3d Dist. Mercer No.
10-10-10, 2010-Ohio-4811, ¶ 10. Since the trial court is in the best position to
observe the witnesses and weigh the testimony, a reviewing court should not reverse
a decision merely because it disagrees with the outcome. Clark v. Clark, 3d Dist.
Union No. 14-06-56, 2007-Ohio-5771, ¶23. “A finding of an error in law is a
legitimate ground for reversal, but a difference of opinion on credibility of witnesses
and evidence is not.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d
77, 81, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984).
-4- Case No. 9-16-64
{¶6} The Ohio Supreme Court has determined that modification of a child
visitation is governed by R.C. 3109.051 unless shared parenting was ordered.
Braatz v. Braatz, 85 Ohio St.3d 40, 1999-Ohio-203, 706 N.E.2d 1218.
“ ‘Visitation’ and ‘custody’ are related but distinct legal concepts. ‘Custody’ resides in the party or parties who have the right to ultimate legal and physical control of a child. ‘Visitation’ resides in a noncustodial party and encompasses that party’s right to visit the child. * * * In other words, ‘visitation’ is granted to someone who does not have ‘custody.’ Although a party exercising visitation rights might gain temporary physical control over the child for that purpose, such control does not constitute ‘custody’ because the legal authority to make fundamental decisions about the child’s welfare remains with the custodial party and because the child eventually must be returned to the more permanent setting provided by that party.”
Id. at 44 quoting In re Gibson, 61 Ohio St.3d 168, 171, 573 N.E.2d 1074 (1991).
Based upon this reasoning, the Court held that the appropriate statute for questions
of modification of visitation was R.C. 3109.051, not R.C. 3109.04. The statute
states in pertinent part the following.
(A) If a divorce * * * proceeding involves a child and if the court has not issued a shared parenting decree, the court shall consider any mediation report filed pursuant to [R.C. 3109.052] and, in accordance with division (C) of this section, shall make a just and reasonable order or decree permitting each parent who is not the residential parent to have parenting time with the child at the time and under the conditions that the court directs, unless the court determines that it would not be in the best interest of the child to permit that parent to have parenting time with the child and includes in the journal its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
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[Cite as Nungester v. Nungester, 2017-Ohio-6935.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MARION COUNTY
KATE NUNGESTER, CASE NO. 9-16-64 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
ROBERT NUNGESTER, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court Family Division Trial Court No. 13-DR-044
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: July 24, 2017
APPEARANCES:
Ted Coulter for Appellant
Nathan Witkin for Appellee Case No. 9-16-64
WILLAMOWSKI, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Robert D. Nungester (“Robert”) brings this appeal
from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Marion County, Family
Division, denying his motions to allocate parental rights and responsibilities and his
motion to modify parenting time. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is
reversed.
{¶2} Robert and plaintiff-appellee Kate Nungester (“Kate”) were divorced
on August 23, 2013. Doc. 58. At that time, they entered into an agreed parenting
plan for their three minor children, Katlyn, Roston, and Kareston. Id. The
agreement designated Kate as the residential parent and gave visitation to Robert
with the intent to increase his visitation over time to equal that set forth in Marion
County Local Rule 32(A). Id. The visitation was to be increased at the
recommendation of the children’s counselor with overnight visits occurring when
Robert had appropriate housing. Id.
{¶3} On March 20, 2015, Robert filed a motion to modify the agreement and
to be named the residential parent of the children. Doc. 60. That same day Robert
also filed a motion to modify his parenting time. Doc. 61. On April 3, 2015, Kate
filed a motion to show cause alleging that Robert had failed to pay her funds as
required in the divorce decree. Doc. 75. Robert then filed a motion to show cause
alleging that Kate had failed to allow him access to the barn on the property as
required by the court order and for removing him from the medical insurance before
-2- Case No. 9-16-64
authorized to do so by the court order. Doc. 87. On March 23, 2016, Robert and
Kate resolved these issues in an agreement and stipulation of the parties. Doc. 113.
The agreement also provided a modification of the visits from being supervised by
the Marion County’s Supervised Visitation Agency (“CAREFIT”) to occurring in a
public place and being supervised by Kate. Id. The agreement also provided that
Robert would meet with the children at counseling sessions at the discretion of the
counselor. Id. Another provision was that the parties could “mutually agree to
progression to periods of unsupervised parenting time with [Robert] and the minor
children before the next evidentiary review hearing.” Id. at 4.
{¶4} On October 18, 2016, a hearing was held on Robert’s motions. Doc.
127. Robert indicated at the hearing that he merely wanted to expand his visitation
rights to match the default visitation schedule of the court. Tr. 4. No argument was
made as to a change of circumstance that would support the motion to change the
residential parent from Kate to Robert. On November 23, 2016, the trial court
entered judgment denying Robert’s motions. Doc. 127. The judgment specified
that Robert was seeking more specific parenting time “in accordance with Local
Rule 32A”. Id. at 2. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by the trial
court on December 5, 2016. Doc. 129. Robert filed his notice of appeal on
December 22, 2016. Doc. 132. On appeal, Robert raises the following assignments
of error.
-3- Case No. 9-16-64
First Assignment of Error
The trial court erred as a matter of law by requiring there be proven a change of circumstances of the children of residential parent before there was a modification of the parenting time (visitation order) of [Robert].
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred as a matter of law, abused its discretion and erred against the weight of the evidence by determining it was not in the best interests of the parties’ children to have Local Rule 32(A) parenting time with [Robert] and therefore denying [Robert’s] motion to modify parenting time.
{¶5} The establishment of a non-residential parent’s visitation rights is left
to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent a
showing that an abuse of that discretion has occurred. Cichanowicz v. Cichanowicz,
3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-13-05, 2013-Ohio-5657, ¶ 71. “The term ‘abuse of
discretion’ means more than a mere error; it implies that the court's attitude is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Hay v. Shafer, 3d Dist. Mercer No.
10-10-10, 2010-Ohio-4811, ¶ 10. Since the trial court is in the best position to
observe the witnesses and weigh the testimony, a reviewing court should not reverse
a decision merely because it disagrees with the outcome. Clark v. Clark, 3d Dist.
Union No. 14-06-56, 2007-Ohio-5771, ¶23. “A finding of an error in law is a
legitimate ground for reversal, but a difference of opinion on credibility of witnesses
and evidence is not.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d
77, 81, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984).
-4- Case No. 9-16-64
{¶6} The Ohio Supreme Court has determined that modification of a child
visitation is governed by R.C. 3109.051 unless shared parenting was ordered.
Braatz v. Braatz, 85 Ohio St.3d 40, 1999-Ohio-203, 706 N.E.2d 1218.
“ ‘Visitation’ and ‘custody’ are related but distinct legal concepts. ‘Custody’ resides in the party or parties who have the right to ultimate legal and physical control of a child. ‘Visitation’ resides in a noncustodial party and encompasses that party’s right to visit the child. * * * In other words, ‘visitation’ is granted to someone who does not have ‘custody.’ Although a party exercising visitation rights might gain temporary physical control over the child for that purpose, such control does not constitute ‘custody’ because the legal authority to make fundamental decisions about the child’s welfare remains with the custodial party and because the child eventually must be returned to the more permanent setting provided by that party.”
Id. at 44 quoting In re Gibson, 61 Ohio St.3d 168, 171, 573 N.E.2d 1074 (1991).
Based upon this reasoning, the Court held that the appropriate statute for questions
of modification of visitation was R.C. 3109.051, not R.C. 3109.04. The statute
states in pertinent part the following.
(A) If a divorce * * * proceeding involves a child and if the court has not issued a shared parenting decree, the court shall consider any mediation report filed pursuant to [R.C. 3109.052] and, in accordance with division (C) of this section, shall make a just and reasonable order or decree permitting each parent who is not the residential parent to have parenting time with the child at the time and under the conditions that the court directs, unless the court determines that it would not be in the best interest of the child to permit that parent to have parenting time with the child and includes in the journal its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Whenever possible, the order or decree permitting the parenting time shall ensure the opportunity for both parents to have frequent and continuing contact with the child, unless frequent
-5- Case No. 9-16-64
and continuing contact by either parent with the child would not be in the best interest of the child. * * *
***
(C) When determining whether to grant parenting time rights to a parent pursuant to this section * * *, when establishing a specific parenting time or visitation schedule, and when determining other parenting time matters under this section * * *, the court shall consider all other relevant factors, including, but not limited to, all of the factors listed in division (D) of this section. * * *
(D) In determining whether to grant parenting time to a parent pursuant to this section * * * in establishing a specific parenting time or visitation schedule, and in determining other parenting time matters under this section * * *, the court shall consider all of the following factors.
(1) The prior interaction and interrelationships of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, and other persons related by consanguinity or affinity, * * *;
(2) The geographical location of the residence of each parent and the distance between those residences, * * *;
(3) The child’s and parents’ available time, including, but not limited to, each parent’s employment schedule, the child’s school schedule, and the child’s and the parents’ holiday and vacation schedule;
(4) The age of the child;
(5) The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community;
(7) The health and safety of the child;
(9) The mental and physical health of all parties;
-6- Case No. 9-16-64
(10) Each parent’s willingness to reschedule missed parenting time and to facilitate the other parent’s parenting time rights, and with respect to a person who requested companionship or visitation, the willingness of that person to reschedule missed visitation;
(13) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the other parent’s right to parenting time in accordance with an order of the court;
(16) Any other factor in the best interest of the child.
R.C. 3109.051. “The party seeking the modification of the parenting time schedule
bears the burden of proving that the requested change is in the child’s best interest.”
Cichanowicz, supra at ¶ 70 quoting Williamson v. Cooke, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
09AP-222, 2009-Ohio-6842, ¶ 17/
{¶7} Robert argues in the first assignment of error that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a modification of his visitation rights because there was no
change of circumstances as is required by R.C. 3109.04. In Braatz the Supreme
Court of Ohio determined that a modification of visitation does not require the
moving party to show a change of circumstances. Braatz, supra at 45. Instead the
trial court must consider the statutory factors set forth in R.C.3109.051(D) and make
a determination as to the best interest of the child. Id. There is no question that the
trial court in its entry used the wrong statute in considering the motion. Specifically,
-7- Case No. 9-16-64
the trial court stated that R.C. 3109.04 was the guide to be followed when addressing
the modification of parental rights and responsibilities. Doc. 127. This would be
correct for a modification of parental rights, but the trial court was addressing a
modification of visitation, not a modification of custody.1 As discussed above, the
correct statute to be used in modifications of visitation is R.C. 3109.051. Pursuant
to the statute, the trial court must consider the listed factors. A review of the two
statutes shows that the factors listed in R.C. 3109.04(F), which were addressed by
the trial court in this case, do somewhat overlap with the factors set forth in R.C.
3109.051. However, there are several additional factors set forth in R.C. 3109.051
which the statute states “shall” be considered. The trial court failed to consider
those factors and applied the incorrect statute. An error at law is reversible error.
Thus, the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to consider the statutory
factors set forth in R.C. 3109.051. The first assignment of error is sustained.
{¶8} In the second assignment of error, Robert claims that the trial court’s
determination as to the best interest of the children was not supported by the
manifest weight of the evidence. This court noted above that the trial court used the
wrong statute when considering the best interests of the children. Before the trial
court can make a determination as to the best interests of the children in a case
1 Although Robert filed a motion to modify parental rights and responsibilities as well as a motion to modify parenting time, he did not argue that a change of custody should occur. As discussed above, he indicated to the trial court that he only wished to have visitation as set forth in the local rules, not change the residential parent status. Based upon the judgment entry, the trial court identified this as the only issue for review as well.
-8- Case No. 9-16-64
involving a modification of visitation, it must consider the factors mandated by R.C.
3109.051. The trial court did not do so in this case. Therefore the second
assignment of error is sustained.
{¶9} Having found prejudicial error in the particulars assigned and argued,
the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Marion County, Family Division is
reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings in accord with this
opinion.
PRESTON, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur.
/hls
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