In Re Motions to Quash Subpœnas Duces Tecum Returnable Before the Second Grand Jury

30 F. Supp. 527, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1824
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedAugust 29, 1939
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 30 F. Supp. 527 (In Re Motions to Quash Subpœnas Duces Tecum Returnable Before the Second Grand Jury) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Motions to Quash Subpœnas Duces Tecum Returnable Before the Second Grand Jury, 30 F. Supp. 527, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1824 (S.D. Cal. 1939).

Opinion

*530 McCORMICK, District. Judge.

As I view the motions before the court, in the light of, applicable decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of other appellate federal courts, the sole litigable .issue at • this time is whether or not, .under the movants’ chargeable knowledge ,of. the scope of investigations by the Second. Grand Jury,, the documents called for are indicated to the corporate officers served with reasonable specification as to subjects and subject matter and are reasonably limited as to dates. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652; Nelson v. United States, 201 U.S. 92, 26 S.Ct. 358, 50 L.Ed. 673; Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541, 28 S.Ct. 178, 52 L.Ed. 327, 12 Ann.Cas. 658; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 362, 31 S.Ct. 538, 55 L.Ed. 771, Ann.Cas.1912D, 558; Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979; Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 43 S.Ct. 514, 67 L.Ed 917; Norcross v. United States, 9 Cir., 209 F. 13; Consolidated Mines v. Securities Exchange Comm., 9 Cir., 97 F.2d 704; In re Black, 2 Cir., 47 F.2d 542.

The policy of the government in the investigation of alleged violation of antitrust laws of the United States has been disclosed in an article by the present Assistant Attorney General, who has charge of such matters in the Department of Justice, in '47 Yale Law Journal (1303), where he stated: “I conceive of the duty of the Department of Justice both to the courts and to Congress. To the courts they owe the duty of fair and able presentation of the particular cases which they prosecute. To Congress they owe the duty of marking out. an intelligible line of policy of law enforcement. No other department can possibly outline that duty for them in a field where rules of thumb are not possible. Therefore, acting under the. advice of the Attorney General, I propose to announce in connection with particular cases or investigations which are instituted in the future enough information so that the exercise of the discretion in selecting the cases may be as "consistent as public announcement and public criticism can make it.”

This governmental policy relating to restraint of trade was followed prior to the; impanelment of the Second Grand Jury' in. this division of the court, when, in á press release by the Department of Justice on May' 1, 1939; it was stated:

“The Department of Justice will begin in the near future an inquiry before,a Federal grand jury in the Southern District of California with reference to alleged monopolistic practices by oil companies in the’Pacific Coast Area in the distribution of petroleum products. This' statement' is issued in accordance with the established policy of the Department ,to make public its reasons for instituting such an inquiry.

“The major oil companies produce 84% of the gasoline refined and distribute 85% of the gasoline marketed in the, Pacific. Coast Area. In 1936 the price of gasoline róse sharply throughout the Pacific Coast Area, and it has since exhibited a stability without precedent in the area. By reason of two price advances in April, 1936, the maj ors’ retail price for third structure gasoline in Los Angeles went from 7-1/20 to 120 per gallon, exclusive of taxes; on first and second structure gasoline the advance wa.s 40 a gallon. At the. same time' prices on all three grades were raised 4-1/20 throughout the balance of the .area, In March, 1937 the majors made an additional á'dvance of 1/20 a gallon on all grades throughout, the area. There have been no general reductions since April, 1936 in the majors’ posted prices for gasoline.

“These price advances have made the practices in the Pacific Coast Area the subject of complaints and government investigations. extending over a considerable period of time. The complaints have charged that by resort to . various practices • all substantial competition in the marketing of petroleum products is being eliminated. A comparatively small number of companies occupy such a predominant position in the Pacific Coast oil industry, that concerted action to restrict competition may ’ easily place-in the hands of a few companies' the power to. fix monopolistic prices. ' Under such circumstances and in view of the well known importance of petroleum products, it is the duty of the Department to exercise extreme vigilance and to take vigorous action whenever it appears that current practices definitely restricting competition may be the product of concerted action.

“An earlier investigation by the Department, following complaints of monopolistic practices,' resulted in’the entry of a consent decree on September, 15, 1930 against a number of' the Pacific Coast oil companies. In 1936 the Federal Trade Commission at the request of-the Attorney General inves *531 tigated complaints charging that monopolistic practices similar to those which led to the 1930 decree were being resorted to. As a result of the facts reported by the Commission, the Department in November, 1937 undertook a comprehensive field investigation.

“The purpose of the inquiry before the grand jury is to present the facts obtained in the course of the investigations conducted by the Department and the Federal Trade Commission as well as such othei facts as may appear to be pertinent, in order to ascertain whether prosecutions for violation of the antitrust laws should be had;”

It is not claimed that the movants as responsible officers oí the oil companies affected by the subpoenas duces tecum have not had knowledge of the activities of the government as published relating to the corporate business of their principals prior to and during the proceedings of the Second Grand Jury and of the problems of the petroleum industry with which the inquisitorial body is concerned, and the designation in the- subpoenas of the documentary evidence required is, we think, adequate to enable the respective officers to respond to the process. The, materiality of the evidence sought by the process is apparent from a consideration of the public announcement by the Department of Justice, the empanelment of the Second Grand Jury by the court, and the contents of the subpoenas. All such matters are so closely related to the business of movants that the parties served cannot fail to understand what evidence is desired.

It is undeniably true that the subpoena requires the production of a great mass of material. It imposes an unusual and severe burden. This is unavoidable, by reason of the magnitude of the enterprises that are the subject of the investigation and the ramifications and complexities of detail that normally occur in the operation of great industrial concerns'. The reasonableness of the requirements of a subpoena duces tecum in a .valid grand jury investigation under the laws of the United States is a concrete matter. F.ssgee Co. v. United States, supra.

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Bluebook (online)
30 F. Supp. 527, 1939 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1824, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-motions-to-quash-subpnas-duces-tecum-returnable-before-the-second-casd-1939.