In re: Miguel Leon Gregory Lee

• Court: United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 14, 2012
• Docket: CC-12-1150-MkBePa
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED DEC 14 2012 1 SUSAN M SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 2 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL 3 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 4 5 In re: ) BAP No. CC-12-1150-MkBePa ) 6 MIGUEL LEON; GREGORY LEE, ) Bk. Nos. RS 10-15045-MJ ) RS 10-15079-MJ 7 Debtors. ) (Consolidated Bankruptcy Cases) ______________________________) 8 ) Adv. Nos. RS 11-01980-MJ DONOVANT GRANT, ) RS 11-01981-MJ 9 ) (Consolidated Adversary Proceedings) Appellant, ) 10 ) v. ) MEMORANDUM* 11 ) MIGUEL LEON; GREGORY LEE, ) 12 ) Appellees. ) 13 ______________________________) 14 Submitted Without Oral Argument on November 15, 2012** 15 Filed – December 14, 2012 16 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court 17 for the Central District of California 18 Honorable Meredith Jury, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding*** 19 Appearances: Appellant Donovant Grant pro se on brief; Gary Sodikoff on brief for appellees Miguel Leon and 20 Gregory Lee. 21 22 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 23 Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 24 See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1. ** 25 By order entered October 4, 2012, this appeal was deemed suitable for submission without oral argument. 26 *** Case Number RS 10-15079-MJ and Adversary Number 27 RS 11-01981-MJ formerly were assigned to Judge Catherine Bauer. 28 However, by order of both Judge Bauer and Judge Jury, Case Number RS 10-15079-MJ and Adversary Number RS 11-01981-MJ were reassigned to Judge Jury. 1 Before: MARKELL, BEESLEY**** and PAPPAS, Bankruptcy Judges. 2 3 INTRODUCTION 4 Donovant Grant (“Grant”) commenced nondischargeability 5 adversary proceedings against debtors Miguel Leon and Gregory Lee 6 (collectively, “Debtors”) under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and 7 (a)(6).1 The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment in favor 8 of the Debtors, holding that Grant had not timely filed his 9 dischargeability complaints. Grant appeals, and we AFFIRM. 10 FACTS 11 Most of the key facts are not in dispute. We have drawn 12 many of them from the adversary proceeding dockets and from the 13 underlying bankruptcy case dockets.2 14 In 2005, Grant bought a 2002 Ford Explorer (“Explorer”) for 15 roughly $8,000. Grant claims that he bought the Explorer from 16 both of the Debtors. Grant also claims that, in order to induce 17 him to purchase the Explorer, the Debtors intentionally made 18 misrepresentations to him regarding the condition of and 19 20 **** Hon. Bruce T. Beesley, United States Bankruptcy Judge for 21 the District of Nevada, sitting by designation. 22 1 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section 23 references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and all “Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 24 Procedure, Rules 1001-9037. All “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 25 2 26 We can take judicial notice of these dockets and of the imaged documents attached thereto. See O’Rourke v. Seaboard Sur. 27 Co. (In re E.R. Fegert, Inc.), 887 F.2d 955, 957–58 (9th Cir. 1989); Atwood v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 28 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th Cir. BAP 2003).

2 1 maintenance performed on the Explorer. According to Grant, he 2 suffered approximately $4,000 in damages as a result of the 3 Debtors’ alleged fraud. 4 Grant first sued the Debtors in state court (Ventura County 5 Superior Court Case No. CIV 244559). But before the disposition 6 of Grant’s state court lawsuit, both debtors filed chapter 7 7 bankruptcy cases on February 24, 2010. Neither of the Debtors 8 initially listed Grant on their original master mailing lists 9 filed on February 24, 2010, contemporaneously with their 10 bankruptcy petitions. Consequently, unlike those creditors 11 initially listed by the Debtors, the bankruptcy court did not 12 mail to Grant formal written notice of the bankruptcy filings. 13 That notice, sent to other creditors as of February 26, 2010, set 14 forth the date of the § 341(a) first meeting of creditors and the 15 deadline or bar date under Rule 4007(c) for filing 16 nondischargeability complaints. In Leon’s case, the bar date was 17 set for June 7, 2010, and in Lee’s case it was set for June 4, 18 2010. 19 Both Debtors filed papers in their respective bankruptcy 20 cases in March 2010 listing Grant and his correct address. These 21 papers included: (1) their amended master mailing lists, and 22 (2) their schedule of nonpriority unsecured creditors 23 (Schedule F). There are proofs of service attached to both 24 amended master mailing lists, both dated March 3, 2010. In them, 25 the debtors declared under penalty of perjury that they had 26 mailed a notice of their amended master mailing lists to the 27 parties listed on the attached mailing list (“March 2010 28 Notice”). Grant is listed on both mailing lists, again at his

3 1 correct address. 2 In addition, Grant admitted to having actual knowledge of 3 both bankruptcy filings by no later than early May 2010 (“May 4 2010 Notice”). He received the May 2010 Notice from Debtors’ 5 state court counsel, who filed and served in the state court, on 6 April 29, 2010, formal notice of the bankruptcy filings. 7 Grant did not take any action in either of the Debtors’ 8 bankruptcy cases until January 2011, when he filed motions to 9 reopen both bankruptcy cases so that he could commence 10 dischargeability actions against both Debtors. Grant obtained 11 leave to reopen both cases, and in October 2011 he commenced an 12 adversary proceeding in each bankruptcy case seeking an exception 13 from discharge of debt under §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6).3 14 Ultimately, the bankruptcy court consolidated for hearing and 15 disposition both bankruptcy cases and both adversary proceedings. 16 Shortly before consolidation, at status conferences held in 17 December 2011 in both adversary proceedings, the court discussed 18 with the parties its view that the adversary proceedings appeared 19 ripe for disposition on summary judgment. Particularly in the 20 adversary proceeding against Leon, the court explained why it 21 thought Leon was entitled to summary judgment. According to the 22 court: (1) the complaint appeared untimely, and (2) Grant 23 3 24 In addition to his claims for relief under §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6), Grant stated in each complaint a third claim for 25 relief under § 105(a). Because Grant’s appeal brief does not 26 address this third claim for relief, he has waived any argument relating thereto. See Golden v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (In re 27 Choo), 273 B.R. 608, 613 (9th Cir. BAP 2002); Branam v. Crowder (In re Branam), 226 B.R. 45, 55 (9th Cir. BAP 1998), aff’d, 28 205 F.3d 1350 (table) (9th Cir. 1999).

4 1 appeared to have sufficient knowledge of the bankruptcy filing 2 such that he should have filed his dischargeability complaints 3 long before he actually did. The Debtors’ counsel indicated at 4 both status conferences that he would be filing summary judgment 5 motions along the lines indicated by the court. Thus, Grant knew 6 in December 2011 that he likely was going to face summary 7 judgment motions in both adversary proceedings asserting: 8 (1) that he had actual knowledge of the Debtors’ bankruptcy 9 filings, and (2) that he nonetheless failed to timely file his 10 dischargeability complaints. 11 The Debtors moved for summary judgment, asserting that Grant 12 did not timely file his nondischargeability complaints, as 13 required by Rule 4007(c). The hearing on the summary judgment 14 motion4 was set for March 1, 2012. Grant did not timely respond 15 to the summary judgment motion. Instead, he filed on 16 February 17, 2012, less than two weeks before the hearing on the 17 summary judgment motion, a motion to continue. The main reason 18 Grant gave for a continuance was that he needed more time to 19 conduct discovery. In relevant part, Grant asserted that he was 20 in the process of conducting discovery in order to address the 21 issue of whether Debtors actually served their March 2010 22 23 24 25 4 Actually, the adversary proceedings had not yet been 26 consolidated, so the Debtors filed two separate summary judgment motions. But we still refer to them herein as a single summary 27 judgment motion, in light of the subsequent consolidation and for ease of reference. There is no material distinction between the 28 two motions.

5 1 Notice.5 2 The bankruptcy court denied Grant’s motion to continue. In 3 part, the bankruptcy court ruled that Grant’s pending and 4 proposed discovery was irrelevant to the sole issue presented by 5 the summary judgment motion – the timeliness issue. 6 The day before the hearing on the summary judgment motion, 7 Grant filed a belated opposition. Grant argued that the 8 bankruptcy court already had effectively granted him an extension 9 of the deadline under Rule 4007(c) for filing his 10 nondischargeability complaints, when it entered orders reopening 11 the Debtors’ bankruptcy cases in 2011. Grant alternately argued 12 that he should be granted Civil Rule 60(b)(1) relief from the 13 untimely filing of his complaints. According to Grant his 14 untimely filings were the result of excusable neglect caused by 15 the distraction of his ongoing litigation of unrelated disputes 16 with third parties. Grant also contended that the Debtors’ 17 allegedly fraudulent and evasive conduct during the sale of the 18 Explorer, during the state court litigation and during their 19 bankruptcy cases all militated in favor of extending the 20 Rule 4007(c) deadline.6 21 5 22 As Grant put it, “plaintiff should be allowed to further discover information pertaining to . . . when and whether the 23 defendant[s] gave notice of [their] late filed schedules, statement of affairs as declared to in their Chapter 7 petitions 24 to local creditors.” Ex Parte Motion for Continuance (Feb. 17, 2012) at p. 4 of 7. In this regard, Grant further stated: 25 “Plaintiff served subpoenas on two of the several witnesses he as 26 [sic] intended to serve, in efforts to prove facts in support of his opposition.” Id. at p. 2 of 7; see also p. 7 of 7. 27 6 In part, Grant contended that the Debtors’ failure to 28 (continued...)

6 1 The next day, on March 1, 2012, the bankruptcy court held a 2 hearing on the summary judgment motion. The court decided to 3 consider Grant’s belated opposition, but it rejected his 4 arguments. The court held that it had no discretion to extend 5 the Rule 4007(c) deadline, based on excusable neglect, the 6 Debtors’ alleged conduct, or Grant’s motions to reopen. 7 According to the court, because Grant had admitted to receiving 8 actual notice of the Debtors’ bankruptcy filings by early 9 May 2010, Grant should have filed his dischargeability complaints 10 certainly by no later than September 2010. Because Grant did not 11 file his dischargeability complaints until October 2011, the 12 bankruptcy court concluded that the Debtors were entitled to 13 summary judgment and that Grant’s adversary proceedings should be 14 dismissed. 15 The bankruptcy court entered a judgment on March 1, 2012, 16 dismissing Grant’s consolidated adversary proceedings and 17 declaring Grants’ claims against the Debtors to be discharged. 18 Grant timely filed a notice of appeal from the judgment on 19 March 14, 2012. 20 21 6 (...continued) 22 schedule and list Grant and his claim at the time they filed 23 their bankruptcy petitions was intentional and fraudulent. But Grant offered no evidence to support this proposition. More 24 importantly, the Debtors’ tardiness in scheduling and listing their debt to Grant had no impact on the dischargeability of the 25 debt. These both were chapter 7 no-asset cases. In such cases, 26 failure to schedule (or tardily scheduling) a debt does not affect its dischargeability. Beezley v. Cal. Land Title Co. 27 (In re Beezley), 994 F.2d 1433, 1434 (9th Cir. 1993). Accord, White v. Nielsen (In re Nielsen), 383 F.3d 922, 925–27 (9th Cir. 28 2004).

7 1 JURISDICTION 2 The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 3 §§ 1334 and 157(b)(2)(I). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 4 § 158. 5 ISSUE 6 Did the bankruptcy court err when it held that Grant’s 7 nondischargeability complaints would be dismissed as untimely 8 under Rule 4007(c)? 9 STANDARDS OF REVIEW 10 We review de novo the application and construction of the 11 Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 12 Duffy v. Dwyer (In re Dwyer), 303 B.R. 437, 439 (9th Cir. BAP 13 2003) aff’d, 426 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir 2005). 14 DISCUSSION 15 The exceptions to discharge under §§ 523(a)(2), (4) and (6) 16 are not self-executing. See § 523(c)(1). A creditor holding a 17 debt subject to one or more of these paragraphs must “request” 18 that the debt be excepted from discharge. Id. That request 19 should be in the form of an adversary complaint, Rules 4007(e) 20 and 7001(6), and must be filed no later than sixty days after the 21 first date set for the § 341(a) meeting of creditors. 22 Rule 4007(c).7 Under the explicit language of Rule 4007(c), the 23 deadline for commencing an action on a § 523(c) claim only may be 24 extended if the creditor files an extension motion before the 25 7 26 The deadline under Rule 4007(c) is not jurisdictional, and must be asserted as a defense, or the defense of untimeliness may 27 be forfeited. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458-60 (2004). Both Debtors here asserted untimeliness as a defense in their 28 answers.

8 1 deadline has run. Excusable neglect and relief under Civil 2 Rule 60(b)(1) cannot be used to extend the deadline, unless those 3 theories are asserted in connection with a timely extension 4 motion. Kelly v. Gordon (In re Gordon), 988 F.2d 1000, 1001 (9th 5 Cir. 1993); Jones v. Hill (In re Hill), 811 F.2d 484, 486 (9th 6 Cir. 1987); Herndon v. De La Cruz (In re De La Cruz), 176 B.R. 7 19, 24 (9th Cir. BAP 1994); Osborn v. Ricketts (In re Ricketts), 8 80 B.R. 495, 496 (9th Cir. BAP 1987). 9 The Ninth Circuit has strictly enforced the Rule 4007(c) 10 deadline against untimely § 523(c) claims. See, e.g., Moody v. 11 Bucknum (In re Bucknum), 951 F.2d 204, 206-07 (9th Cir. 1991); 12 Lompa v. Price (In re Price), 871 F.2d 97, 98-99 (9th Cir 1989). 13 Nonetheless, the Bankruptcy Code provides an alternate claim for 14 relief for § 523(c) creditors who are neither “listed nor 15 scheduled” in time to permit them to file their dischargeability 16 complaint before the Rule 4007(c) deadline expires. See 17 § 523(a)(3)(B). That section provides in relevant part: 18 (a) A discharge under section 727, . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt- 19 . . . . (3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 20 521(1) of this title with the name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is 21 owed, in time to permit- . . . . 22 (B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4) or (6) of this subsection, 23 timely filing of a proof of claim and timely request for a determination of dischargeability of 24 such debt under one of such paragraphs, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of 25 the case in time for such timely filing and request. 26 27 28

9 1 (Emphasis added).8 2 This Panel agrees with the parties and the bankruptcy court 3 that the key to this appeal is the independent clause at the end 4 of § 523(a)(3)(B): “unless such creditor had notice or actual 5 knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing and 6 request.” We also agree with them that Manufacturers Hanover v. 7 Dewalt (In re Dewalt), 961 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1992), is 8 controlling. We first will examine Dewalt and its application in 9 this case; then we will consider Grant’s arguments on appeal. 10 In Dewalt, the creditor Manufacturers Hanover (“Hanover”) 11 filed an untimely adversary complaint under § 523(a)(2)(B), 12 roughly five months after the Rule 4007(c) deadline had passed. 13 The debtor Dewalt filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based 14 on the timeliness issue. It was undisputed that Hanover did not 15 receive any formal written notice of either the bankruptcy filing 16 or of the Rule 4007(c) bar date. It also was undisputed that 17 Hanover gained actual knowledge of Dewalt’s bankruptcy filing 18 seven days before the Rule 4007(c) deadline, when “the debtor’s 19 counsel telephoned the office of the creditor’s counsel and left 20 a cryptic message with the secretary that the debtor had 21 previously filed for bankruptcy.” Id. at 849. 22 The bankruptcy court granted the motion to dismiss, and a 23 divided BAP panel affirmed the bankruptcy court. Relying on 24 25 8 The Rule 4007(c) bar date does not apply to § 523(a)(3)(B) 26 claims for relief. See Wilborn v. Gallagher (In re Wilborn), 205 B.R. 202, 208 (9th Cir. BAP 1996); Irons v. Santiago (In re 27 Santiago), 175 B.R. 48, 50 (9th Cir. BAP 1994). Instead, Rule 4007(b) applies, and that rule states that the complaint can 28 be filed “at any time.” See id.

10 1 In re Price, 871 F.2d at 97, the BAP held that seven days was 2 enough time to permit Hanover to at least file an extension 3 motion seeking more time to file its complaint. Thus, according 4 to the BAP, Hanover could not assert a claim for relief under 5 § 523(a)(3)(B) because § 523(a)(3)(B)’s actual knowledge clause 6 precluded it from doing so. Id. at 850. 7 The Ninth Circuit reversed the BAP, holding that, in most 8 cases, the creditor must have actual knowledge of the bankruptcy 9 case at least thirty days before the Rule 4007(c) bar date in 10 order to satisfy § 523(a)(3)(B)’s actual knowledge clause. As 11 the Ninth Circuit put it, “ . . . in the great majority of cases, 12 30 days advance knowledge of the case is both necessary and 13 sufficient to satisfy section 523(a)(3)(B).” In re Dewalt, 14 961 F.2d at 851 (emphasis added). 15 The Dewalt court further opined that Price had not set forth 16 any standards to enable a bankruptcy court to determine how long 17 before the Rule 4007(c) bar date an unscheduled (or tardily 18 scheduled) chapter 7 creditor must learn of the bankruptcy to 19 fall within § 523(a)(3)(B). Id. at 850. As a result, the Dewalt 20 court endeavored to set forth such standards. Id. at 850-51. 21 Dewalt stated that thirty days was an appropriate benchmark for 22 most cases as to “the minimum time within which it is reasonable 23 to expect a creditor to act at penalty of default.” Id. at 851. 24 Dewalt cautioned that, in the presence of certain 25 “extraordinary circumstances,” thirty days knowledge of the 26 bankruptcy filing in advance of the bar date might not be enough 27 time to satisfy § 523(a)(3)(B)’s actual knowledge clause. Id. 28 According to Dewalt, one set of extraordinary circumstances that

11 1 might necessitate more than thirty days advance knowledge 2 included: (1) an unsophisticated creditor, (2) unrepresented by 3 counsel, (3) without apparent familiarity with the bankruptcy 4 system, who (4) receives only the most sketchy notice that a 5 bankruptcy has been filed. Id. On the other hand, Dewalt 6 concluded that, even if extraordinary circumstances required more 7 than thirty days advance knowledge of the bankruptcy, in no event 8 would the creditor be entitled to actual knowledge of the 9 bankruptcy filing more than eighty days in advance of the 10 Rule 4007(c) bar date. Id. at 851 n.4. 11 In sum, Dewalt requires bankruptcy courts to count backward 12 from the Rule 4007(c) bar date to determine how much in advance 13 of the bar date the creditor had actual knowledge of the 14 bankruptcy filing. In the vast majority of cases, a minimum of 15 thirty days will be sufficient to satisfy § 523(a)(3)(B)’s actual 16 knowledge clause. 17 Here, applying the standard set forth in Dewalt, Grant had 18 between thirty-two and thirty-five days actual knowledge of the 19 bankruptcy filings in advance of the Rule 4007(c) bar dates. We 20 have made this calculation by counting back from the bar dates of 21 June 4, 2010, and June 7, 2010, to May 3, 2010, when Grant 22 obtained actual knowledge of the bankruptcy filings based on his 23 admitted receipt of the May 2010 Notice. This meets Dewalt’s 24 standard for the thirty-day minimum amount of advance knowledge 25 required in the vast majority of cases to satisfy 26 § 523(a)(3)(B)’s actual knowledge clause. See Dewalt, 961 F.2d 27 28

12 1 at 851.9 2 We note that the bankruptcy court did not appear to consider 3 whether any extraordinary circumstances existed which might have 4 required longer advance notice to satisfy § 523(a)(3)(B)’s actual 5 knowledge clause. But Grant did not challenge in his opening 6 appeal brief the bankruptcy court’s failure to consider 7 extraordinary circumstances. Nor did he argue in his opening 8 brief that such extraordinary circumstances existed. 9 Grant obviously was aware of Dewalt and its standards 10 because he discussed Dewalt extensively in his opening appeal 11 brief. Yet he made no attempt to address the portion of Dewalt 12 dealing with extraordinary circumstances. Consequently, he has 13 waived the issue; arguments not specifically and distinctly made 14 9 15 If we were to count back to the March 2010 Notice, Grant would have had between 81 and 84 days knowledge of the bankruptcy 16 filings in advance of the bar dates. Based on Dewalt, this would have exceeded the amount of advance knowledge any creditor under 17 any circumstances needs to have in order to satisfy § 523(a)(3)(B)’s actual knowledge clause. Furthermore, the March 18 2010 Notice likely is subject to application of the “mailbox 19 rule,” as the only items of evidence we could find in the record concerning receipt of the March 2010 Notice were: (1) the proofs 20 of service each Debtor executed indicating that they mailed the March 2010 Notice to Grant; and (2) a declaration of Grant in 21 which he indicated that he did not receive the March 2010 Notice. Under the “mailbox rule,” a litigant’s declaration of non-receipt 22 is insufficient by itself to overcome the presumption of receipt 23 arising from valid proof of service. In re Bucknum, 951 F.2d at 206-07 & n.1; CUNA Mut. Ins. Grp. v. Williams (In re Williams), 24 185 B.R. 598, 599 (9th Cir. BAP 1995). Simply put, if the bankruptcy court had chosen to focus on the March 2010 Notice, 25 Grant would have failed to overcome the mailbox rule presumption 26 by presenting “‘clear and convincing evidence that the mailing was not, in fact, accomplished.’” Berry v. U.S. Trustee 27 (In re Sustaita), 438 B.R. 198, 209 (9th Cir. BAP 2010), aff’d, 460 Fed.Appx. 627 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Bucknum, 28 951 F.2d at 207).

13 1 in the appellant’s opening brief are deemed waived. Brownfield 2 v. City of Yakima, 612 F.3d 1140, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010) 3 (citing Greenwood v. F.A.A., 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994)); 4 Cashco Fin. Servs., Inc. v. McGee (In re McGee), 359 B.R. 764, 5 774 (9th Cir. BAP 2006) (citing Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 6 540, 548 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also Wilcox v. C.I.R., 848 F.2d 7 1007, 1008 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that even pro se 8 litigants must brief arguments on appeal, or they will forfeit 9 them). 10 In short, because Grant had sufficient actual knowledge of 11 the bankruptcy filings within the meaning of § 523(a)(3)(B)’s 12 actual knowledge clause, Grant was not entitled to pursue a claim 13 for relief under § 523(a)(3)(B). Instead, he was limited to the 14 claims subject to § 523(c) for relief, and these types of claims 15 are subject to the strict Rule 4007(c) bar date. Thus, the 16 bankruptcy court correctly dismissed as untimely Grant’s § 523(c) 17 claims for relief. 18 None of Grant’s arguments on appeal persuade us otherwise. 19 Grant argues that the orders granting his motions to reopen the 20 Debtors’ bankruptcy cases (“Reopening Orders”) explicitly 21 permitted him to file his untimely § 523(c) complaints. But 22 Grant has not explained how or why the Reopening Orders, if they 23 did purport to set new bar dates, could trump the explicit 24 prohibition against granting extensions of Rule 4007(c) bar dates 25 after the bar dates have expired. In any event, the bankruptcy 26 court declined to interpret its own Reopening Orders in a manner 27 that would bring them into conflict with Rule 4007(c). We will 28 defer to the bankruptcy court’s interpretation of its own orders.

14 1 See Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City and County 2 of San Francisco, 934 F.2d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 1991); see also, 3 Zinchiak v. CIT Small Bus. Lending Corp. (In re Zinchiak), 4 406 F.3d 214, 224 (3rd Cir. 2005) (noting that the bankruptcy 5 court “was well suited to provide the best interpretation of its 6 own order.”); Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 7 1203 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Few persons are in a better position to 8 understand the meaning of a [court order] than the [bankruptcy] 9 judge who oversaw and approved it.”) 10 Moreover, Grant’s argument betrays a fundamental 11 misunderstanding of the limited significance of the reopening of 12 the Debtors’ bankruptcy cases. Generally speaking, an order 13 granting a motion to reopen typically does not alter the rights 14 and liabilities of the parties involved. See Menk v. Lapaglia 15 (In re Menk), 241 B.R. 896, 916-17 (9th Cir. BAP 1999). More to 16 the point, an order granting a motion to reopen entered in a no 17 asset chapter 7 case does not change the rights and liabilities 18 of a creditor holding an unfiled § 523(c) claim for relief. 19 Regardless of the reopening, either: (1) the creditor had 20 sufficient notice/knowledge and the claim was discharged before 21 the bankruptcy case was closed, or (2) the creditor had 22 insufficient notice/knowledge and the creditor still has an 23 alternate claim for relief under § 523(a)(3)(B). See 24 In re Beezley, 994 F.2d at 1434. 25 Grant’s other arguments on appeal are similarly 26 unpersuasive. For instance, Grant argues that the Debtors’ 27 allegedly fraudulent and evasive conduct, both before and after 28 he started litigating with them, justified an extension of the

15 1 Rule 4007(c) bar date. There are two obvious problems with this 2 argument: (1) Grant presented no evidence to the bankruptcy court 3 to support his allegations of fraudulent and evasive conduct, and 4 (2) even if he had presented such evidence, Rule 4007(c) simply 5 did not permit the bankruptcy court to give Grant an extension of 6 the bar date under these types of circumstances when Grant did 7 not request the extension before the bar date expired. See 8 In re Gordon, 988 F.2d at 1001; In re Hill, 811 F.2d at 486. 9 Finally, Grant argues that he was denied due process by the 10 bankruptcy court’s application of § 523(a)(3)(B)’s actual 11 knowledge clause. But the Ninth Circuit, and many other courts, 12 have repeatedly upheld this clause against such due process 13 challenges. As one leading treatise puts it: 14 The exception in section 523(a)(3) for creditors who do not receive notice of the case but otherwise acquire 15 actual knowledge has been consistently upheld against challenges based on due process. 16 17 4 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 523.09[4][a] (Alan N. Resnick and Henry 18 J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2012) (citing, among other cases, 19 In re Price, 871 F.2d at 97). 20 CONCLUSION 21 For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the 22 bankruptcy court’s summary judgment dismissing Grant’s 23 nondischargeability complaints as untimely.10 24 25 10 26 In their responsive brief, the Debtors requested that sanctions be imposed against Grant for filing a frivolous 27 appeal. That request is hereby ORDERED DENIED. Pursuant to Rule 8020, sanctions requests must be made by separately-filed 28 motion.