Opinion
FLIER, J.
John McTiernan (husband) and Donna Dubrow (wife) both appeal from a judgment in the dissolution of their marriage. Their appeals raise distinct issues. Husband primarily challenges the trial court’s determination that there existed goodwill in his business as a motion picture director, and that all of the $1.5 million of goodwill constituted community property. Husband also contests a ruling that he must reimburse wife’s share of profits that were lost after husband sold certain community securities without her consent, and in violation of the automatic injunctive order imposed upon commencement of the proceedings. (Fam. Code, § 2040, subd. (b).)
In her appeal, wife contends that the court abused its discretion by limiting her postdissolution spousal support to two years, and by characterizing several months of pendente lite payments as community property distributions rather than temporary support. Wife also asserts that the judgment should be modified to preserve jurisdiction over support beyond the two-year period. Finally, wife contends that the court abused its discretion by reducing husband’s obligation to pay wife’s attorney fees, by reason of an irrelevant and inaccurate reckoning of her postdissolution estate.
We find merit in husband’s contention that there is no goodwill in his career as a motion picture director. We also find merit in wife’s contentions regarding the duration of spousal support and retention of jurisdiction. We reverse the judgment as to those elements, and affirm it in all other respects.
FACTS
The parties were married in November 1988. They separated in July 1997, and husband commenced this proceeding the following month. The matter was extensively litigated, including 21 days of trial, conducted between June 1999 and June 28, 2000. The court’s 34-page statement of decision was filed August 23, 2000, and the judgment under review was entered on August 28, 2002. At that time, husband was 51 years old and wife was 59.
[1094]*1094The evidence showed that, during and after the marriage and to some extent before, husband was a very successful motion picture director, commanding six- to high seven-figure compensation per film, and having to his credit such blockbusters as Die Hard (20th Century Fox 1988), The Hunt for Red October (Paramount Pictures 1990), and The Thomas Crown Affair (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1999). Wife also pursued a career in motion picture production, and before the marriage she was earning $195,000 a year as a production company executive. She produced several films during the marriage, while accompanying husband in his directorial pursuits. The trial court found that during the eight and three-quarter years of marriage before separation, husband had earned approximately $15 million, and wife had earned about $1 million. Predictably, the parties’ community estate was substantial, as was the scale of their lifestyle.
Because the issues raised on these appeals largely involve distinct factual and legal bases, we will state the facts relevant to each issue in conjunction with its discussion. We proceed to consideration of the issues.
I. HUSBAND’S APPEAL
A. Professional Goodwill
1. The Trial Court’s Ruling and Husband’s Contention on Appeal
The trial court found that husband “is a motion picture director who has achieved exceptional success in that field. His success is dependent upon his personal skill, experience and knowledge, and the Court finds that, in that respect, the profession which he practices is similar to that of an attorney, physician, dentist, accountant, editor, architect, or any other professional who has established a successful professional practice, with quantifiable expectation of future patronage, based upon his or her personal skill, experience and knowledge.”
The finding that husband has achieved exceptional success as a motion picture director is based for the most part on testimony presented by Arthur De Vany, Ph.D., an economist who is a professor in the Department of Economics of the Institute of Mathematics and Behavioral Sciences at the University of California, Irvine. The trial court found that the “evidence presented by Dr. De Vany was persuasive . . . that Petitioner [husband] has developed an earning capacity and reputation in his profession as a motion picture director which greatly exceeds that of most persons involved in that profession and that Petitioner commands a premium for his services, [f] In addition, the evidence established that Petitioner can reasonably expect to [1095]*1095continue to enjoy said premium. In other words, he has expectation of continued patronage at his prior level of compensation.”
The trial court detailed the facts upon which these conclusions were based. Among these facts are that husband is ranked No. 13 among 1,058 motion picture directors in cumulative box office revenues during 1985-1996, No. 8 in terms of gross domestic revenues produced by movies he directed, and No. 1 in terms of production budgets entrusted to his control. Husband does not contest the trial court’s conclusion that all of this boils down to the fact that he has, in the trial court’s words, “elite professional standing.”
The trial court determined the value of husband’s goodwill by means of the “excess earnings” approach. It has been noted that the “excess earnings” method is a method that is commonly used to determine the value of the goodwill in a professional practice. (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2005) f 8:1445, p. 8-350.) Broadly put, the excess earnings approach is predicated on a comparison of the earnings of the professional in question with that of a peer whose performance is “average.”1 Using this method with some modifications, the trial court determined that husband’s goodwill at the time of separation was $1.5 million.
Husband contends that he does not possess an asset that can be properly classified as goodwill. Relying on In re Marriage of Rives (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 138, 153 [181 CaL.Rptr. 572], and In re Marriage of Aufmuth (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 446, 460-462 [152 Cal.Rptr. 668],2 among other cases, husband points out that skill, reputation and experience are not community property. Husband contends that the goodwill found to exist in this case is in reality nothing other than his skill, reputation and experience.
[1096]*10962. The Issue Defined
The trial court found that husband has a “quantifiable expectation of future patronage.” Future, or continued, public patronage is one essential aspect of goodwill. “The ‘good will’ of a business is the expectation of continued public patronage.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 14100.) However, there is more to goodwill than expectation of continued patronage. “The good will of a business is property and is transferable.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 14102, italics added.)
Since the goodwill of a business is property (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 14102), the question is: What is the meaning of “a business” in the definition of goodwill?
There are two possible answers.
One answer is that the term “a business” also includes “a person doing business.” This is the interpretation that the trial court adopted in this case.
The other answer is that “a business” refers to a professional, commercial or industrial enterprise with assets, i.e., an entity other than a natural person.
There are three reasons why the second answer is the better one. First, it conforms to the historical understanding of goodwill. Second, the plain text of Business and Professions Code sections 14100 and 14102, which, in this respect, have not been amended since their enactment in 1872, speaks of “a business,” and not of natural persons. Third, interpreting the term “a business” as it appears in Business and Professions Code sections 14100 and 14102 to refer to a professional, commercial or industrial enterprise with assets ensures that the interest that is divided as goodwill is “property,” as “property” is defined by law.
3. The Historical Understanding of “a Business"
The precursors of Business and Professions Code sections 14100 and 14102 were Civil Code sections 992 and 993, which were enacted in 1872 as part of the Civil Code.3 Contemporaneously with the enactment of the [1097]*1097California Civil Code in 1872, and as of the closing decades of the 19th century, the courts spoke of goodwill as an incident of an existing business; goodwill did not exist in the abstract, apart from a business. “Undoubtedly, good will is in many cases a valuable thing, although there is difficulty in deciding accurately what is included under the term. It is tangible only as an incident, as connected with a going concern or business having locality or name, and is not susceptible of being disposed of independently.” (Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co. (1892) 149 U.S. 436, 446 [37 L.Ed. 799, 13 S.Ct. 944].)4
California decisions echoed this view, rejecting that goodwill attaches to the shares of stock. “It would be strange to predicate good-will as pertaining to or extending to an abstraction, to an ‘artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.’ ” (Spring Valley W.W. v. Schottler (1882) 62 Cal. 69, 118, cited with approval in Merchants’ Ad-Sign Co. v. Sterling (1899) 124 Cal. 429, 432 [57 P. 468].)5 The courts spoke of the fact that goodwill was not separable from the physical assets of the business that generated the goodwill. (E.g., Russell v. Russell (1918) 39 Cal.App. 174, 176-177 [178 P. 307]; Ward-Chandler Bldg. Co. v. Caldwell (1935) 8 Cal.App.2d 375, 378 [47 P.2d 758].) This led text writers to state that goodwill cannot be sold independently of the business or the physical elements or assets to which it is incident (35 Cal.Jur.3d (1988) Good Will, § 5, at fn. 43), which is a view supported by the court in Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., supra, 149 U.S. 436, 446.
One of the classic definitions of goodwill in our case law appears in In re Lyons (1938) 27 Cal.App.2d 293, 297-298 [81 P.2d 190].6 This definition, [1098]*1098which is the same as offered in Metropolitan Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., supra, 149 U.S. at page 446, predicates the existence of goodwill on the operations of a business entity with assets separate and distinct from the person or persons who operate, own or manage the business.
In this respect, nothing had changed since these early cases were decided. No California case has held that a natural person, apart and distinct from a “business,” can create or generate goodwill. In the instance of professionals, the courts have spoken of “the nature and duration of his business as a sole practitioner” (In re Marriage of Lopez (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 93, 109-110 [113 Cal.Rptr. 58]) and of the value of a “professional practice” (Golden v. Golden (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 401, 405 [75 Cal.Rptr. 735]; see also Todd v. Todd (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 786, 792 [78 Cal.Rptr. 131]). It is the business, i.e., the practice, that generates goodwill, even if the practice is conducted by a sole practitioner, as was the case in Golden and Todd. (See Annot. (1990) 76 A.L.R.4th 1025; Annot. (1990) 79 A.L.R.4th 171.)
4. Business and Professions Code Sections 14100 and 14102 Endow a Business, and Not a Person, with the Capacity to Generate Goodwill
“There is order in the most fundamental rules of statutory interpretation if we want to find it. The key is applying those rules in proper sequence. [ft] First, a court should examine the actual language of the statute. ... [ft] In examining the language, the courts should give to the words of the statute their ordinary, everyday meaning .... [ft] If the meaning is without ambiguity, doubt, or uncertainty, then the language controls.” (Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238-1239 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298], citations omitted.)
There is no doubt about the “ordinary, everyday meaning” of the term “a business,” nor is the term ambiguous or uncertain. In the term “a business,” the word “business” is a noun, and means a professional, commercial or industrial enterprise with assets. It is also clear that “a business” is not a natural person.
[1099]*1099It may be asked whether the term “a business” should be read to include “a person doing business,” in which event Business and Professions Code section 14102 would effectively read: “The good will of a business or of a person doing business is property and is transferable.”
It is not within the powers of a court to amend the statute in such a fashion. And there is no doubt that this would be an amendment of the statute. It would enlarge the scope of the statute beyond the traditional understanding of goodwill, which anchors goodwill to a business establishment with assets. Nor can it be said that “a person doing business” is logically included in the term “a business.” In the ordinary, everyday sense, “a business” refers to an establishment, a thing, and not a person. With deference to our dissenting colleague, expanding Business and Professions Code section 14102 to state “[t]he good will of a business or of a person doing business is property and is transferable” should be left to the Legislature, especially since such an expansion involves considerations of social policy, as appears in the following paragraph.
Endowing “a person doing business” with the capacity to create goodwill, as opposed to limiting goodwill to “a business,” has wide ramifications. “A person doing business” includes much of the working population. Notably, there would be no principled distinction between husband in this case, who is a director, and actors, artists and musicians, all of whom could be said to be “persons doing business. ” Thus, all such persons who would have the “expectation of continued public patronage” would possess goodwill. This would create a substantial liability, as in this case, without a guaranty that the liability would be funded. It is clear that, from an economic perspective, the “goodwill” in this case is based on earnings, and that “goodwill” is an expression of husband’s earning capacity.7 However, there is no guaranty, especially in the arts, that earnings will not decline or even dry up, even though expectations were to the contrary. In such an event, a person would find him- or herself saddled with a massive liability without the means of satisfying it. Putting it another way, endowing directly persons with the ability to create goodwill would create an “asset” predicated on nothing other than predictions about earning capacity.
[1100]*11005. Interpreting the Term “a Business” As It Appears in Business and Professions Code Sections 14100 and 14102 to Refer to a Professional, Commercial or Industrial Enterprise with Assets Ensures That the Interest That Is Divided As Goodwill Is “Property. ”
The trial court found that husband “has developed an earning capacity and reputation in his profession as a motion picture director which greatly exceeds that of most persons involved in that profession and that [husband] commands a premium for his services.” In order for this to be divisible as community property, it must be, in the first place, property, and, in the second place, it must have been acquired during marriage. “Except as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property.” (Fam. Code, § 760.)8
Since every kind of property that is not real is personal (Civ. Code, § 663), the property interest in this case, if it exists, must be personal. Personal property may be incorporeal (King v. Gotz (1886) 70 Cal. 236, 240 [11 P. 656]), i.e., without tangible substance, and it may be intangible in the sense that it is a right rather than a physical object. (Navistar Internat. Transportation Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1994) 8 Cal.4th 868, 875 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 651, 884 P.2d 108].) But, even if incorporeal or intangible, property must be capable of being transferred. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of law that one of the chief incidents of ownership in property is the right to transfer it.” (Bias v. Ohio Farmers Indemnity Co. (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 14, 16 [81 P.2d 1057].) “A common characteristic of a property right, is that it may be disposed of, transferred to another.” (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Byram (1943) 57 Cal.App.2d 311, 317 [134 P.2d 15].)
Husband’s “earning capacity and reputation in his profession as a motion picture director which greatly exceeds that of most persons involved in that profession” or, in the trial court’s shorthand, his “elite professional standing,” cannot be sold or transferred. His high standing among other motion picture directors is entirely personal to him. He cannot confer on another director his standing as No. 13 in cumulative box office revenues during 1985-1996. He cannot sell this standing to another, because a buyer would not be John McTiernan, no matter how much the buyer was willing to pay. For the same reason, and unlike a law or medical practice, husband cannot transfer his [1101]*1101“elite professional standing.” That standing is his, and his alone, and he cannot bestow it on someone else. Thus, an essential aspect of a property interest is absent.
The fact that husband’s “elite professional standing” is not transferable effectively refutes the trial court’s conclusion that husband’s “practice” as a motion picture director is like the “practice” of an attorney or physician. The practice of an attorney, physician, dentist, or accountant is transferable, but husband’s “elite professional standing” is his alone, and not susceptible to being transferred or sold.
That husband’s “elite professional standing” is not a property interest is also reflected by the trial court’s calculation of husband’s “goodwill.” Under the excess earnings method, the court must deduct from the average net pretax earnings of the business being valued the “fair return” on the “net tangible assets used by the business.” (Fn. 1, ante.) No such deduction was made in this case, and the comparison was between husband’s pretax net income, and that of a motion picture director who is compensated at minimum levels. Thus, the trial court’s calculation of “goodwill” demonstrates that there was no business—there were no assets—that would qualify as property.
Were we to construe the goodwill of a business as the trial court did in this case, we would be faced with a conflict between Business and Professions Code section 14102 (the goodwill of a business is property) and the fundamental concept that property is transferable. Under section 14102, we would call “property” something that is not transferable, and therefore is not property. Instead, we anchor goodwill to “a business,” as the statute requires. This ensures that goodwill is attached to property that is transferable, as a professional, commercial or industrial enterprise is transferable.
In sum, adhering to the rule that property, in order to qualify as property, must be transferable is not a theoretical exercise. Something that cannot be transferred or sold has no value on the market. Dividing such a nontransferable quantity as community property therefore creates an obligation without ensuring that that obligation can be funded. However, when “a business” with assets is divided, there is some assurance that the obligation created by the division can and will be met.
6. Respondent’s Arguments in Support of the Trial Court’s Finding of Goodwill Are Without Merit
Respondent contends that the “existence of a business in the traditional sense is not a prerequisite to finding professional goodwill.” The contrary is [1102]*1102trae. As we have seen, the plain text of Business and Professions Code sections 14100 and 14102, as well as its predecessors, refers to the “good will of a business.” As we have shown, this is a reference to a professional, commercial or industrial enterprise with assets.
Respondent contends that since there is substantial evidence that husband has an expectation of continued public patronage, husband has goodwill. This begs the question. It is true that “[t]he ‘good will’ of a business is the expectation of continued public patronage.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 14100.) However, the “expectation of continued public patronage” must be generated by “a business.” A business is a professional, commercial or industrial enterprise with assets; “a business” is not earning capacity or professional reputation.
Finally, the fact that the trial court was able to, and did, apply the “excess earnings” method to calculate goodwill does not mean that there is goodwill in this case. Boiled down to its essentials, the excess earnings method is a comparison of husband’s earnings with that of an “average” peer. The fact that this calculation can be performed, as it was performed, does not convert husband’s skill and reputation into “a business,” and does not transmute unique and idiosyncratic talents into property that can be transferred or sold.
We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that there was goodwill in husband’s practice or career as a motion picture director. Accordingly, the judgment must be modified to eliminate $1.5 million in assets that are subject to division. As noted in the text, post, this affects the calculation of attorney’s fees under the formula crafted by the trial court.
B. Remedy for Violation of Restraining Order
Husband’s final assignment of error concerns the remedy imposed for his violation of a restraining order. Pursuant to sections 2040, subdivision (a)(2), and 233, subdivision (a), upon service of the petition for dissolution both parties became subject to a temporary restraining order against their transferring or disposing of any property, “whether community, quasi-community, or separate,” without an order of the court or written consent of the other party, “except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life . . . .” (§ 2040, subd. (a)(2).) In April 1998, faced with a cash shortage, husband sold certain community property stocks, the proceeds of which he used in part to pay community expenses. Husband did not inform wife or seek court approval of the stock sale before conducting it.
[1103]*1103Wife subsequently requested relief on account of the sale, the stock’s market price having increased substantially between the sale and the time of trial. In its statement of decision, the court found that husband had violated the restraining order by disposing of the asset, “although the court believes he did not do so maliciously or of ill will.” The court noted that husband could have consulted wife, and if she had not agreed to sell he could have sought court approval—but “he did neither.” The court therefore ruled that the asset would be valued as if it had not been sold, and that the valuation date for all securities controlled by either party would be the date trial commenced. The outcome was that the judgment awarded wife “Lost appreciation on community property securities valued at $284,087 as of June 24, 1999.” The court did not obligate husband for the substantial further appreciation that occurred during the extended trial, a remedy the court eschewed as “an unreasonable penalty on [husband] for his violation of the ATRO . . . .”
Husband nonetheless contends that the award of wife’s share of profits lost by his violation of the injunctive order constituted a form of punitive damages, unauthorized and inappropriate for what husband terms “a technical violation” of the order. But the violation could just as well be labeled “a square one.”9 And the remedy imposed was not a form of punitive damages, but rather restitution of the loss caused wife by husband’s violation.
In fact, the remedy here precisely paralleled the one provided by section 1101, subdivision (f), for breach of a spouse’s fiduciary duty involving asset transfer that impairs the other spouse’s undivided one-half interest (see id.., subd. (a)). Husband argues that he did not breach such a duty, especially in light of the trial court’s finding he did not act maliciously. But the statutory remedy applies to nonmalicious breaches (In re Marriage of Hokanson (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 987, 992 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 699]), and it was not inappropriate to treat in the same manner husband’s violation of an injunctive order designed to preserve the parties’ property interests from unilateral disposition.
II. WIFE’S APPEAL
A. Spousal Support and Retention of Jurisdiction
Wife raises three issues concerning spousal support: the proper characterization of stipulated payments to her by husband before interim support was [1104]*1104ordered; the proper duration of postjudgment support, which was ordered for two years; and the proper understanding and disposition of the court’s order regarding retention or relinquishment of jurisdiction. We address these questions in the order stated.
1. Initial Payments
Wife filed an order to show cause (OSC) for pendente lite spousal support in October 1997. Among other things, wife declared that during the marriage, husband had provided her $27,500 per month for her personal expenses and those of her Brentwood residence, which she had acquired before the marriage. She also used credit cards, for approximately $5,000 per month, which husband paid.
Wife’s OSC was originally set for December 8, 1997, but on December 5 the parties stipulated that it be continued to January 13, 1998. Approved by the court, the stipulation also provided that pending the hearing, husband would pay wife $27,500 on each of December 1 and January 1. Wife also would retain her credit cards, for which husband would pay, but husband would receive credit for expenses charged during any period for which retroactive support (if any) was later ordered. These payments were to be nontaxable to wife and nondeductible by husband. They also were to be without prejudice to the parties’ positions regarding wife’s needs, based on the marital standard of living and husband’s ability to pay.
A similar “Stipulated Order re Interim Payments and Continuance of Hearing Date” was filed on January 13, 1998. It continued the OSC hearing to February 18 and provided, inter alia, for another $27,500 payment to wife, on February 1. This order provided that the payments to wife were not to be taken either “as a measure of pre-separation lifestyle or as establishing [wife’s] need for spousal support or [husband’s] ability to pay same.”
On February 18, 1998, the court ordered further monthly payments, as spousal support. In its ultimate statement of decision, however, the court ruled that husband’s payments to wife from July 1, 1997, to March 1, 1998, (the first payment ordered on February 18) were to be characterized not as retroactive support but rather as advances of community property, one-half of which wife had to reimburse husband. The court explained that neither wife nor husband had ever requested that spousal support be granted retroactively from its March 1, 1998 commencement, nor did the stipulations and orders regarding interim payments so provide, the orders having been without [1105]*1105prejudice to characterization. The court stated it had been cognizant of those orders when it directed support on February 18, without ordering retroactivity.
Wife contends that the court’s refusal to characterize the interim payments as retroactive support was error, in light of the fact that her need for support during separation was as vital before March 1, 1998, as thereafter. She relies on In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 312 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 755], which declared that “the trial court’s exercise of its discretion regarding retroactivity of temporary support must be guided by two overriding concerns: the supported spouse’s need and the supporting spouse’s ability to pay.” But in this case, no request for or issue of retroactive support was presented when temporary support was ordered. Hence, Cheriton is not on point. Moreover, wife’s needs were met by the interim payments, which were made without prejudice to spousal support. The trial court’s characterization of those nontaxable payments as community property advances was not an abuse of discretion.
2. Permanent Support
Commencing March 1, 1998, wife was granted and received tax-free pendente lite support of $30,000 per month. Husband paid that amount for 28 months, to July 2000. In its statement of decision and judgment, the court ordered further support, in the same monthly amount (now taxable to wife), for two more years, until July 2002. The judgment declared this duration to be “non-modifiable,” and used other language indicating that jurisdiction to extend support further would not be retained. In making this award, the court cited and discussed various factors bearing on a spousal support order, provided in section 4320, which is set forth post.10
[1106]*1106Wife contends that the court abused its discretion by limiting her “permanent” support to two years. She does not challenge the monthly amount of support, only its duration. Wife argues that the decision failed to take into account certain of the relevant circumstances set forth in section 4320, and evaluated others insufficiently, or in disregard of the evidence. We review the spousal support award for abuse of discretion, but with the understanding that a sustainable exercise of discretion requires that the trial court have considered and applied all relevant factors under section 4320. (In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 479-480 [274 Cal.Rptr. 911]; In re Marriage of Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at pp. 302-304; see In re Marriage of Fransen (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 419, 425 [190 Cal.Rptr. 885].)
That was not the case here. Strikingly absent from the trial court’s analysis was any reference to the fundamental factor of husband’s ability to pay support, “taking into account [his] earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living.” (§ 4320, subd. (c).) The closest the statement of decision came to addressing this element was a finding that husband at that time had “gross monthly income of $115,640 . . . .” The court did not address husband’s assets, nor did it refer to his earning capacity (although it considered wife’s at length). The latter omission seems particularly odd because elsewhere in its statement of decision, on the issue of goodwill, the court documented that husband had developed and possessed an elevated earning capacity. Indeed, in its contemporaneous attorney fees order, the court referred to husband’s earning capacity as “enormous.”
In In re Marriage of Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 269, a similar failure to consider the “key factor” (id. at p. 304) of the husband’s ability to pay was [1107]*1107held an abuse of discretion, requiring reversal of a spousal support judgment. The trial court had been aware of the husband’s substantial assets, but had not taken them into account. The reviewing court noted that “[ijgnoring the ability to pay is particularly egregious in this case, given the enormous financial disparity between the parties. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 305.)
Yet a second factor that received no explicit attention in the decision below were wife’s needs, “based on the standard of living established during the marriage.” (§ 4320, subd. (d).) The court found that the marital living standard had consumed community expenditures of $147,000 or $170,000 monthly (respectively exclusive or inclusive of private aircraft costs, which the court deemed business expenses). The court further observed that neither party could presently enjoy that lifestyle. That is a truism in most dissolved marriages. (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, 1 6:947, p. 6-346.) It does not, however, excuse consideration of the supported party’s needs under the statute. (Id., ¶ 6:891, p. 6-319.)
Here, the court found husband’s current monthly income to be $115,640, or between 68 and 79 percent of the marital lifestyle expenditures. In contrast, wife was receiving “passive income” of $5,777 monthly, and the court found that she had the capacity to earn $11,000 a month (although she had earned no income for two years). Wife’s projected present income was thus 14.5 percent of husband’s, and hardly one-tenth of the former lifestyle expenditures. Unless the marital standard of living is to be ignored entirely when not fully unattainable, these facts evidenced a question of wife’s need, particularly should she not become fully employed. Failure to give direct consideration to that need worked another serious defect in the court’s evaluation.
The finding that wife possessed a personal earning capacity of $11,000 per month, or $132,000 annually, was critical to the ruling that permanent support should extend for only two years. (See § 4320, subd. (a).) There were, however, deficiencies in the premises underlying this finding. First, the court noted that wife had been earning $195,000 annually when she married husband. But she had received this income as an executive of a motion picture production company, whereas her employment during the marriage, as well as her intentions after it, more involved acting as an independent producer.
Second, the court found that during the marriage wife had earned an average of $125,000 per year as a producer. However, almost all of the film projects that wife pursued and garnered earnings from during the marriage [1108]*1108also involved husband’s participation, in one capacity or another. Wife testified that the few projects on which she worked independently, without husband, together paid her approximately $50,000. The court’s finding that wife “has the capability to earn a similar amount that she did during the course of the marriage” thus appears at best uncertain in support. Indeed, in its attorney fees order, the court stated that “[wife’s] earning capacity is at this time almost nonexistent.”
The court’s evaluation of wife’s existing and prospective separate property, as a factor affecting the need for support, also appears unnuanced. The statement of decision rather casually reasoned that “someone coming out of divorce [ric] with 5 million dollars, when they entered the marriage with one million dollars has the ability to provide for one’s self.” This observation did not take into account that wife’s assets included her home of many years, nor did it pay regard to the marital standard of living (except to say, once more that both husband and wife were presently living below that lifestyle). Furthermore, the gratuitous comparison of wife’s assets before and after the marriage compounded a series of at best irrelevant findings about how wife had benefited from being married to her prosperous husband, and how long it would have taken her to earn her share of the community estate by working her premarital job.
The foregoing deficiencies dictate that the judgment be reversed, insofar as it imposed a two-year limit on permanent spousal support. This disposition is required because of the court’s failure to consider and apply the factors of ability to pay and need (§ 4320, subds. (c), (d)), and also because of the evidentiary uncertainty that wife could and would independently support herself, at an appropriate level, within the limited time. On remand, the trial court will be able to assess the proper measure of support to be accorded for the period since June 30, 2002, as well as prospectively, in light of present and intervening circumstances, as well as all relevant statutory factors.
3. Retention of Jurisdiction
Although wife urges otherwise, the text of the judgment (and also that of the statement of decision) registers the trial court’s intention to terminate any jurisdiction to extend spousal support beyond June 30, 2002. Given the holding that permanent spousal support should not have been truncated at that date, reversal or modification of this aspect of the judgment appears essential as a matter of consistency. But even viewed in its original context, the retraction of jurisdiction was overly restrictive, because the court’s expectations about wife’s capacity to become adequately employed and self-supporting were tentative and untested. Much as in In re Marriage of Frick [1109]*1109(1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 997 [226 Cal.Rptr. 766], the circumstances at judgment made it inappropriate for the court then to “ ‘ “bum its bridges,” ’ ” by terminating the “jurisdiction to deal with unforeseen eventualities.” (Id. at pp. 1021-1022.)11
B. Attorney Fees
Wife’s final issues concern the court’s assignment of responsibility for paying the approximately $5 million of attorney fees and costs, including experts’ fees (hereafter collectively attorney fees), that were incurred by the parties below, particularly the approximately $2 million for wife’s representation.
At the time of the orders in question, husband had assumed full responsibility for his attorney fees, much of which he had already paid. He had also paid over $500,000 of wife’s fees. The ultimate disposition, about which wife complains, required provisionally that husband pay an additional $850,000 of her fees. This mling was made in advance of disposition of the parties’ Wyoming ranch, perhaps the largest single community asset, which had been listed for sale for over $6 million.
The court’s order recited that the court viewed wife’s share of that ranch “as the basis for [wife’s] separate estate post-marriage and the source of the payment of attorneys’ fees and costs.” The court also stated that its order for spousal support had “posited that [wife] would have a substantial estate made up of her share of the community estate and her separate property,” estimated to amount to a bit over $5 million. Assuming that the ranch sale allowed wife to achieve such a $5 million estate, the court stated, husband would have to pay $850,000 of wife’s attorney fees. However, if wife’s estate exceeded $5 million, husband’s fee obligation would be reduced by one-half of the additional amount. (For example, if wife’s estate totaled $6 million, husband’s responsibility for the $850,000 fees would be reduced by $500,000, for which wife would be responsible).
Ultimately, this arrangement proved unproductive for wife, as far as fee shifting was concerned. Husband bought out wife’s share of the Wyoming ranch, for $2,825,379, and wife’s estate as calculated by the court totaled $6,583,795. The judgment therefore reduced husband’s attorney fees obligation by $791,897.50, to $58,102.50. Moreover, because husband had already advanced $200,000 for wife’s fees (when the proceeds of sale of another ranch were deposited with wife’s trial attorneys), the judgment allowed him a [1110]*1110net credit of $141,897.50, to be taken against the judgment’s equalization payment to wife (originally $1,022,613 but now $880,715.50).
Wife contends that use of what the court termed the “$5 million benchmark” was unfounded and improper, and that even if not, the court miscalculated wife’s assets and thus misapplied the benchmark. We review a matrimonial attorney fees order for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Sullivan (1984) 37 Cal.3d 762, 768-769 [209 Cal.Rptr. 354, 691 P.2d 1020].)
Wife first argues that there was no evidentiary or other rationale for pivoting husband’s responsibility for her fees on the $5 million measure of assets. Wife relies primarily on In re Marriage of O’Connor (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 877 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 480]. There the court rejected the argument that a spouse had not shown need for an award of attorney fees because those fees represented only 25 percent of his assets. Observing that under section 2032, an ability to pay one’s own fees was not a bar to their award, the court stated that the Legislature had not “intended to endorse any fixed measure or percentage as a way to demonstrate need or the lack thereof,” and that the statute “eschew[ed] any notion that a numerical standard should be applied.” (O’Connor, at p. 883.)
Contrary to wife’s contention, the court’s order and judgment reflect a defensible rationale for choosing the $5 million amount, namely the court’s prior resolve to afford wife a full $5 million estate. And the court’s positive focus on wife’s situation was part of the consideration of assets and ability to pay, which wife contends was absent. We cannot say that the court’s disposition was an abuse of discretion, that is, one that “ ‘no judge could reasonably make.’ ” (In re Marriage of Sullivan, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 769.)
Wife further contends that even if her estate value was a proper basis for disallowing recovery of some fees, the court included in that estate several items that should not have been so included. The first of these was $402,000 from the smaller ranch’s sale, which had gone directly to the attorneys. We see no reason, however, why the court could not define wife’s estate as including funds that were used to defer existing expenses, even though she never physically possessed those funds. The same holds true with respect to the judgment’s equalization payment. Wife also complains about the inclusion of about $1.5 million of nonliquid assets, arguing that they could not readily be spent for attorney fees. (Cf. In re the Marriage of Kerry (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 456, 464 [204 Cal.Rptr. 660].) But the court was assessing wife’s entire base of assets, not just what was available for fees.
Wife finally argues that by forcing her to pay about $795,000 of the attorney fees husband originally was to pay, the trial court self-contradictorily [1111]*1111diminished the very estate on which it relied to justify her limited spousal support. But in that connection, as in this one, the court had estimated an estate of $5 million, and the attorney fees order did not infringe that amount at all.
In view of our conclusion that there is, as a matter of law, no such asset as goodwill in husband’s profession as a motion picture director, wife’s estate is necessarily diminished by $750,000. This requires a recalculation of attorney’s fees under the formula adopted by the trial court, which we affirm. Under that formula, husband’s obligation for attorney fees is reduced by $416,897. We remand the matter for a modification of the judgment on the amount of attorney fees and the credit against the equalization payments to wife.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed insofar as it limits to June 30, 2002, the obligation to pay spousal support and the court’s jurisdiction to enlarge or extend such support. The superior court shall enter judgment retaining such jurisdiction, and providing for spousal support payable by husband to wife for the period commencing July 1, 2002, and continuing as warranted. The judgment is to be modified by deleting $1.5 million in assets, denominated as goodwill, from property that is subject to division. The judgment is also to be modified as to the amount of wife’s attorney fees to be paid by husband, and the credit against the equalization payments. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Wife shall recover costs on both appeals.