In Re Marriage of Denton

930 P.2d 239, 145 Or. App. 381, 1996 Ore. App. LEXIS 1917

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: December 24, 1996
• Docket: 93C-35739; CA A86943
• Status: Published

Opinions

LANDAU, J.

Husband appeals a dissolution judgment that awarded wife, among other things, $15,000 per year as payment for her contribution to his “enhanced earning capacity,” $2,000 per month indefinite spousal support and a portion of the parties’ real estate and other holdings. Husband assigns error to the enhanced earning capacity award, to the award of spousal support and to the valuation of his business, which was a predicate to the distribution of the marital property. On de novo review, ORS 19.125(3), we conclude that the facts of this case do not justify an award for enhanced earning capacity, that the trial court’s award of indefinite spousal support is not warranted under the circumstances and that the valuation of husband’s business was correct.

The parties were married for 14 years before they separated in 1990. They had lived together for a few years before they married. At the time of trial, both husband and wife were 45. They had no children.

At the beginning of the marriage, wife had a high school education and worked as a licensed practical nurse (LPN). Husband had a bachelor’s degree in zoology and a master’s degree in wildlife ecology. He continued his graduate studies and worked part time. In 1978, husband entered medical school. During medical school, husband received loans, grants and scholarships that more than paid for his educational expenses. During that same time, however, wife continued working as an LPN. Upon completion of medical school, husband took a one-year paid internship, during which time his income was comparable to that of wife’s. The following year, he took a staff position at a local hospital, where his income doubled; wife, meanwhile, cut back on her hours of work.

In 1984, husband took a residency in dermatology in Iowa. His income was large enough that wife could afford to attend school, so she attended a community college during the three-year residency and did not work outside the home. At the conclusion of the residency, the parties moved to Salem, and husband began his practice as a dermatologist. Wife, meanwhile, continued going to school, first at a community college and later at Oregon State University. All educational expenses were paid out of the income from husband’s practice. In 1988, husband became a shareholder in a dermatology clinic. Two years later, the parties separated. Wife continued her schooling, and in 1991, she graduated magna cum laude with a bachelor’s degree in sociology. At the time of trial, in 1994, husband was earning $12,300 per month gross income from his salary and bonuses at the clinic. Wife was working only part time as a hospital clerk. By that time, the parties had accumulated substantial assets, including a home in Amity, a home in Salem, other real estate, a share of the dermatology clinic, cars, a boat, retirement accounts and personal property.

The trial court valued the assets and then divided them, awarding wife the Salem home free and clear of encumbrances, a car, $23,000 in cash, half of husband’s retirement benefits and an equalizing judgment of approximately $121,000. The court awarded separately to wife an annual payment of $15,000 “on account of husband’s enhanced earnings” for as long as husband continues to work. Finally, the court awarded wife indefinite spousal support of $2,000 per month.

Husband first assigns error to the trial court’s award of an annual payment to wife to compensate her for her contributions to his enhanced earning capacity. According to husband, a court may order an award to compensate one spouse for contributions to the enhanced earning capacity of the other only upon proof that those contributions were “material,” that is, were “to the education and training that resulted in the enhanced earning capacity” and were “substantial and of prolonged duration.” ORS 107.105(1)(f). Husband argues that wife made no such contributions to his enhanced earning capacity. He already had acquired both a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree before the parties married. Any enhancement of his earning capacity beyond that, he contends, resulted from his acquisition of a medical degree, to which wife made no material contributions. Husband points to the fact that he paid for his direct educational expenses by loans and substantial grants and scholarships. He further points to the fact that wife made no career sacrifices on his behalf of any sort and that she was able to pursue any educational and career choices that she wished throughout the marriage.

Wife concedes that she did not contribute to husband’s direct educational expenses. She further concedes that she was able to pursue all of her professional and academic goals during the marriage, that she did not work for husband at any time and that she was not compelled to forgo any employment or educational opportunities during the marriage. She nevertheless contends that she made material contributions to husband’s medical education by working outside the home to help defray living expenses while husband went to school, by allowing husband to borrow her car, by occasionally drawing from her savings for sundry family expenses and by performing various domestic chores such as maintaining the home and tending to the family bills.

To determine whether wife is entitled to an award to compensate her for contributions to husband’s enhanced earning capacity we must ascertain the meaning of ORS 107.105(l)(f), which provides, in part:

“(1) Whenever the court grants a decree of marital annulment, dissolution or separation, it has power further to decree as follows:

* * * *

“(f) For the division or other disposition between the parties of the real or personal property, or both, of either or both of the parties as may be just and proper in all the circumstances. * * * The court shall consider the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker as a contribution to the acquisition of marital assets. There is a rebuttable presumption that both spouses have contributed equally to the acquisition of property during the marriage [.] * * * The present value of, and income resulting from, the future enhanced earning capacity of either party shall be considered as property. The presumption of equal contribution to the acquisition of marital property, however, shall not apply to enhanced earning capacity. A spouse asserting an interest in the income resulting from an enhancement of earning capacity of the other spouse must demonstrate that the spouse made a material contribution to the enhancement. Material contribution can be shown by, among other things, having contributed, financially or otherwise, to the education and training that resulted in the enhanced earning capacity. The contribution shall have been substantial and of prolonged duration.”

In particular, we must determine whether the prior efforts on which wife relies constitute “material” contributions of a “substantial” nature and for a “prolonged duration.”

We undertake that interpretive effort with the goal of ascertaining, if possible, the intention of the legislature by examining the text in context and, if necessary, the legislative history and other interpretive aids. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). The “context” of the statute includes the preexisting common law and statutory framework within which the law was enacted, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or 406, 416-17, 908 P2d 300 (1995), recons allowed (July 23, 1996), including other statutes in pari materia, State v. Carr, 319 Or 408, 412, 877 P2d 1192 (1994), and prior versions of the statute, Krieger v. Just, 319 Or 328, 336, 876 P2d 754 (1994). We begin our examination of the statute by addressing each of those aspects of its context.

Oregon’s current system of no-fault dissolution dates back to 1971. Since that time, the dissolution of any marriage has required the division of all “property” that the parties accumulated during their time together. When the parties accumulated real estate, personal property and other tangible assets, the division of marital property presented a straightforward question of valuation and equitable division in accordance with the statutory admonition to divide property in a manner that is “just and proper in all the circumstances.” ORS 107.105(l)(e) (1971). Courts early on encountered difficulties, however, in fashioning “just and proper” divisions in two important respects.

First, there arose a question as to the basis on which to divide equitably the property accumulated during the marriage. With the advent of the no-fault divorce law, the courts focused not on the fault of one or the other of the parties but on the relative contributions to the marital partnership. Still, valuing the extent of the contributions of a homemaker spouse proved difficult to establish. In response to that difficulty, in 1977, the legislature declared that such efforts are to be considered contributions to the acquisition of marital assets and created a statutory presumption that both parties — whether or not either works outside the home — have contributed equally to the acquisition of property during the marriage. ORS 107.105(1)(e) (1977).

Second, when faced with less tangible assets, such as the value of a professional degree or license or, more generally, the enhanced earning capacity of a spouse, questions arose as to whether those assets could be considered part of the marital property to which the statutory presumption of equal contribution applied. On the one hand, such intangible assets did not readily conform to common-law notions of “property,” traditionally defined as something with an “exchangeable value.”¹ And, not surprisingly, Oregon courts, along with the overwhelming majority of courts elsewhere in the country, expressed reluctance to recognize enhanced earning capacity as property to be divided upon dissolution. See, e.g., Grove and Grove, 280 Or 341, 357-58, 571 P2d 477, modified 280 Or 769, 572 P2d 1320 (1977) (“We do not, however, approve the allocation of future earnings on principles applicable to property rights.”).² On the other hand, the capacity to earn additional income as a function of education and training acquired during the marriage clearly is not without value in an economic sense, and it appeared inconsistent with the statutory command to devise a “just and proper” disposition of marital assets to leave such a valuable commodity outside of the dissolution equation. In 1983, the legislature attempted to address that perceived inequity by including “[t]he contribution by one spouse to the education, training and earning power of the other spouse” as a factor that courts are to consider in setting an award of spousal support. ORS 107.105(1)(d)(C).

The use of spousal support to compensate a spouse for contributions to enhanced earning capacity prompted criticism that the remedy was incomplete at best. Among other things, critics noted, spousal support may not be available even to a spouse who has contributed to another’s enhanced earning capacity if both spouses are currently capable of self-support. See generally Amanda Franz, Comment, Disposition of a Professional Degree upon Dissolution of a Marriage: What Will Oregon’s Solution Be?, 20 Willamette L Rev 141, 166 (1984).³

Meanwhile, courts in at least two other states began to recognize the equitable necessity of awarding compensation to a spouse who has sacrificed his or her own educational or career opportunities for the enhancement of the earning capacity of the other spouse. The most celebrated of those cases was the New York Court of Appeals decision in O’Brien v. O’Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 489 NE2d 712, 498 NYS2d 743 (1985). In that case, the court held that the husband’s medical license was marital property and that the nonlicensed spouse was entitled to a distributive share of the increased earning potential that resulted from the license. The court justified its award on the basis of the wife’s direct contributions to the husband’s education expenses and the extent to which the wife had modified her own career plans to accommodate the husband’s educational needs. O’Brien, 66 NY2d at 585-86, 489 NE2d at 716, 498 NYS2d at 747.⁴

In Oregon, however, courts continued to adhere to the view that enhanced earning capacity could not be considered a form of property to be divided upon dissolution and, instead, could be considered only in awarding spousal support. In Stuart and Stuart, 107 Or App 549, 813 P2d 49 (1991), the wife sacrificed her own career to maintain the family home and care for the children to enable the husband to complete his medical school education and later worked for the husband as he attempted to establish his own medical practice. Relying on the O’Brien decision, among others, the wife argued that Oregon courts should recognize enhanced earning capacity as a form of marital property and that her contributions to the husband’s education and enhanced earning capacity entitled her to a share of that property. We declined to adopt the O’Brien approach and instead ordered an increase in the duration of spousal support to reflect the wife’s contributions. Stuart, 107 Or App at 552-53.

While Stuart was pending before this court, the wife’s lawyer in that case — who also happened to be a legislator — proposed legislation that expressly would have recognized enhanced earning capacity as a form of marital property. HB 3224, 66th Or Leg Assembly (1991). The version of the bill that passed the House provided that

“[t]he value of, and income resulting from, the enhanced earning capacity of either party acquired during the marriage shall be considered as property.”

Id. (A-Engrossed). That bill contained no further qualifications as to the nature of the contributions that would entitle one spouse to a share of the other’s enhanced earning capacity; in fact, the House deleted a provision that would have exempted enhanced earning capacity from the presumption of equal contribution and required an award to one spouse of a distributive share of enhanced earning capacity only upon proof of a “material contribution” to the education and training of the other. Minutes, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Family Justice, May 6,1991, p 8. That bill died in the Senate.⁵

During the following legislative session, what has now been codified as ORS 107.105(l)(f) was enacted. It is, so far as we can tell, the first of its kind in the nation; no other state has declared by statute that one spouse’s enhanced earning capacity is a species of property that under some circumstances may be subject to division along with other marital assets.⁶ We turn, then, to the language of that unique enactment.

From the language of the statute in the context that we have described, it becomes clear that the legislature intended to accomplish two principal objectives. First, ORS 107.105(1)(f) was intended to establish that, contrary to the prior Oregon case law, enhanced earning capacity must be considered as marital property:

“The present value of, and income resulting from, the future enhanced earning capacity of either party shall be considered as property.”

ORS 107.105(1)(f) (emphasis supplied). Whatever the difficulties of “pigeon-holing” such an intangible asset within the existing framework of property law, the Oregon legislature has commanded that courts now must consider enhanced earning capacity as a species of property.

Second, ORS 107.105(1)(f) was intended to provide that one spouse may obtain a share of that property only by affirmatively establishing entitlement to it; no spouse is automatically entitled to a share of another’s enhanced earning capacity. The statutory presumption of equal contribution that ordinarily applies to the acquisition of assets during a marriage expressly does not apply:

“The presumption of equal contribution to the acquisition of marital property, however, shall not apply to enhanced earning capacity.”

ORS 107.105(1)(f) (emphasis supplied). Instead — and in contrast to enhanced earning capacity legislation that had passed out of the House in 1991 — the statute requires a threshold showing that contributions of a certain type were made and that those contributions were of a sufficient quantity and duration as to justify an award of a share of the enhancement as property:

“A spouse asserting an interest in the income resulting from an enhancement of earning capacity of the other spouse must demonstrate that the spouse made a material contribution to the enhancement. Material contribution can be shown by, among other things, having contributed, financially or otherwise, to the education and training that resulted in the enhanced earning capacity. The contribution shall have been substantial and of prolonged duration.”

ORS 107.105(1)(f).

To be sure, the statute regards the term “contribution” broadly to include those of both financial and nonfinancial nature; indeed, ORS 107.105(1)(f) expressly declares that the contribution of a homemaker spouse is a “contribution” to marital assets generally, and there is no mention of an intention to use the term more narrowly with respect to the particular asset of enhanced earning capacity. But the statute does not stop there. It goes on to say that not all contributions, however broadly defined, will trigger an enhanced earning capacity award. Only those that are “material,” that are “to the education and training” that produce the enhancement, that are “substantial” and of “prolonged” duration suffice. Thus, some contributions indeed may have been targeted to the education and training of one spouse or the other, but, unless they are of a sufficient quantity and duration, they will not justify an award of enhanced earning capacity as property. Material contributions that are not sufficiently “substantial” or “prolonged” are not ignored; they may be considered under ORS 107.105(1)(d)(C) in the award of spousal support. They are not, however, sufficient to justify an award of a share of enhanced earning capacity as property.

The legislature did not define the precise contours of the terms “substantial” or “prolonged.” It is apparent that it intended the courts to exercise some measure of judgment in the light of the particular facts of individual cases. Even the dictionary definitions of those terms defy precise delineation.⁷ The general thrust of the legislature’s intentions, however, are fairly clear: Not just any contributions will suffice. To justify an award of enhanced earning capacity, there must be evidence of material contributions that are sufficiently sizeable and over a sufficiently long period of years as to justify treating the intangible asset of enhanced earning capacity as a form of marital property and awarding the contributing spouse a share of it as property, instead of compensating the spouse for those contributions through spousal support. That is the only interpretation of the statute that comports with all of its language, both in text and context. Any other reading of the statute would render meaningless the qualifying language that the legislature deliberately included and effectively would restore the presumption of equal contribution, which the legislature deliberately chose to eliminate from evaluation of the appropriateness of an enhanced earning capacity award.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the language of the statute admits more than one reasonable construction in that regard, the legislative history confirms the foregoing interpretation.The language of ORS 107.105(1)(f) that is at issue in this case originally was enacted as House Bill 2946 in the 1993 Legislative Session. The bill was drafted by Representative Parks, who was the lawyer-legislator who represented the wife in the Stuart case and who unsuccessfully introduced the enhanced earning capacity bill during the 1991 session. In the first hearing on the bill before the House Judiciary Civil Law and Judicial Administration Subcommittee, committee counsel explained that the bill was an outgrowth of the Stuart case and Parks’s unsuccessful efforts in 1991. She explained that the purpose of his bill was to

“designate enhanced earning capacity as property for the purposes of division of property during a dissolution action. This is based on a recent case, Stuart and Stuart, which is a 1991 Court of Appeals case. This measure would recognize that the spouse who contributed to the acquisition of a valuable asset, such as a better education, that creates enhanced, or, actual enhanced earnings, would be awarded a portion of the value of that asset as an economic partner.”

Tape recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil Law and Judicial Administration, April 27, 1993, Tape 91, Side A at 017. Referring to the Stuart case, Parks explained:

“These are two people that in their married life did one thing and that was, among other things, and that was to make a mutual decision on a business arrangement and that was, in this case, that the husband — all of the assets of the family were directed toward increasing his earning capacity. And it just flat is not fair that on dissolution he walks off with the big asset in the marriage * * *.”

Tape recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil Law and Judicial Administration, April 27,1993, Tape 91, Side A at 025. According to Parks, this court’s award of indefinite spousal support to compensate the wife for her contributions was inadequate, because spousal support is based generally on the equalization of current earning capacity without regard to future enhancement and because spousal support is terminable upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. In describing the features of his bill, Parks emphasized the principal difference between the current proposal and the 1991 bill that was passed out of committee, namely, that the 1991 bill lacked any reference to the quality or quantity of the contributing spouse’s contributions:

“The bill that passed last time [in the House] did not require that the contributing spouse made a material and substantial contribution for a long duration to the enhanced earning capacity. That wasn’t in the bill that passed. That [is] in the bill ** * * that I propose this time. I think it’s a more balanced approach, and it does require the contributing spouse to demonstrate those things, but only in the area of enhanced earning capacity.”

Tape recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil Law and Judicial Administration, April 27,1993, Tape 91, Side A at 287.

Helenjane Williams, a representative of the Older Women’s League, testified in opposition to the bill, principally on the basis of its requirement that an enhanced earning capacity award would be conditioned on proof of a “substantial” and “material” contribution for a “prolonged” period of time:

“I don’t think you should — I don’t — but I don’t like that: ‘prolonged,’ ‘substantial.’

* * * *

“So this is — but the thing of it is, you know, they [the courts] are going to take those words and interpret them in their own way. And once they start — because they’ll look at it differently and say: Well here’s your alimony over here. Now here’s this enhanced earning thing and it says ‘substantial,’ * * * then this leaves the older woman in the garbage can frankly.”⁸

Tape recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil Law and Judicial Administration, April 27,1993, Tape 91, Side B at 021-130. Williams further complained that the bill did not make clear that nonfinancial contributions could be considered “contributions” within the meaning of the law. A member of the subcommittee asked if an amendment making clear that nonfinancial contributions could suffice would satisfy her concerns in that regard. Williams replied that it would, but that she still opposed the bill’s references to “substantial” and “prolonged” contributions. Tape recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil Law and Judicial Administration, April 27,1993, Tape 92, Side A at 355-400.

A third witness, Diane Thelen, testified in support of the bill. She described her personal experience of devoting her own time and resources to the development of her husband’s career, only to be deprived of any share of his enhanced earnings upon their divorce:

“I was the full-time breadwinner and tuition payer and so forth. And I had a very successful career in Eugene. I didn’t want to leave Eugene. But at that point, when he graduated from architecture school, he felt he needed to return to Portland. It was better to be up here, up there, to get — for his career advancement. So his career was what we focused on at that point. And we came back to Portland and I got another job with the Portland Public Schools. * * * I put my things on hold — I had been encouraged to go into administration — everything was put on hold again while he started his business. And I supported us, again, while that got off the ground. It was a conscious decision. It was not something that I was not — didn’t go along with. I also did most of the household tasks and caring for our children, because he was busy. I was also very actively involved in the business.”

Tape recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil Law and Judicial Administration, April 27,1993, Tape 91, Side A at 196. When the marriage dissolved “very suddenly,” her contributions to her husband’s career were not considered in the disposition of their marital assets; she received half of their assets, but her husband’s enhanced earning capacity was not included as an asset:

“Unfortunately I put all of my eggs into one basket. That basket was his earning potential as an architect/contractor. I feel that it is unfair that I received only 50% of the eggs, and he walked away with the other 50% of the eggs and the basket to boot.”

Testimony, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil Law and Judicial Administration, HB 2946, April 27, 1993, Ex C.

At the work session on HB 2946, Representative Jim Edmunson proposed an amendment to address at least a portion of the concerns expressed by the representative of the Older Women’s League. That amendment, which passed without objection, added the language “financially or otherwise” to the contributions that may trigger the enhanced earning capacity award. Tape recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil Law and Judicial Administration, April 27, 1993, Tape 91, Side B at 153. The bill then passed out of the subcommittee and was sent to the House Judiciary Committee, which unanimously approved the bill with minor amendments not pertinent to this appeal.

In the debates on the House floor, Parks explained HB 2946 in much the same terms as he had described it to the House Judiciary Subcommittee:

“What it says is that, when two people are married for a long period of time and they devote a substantial portion of their assets to the acquisition of an asset and, in this case, an asset that is an enhanced earning capacity of one of the partners to the marriage, then the other partner needs to be recognized as a partner, much the same as we do in the dissolution of a business, and some evaluation [must be] made of that earning capacity and, where relevant, the judge makes some monetary award. This probably will not apply in — I’m just guessing — but I don’t think it would apply in more than 5 percent of the cases. But it’s just there when fairness requires that that be given consideration.”

Tape recording, House Floor Proceedings, May 17, 1993, Tape 90, Side A at 274. When asked what Parks meant by “a long period of time,” he replied:

“That would be up to the courts in the individual circumstance. And that’s the way all divorce cases are decided in Oregon. Generally, we say a long marriage — a marriage of long duration is more than ten years. That would probably be the threshold consideration here. But, in addition to that, the spouse who seeks to have this considered by the court would have to show: one, there was a material contribution, which in ordinary language means ‘this was a big-time contribution,’ and secondly, it was over a prolonged period of time. What we’re talking about is like a college education, or one spouse putting the other spouse through medical school. Those sorts of prolonged contributions to the enhanced earning capacity.”

Tape recording, House Floor Proceedings, May 17, 1993, Tape 90, Side A at 301. Without further debate, the measure was approved by the House.

At a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Parks explained the bill in personal terms:

“And I find it easier to use myself to explain this bill. I’ve been married for 30 years. During the course of the 30 years, every decision that my wife and I made in reference to how we would handle the marriage, at least the economic side, was weighted to what was best for my education first, and then my career, and then the building of a practice. And every time those decisions were in conflict, and they often were, we made the decision together that, what was best for me, was best for us; because we were a partnership and, of course, we still are. Many people make those kinds of decisions and as for one reason or another, 20 years out, the marriage falls apart. So they are in the same position that I am, and I can think of nothing that would be more unfair than to get divorced now, for the court to divide what the assets are in our family and to say that, because I have a professional degree, that’s a nondivisible asset, and my wife is not entitled to that.”

Tape recording, Senate Judiciary Committee, June 9, 1993, Tape 187, Side A at 023. Parks emphasized that not all contributions will suffice to justify an enhanced earning capacity award:

“This bill says that the wife — and we’re normally talking about the wife — the wife has to make a substantial contribution for a prolonged period of time to the acquisition of an enhanced earning capacity. Those are big terms, but they’re no more big than what the law says is ‘reasonable,’ what is a ‘material contribution,’ what is a ‘substantial part performance,’ what is the value of a life, what is the value of a scar, what is the value of an arm — they’re no different. Because in Oregon, we try and match the remedy to the injury, and sometimes, we have to give the judges flexibility.”

Tape recording, Senate Judiciary Committee, June 9, 1993, Tape 187, Side A at 023. Representative Kate Brown also testified in support of the bill. She pointed out the fact that the House had deleted reference to enhanced earning capacity in setting a spousal support award and proposed that that language be restored. She explained that spousal support should remain available to compensate for contributions that are not sufficiently direct to require an award of enhanced earning capacity as property. Parks agreed and explained:

“I agree with that, and I’ll tell you the rationale for that is that in someplace in here, the attorney for the supporting spouse is gonna really have to make an election, and in the course of that, the court could find that they [sic] did contribute to the education and the training and the earning power, but it was not substantial and it was not over a prolonged duration, but it was such that would entitle it to be considered in the area of spousal support. So it should be in there, and I think the practicalities of it would be that a court would — in making its findings would say: ‘I find that fits more appropriately here than it does in the property aspect.’ And I think that’s a good change and it’s something that we overlooked in the House.”

Tape recording, Senate Judiciary Committee, June 9, 1993, Tape 187, Side A at 105. After discussion on other matters not pertinent to the issue in this case, the committee approved the bill, with the proposed amendment as to the spousal support statute. HB 2946 ultimately was approved by the Senate with no significant debate.

Drawing conclusions as to legislative intent largely from colloquies in committee hearings always is risky business. See, e.g., Davis v. O’Brien, 320 Or 729, 745, 891 P2d 1307 (1995) (“isolated statements made in committee are not necessarily indicative of the intent of the entire legislature”). Nevertheless, it clearly is the practice of the Oregon Supreme Court to rely on such materials as evidence of legislative intent, and we are in no position to disregard that practice. See, e.g., Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 320 Or 509, 521-23, 888 P2d 544 (1995) (statements of two witnesses and two legislators). Moreover, reliance on the legislative history we just have recounted is supported by the fact that several themes are consistently reflected in both houses and throughout the legislative process, and therefore are more likely to reveal the intentions of the legislature as a whole.

The first of those consistent themes is that the legislature deliberately included the requirement that awarding a share of enhanced earning capacity as property be conditioned on proof of “material” contributions to the enhancement that are “substantial” and of “prolonged” duration. The legislature apparently was well aware that such a threshold showing would limit the number of awards. Even in the face of complaints by the Older Women’s League that the effect of that requirement would significantly reduce the availability of that remedy, the legislature left the language in the law. Over and over, throughout the legislative process, the qualification that enhanced earning capacity awards will be limited to cases in which contributions are “material” and “substantial” was touted as a key feature of the bill and a significant improvement over the version of the bill that failed to pass in 1991.

The second of those consistent themes was that the references to “material,” “substantial” and “prolonged” were understood to impose a significant evidentiary burden on the spouse seeking a share of the enhanced earning capacity. Once again, throughout the process, it was emphasized that an award of a share of enhanced earning capacity as property must be conditioned on proof of “a big-time contribution,” “putting all of [the contributing spouse’s] eggs in one basket,” direction of “all of the assets of the family” toward enhancing earning capacity. That is consistent with the stories of substantial sacrifice that prompted the legislation in the first place. Parks, for example, emphasized in his description of the Stuart case the “mutual decision” of the husband and the wife to devote all of their assets to the development of his business, a decision that required the wife to give up her own career and to work for the husband’s business. Thelen similarly stressed that she “was the full-time breadwinner and tuition payer,” that she “put [her] things on hold,” and that “everything was put on hold” to enable her husband to start his business. Parks echoed that emphasis, explaining that his bill was intended to apply to a narrow set of facts “when two people are married for a long period of time and they devote a substantial portion of their assets” to the development of enhanced earning capacity. Consistently and repeatedly, the legislative history reveals that, although the law was intended to recognize generally a broad range of activities as “contributions” to the acquisition of marital assets, as to enhanced earning capacity, those contributions must be “big-time” to justify an award of that particular species of property.

The third consistent theme revealed in the legislative history is that, in recognition of the significant eviden-tiary burden placed on spouses asserting a right to a share of enhanced earning capacity as property, the legislature chose to retain consideration of enhanced earning capacity as a factor in the setting of spousal support in those cases in which the contributing spouse is unable to establish the requisite “material,” “substantial” and “prolonged” ' contributions. Indeed, early in the process, the House deleted reference to this consideration in the spousal support provision of the statutes, and the Senate restored it, expressly for the purpose of providing a means of acknowledging and compensating for contributions to enhanced earning capacity that were not sufficient to justify an award of the enhancement as property.

With the foregoing analysis of the statute in mind— including its language, its context and its history — we turn to the facts of this case to determine whether wife established that she made “material” contributions to her husband’s enhanced earning capacity, which were “substantial” and of a “prolonged” duration. At the outset, we note that wife concedes that she did not contribute directly to his educational expenses; those were more than adequately covered by the loans, grants and scholarships that husband obtained. We also note that wife further concedes that she was not required to alter her own occupational or educational goals in any way to accommodate husband’s education and training. She did move to Iowa with husband for his three-year residency, but she offered no testimony that the move interrupted her own plans at all. We further note that, during the approximately 15-year period from the time husband started medical school until the separation, wife worked four years; during the remaining years — in particular, the years of husband’s dermatology residency — wife did not work and instead went to school, first to community college on a part-time basis and then to Oregon State University. We finally note that there is no evidence that husband’s medical school education in any way was conditioned on wife bringing in income during those four years that she did work. Said another way, there is no evidence that wife needed to work to enable husband to go to medical school. Similarly, there is no evidence that, during husband’s residency, wife was required to take any particular action to facilitate her husband’s career; to the contrary, during that time, she herself went to school. In the light of that evidence, we are not persuaded that wife made “material” contributions to the enhancement of husband’s earning capacity that were “substantial” and “prolonged.”

Wife insists that her work during husband’s attendance at school, her performance of various household tasks and husband’s use of her automobile together constitute the requisite showing to justify an award of a share of husband’s enhanced earning capacity as property. We have no doubt that each of those efforts constitutes, either directly or indirectly, a “contribution” to husband’s medical school education. We do not, however, find any basis under the circumstances of this case to consider them sufficiently “substantial” and “prolonged” to satisfy the showing that the legislature required as a condition to an enhanced earning capacity award. Her employment, for example, certainly allowed the parties to defray living expenses while husband attended school, at least to some extent. The problem is that, on the record before us, we do not know to what extent that was so. Moreover, as we have noted, there is no evidence that the parties needed wife to work in order for husband to continue going to medical school. The mere fact that one spouse happened to be employed while the other went to school cannot, by itself, satisfy the legislative requirements for establishing entitlement to an enhanced earning capacity award. If that were not so, we would be required to award enhanced earning capacity in virtually all cases in which one spouse or the other attended school, and clearly that result does not comport with the legislature’s expressed intention to limit the availability of the extraordinary remedy afforded by ORS 107.105(l)(f) to a relatively few cases.

Similarly, the fact that wife performed various household tasks while husband went to medical school by itself is insufficient. There is no evidence that those tasks were required to enable husband to complete his education. There is no evidence even of how those efforts facilitated his education. There is no question that the performance of household tasks generally contributes, directly or indirectly, to the acquisition of marital assets. That much is established by statute. ORS 107.105(1)(f). But the fact remains that the legislature saw fit to declare that the presumption as to the effect of those contributions — which ordinarily applies to the acquisition of marital assets — does not apply to the acquisition of enhanced earning capacity. Thus, although household work might in an appropriate case suffice to justify an award of enhanced earning capacity under ORS 107.105(l)(f), there simply is no evidentiary basis for such a conclusion in this case.

Finally, as to the use of the automobile, we again accept for the sake of argument that it constitutes some contribution to husband’s education in the form of eliminating the need to spend money on alternate transportation. But in terms of the larger picture of the acquisition of husband’s medical education over a period of years, we conclude that such a contribution hardly qualifies as the sort of “substantial” one that requires an award of a share of enhanced earning capacity as property.

We conclude, therefore, that the trial court erred in awarding wife any share of husband’s enhanced earning capacity as property under ORS 107.105(l)(f). Wife failed to establish the required “material” contributions to husband’s education or training that were sufficiently “substantial” and “prolonged” to justify such an award under that statute.

The dissent arrives at a different conclusion, based largely on a different reading of what the statute requires to establish that a contributing spouse is entitled to a share of enhanced earning capacity as property. We have considered carefully the arguments put forth by the dissent, but we find them unpersuasive.

The dissent first declares that “[n] either the text nor the context of the statute assists us” in construing its terms. 145 Or App at 414. The dissent offers no explanation for that conclusion and makes no attempt to explain why our analysis of the language of the statute in its context is incorrect.

The dissent next purports to “agree with the majority that it is appropriate” to examine the legislative history to determine the intended meaning of the statute. Id. That mis-characterizes our opinion. We do not, in fact, find it necessary to examine the statute’s history to ascertain its intended meaning. We do, nevertheless, examine it in some detail, “[ajssuming for the sake of argument” that it is necessary to do so, in order to establish the error of the dissent’s analysis. 145 Or App at 393.

The dissent next takes us to task for our interpretation of the legislative history, dismissing it as “a prolonged massaging of one statement” by Representative Parks that a material contribution means a “big-time” contribution. 145 Or App at 414. That, too, mischaracterizes our analysis, which examines the legislative history as a whole, in chronological sequence, from committee to floor, from one house to the other. In contrast, the dissent elects to ignore such statements as Parks’s and approaches the legislative history of the statute in a manner that recalls Judge Harold Leven-thal’s analogy of “entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s friends.”

Even in its selective analysis of the legislative history, the dissent errs. In particular, the dissent relies heavily on testimony of witnesses who urged that the unpaid labor of homemakers not go ignored in determining entitlement to enhanced earning capacity. In so doing, the dissent ignores the fact that those remarks were made in the context of discussions about the definition of the “contributions” that may be taken into account by the courts. As we have taken pains to repeat in our analysis of the language of the statute and the same legislative history that the dissent now cites, it is quite clear that the contributions of homemakers are “contributions” within the meaning of the statute. That does not mean that they are automatically and in all cases sufficiently “material” or “substantial” or of sufficiently “prolonged duration” to warrant awarding the contributing spouse a share of enhanced earning capacity as property under ORS 107.105(1)(f).

The dissent also concludes that, on de novo review of the facts, wife is entitled to a share of husband’s enhanced earning capacity as property. The dissent concludes that, because wife worked for nine years, while husband completed graduate school and began his medical school education, and worked in the home thereafter, she must be regarded as having made “substantial” and “material” contributions to his enhanced earning capacity over a “prolonged” period of time. The dissent’s analysis of the facts, of course, relies on a flawed understanding of the evidentiary requirements contained in ORS 107.105(1)(f); thus, its “de novo” review of the facts rests on a false foundation at the outset. Apart from that, we are unpersuaded by the dissent’s analysis of the facts for several reasons in addition to those already stated.

First, the dissent attempts to “bootstrap” wife’s work while husband completed his master’s degree in wildlife ecology to give the appearance of a longer duration of support for his enhanced earning capacity. In point of fact, wife’s own expert testified that husband’s master’s degree was of no consequence in his calculations of husband’s earning capacity.

Second, the dissent makes much of wife’s recollection that husband expressed gratitude for wife’s support during the three years of medical school. Gratitude, however, does not determine whether support was “material,” “substantial” and “prolonged” within the meaning of the statute. Nor does it necessitate awarding a share of enhanced earning capacity as property, as opposed to reflecting contributions in the form of increased spousal support, as allowed in ORS 107.105-(1)(d)(C).

Third, the dissent spares no effort in attempting to paint husband as a “bad” person, recalling, in particular, an incident in which husband supposedly ejected wife from the family residence to make room for a girlfriend. To begin with, the statute does not include as a consideration whether one party can produce “dirty laundry” about the other; the dissent’s references to such matters must be understood as no more than an attempt to create sympathy for wife. Furthermore, the dissent distorts the facts themselves. By 1992, when husband supposedly informed wife of a paramour and asked wife to leave the family residence, the parties had been separated and living in different cities for over two years. Wife had been living in the family residence, but she did not like living there and told husband that, whether he returned or not, she wanted to leave. Husband returned, and the parties continued marriage counseling. During the counseling, the parties discussed, among other things, wife’s need to look for another home. Husband ultimately purchased outright a new home for wife. It was in that context that husband informed wife that it was time for her to move into the new house and out of the family home. It also bears noting that, when wife began to testify about the incident, the trial court questioned its materiality and admonished the parties not to needlessly “bloody each other” with such testimony. We, too, question the materiality of the incident and the dissent’s reliance on it in urging a different disposition of this case. In short, the dissent’s analysis of the facts of this case does not persuade us that we have erred in concluding that wife has not shown her entitlement to a share of husband’s enhanced earning capacity as property under ORS 107.105(1)(f).

The dissent ventures various opinions on other issues concerning the proper valuation of husband’s enhanced earning capacity and the proper allocation of a share to wife. Because of our disposition of the first assignment, we need not, and do not, express any opinion on those matters.

Husband next assigns error to the trial court’s award of indefinite spousal support in the amount of $2,000 per month. He contends that, in the light of wife’s age, good health, education and employment capabilities, and her size-able property award, she is entitled to no more than $1,000 per month for four years. Wife contends that, if anything, the trial court did not award enough spousal support. Particularly in the event of elimination of the enhanced earning capacity award, wife argues, she should be awarded substantially more than $2,000 per month to compensate her for her contributions to husband’s medical education. Wife argues that the income disparity of the parties, her need for additional education and training, and the extremely comfortable lifestyle to which she had become accustomed all warrant a significant, indefinite spousal support award.

When we set the amount and duration of spousal support, we attempt to arrive at an “amount of money for such period of time as it may be just and equitable” for the paying spouse to pay. ORS 107.105(1)(d). As we explained in Christensen and Christensen, 123 Or App 412, 416, 859 P2d 1192 (1993):

“We do not attempt merely to eliminate any disparities in the parties’ incomes or to enable one spouse to look to the other indefinitely for support. Wolhaupter-Heinzel and Heinzel, 108 Or App 514, 521, 816 P2d 672, rev den 312 Or 526 (1991). We set the award at an amount that is reasonable and that will enable the party receiving the support to enjoy a standard of living that ‘will not be overly disproportionate’ to what was enjoyed during the marriage, to the extent that is practicable. ORS 107.105(1)(d)(F); Grove and Grove, 280 Or 341, 350, 571 P2d 477, mod 280 Or 769, 572 P2d 1320 (1977). We set the duration of that award ‘on terms that are equitable between the parties,’ taking into account both need and ability to pay and keeping in mind ‘the goal of ending the support-dependency relationship within a reasonable time if that can be accomplished without injustice or undue hardship.’ Grove and Grove, supra, 280 Or at 353.”

We applied those principles to facts not dissimilar to those presented in this case in Ley and Ley, 133 Or App 138, 890 P2d 440 (1995). In that case, the parties had been married for 14 years. At the time of trial, the husband was 41, and the wife was 37. The parties had two minor children. The husband earned approximately $250,000 per year. The wife worked sporadically outside the home; her primary role in the marriage was that of homemaker. Although the parties enjoyed a substantial income during the marriage, they had accumulated relatively little in the way of assets. Upon dissolution, the wife was awarded the custody of the children, approximately $62,000 in assets — which represented the lion’s share — and indefinite spousal support that was stepped down from $9,075 per month to $1,500 per month over the course of 12 years.

We reduced the amount of the spousal support and limited its duration. We found that, in the light of the wife’s relatively young age, good health and employability, it was appropriate to provide her with support for a limited time to enable her to develop her skills through education or work experience. We concluded that it was not appropriate, however, to award support indefinitely, particularly in the light of “the statutory objective of ending the support dependency relationship within a reasonable time.” Id. at 143.

In this case, wife is relatively young and in good health. She has no dependents. She was not required to be absent from the job market to perform the role of homemaker and did not forgo any employment or academic opportunities during the marriage. She was awarded over $250,000 in property, including a paid-for residence, a car and a substantial amount of cash. She does have limited earning capacity and no doubt requires additional education and training to become self-supporting at a level not unreasonably disproportionate to what she enjoyed during the marriage; she testified that she would like to obtain a master’s degree in social work and pursue further employment in that field, which would take at least two or three more years of education and training. Furthermore, as we have previously noted, it is appropriate for us to recognize that she did contribute in some fashion to her husband’s medical education.

We conclude that an award of $2,000 per month is not sufficient to enable wife to make the transition to self-sufficiency without undue hardship. Particularly in the light of her educational needs, and in the light of her own contributions to husband’s medical school education, we conclude that an award of $4,000 per month for four years is appropriate, followed by $2,500 per month for three years and $1,500 per month for three years. As in Ley, we do not find that an award of indefinite support comports with the statutory objective of ending the support-dependency relationship within a reasonable time. Id. at 143. We are well aware of the fact that our decision will result in some disparity in the parties’ standards of living. As we noted in Ley, however, “there are few dissolution cases in which the parties’ standards of living do not go down ” Id. at 142; see also Christensen, 123 Or App at 417 (“No doubt reducing the duration of spousal support will perpetuate some disparity between husband’s and wife’s incomes. However, that alone is not reason to continue spousal support indefinitely.”). Moreover, we find that an award in excess of $330,000 over the next ten years to an individual with a home, substantial assets and no dependents does not work an “injustice or undue hardship.” Grove, 280 Or at 353.

Husband finally assigns error to the trial court’s valuation of his business. In particular, he complains that the trial court erred in assigning a value for the goodwill of husband’s medical practice at $50,000. He argues that it is inappropriate to award a share of enhanced earning capacity as property and a share of goodwill, as both reflect the same economic value of husband’s ability to generate income. We need not address that argument, and express no opinion on it. Having concluded that a share of husband’s enhanced earning capacity should not be awarded to wife as property, we have avoided the sort of “double counting” of husband’s earning capacity that is the basis of his assignment.

Reversed and remanded for entry of a modified judgment awarding wife no share of husband’s enhanced earning capacity as property and awarding wife spousal support of $4,000 per month for four years, followed by $2,500 per month for three years, followed by $1,500 per month for three years commencing upon entry of the original judgment; otherwise affirmed. Costs to husband.

1 The Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo 429, 432, 574 P2d 75, 77 (1978), is often cited as the leading case on the point. There, the court held that a professional license is not marital property, because “[i]t cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged” and is “personal to the holder.”

2 For decisions of other state courts declining to award a share of a professional license, advanced degree or of enhanced earning capacity as property, see Jones v. Jones, 454 So 2d 1006, 1009 (Ala Civ App 1984) (law degree); Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz 333, 339-40, 631 P2d 115, 121-23 (Ariz Ct App 1981) (medical license); Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So 2d 146, 150 (Fla Ct App 1983) (undergraduate degrees); Inman v. Inman, 648 SW2d 847, 852 (Ky 1982) (dental license); Sweeney v. Sweeney, 534 A2d 1290, 1291 (Me 1987) (medical license); Archer v. Archer, 303 Md 347, 357, 493 A2d 1074, 1079 (1985) (medical license); Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass 240, 244, 503 NE2d 946, 949 (1987) (medical license); Scott v. Scott, 645 SW2d 193, 197 (Mo Ct App 1982) (law license); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 NJ 488, 495-505, 453 A2d 527, 531-36 (1982) (MBA degree); Haywood v. Haywood, 106 NC App 91, 100, 415 SE2d 565, 570 (1992), rev’d on other grounds 333 NC 342, 425 SE2d 696 (1993) (master’s degree); Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St 3d 115, 120, 492 NE2d 131, 135 (1986) (veterinary degree); Hodge v. Hodge, 513 Pa 264, 268, 520 A2d 15, 17 (1986) (medical degree); Helm v. Helm, 289 SC 169, 171, 345 SE2d 720, 721 (1986) (medical degree); Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp, 357 NW2d 264, 266 (SD 1984) (dental license); Beeler v. Beeler, 715 SW2d 625, 627 (Tenn Ct App 1986) (dental license); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 SW2d 656, 659 (Tex Civ App 1980) (medical degree); Martinez v. Martinez, 818 (Utah 1991) (medical degree); Marion v. Marion, 11 Va App 659, 668, 401 SE2d 432, 438 (1991) (veterinary degree); Downs v. Downs, 154 Vt 161, 165-66, 574 A2d 156, 158 (1990) (medical degree); Hoak v. Hoak, 179 WVa 509, 513, 370 SE2d 473, 477 (1988) (medical degree).

3 See also Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U Chi L Rev 67, 97-106 (1993) (detailing limitations of rehabilitation alimony); Deborah A. Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity in “Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse" Divorces, 63 NYU L Rev 751, 767-71 (1988) (describing limitations of rehabilitative and reimbursement alimony); Scott E. Willoughby, Note, Professional Licenses as Marital Property: Responses to Some of O’Brien’s Unanswered Questions, 73 Cornell L Rev 133, 136-37 (1987) (alimony regarded as inadequate, because terminable upon remarriage and based on current need for support).

4 The Iowa Supreme Court also has recognized that “the potential for increase in the future earning capacity made possible by [a] law degree” and admission to a state bar, both of which were “conferred upon the husband with the aid of his wife’s efforts,” constitute an “asset for distribution by the court.” In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 NW2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978). Interestingly, the court distinguished the license itself, which it concluded was not a marital asset, from the enhanced earning capacity that the license enabled, which it concluded was an asset. Id. In that case, the court awarded wife not a share of the husband’s future earning capacity but reimbursement of her actual expenses; the court, however, hinted that “other methods” could have been used to compensate the wife for her contributions. Id.

5 The bill originally contained a requirement that a contributing spouse would be entitled to a share of enhanced earning capacity as property only upon proof of a “material contribution” to the enhancement. Representative Del Parks, the author of the bill, explained to the House Judiciary Family Subcommittee that the purpose of that language was to make sure that

“the spouse that seeks to have the award has to have made a ‘material contribution.’ That means a large contribution. * * * [A] small contribution is not enough. It has to be substantial and of prolonged duration. And the presumption that a housewife or a husband, just by the mere fact of marriage, equally contributed to the acquisition of the asset, is nullified by the provisions of this law.”

Tape recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Family Justice, April 22, 1991, Tape 101, Side A at 094. He further explained that the purpose of the bill and the foregoing requirement was to address the problem created by the spouse

“who has made a substantial sacrifice, be it time, money, forgone things, to enable the parties, so that we — quote—we could get ahead — end quote — that she has some reasonable reward for her efforts if the husband takes the asset from the marriage.”

Tape recording, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommitte on Family Justice, April 22,1991, Tape 101, Side A at 229. The subcommittee amended the bill, however, deleting the requirement that the contributing spouse make “material contributions” to the enhancement. Minutes, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommitte on Family Justice, May 6, 1991, p 8.

6 See J. Thomas Oldham, Divorce, Separation and the Distribution of Property § 9.01, at 9-2.1 (1996) (characterizing Oregon’s as “the most expansive statute” regarding enhanced earning capacity). Some other state statutes require contributions to enhanced earning capacity or to the acquisition of a professional license to be considered in the distribution of marital property or in the determination of spousal support. See, e.g., Fla Stat Annot § 61.075(l)(e) (including as property distribution consideration “[t]he contribution of one spouse to the personal career or educational opportunity of the other spouse”); Wis Stat Annot § 767.255(3)(f) (same). Others allow a spouse contributing to another’s education to be reimbursed for those contributions. See, e.g., Cal Fam Code § 2641 (requiring reimbursement for “contributions to education or training of a party that substantially enhances the earning capacity” of the other spouse); La Civ Code Art 121 (allowing court to award a sum for “financial contributions” to other spouse’s education). Oregon’s is, however, the only statute to declare that the enhancement of earning capacity is itself property.

7 The term “substantial,” for example, ordinarily means

“existing as or in substance * * * having good substance: firmly or stoutly constructed * * * having a solid or firm foundation: soundly based: carrying weight < a ; argument > < ; evidence > * * * being that specified to a large degree or in the main * *

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1280 (5th ed 1979) (“[o]f real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable”).

8 In written testimony submitted to the subcommittee, Williams further complained that the bill

“would put the entire burden of proof on the contributing spouse. The contributing spouse would also have to prove that they [sic] had made a ‘material’ and a ‘substantial’ contribution for a ‘prolonged duration.’

* * * *

“It stacks the deck against the contributing spouse as it has deleted the protection of the present law with its presumption of equal contribution to the marital assets and property. It substitutes the following: ‘THE PRESUMPTION OF EQUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ACQUISITION OF MARITAL PROPERTY, HOWEVER, DOES NOT APPLY TO ENHANCED EARNING CAPACITY.’ ”

Testimony, House Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil Law and Judicial Administration, HB 2946, April 27,1993, Ex C (capitalization and underscoring in original).