Opinion
SIMS, J.
By his petition for habeas corpus the petitioner seeks a judgment declaring that certain conditions upon which he was granted probation are void, and releasing him from all custody and obligations under those conditions.1 He contends (1) that the state may not grant the privilege [957]*957of probation on conditions requiring the relinquishment of First Amendment rights, (2) that the complained of conditions of probation are an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech, (3) that those conditions are unreasonable and excessive in the light of California probation law, and (4) that those conditions constitute an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment rights of petitioner’s potential audience.
For reasons hereinafter set forth it is determined that many of the conditions in question exceed the criteria prescribed by law for terms of probation, and are therefore invalid; and that insofar as the remaining conditions impinge on freedom guaranteed by the United States Constitution they are warranted, because of the status of the petitioner as a convicted felon, as conditions, which are reasonably related and sufficiently narrowly drawn, to serve the interest of the state in providing for the reform and rehabilitation of the petitioner. The writ must be granted to the extent that the trial court must be ordered to revise its order in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.
Attached to the petition are a copy of a judgment and commitment to the county jail, copy of minutes of the court, bearing date of November 5, 1969, which contain the conditions of which the petitioner complains,2 and a memorandum decision of the court dated March 30, 1970 denying the petitioner’s petition to modify the terms and conditions of his probation. In their return to an order to show cause issued by this court the People adopted by reference a copy of a probation report dated September 3, 1969 and a copy of the transcript of the sentencing proceedings held November 5, 1969, both of which had previously been lodged with this court.
[958]*958From the foregoing it appears that on August 1, 1969 after a jury trial, the petitioner was found guilty of assault with force likely to produce great bodily harm in violation of section 245 of the Penal Code; that the matter was referred to the probation officer for a report; and that subsequently, presumably after the receipt of the probation officer’s report dated September 3, 1969, the petitioner was referred to the Department of Corrections under the provisions of section 1203.03 of the Penal Code for diagnosis and recommendation; and that on November 5, 1969, following his return to court for sentencing, he was sentenced to state prison for the term prescribed by law, execution of sentence was suspended, and defendant was granted probation for a term of five years on the following conditions, in addition to those which have been noted in the margin: first, that he serve six months in the county jail with credit for time served with the Department of Corrections under the section 1203.03 order; second, that “he shall, during the period of probation, attend an accredited school or university taking at least 12 semester units or equivalent quarter units each semester or quarter enrolled, for at least 2 semesters or 3 quarters per year, commencing not later than the fall 1970 semester and continuing until a bachelor’s degree is obtained”; and third, “He shall make restitution to the victim in the amount to be determined by the probation officer and to be paid thru the probation officer.”
I
“When granting probation, courts have broad discretion to impose restrictive conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect ‘public safety. Penal Code section 1203.1 authorizes the court to impose any ‘reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, . . . and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.’ ” (In re Bushman (1970) 1 Cal.3d 767, 776 [83 Cal.Rptr. 375, 463 P.2d 727]. See also In re Allen (1969) 71 Cal.2d 388, 390 and 393 [78 Cal.Rptr. 207, 455 P.2d 143]; People v. Osslo (1958) 50 Cal.2d 75, 103 [323 P.2d 397]; People v. King (1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 814, 822 [73 Cal.Rptr. 440] [cert. den. (1970) 396 U.S. 1028 [24 L.Ed.2d 524, 90 S.Ct. 576]; In re Peeler (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 483, 488-489 [72 Cal.Rptr. 254]; People v. Kern (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 962, 964-965 [71 Cal.Rptr. 105]; People v. Dominguez (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 623, 626-627 [64 Cal.Rptr. 290]; and People v. Bresin (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 232, 240 [53 Cal.Rptr. 687].)
“The appellate courts of this state have had occasion repeatedly to emphasize thát a defendant has no right to be granted probation; probation is a privilege, an act of grace or clemency. [Citations.]” (In re Osslo (1958) 51 Cal.2d 371, 377 [334 P.2d 1]. See also, People v. King, supra, [959]*959267 Cal.App.2d 814, 822; and In re Peeler, supra, 266 Cal.App.2d 483, 489.) It is also generally stated, “If the defendant considers the conditions of probation more harsh than the sentence the court would otherwise impose, he has the right to refuse probation and undergo the sentence. [Citations.]” (In re Bushman, supra, 1 Cal.3d 767, 776. See also In re Osslo, supra, 51 Cal.2d 371, 381; People v. Osslo, supra, 50 Cal.2d 75, 103; People v. King, supra, 267 Cal.App.2d 814, 826; People v. Kern, supra, 264 Cal.App.2d 962, 965; People v. Williams (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 394, 403-404 [55 Cal.Rptr. 550]; and People v. Bresin, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d 232, 240.)
It is sometimes suggested that the principle that the convicted defendant has the right to refuse probation and suffer his sentence renders him powerless to attack any condition of probation which he has accepted.3 An examination of the cases last cited in the text indicates that in each case the term of probation under attack was expressly found to be reasonable or proper when it was upheld. (See, People v. Osslo, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 103; People v. King, supra, 267 Cal.App.2d at pp. 823-824; People v. Kern, supra, 264 Cal.App.2d at p. 965; and People v. Bresin, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at p. 240.) Moreover, it has often been recognized that if the sentencing court has exceeded its powers, the defendant, despite acceptance of probation, may attack an improper term of probation by appeal or application for a writ of habeas corpus. (In re Bushman, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 776 [fn. 1 above]; People v. Osslo, supra, 50 Cal.2d at p. 104; People v. Dominguez, supra, 256 Cal.App.2d at p. 629; and People v. Williams, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 394, 404.)
“Although the discretion of the trial court in granting probation, and imposing the conditions of probation and in revoking or modifying those conditions ... is wide, its powers are not boundless.” (In re [960]*960Peeler, supra, 266 Cal.App.2d 483, 489. See also People v. Dominguez, supra, 256 Cal.App.2d 623, 627; and People v. Williams, supra, 247 Cal.App.2d 394, 407.) “A condition of probation which (1) has no relationship to' the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality does not serve the statutory ends of probation and is invalid.” (People v. Dominguez, supra, 256 Cal.App.2d at p. 627.)4
The application of these criteria can be traced through the cases which have been referred to above and through earlier cases, which are reviewed in People v. Dominguez (256 Cal.App.2d at pp. 627-628), and People v. Williams (247 Cal.App.2d at pp. 403-404) and need not be reexamined here. The pertinent precedents are noted below.
The first condition, set forth in what has been denominated paragraph “[3]” of the order admitting petitioner to probation, restrains his freedom to associate with others. The right to “become a member, either actively or passively, of any political or other organization, either on or off campus that participates in or advocates any form of protest or change in existing conditions” is a constitutionally protected right. In Vogel v. County of Los Angeles (1967) 68 Cal.2d 18 [64 Cal.Rptr. 409, 434 P.2d 961], the opinion states, “The United States Supreme Court . . . pointed out that persons who join an organization but do not share in its unlawful activities pose no threat either as citizens or as public employees, that a law which applies to membership without the specific intent to further the illegal aims of the organization infringes unnecessarily on protected freedoms and rests on the doctrine of guilt by association, and that such a law cannot stand. (Elfbrandt v. Russell [1966] supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 17-19 . . .)” (68 Cal.2d at p. 23. See also Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967) 385 U.S. 589, 607 [17 L.Ed.2d 629, 643, 87 S.Ct. 675]; Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 508-509 [55 Cal.Rptr. 401, 421 P.2d 409]; and Fort v. Civil [961]*961Service Commission (1964) 61 Cal.2d 331, 334-335 [38 Cal.Rptr. 625, 392 P.2d 385].)
From the foregoing it is clear that the prohibited conduct is not in itself criminal. Nevertheless, People v. Osslo, supra, suggests that when the offense of which the defendant was convicted arose out of his activities with an organization, his activities, within such organization even though otherwise lawful may be curtailed. The court said, “. . . since it could be and presumably was found that these defendants are guilty of crimes growing out of union activities, it appears not improper that restrictions be placed upon such activities as a condition of probation.” (50 Cal.2d at p. 103.) The People also rely upon People v. King, supra, which upheld conditions of probation which the opinion refers to as follows: “. .. the trial judge suspended proceedings and placed defendant on probation for three years on certain conditions, one of which, according to order made in open court, was ‘that she not take an active or official part in any other demonstrations of this kind during the period of probation’; according to the judgment she was ‘Not to participate actively in demonstrations involving sit-down, road-blocking, et cetera.’ ” (267 Cal.App.2d at p. 819.) The court affirmed an order revoking the defendant’s probation for her active participation—blowing up balloons—in a peaceful anti-war demonstration against a manufacturer of a product used in napalm bombs. (Id., pp. 826-827.) In upholding the conditions of probation, the court observed, “A reading of the record makes the purpose of the disputed condition obvious. Since defendant was guilty of crimes growing out of a demonstration and had suffered a prior conviction arising out of one, it was not improper that restraint was placed on such activity. (People v. Osslo, 50 Cal.2d 75, 103. . . .) From her conduct in the June 20, 1967, demonstration, which the trial judge assigned to her youth, lack of emotional maturity, exercise of poor or any judgment, and lack of regard for the rights and property of others, he correctly assessed defendant’s proclivities when involved with others in a protest or demonstration. The clear purpose of restraining her from active participation in future demonstrations was to protect her from her own irresponsible conduct when involved in emotionally charged situations which she seems to be too immature to handle.” (Id., pp. 823-824, fn. omitted.) Her “crimes” were described as follows: “While originally she was charged with two counts of battery upon a peace officer and the trial judge felt that ‘this is, in fact, a felony,’ defendant was actually convicted of two counts of simple assault in violation of section 240, Penal Code, a misdemeanor.” (Id., p. 827.)
In King, however, the court distinguished between active participation in demonstrations, and any abridgement of the defendant’s First Amendment rights. It stated, “At the outset, it should be noted that the judge did not bar [962]*962her from peaceful attendance at gatherings or speeches or the exercise of free speech and association; but he did warn her that the exercise of her own rights does not include a destruction of the rights of others. . . . Surely the condition that she not ‘participate actively in demonstrations involving sit-down, road-blocking, et cetera’ does not proscribe her freedom of speech and association under the First Amendment. Further, whether, in a protest or dissent, the right of free speech or association is exercised in such a way as to bring the protestor under the shield of the constitutional guarantees must depend upon the circumstances—what is said, the place where it is uttered, the purpose of the utterance, the manner in which it is uttered, the size of the assemblage and its purpose, and whether the utterance is accompanied by activities such as blocking movement of traffic, trespassing on public or private property, interfering with the rights of others, preventing ordinary use of premises by an occupant, physically attacking law enforcement officers, etc. We cannot hold under the circumstances of this case that the condition of probation in any manner abridges defendant’s First Amendment freedoms.” (Id.., pp. 825-826, fn. omitted.)
In this case the court had before it a probation report which revealed the following: The present conviction of assault arose out of an incident which occurred in a “highly charged emotional atmosphere” during an unauthorized demonstration at the College of San Mateo. Petitioner kicked another young man in the face, resulting in a severe dislocation and breaking of the latter’s jaw. Petitioner had earlier been suspended from the College of San Mateo and was not authorized to appear on campus.
Petitioner’s prior criminal record consists of misdemeanor offenses resulting from his activities in various anti-draft and anti-war movements in Wyoming, Oakland and Berkeley, California. In at least one of those instances petitioner was specifically noted by campus police officers at the University of California as having kicked them with heavy boots. (See also, fn. 8 below.) It also appears from the proceedings at sentencing that the diagnostic report from the Department of Corrections (Pen. Code, § 1203.03) recommended that the petitioner be sent to prison.
The court orally pronounced the terms of probation in substantially the form in which they are found in the order.5 The judge also advised the [963]*963defendant, “. . . you are going to be gagged is what I have got in mind as far as participating in campus activities, not because I am opposed to protest, but of the fact that you were not able to control yourself while you were in fact engaged in a protest movement.”
After the judge pronounced the conditions of probation, the following colloquy occurred: “[Petitioner]: That includes no speaking, right, at any functions on the campus, right? No contributing by writing and no participation in any organizations on or off the campus that do what, that are— I mean, off-campus, too, that’s got anything to do with the campus or no off-campus thing period? The Court: Involving any on or off-campus activities. In other words, I am putting the gag on you. I want you to understand that. [Petitioner]: In other words, it’s no- organizations, then. The Court: That’s right. As I say, if you stay out of any organizations, except the official student body of the campus, the student body organization for the purpose of getting a student body card to go to various activities, that’s it. You can go to school. I want you to go to school. That’s one of the conditions of probation, but the gag is on. You go there to study and study alone. [Petitioner]: No speaking? The Court: No speaking; no writing upon any of these matters that are of vital interest to you. I know that these are tough conditions. Do you accept them? [Petitioner]: Yes, Your Honor.”
The court’s motivation is clearly analogous to that found and approved in People v. King, supra. Nevertheless, the conclusion that the petitioner was unable to control himself while he was in fact engaged in a protest movement does not rationally require a curb on all thought or expression in order to discourage future criminality. The physical restraint of a prison sentence from which the petitioner was relieved would have curbed his activity, and physical association with companions of his own choosing. It could not, however, imprison his ideas or purge his mind of his beliefs. Should more be required as a condition of probation? It is only action or the threat of immediate action that could result in future criminality. People v. King, supra, goes no further.
It is true that the petitioner’s membership in organizations participating in and advocating protests or change of existing conditions may [964]*964bear some relationship to the offense of which he was convicted. It was only, however, his active participation in demonstrations sponsored by such organizations which resulted in criminal action. His mere embracing of the causes referred to would not alone have led to his transgressions. Moreover, the order is not limited to organizations which are engaged in demonstrations leading to violence, and breaches of the peace or violations of other laws. From all that appears the defendant could not become a member of a political party advocating a reform of welfare payment procedures, or legislation designed to preserve man’s environment.6
It is concluded that the first sentence of paragraph “[3]” of the conditions of probation is invalid insofar as it prohibits petitioner’s passive membership in any of the organizations included in the court’s proscription. On the precedent of People v. Osslo, supra, he may be prohibited from holding any office or position of responsibility in any organization to which he belonged while he was engaged in unlawful activities. The record (see fn. 8 below) fails to reflect that petitioner’s criminal conduct can be attributed to a course of conduct involving a particular organization, as distinguished from an unpremeditated individual act of violence. He also may be prohibited from actively participating in demonstrations staged by any organization included in the court’s order. (See People v. King, supra, 267 Cal.App.2d 814, 825.7) The further restrictions fail to come within the criteria pronounced in People v. Dominguez, supra (256 Cal.App.2d at p. 627) and approved in In re Bushman, supra (1 Cal.3d at pp. 776-777).
The conditions in the second and third sentence of paragraph “[3]” curb petitioner’s freedom of expression, written and oral. It is axiomatic that freedom of speech is a constitutionally protected right, and cannot be criminal per se aside from some vice in its content. (See Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) 395 U.S. 444, 448 [23 L.Ed.2d 430, 434, 89 S.Ct. 1827]; and Carroll v. President & Com’rs. of Princess Anne (1968) 393 U.S. 175, 180-181 [21 L.Ed.2d 325, 330-331, 89 S.Ct. 347].) Petitioner’s writing, albeit in protest of or for a change of, existing conditions, does not appear to have any direct relationship to the crime of which he was convicted, nor has it been shown to have any effect on his future criminality. [965]*965His speaking was directly related to the assault.8 It may rationally be inferred from petitioner’s past conduct, that future speeches under similar circumstances would tend to produce confrontations leading to future criminality. The condition, however, covers any speech for any organization regardless of the subject matter or the nature of the organization. It is, therefore, too broad to satisfy the Dominguez criteria. Insofar as it embraces a reasonable restraint, it is encompassed in condition “[5],” which is discussed below.
In the final sentence petitioner’s freedom of movement is curtailed. Here again the exercise of the right restrained is not only lawful in itself, but also constitutionally protected. (See, Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 629-631 [22 L.Ed.2d 600, 612-613, 89 S.Ct. 1322].) Moreover, banishment itself is a prohibited term of probation. (People v. Blakeman (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 596, 597-598 [339 P.2d 202].) This is not to say, however, that a state university or college, or a local junior college, or high school, may not reasonably control admission to its premises. (See, Pen. Code, §§ 626-626.8; and Ed. Code, §§ 15801 and 25422.5.) His unauthorized presence at the scene of the crime was related to its commission, and it may be reasonable to assume that his presence on another campus for the purpose of actively participating in a demonstration could lead to future criminal conduct. The restraint imposed, however, is overbroad and prohibits lawful movement which has no relationship with past or future criminality.
It is concluded that the conditions in paragraph “[3],” insofar as they exceed the general prohibition in paragraph “[5]” are invalid because they exceed accepted criteria for what reasonably may be imposed as a condition of prohibition.
Condition “[5]” states, “He shall not participate in, actively or passively, nor shall he be an advisor to any on-campus or off-campus [966]*966demonstration for any purpose whatsoever.” It may be, and is, interpreted as curbing the petitioner’s freedom of assembly, speech (including writing), and movement insofar as the exercise of any of those freedoms are directed to a demonstration, whether the demonstration be advocating a form of protest, a change in existing conditions or maintenance of the status quo. Insofar as this condition prohibits active participation in a demonstration involving “sit-down, road-blocking, et cetera” it is countenanced by People v. King, supra, and warranted by the court’s finding, on an adequate record, that the petitioner has not been able to control himself when he was in fact engaged in a protest movement. It does not follow, however, that being an advisor to a demonstration bears any relationship to his past or future criminality. He was not charged or found guilty of inciting others to riot or to commit any other breach of law. Prom all that appears he may advise peaceful rather than unlawful demonstrations. If he engages in any criminal practices9 or becomes abandoned to improper associates or a vicious life his probation may be revoked in any event. (Pen. Code, § 1203.2.)
Insofar as passive participation connotes participation which is not active or open it may not only be undetected, but also may have no relationship to his past or possible future criminality. The phrase may also convey the meaning attributed to it in “passive resistance” which connotes techniques and acts of noncooperation in place of violence or active measure of opposition. Paragraph “[5]” may, therefore, be clarified to read, “He shall not actively participate or engage in any on-campus or off-campus demonstration, or protest, or passive resistance for any purpose whatsoever.”
It is true that petitioner’s conviction subjected him to imprisonment which would restrain his freedom of association, speech, and movement, but it is an over-simplification to conclude that the greater restraint should include the lesser. History is replete with examples that demonstrate that imprisonment does not curb thought or the dissemination of ideas. “Putting the gag” on the convicted probationer, insofar as it is not directly related to a past criminal abuse of the privilege of freedom of speech itself, or to the prospect of future criminality, does not serve to further [967]*967“the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law,” nor does it provide “generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.” (See Pen. Code, § 1203.1.) It has been recognized that the public interest in the free flow of information, and the right of freedom of speech which protects it, preclude precensorship of speeches made by a parolee or the subject of prison conditions. (See Hyland v. Procunier (N.D. Cal.) 311 F.Supp. 749. Note also, Jackson v. Godwin (5th Cir. 1968) 400 F.2d 529, 535, and 541-542; and Palmigiano v. Travisono (D.R.I. 1970) 317 F.Supp. 776 [7 Crim.L. 2481].)
II
The restraint attendant to the prohibition or active participation in demonstrations which has been countenanced above does interfere with the constitutional rights which petitioner was entitled to enjoy before his conviction.
“It is now well settled that, although an individual can claim no constitutional right to obtain public employment or receive any other publicly conferred benefit, the government may not condition public employment or receipt of such benefit upon any terms that it may choose to impose, and that the power of government to withhold benefits from its citizens does not encompass a ‘lesser’ power to grant such benefits upon an arbitrary deprivation of constitutional rights. [Citations.]” (Vogel v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 68 Cal.2d 18, 21. See also, Parrish v. Civil Service Commission (1967) 66 Cal.2d 260, 271 [57 Cal.Rptr. 623, 425 P.2d 223]; Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist., supra, 65 Cal.2d 499, 503-505; and Danskin v San Diego Unified Sch. Dist. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 536, 545-547 [171 P.2d 885].10)
In re Allen (1969) 71 Cal.2d 388 [78 Cal.Rptr. 207, 455 P.2d 143], suggests that the principle is applicable to conditions of. probation. The court stated, “The government is without constitutional authority to impose a predetermined condition on the exercise of a constitutional right or penalize in some manner its use.” (71 Cal.2d at p. 391.) In striking down a condition of probation that the defendant, who was presumably indigent at the time of her trial, reimburse the county for funds expended in supply[968]*968:ing her court-appointed counsel, the court concluded “that the imposition of the condition under attack constitutes an impediment to the free exercise of a right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution and as with respect to other impediments or forms of compulsion against the exercise of such rights may not be permitted by the courts.” (Id., pp. 391-392. Cf., however, People v. Kern, supra, 246 Cal.App.2d 962, 965.)
Nevertheless, in Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist., supra, the court observed, “On the other hand, we cannot accept the apparent suggestion of some few cases that government may never condition the receipt of benefits or privileges upon the non-assertion of constitutional rights. [Citations.] . . . Just as we have rejected the fallacious argument that the power of government to impose such conditions knows no limits, so must we acknowledge that government may, when circumstances inexorably so require, impose conditions upon the enjoyment of publicly conferred benefits despite a resulting qualification of constitutional rights.” (65 Cal.2d atp. 505, fn. omitted.)
The criteria for determining whether the qualification of a constitutional right may properly be imposed are set forth in Parrish v. Civil Service Commission, supra, as follows: “When . . . the conditions annexed to the enjoyment of a publicly conferred benefit require a waiver of rights secured by the Constitution, however well-informed and voluntary that waiver, the governmental entity seeking to impose those conditions must establish: (1) that the conditions reasonably relate to the purposes sought by the legislation which confers the benefit; (2) that the value accruing to the public from imposition of those conditions manifestly outweighs any resulting impairment of constitutional rights; and (3) that there are available no alternative means less subversive of constitutional right, narrowly drawn so as to correlate more closely with the purposes contemplated by conferring the benefit. [Citations.]” (66 Cal.2d at p. 271.)
These criteria in part embrace those which have been reviewed in connection with the determination of the validity of the terms and conditions of probation. It is unnecessary to determine whether the two tests are coterminous. It suffices to state that the restraint on petitioner’s freedom from prohibiting his active participation in demonstrations reasonably relates to his reformation and rehabilitation; that the value accruing to the public from the imposition of such conditions outweighs the resulting impairment of constitutional rights; and that the narrow restriction, to circumstances which are apt to become emotionally charged, is an alternative which correlates closely with the purposes to be served by probation.
In view of the invalidation of the overbroad conditions of probation it is unnecessary to discuss the alleged effect of the conditions as a prior [969]*969restraint on free speech insofar as the content of petitioner’s writing or of nondemonstration related speech is concerned. (See Carroll v. President & Com’rs. of Princess Anne, supra, 393 U.S. 175, 180-181.) The restriction countenanced goes to the time, place and manner of his speaking or other participation, so as to prevent him from subjecting himself to an emotionally charged atmosphere. Nor is it necessary to determine whether the rights of potential auditors may enlarge the rights of the speaker, or, more accurately, preclude the imposition of otherwise valid restraints on the speaker. (See, Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479, 482-483 [14 L.Ed.2d 510, 513-514, 85 S.Ct. 1678].) It is obvious that the right to hear, cannot, as did the trumpets at Jericho, blow down the prison walls. Under this decision the potential auditor may under appropriate conditions read all that the probationer may have to say.
The writ is granted and the Superior Court of San Mateo County is directed to modify its order granting probation in accordance with the views set forth above. In all other respects the order to show cause is discharged and the petition is denied.
Molinari, P. J., concurred.