Opinion No. (1997)

CourtCalifornia Attorney General Reports
DecidedJanuary 3, 1997
StatusPublished

This text of Opinion No. (1997) (Opinion No. (1997)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Attorney General Reports primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Opinion No. (1997), (Cal. 1997).

Opinion

DANIEL E. LUNGREN Attorney General GREGORY L. GONOT Deputy Attorney General

THE HONORABLE BRUCE McPHERSON, MEMBER OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE, has requested an opinion on the following question:

For purposes of the California Uniform Retail Food Facilities Law, does a "temporary food facility" include a food facility operating out of temporary facilities at a fixed location one day each week in close proximity to and in conjunction with a certified farmers' market?

CONCLUSION
For purposes of the California Uniform Retail Food Facilities Law, a "temporary food facility" does not include a food facility operating out of temporary facilities at a fixed location one day each week in close proximity to and in conjunction with a certified farmers' market.

ANALYSIS
The California Uniform Retail Food Facilities Law (Health Saf. Code, §§ 113700-114455; "CURFFL")1 provides uniform statewide health and sanitation standards for retail food facilities. (§ 113705.) Its purpose is "to assure the people of this state that food will be pure, safe, and unadulterated." (Ibid.) The question presented for resolution concerns whether a food facility operating out of temporary facilities one day each week in conjunction with a certified farmers' market qualifies for treatment as a "temporary food facility" under the terms of CURFFL. We conclude that it does not.

A "food facility," as defined in CURFFL, means:

"(1) Any food establishment, vehicle, vending machine, produce stand, swap meet prepackaged food stand, temporary food facility, satellite food distribution facility, stationary mobile food preparation unit, and mobile food preparation unit.

"(2) Any place used in conjunction with the operations described in paragraph (1), including, but not limited to, storage facilities for food-related utensils, equipment, and materials.

"(3) A certified farmers' market, for purposes of permitting and enforcement." (§ 113785, subd. (a).)

"`Food establishment' means any room, building, or place, or portion thereof, maintained, used, or operated for the purpose of storing, preparing, serving, manufacturing, packaging, transporting, salvaging, or otherwise handling food at the retail level." (§113780.) "`Food establishment' does not include . . . a vehicle, vending machine, satellite food distribution facility, temporary food facility, open-air barbecue, certified farmers' market, stationary mobile food preparation unit, or mobile food preparation unit." (Ibid.)

A "food establishment" is subject to more rigorous sanitation and structural standards than other types of food facilities, such as a temporary food facility. (Compare §§ 27623- 27627, 114105,114145, and 114150 with §§114310-114325.) Walls and ceilings in a temporary food facility may consist of plastic, canvas, fly screening, or similar materials not permitted in the construction of food establishments. Hand washing and waste disposal in a temporary food facility may be set up without permanent plumbing connections. Rest room facilities may be located up to 200 feet away from a temporary food facility. However, like food establishments, temporary food facilities must maintain potentially hazardous foods at appropriate temperatures (§ 27601) and are required to have all of their food contact surfaces in a smooth and cleanable condition (§114315).

Section 113895, the focus of our inquiry, states:

"`Temporary food facility' means a food facility operating out of temporary facilities approved by the enforcement officer at a fixed location for a period of time not to exceed 25 days in any 90-day period in conjunction with a single event or celebration."

Does the language of section 113895 apply to a food facility operating out of temporary facilities approved by an enforcement officer2 at a fixed location in close proximity to and in conjunction with a certified farmers' market ("CFM")3 one day each week? The food facility would be dismantled and stored off-site until the next weekly staging of the CFM.

Resolution of the question presented requires an examination of what the Legislature meant when it used the phrase "period of time not to exceed 25 days in any 90-day period in conjunction with a single event or celebration." (§ 113895.) In analyzing this language, we first note that if a CFM is conducted on a once-a-week basis, and if each weekly CFM is considered a separate "single event or celebration," the food facility would never use more than one day of the 25-day statutory period in any 90 days.4 Such an interpretation would allow the food facility to operate as a temporary food facility on a year-round basis under the circumstances presented. Similarly, if theannual session of the CFM were to be viewed as a separate single event, and if the food facility were viewed as using only one day of the 25-day allotment each week, it again would be able to stay in operation as a temporary food facility throughout the year. For "any 90-day period," it would be used for less than 15 days under this interpretation of the statutory language.

To determine whether either interpretation may be applied to the terms of section 113895, we look to established principles of statutory construction. "[O]ur first task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. In determining such intent, a court must look first to the words of the statutes themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import. . . ." (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment HousingCom. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386-1387.) "[I]t is well established that reports of legislative committees and commissions are part of a statute's legislative history and may be considered when the meaning of a statute is uncertain. [Citations.]" (Hutnick v. United States Fidelity GuarantyCo. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 456, 465, fn. 7.) "Unless unreasonable or clearly contrary to the statutory language or purpose, the consistent construction of a statute by an agency charged with responsibility for its implementation is entitled to great deference. [Citation.]" (Dix v.Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 462, 460.) "[A] statute should be accorded a reasonable and common sense interpretation, avoiding absurd or impractical results." (Dakin v. Department of Forestry Fire Protection (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 681, 686.) Finally, "a proviso or exception carved out of the general enactment must be construed strictly. . . ." (San JoseTeachers Assn. v. Barozzi (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1376, 1383.)

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hutnick v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
763 P.2d 1326 (California Supreme Court, 1988)
San Jose Teachers Ass'n, CTA, NEA v. Barozzi
230 Cal. App. 3d 1376 (California Court of Appeal, 1991)
Dakin v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection
17 Cal. App. 4th 681 (California Court of Appeal, 1993)
Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission
743 P.2d 1323 (California Supreme Court, 1987)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Opinion No. (1997), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/opinion-no-1997-calag-1997.