OPINION
BLATZ, C.J.
In this remand from the United States Supreme Court, appellant Dennis Darol [869]*869Linehan contends that the Minnesota Sexually Dangerous Person Act (SDP Act), Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (1998), is unconstitutional on substantive and procedural due process grounds. He also argues that the SDP Act violates the ban on double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. We again address appellant’s constitutional challenges to the SDP Act.
In order to adequately address appellant’s contentions, we must first detail his extensive history of harmful sexual conduct. Appellant was sexually and physically abused as a child, and started his long course of harmful sexual conduct in his teens. In 1956, at age 15, appellant pulled down the shorts of a 4-year-old girl and was sent to reform school. In 1960, at age 19, he had intercourse with a 13-year-old girl. In 1963, appellant engaged in windowpeeping. Later that year, he and a friend beat and repeatedly raped L.H.
On June 10, 1965, after windowpeeping, the 23-year-old appellant killed 14-year-old B.I. while attempting to sexually assault her. In a one month window before his arrest, appellant committed two additional sexual assaults, including one rape. He pleaded guilty to kidnapping B.I. and was sentenced to a maximum prison term of 40 years. While serving his sentence, on June 20, 1975, appellant escaped from Stillwater Correctional Facility’s minimum security unit and assaulted 12-year-old T.L. in a ditch off the side of a Michigan road. He was convicted of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual misconduct and was imprisoned in Michigan. He was returned to Stillwater prison five years later.
Shortly before the end of appellant’s Minnesota prison term in 1992, the state moved to civilly commit appellant under the Psychopathic Personality Commitment Act (PP Act). Minn.Stat. §§ 526.09-.10 (1992). In order to be committed under the PP Act, as that act was interpreted by this court, a person must evidence an “utter lack of power to control [his or her] sexual impulses.” State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 555, 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 270, 60 S.Ct. 523, 84 L.Ed. 744 (1940). This standard will be referred to as the “utter inability test.”
In appellant’s initial commitment and 60-day review hearings, the district court heard extensive testimony about appellant’s mental state from a number of psychologists and psychiatrists. While the experts offered conflicting testimony as to appellant’s sexual impulsivity, none were asked whether appellant met the Pearson utter inability test and none testified that appellant evidenced an utter lack of control over his sexual impulses. Nonetheless, the district court found that appellant met the Pearson criteria and ordered him civilly committed under the PP Act for an indefinite period of time.
The court of appeals upheld the district court’s determination, In re Linehan, 503 N.W.2d 142 (Minn.App.1993), but we reversed, holding that appellant could not be committed under the PP Act because the state failed to present “clear and convincing evidence that appellant has an utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses.” In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn.1994) (hereinafter Linehan I). Upon his release, appellant was paroled to a special residence on the grounds of Still-water Correctional Facility. At Stillwater, he remained under “intensive supervised release” at a residence with substantial security precautions. Appellant participated in an out-patient sex offender program and was subject to drug testing.
In the wake of appellant’s release, the legislature passed the SDP Act. Act of August 31, 1994, ch. 1, art. 1, 1995 Minn. Laws 5, 7-8 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (1998)). The SDP Act establishes a new procedure for [870]*870civil commitment of persons who suffer from certain disorders and dysfunctions and are dangerous to the public. It states:
(a) A “sexually dangerous person” means a person who:
(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 7a;[1]
(2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and
(3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 7a.
(b) For the purposes of this provision, it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person’s sexual impulses.
Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c.
Upon enactment of the SDP Act, the state once again moved to have appellant civilly committed, this time as a sexually dangerous person. After hearing and rejecting constitutional challenges to the SDP Act, the district court held extensive initial commitment and 60-day review hearings. It found the requisite past course of harmful sexual conduct based on appellant’s eight prior convictions. In re Linehan, No. P8-94-0382, slip op. at 5-9 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct., July 27, 1995) (hereinafter Initial Commitment Hearing). The district court also found that appellant suffered from an Axis II antisocial personality disorder, based in part on the appellant’s own expert’s testimony. Id. at 9-13. Finally, the court considered appellant’s current aggressive behavior and his “lack of control in connection with sexual impulses” to be highly persuasive predictors of his future behavior. Id. at 23-24, 26. The court therefore found it highly probable that appellant would engage in future acts of harmful sexual conduct and ordered appellant civilly committed under the SDP Act. Id. at 26. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s rulings. In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308 (Minn.App.1996).
On appeal, we upheld the district court’s findings following appellant’s 60-day review hearing and ordered appellant indeterminately committed as a sexually dangerous person. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 167 (Minn.1996) (hereinafter Linehan II). In a separate opinion, we upheld appellant’s initial civil commitment pursuant to the SDP Act against substantive due process, equal protection, ex post fac-to, and double jeopardy challenges under the federal and state constitutions. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn.1996) (hereinafter Linehan III). We concluded that an utter inability to control one’s sexual impulses was not integral to narrowly tailoring the SDP Act to meet substantive due process requirements, and that distinguishing between sexually dangerous persons with and without mental disorders did not offend equal protection. Id. at 182-87. Further, the SDP Act was adjudged a civil and not a criminal law, and therefore held not to implicate the double jeopardy or ex post facto doctrines. Id. at 187-89. Appellant petitioned for a writ of certiorari for both cases from the United States Supreme Court.
Shortly before granting appellant’s writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court decided Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997), a challenge to a Kansas statute providing for civil commitment of sexually violent predators. Hendricks challenged his civil commitment under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (Kansas Act) on substantive due process grounds, and claimed that the Act established criminal proceedings in violation of the ban on double jeopardy and ex post facto laws.
[871]*871The language of the Kansas Act is very similar to the language of the Minnesota SDP Act. The Kansas Act defines a sexually violent predator as one:
who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(a) (1994 & Supp.1998).
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that the Kansas Act was constitutional and did not violate substantive due process or the ban on double jeopardy and ex post facto laws. In reviewing the substantive due process claim, the Supreme Court noted that states have civilly confined certain persons since the late 18th century. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357, 117 S.Ct. 2072. However, the Court clarified that it had sustained civil commitment statutes when the statutes “have coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor, such as a ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental abnormality.’ These added statutory requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.” Id. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (citations omitted). Under this scheme, the Supreme Court upheld the Kansas statute against Hendricks’ substantive due process challenge. Id. at 360,117 S.Ct. 2072.
The Supreme Court also determined that Kansas’ commitment proceeding was civil in nature, focusing on both the legislature’s stated intent and the purposes of the legislation. Id. at 368-69, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Therefore, Hendricks’ double jeopardy and ex post facto claims could not stand. Id. at 369-71,117 S.Ct. 2072.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment in Linehan III, and remanded it for reconsideration in light of its decision in Hendricks. Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011, 118 S.Ct. 596, 139 L.Ed.2d 486 (1997). We now address appellant’s constitutional challenges to the SDP Act in light of the Hendricks decision.
I.
On remand, we view our mandate very narrowly. We reconsider our decision in Linehan III only in light of issues raised in the Supreme Court’s Hendricks ruling.2 As Hendricks analyzes both double jeopardy and ex post facto claims, we briefly review appellant’s renewed double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges to the SDP Act.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning supports our earlier, ruling that the SDP Act does not contravene the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The Minnesota and Kansas Acts share many elements important to the Supreme Court’s determination that the Kansas Act was civil. Both states’ acts are in the civil commitment chapters of their statutes; neither requires a prior criminal conviction; neither includes a scienter requirement for commitment; and under both acts a person committed is to be released once he or she is sufficiently rehabilitated and can control his or her sexual impulses. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-69, 117 S.Ct. 2072.
Further, the Supreme Court focused heavily on whether the Kansas Act implicated the two primary objectives of criminal punishment — retribution and deterrence — in its analysis of Hendricks’ double jeopardy and ex post facto claims. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-63, 117 S.Ct. 2072. The Minnesota SDP Act is similar to the Kansas Act, using prior criminal acts for evidentiary purposes only, and therefore [872]*872does not involve retribution. In addition, neither act implicates deterrence because persons committed under both acts are “by definition, suffering from a ‘mental abnormality’ or a ‘personality disorder’ that prevents them from exercising adequate control over their behavior.” Id. at 362, 117 S.Ct. 2072; infra Section II. As our reasoning in Linehan III is supported by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hendricks, we see no need to modify our earlier rulings on appellant’s double jeopardy and ex post facto claims.
II.
The essence of appellant’s claim on remand is his substantive due process argument. “Although freedom from physical restraint ‘has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action,’ that liberty interest is not absolute.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504. U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992)). Rather, substantive due process protects individuals from “certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.’ ” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)); see also State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Minn.1986). When faced with a civil commitment law, “the judiciary has a constitutional duty to intervene before civil commitment becomes the norm and criminal prosecution the exception.” Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 181. Still, the state long has had the power to civilly commit certain persons in narrow circumstances. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357, 117 S.Ct. 2072.
In determining whether a civil commitment law violates substantive due process, a court will subject the law to strict scrutiny, placing the burden on the state to show that the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 181. States have a compelling interest in both protecting the public from sexual violence and rehabilitating the mentally ill. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979); Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 181; In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn.1994). As the state has set forth compelling interests supporting the SDP Act, this case turns on whether the state has demonstrated that the SDP Act is narrowly tailored to meet these interests.
Appellant argues that the SDP Act does not sufficiently narrow the class of targeted persons because it dispenses with the need to prove that a person has an utter inability to control his or her sexual impulses before allowing indeterminate civil commitment. He maintains that the utter inability test set out in Pearson’s interpretation of the PP Act sets the outer constitutional limit for civil commitment, and that this outer limit was upheld in Hendricks. Appellant’s arguments raise two questions: (1) does Hendricks require a complete or, at a minimum, a partial lack of volitional control over sexual impulses in order to narrowly tailor a civil commitment law to meet substantive due process standards; and (2) does the SDP Act meet the substantive due process standards set out in Hendricks?
First we consider Hendricks’ substantive due process reasoning. In Hendricks, the Supreme Court affirmed the forcible civil detainment in certain narrow circumstances of “people who are unable to control their behavior and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357, 117 S.Ct. 2072. It reasoned that a finding of mere dangerousness was not sufficient to justify civil commitment, but that dangerousness cou[873]*873pled with proof of an additional statutory factor such as a mental illness or personality disorder could ground civil commitment as such additional “requirements serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.” Id. at 358,117 S.Ct. 2072.
The Supreme Court turned to the Kansas Act and concluded that it
requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior. ⅜ * * [the Kansas Act thereby] narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Applying the Kansas Act to Hendricks’ circumstances, the Court held Hendricks’ “lack of volitional control, coupled with a prediction of future dangerousness, adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360, 117 S.Ct. 2072. At no point in its analysis did the Supreme Court state that a civil commitment statute aimed at sexually dangerous persons could pass substantive due process without a volitional impairment element. Rather, the Court’s reasoning establishes that some lack of volitional control is necessary to narrow the scope of civil commitment statutes.3
Even the dissent in Hendricks subscribed to the notion that some lack of volitional control is necessary for civil commitment statutes to stay within substantive due process bounds. The dissent noted that Hendricks was committed under the Kansas Act not just on the basis of his antisocial behavior, but also because of Hendricks’ “highly unusual inability to control his actions.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 375, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Thus, the conclusion that some degree of volitional impairment must be evidenced to satisfy substantive due process garnered nearly unanimous Supreme Court support.
As Hendricks limits involuntary civil confinement to “those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control,” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072, we must consider whether the Minnesota SDP Act also requires a similar volitional impairment. We begin by comparing the Minnesota and Kansas Acts. For the most part, the Minnesota SDP Act mirrors the Kansas Act. Both contain three-prong tests that must be met to civilly commit someone as a sexually dangerous person. The Kansas Act defines a sexually violent predator as one:
who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense and
who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person
likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a02(a).
The Minnesota SDP Act defines a sexually dangerous person as one who:
[874]*874(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct * * *;
(2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and
(3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct * * *.
Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(a).
Under the Supreme Court’s reading of the Kansas Act, the statute “requires evidence of past sexually violent behavior and a present mental condition that creates a likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Each of the prongs is critical because together they “limit involuntary civil confinement to those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.” Id. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Like the Kansas Act, the Minnesota SDP Act requires evidence of past harmful sexual behavior and a present qualifying disorder or dysfunction that makes future dangerous conduct highly likely if the person is not incapacitated. Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18e(a); Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 180. However, unlike the Kansas Act, the Minnesota Act explicitly states that “it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person’s sexual impulses.” Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(b). This section calls into question whether the Minnesota Act is outside the embrace of Hendricks ’ reasoning.
Our interpretation of section 253B.02, subd. 18c, must be guided by welhsettled canons of statutory construction. The legislature has stated that “[e]very law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1998); see United Power Ass’n v. C.I.R., 483 N.W.2d 74, 79 (Minn. 1992). Similarly, this court has stated that “a statute is to be construed as a whole so as to harmonize and give effect to all of its parts.” Willmus ex rel. Willmus v. Comm’r of Revenue, 371 N.W.2d 210, 213 (Minn.1985) (relying on Anderson v. Comm’r of Taxation, 253 Minn. 528, 533, 93 N.W.2d 523, 528 (1958)). Finally, when interpreting a statute, we are guided by the principle that “when any doubts arise as to the constitutionality [of a law] such doubts must be resolved in favor of the law.” Pearson, 205 Minn. at 555, 287 N.W. at 302.
In interpreting section 253B.02, subd. 18c, we first consider the SDP Act’s predecessor, the PP Act, under which the state first attempted to commit appellant. The PP Act required
the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of personal acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render such person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons.
Minn.Stat. § 526.09 (1992).
In Pearson we held that the PP Act mandated that the state prove a person: (a) has engaged in “a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters,” and (b) has “evidenced an utter lack of power to control [his or her] sexual impulses,” such that (c) the person is “likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire.” 205 Minn, at 555, 287 N.W. at 302. The state first tried to commit appellant under the PP Act but we reversed the commitment in Linehan I, holding that the district court did not have sufficient evidence before it to find that appellant was utterly unable to control his sexual impulses. Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 610.
After our decision in Linehan I, the legislature convened in a special session to [875]*875amend the PP Act. As passed, the amended PP Act was reworked into what is now known as the Sexual Psychopathic Personality Act (SPP Act). Act of August 31, 1994, ch. 1, art. 1, 1995 Minn. Laws 5, 6 (codified as amended at MinmStat. § 253B.02, subd. 18b (1998)). In order to civilly commit a person under the SPP Act, the state must show:
the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of personal acts, or a combination of any of these conditions, which render the person irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to sexual matters, if the person has evidenced, by a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, an utter lack of power to control the person’s sexual impulses and, as a result, is dangerous to other persons.
Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18b (1998) (emphasis added).
In. conjunction with the SPP Act, the legislature passed the law at issue in this case, the SDP Act. Act of August 31, 1994, ch. 1, art. 1, 1995 Minn. Laws 1, 5-9 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c (1998)). In the SDP Act, the legislature set out a three prong test for determining whether a person is sexually dangerous for purposes of civil commitment. Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(a). Nowhere in the SDP Act did the legislature set forth the “utter inability test.” However, the legislature stated that “it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control [his or her] sexual impulses.” Id. subd. 18c(b).
Against this legislative history, we held in Linehan III that the newly enacted SDP Act did not require “proof that the proposed patient has an inability to control his or her sexual impulses” in order to uphold civil commitment. Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 179 (interpreting the SDP Act). We then reviewed adequate grounds for civil commitment of mentally disordered and dangerous persons, and concluded that the SDP Act was enacted to protect the public from sexual predators with mental disorders “who retain enough control to ‘plan, wait, and delay the indulgence of their maladies until presented with a higher probability of success.’” Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 182 (quoting Linehan, 544 N.W.2d at 318) (emphasis added). Linehan III acknowledged that the SDP Act allows for commitment of individuals who do not lack total control over their harmful sexual impulses but have a degree of volitional impairment such that they are “unable to control their dangerousness,” as Hendricks requires. 557 N.W.2d at 182; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072. This becomes even clearer when viewed against the legislature shifting from the requirement that an utter lack of control be proven while remaining cognizant of the bounds of substantive due process.
Accordingly, the provision in subdivision 18c(b), stating that “it is not necessary to prove that the person has an inability to control the person’s sexual impulses,” should be read very narrowly, as in the Linehan III decision, to mean only that the state does not need to prove that a person meets the Pearson utter inability standard, thus differentiating the SDP Act from the PP Act or its successor statute, the SPP Act. Still, like the Kansas Act, the Minnesota SDP Act “requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072; see Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c(a). Such a reading harmonizes all parts of the statute and acknowledges the legislature’s [876]*876intent to abandon the “utter lack of control” test required for commitments under the SPP Act while insuring that the statute is narrowly tailored.4 Compare Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18b, with Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18c; see also Pearson, 205 Minn, at 555, 287 N.W. at 302.
While Pearson interpreted the PP Act to include an utter inability to control standard, we subsequently recognized that other grounds for civil commitment exist. See Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914 n. 6 (allowing for breadth in civil commitment classifications in challenge to commitment under PP Act). We now clarify that the SDP Act allows civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons who have engaged in a prior course of sexually harmful behavior and whose present disorder or dysfunction does not allow them to adequately control their sexual impulses, making it highly likely that they will engage in harmful sexual acts in the future.
III.
In light of our interpretation of the SDP Act, we must determine whether appellant’s commitment is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We review only whether appellant demonstrates a lack of adequate control over his sexually harmful behavior based on the district court’s findings, as all of the other, elements of appellant’s commitment were fully reviewed in Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d at 189-91.
The dissent states that there are no factual findings supporting a holding that appellant lacks adequate control over his harmful sexual behavior, and that we have stepped into the role of fact finder. However, the district court records from both the initial commitment and 60-day review hearings are replete with findings concerning appellant’s lack of volitional control over his sexually dangerous tendencies, which we merely summarize. The district court’s findings support our conclusion that appellant lacks adequate control over his sexual behavior and merits commitment under the SDP Act.
First, the district court found that appellant had recently displayed impulsiveness in his sexual behavior. After hearing testimony from prison guards and viewing a videotape, the district court determined that appellant engaged in physical play with his step-daughter and then left the room to masturbate, once on December 31, 1994 and once on January 1, 1995.5 Initial Commitment Hearing at 23; In re Linehan, No. P8-94-0362, slip op. at 7 (Ramsey County Dist. Ct., February 23,1996) (hereinafter 60-Day Hearing). Both incidents occurred during time-limited visits. The court found that appellant’s masturbation “shows a continuing sexual attraction to young females.” Initial Commitment Hearing at 23. Further, the court stated that, because the incidents occurred during time-limited visits, they “suggest a degree of impulsivity and lack of control in connection with sexual impulses.” Id.
Appellant later lied to a psychiatrist about the December 31 and January 1 incidents, stating that he no longer masturbated. The district court found that [877]*877appellant knowingly “lied about a sexual matter when he thought he could not be caught doing so.”6 Id. The incidents, appellant’s masturbation after playing with a young girl and his later denial that he masturbated, cumulatively show not only that appellant lacks adequate control over his sexual impulses, but also that appellant conceals his sexual misconduct.
In considering appellant’s likelihood of engaging in harmful sexual conduct, the district court was also concerned about appellant’s history of alcohol abuse. Appellant admits that most of his sexual assaults occurred while he was under the sway of alcohol — he could not remember many of his offenses because he was drunk at the time of the assaults. While incarcerated, appellant completed the Atlantis Chemical Dependency Program. However, appellant currently refuses to participate in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), claiming that he does not accept AA’s philosophy. In discussing its initial findings, the district court found a sex offender therapist’s testimony that “chemically dependent offenders who do not accept the AA philosophy are more likely to reoffend than those who do accept it” to be persuasive.7 60-Day Hearing at 6. Appellant’s refusal to participate in offered substance abuse treatment gave the district court great concern that appellant will reoffend. Initial Commitment Hearing at 21; 60-Day Hearing at 6.
The district court also considered appellant’s behavior toward hospital and prison staff in determining appellant’s likelihood of engaging in harmful sexual conduct. It found that appellant displayed aggressiveness toward the St. Peter Security Hospital staff when confined there.8 Initial Commitment Hearing at 24; 60-Day Hearing at 6. While living in a residence on the grounds of Stillwater Correctional Facility after his parole, appellant at times acted abusively toward his guards. Initial Commitment Hearing at 24. The district court found that appellant’s aggression in these circumstances showed appellant’s lack of control over his behavior, noting that in light of appellant’s long incarceration “one has to look for more subtle signs than rape and killing.” Id Appellant’s continued aggressive behavior in situations where he surely knew his behavior was subject to careful review further demonstrated appellant’s inability to exercise adequate control over his actions.
Finally, the district court made specific findings that appellant met the diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder, basing its findings on the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 1994) (DSM-IV). 60-Day Hearing at 10-11. Criteria for antisocial personality disorder include a failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior, deceitfulness, irritability and aggressiveness, reckless disregard for the safety of self and others, and lack of remorse. DSM-IV at 649-50. The court found that appellant met each of these criteria. 60 Day Hearing at 10-11. However, the trial court made no findings on another criterion for antisocial personality disorder, im-pulsivity or failure to plan ahead. Id. at 10. We do not believe that this omission is conclusive as to the amount of control appellant has over his sexual behavior. Im-[878]*878pulsivity as defined in DSM-IV refers to ability to plan ahead, such as “sudden changes of jobs, residences, or relationships,” but does not encompass ability to control one’s sexual behavior. DSM-IV at 646. Therefore, the lack of court findings on this diagnostic criterion does not indicate that appellant is able to exercise adequate control over his harmful sexual urges.
The district court record contains substantial evidence that appellant continued to engage in impulsive sexual behavior and lacks adequate control over his harmful sexual impulses. The district court found that appellant clearly meets all of the prongs of the SDP Act: he has a long history of engaging in harmful sexual behavior, he suffers from Axis II antisocial personality disorder, and he is highly likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct in the future. Accordingly, we uphold his commitment under the SDP Act.
We therefore reaffirm our decision in Linehan III, 557 N.W.2d 171. We also affirm the court of appeals decision in In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, holding that the SDP Act is constitutional and appellant’s civil commitment under the SDP Act is appropriate.
Affirmed.