Ronald Lindsey Reed v. Minnesota Department of Corrections

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: April 8, 2024
• Docket: a231121
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A23-1121

Ronald Lindsey Reed, Appellant,

vs.

Minnesota Department of Corrections, et al., Respondents.

Filed April 8, 2024 Affirmed Slieter, Judge

Anoka County District Court File No. 02-CV-22-3098

Zachary A. Longsdorf, Longsdorf Law Firm, PLC, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Elizabeth Johnston, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Wheelock,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SLIETER, Judge

Appellant challenges the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing

that the district court erred because the impact caused by changes to the parole authority

and process, which makes it more difficult to receive parole, violate several of his

constitutional rights. Because appellant has not demonstrated that the changes to the parole authority and process in determining parole requests violate his constitutional rights, we

affirm.

FACTS

In 2006, appellant Ronald Lindsey Reed received a life sentence for aiding and

abetting the murder of a St. Paul police officer in 1970. 1 Reed was sentenced pursuant to

Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (1969), which required him to serve a minimum of 20 years’

imprisonment before becoming eligible for parole, Minn. Stat. § 243.05 (1969). 2

Reed became eligible for parole in 2021. In 2021, Reed was provided an advisory

panel review hearing, after which the commissioner decided to continue Reed’s review for

three years.

Reed petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus against respondents

Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC), commissioner Paul Schnell, Lino Lakes

Correctional Facility, and warden Shannon Reimann. Reed challenged the procedures used

to determine his parole eligibility, arguing that he is entitled to have his parole determined

by the procedures and policies that were in place at the time of the offense. The district

court denied Reed’s petition, concluding that there is no liberty interest in parole and that

none of Reed’s constitutional rights were violated. Reed appeals.

1 Reed’s conviction was affirmed in 2007. State v. Reed, 737 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2007). 2 It is unclear whether Reed had to serve a minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment or 25 years’ imprisonment before becoming eligible for parole. We identify 20 years because it is the prison term referenced by the district court.

2 DECISION

A writ of habeas corpus is a statutory civil remedy by which a petitioner may “obtain

relief from [unlawful] imprisonment or restraint.” Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2022). It is an

“extraordinary remedy.” State ex rel. Young v. Schnell, 956 N.W.2d 652, 673-74 (Minn.

2021).

For the district court to grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petition must

allege “sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case for [the petitioner’s] discharge.” State

ex rel. Fife v. Tahash, 111 N.W.2d 619, 620 (Minn. 1961); see also Case v. Pung, 413

N.W.2d 261, 262 (Minn. App. 1987) (stating that the petitioner has the burden of showing

that they are being illegally detained), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 24, 1987). And the district

court will grant a petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing “only if a factual dispute

is shown by the petition.” Seifert v. Erickson, 420 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Minn. App. 1988),

rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 1988).

This court may affirm the denial of a habeas petition when the petition, on its face,

fails to present a case for issuing a writ of habeas corpus. State ex rel. Nelson v. Rigg, 107

N.W.2d 378, 379 (Minn. 1961). We review questions of law pertaining to a habeas corpus

proceeding de novo, but we afford “great weight” to the district court’s findings of fact,

which will not be reversed absent clear error. State ex rel. Ford v. Schnell, 933 N.W.2d

393, 401, 406-07 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).

Procedural Due Process

Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit the state from

depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const.

3 amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. Whether due process is required is a question of

law that appellate courts review de novo. Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 768 (Minn.

2005).

“While a prison inmate does not enjoy the full range of rights and privileges

available to ordinary citizens, he does not surrender all of his constitutional rights upon

incarceration.” Id. The government must, therefore, provide inmates with due process

before they are deprived a protected liberty interest. Id. Determining whether due process

is implicated in a particular case is a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine

whether the state deprived the complainant of a constitutionally protected liberty interest.

Id. Second, if the state deprived the complainant of a protected liberty interest, the court

must determine whether the deprivation followed constitutionally sufficient procedures.

Id.

Relying on State ex rel. Taylor v. Schoen, 273 N.W.2d 612 (Minn. 1978), Reed

argues that the district court erred in determining that he does not have a liberty interest in

parole. Subsequent caselaw compels our disagreement.

Taylor, relying on federal caselaw, concluded that inmates have a liberty interest in

parole and held “that parole release decision-making must be conducted in accordance with

the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 273 N.W.2d at 617. In so

holding, the court relied on Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex v. Greenholtz, 576

F.2d 1274 (8th Cir. 1978), which was subsequently reversed by the United States Supreme

Court. In Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979),

the United States Supreme Court compared a discretionary parole decision with the

4 possibility of obtaining conditional release and an inmate’s hope of not being transferred

to a different prison. It explained:

That the state holds out the possibility of parole provides no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained. . . . [T]he general interest asserted here is no more substantial than the inmate’s hope that he will not be transferred to another prison, a hope which is not protected by due process.

Id. at 10-11.

Because the United States Supreme Court determined that the Fourteenth

Amendment does not provide inmates with a liberty interest in an initial parole decision,

id., Reed’s reliance on Taylor is misplaced. And, notably, Reed did not separately base his

claim upon article I, section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution.

Because the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not

provide inmates with a liberty interest in parole, and because Reed advances no

due-process argument arising from the Minnesota Constitution, the district court properly

determined that Reed does not have a liberty interest in parole. The district court, therefore,

did not err in rejecting Reed’s procedural-due-process claim. See Phillips v. State, 725

N.W.2d 778, 782-83 (Minn. App. 2007) (“Without a protected interest, the government has

no constitutional obligation to provide due process.”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2007).

Substantive Due Process

Substantive due process protects individuals against “certain arbitrary, wrongful

government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”

In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 872 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted). “When assessing

5 a due process challenge, the analysis [appellate courts] apply depends on whether the

statute implicates a fundamental right.” State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762, 773 (Minn.

2015).

When a fundamental right is at stake, appellate courts apply the strict-scrutiny test

to substantive-due-process challenges under which “the state must show a legitimate and

compelling interest for abridging that right.” Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 716

(Minn. 1999). But when no fundamental right is at stake, appellate courts apply the

rational-basis test, and a challenged statute will be deemed constitutional if it “provide[s]

a reasonable means to a permissible objective.” Id.

Reed did not present a rational-basis or strict-scrutiny analysis in the district court,

and neither does he do so on appeal. “[O]n appeal error is never presumed. It must be

made to appear affirmatively before there can be reversal . . . [and] the burden of showing

error rests upon the one who relies upon it.” Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65

(Minn. 1944). Moreover, we typically will not address claims not argued before and

considered by the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating

that appellate courts generally address only those questions previously presented to and

considered by the district court). We may consider a new argument on appeal in the interest

of justice, Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04, but we decline to do so here because Reed failed

to present a rational-basis or strict-scrutiny analysis for this court to review.

Equal Protection

Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee similarly situated

individuals equal protection under the law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const.

6 art. I, § 2. “To establish that he has been denied equal protection of the laws, [Reed] must

show that similarly situated persons have been treated differently.” Paquin v. Mack, 788

N.W.2d 899, 906 (Minn. 2010). “[T]his threshold showing [is required] ‘because the

guarantee of equal protection does not require that the State treat persons who are

differently situated as though they were the same.’” State v. Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 521

(Minn. 2011) (quoting Paquin, 788 N.W.2d at 906). Courts “routinely reject[]

equal-protection claims when a party cannot establish that he or she is similarly situated to

those whom they contend are being treated differently.” Id.

Reed claims that the district court erred in denying his equal-protection claim

without an evidentiary hearing. The district court found that Reed failed to make the

preliminary showing that he is being treated differently than similarly situated individuals.

Reed contends that he was unable to make a preliminary showing without an evidentiary

hearing, which would necessarily be preceded by discovery.

Inmates are not entitled to discovery during habeas proceedings unless their petition

alleges facts that, if proved, demonstrate that the inmate is entitled to relief. See Bracy v.

Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904, 908-09 (1997) (noting habeas petitions are not typically

entitled to discovery, but discovery may be needed when the petition alleges facts that, if

fully developed, may demonstrate that the petitioner is entitled to relief); see also State ex

rel. Roy v. Tahash, 152 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Minn. 1967) (noting Minnesota’s standards

“substantially equate those required of the Federal trial courts”). Reed’s petition

summarily states that “[a]s a result of the Respondents’ failure to treat Reed consistently

7 with other defendants serving sentences under the statutes in effect . . . in May 1970, Reed

has been denied the equal protection of the law.”

Reed alleges no facts indicating that individuals who aided and abetted first-degree

murder were treated differently than him. Because Reed’s petition fails to allege facts that,

if proved, would entitle him to relief, the district court properly determined that he failed

to make the threshold showing that he is being treated differently than similarly situated

persons, and its finding is not clearly erroneous. And, because Reed failed to make a

threshold showing, the district court did not err in denying his petition without an

evidentiary hearing.

Ex Post Facto

Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit the enactment of ex

post facto laws. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Minn. Const. art. I, § 11. Whether a law

violates the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws is a legal question appellate

courts review de novo. Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 790 (Minn. 2014).

The prohibition on ex post facto laws forbids “laws that render an act punishable in

a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed.” Id. (quotation omitted).

A law falling within the ex post facto prohibition “must be a criminal or penal law, it must

not be merely procedural, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it

must disadvantage the offender affected by it.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted).

Reed claims that the changes to the decision-making body and the information that

the decision-maker must consider when determining whether parole is appropriate presents

an ex post facto violation. In particular, he points to the new requirement that, prior to

8 considering a parole request, the commissioner must hear from the victim. This

requirement, Reed claims, significantly reduces the likelihood that parole will be granted

in comparison to when victim input was not required.

Although the legislature has changed the composition of the decision-making body

responsible for determining whether to grant parole, changes to the decision-making body

are procedural and, therefore, do not violate the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto

laws. See Hankerson v. State, 723 N.W.2d 232, 241-42 (Minn. 2006) (citing Dobbert v.

Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292-94 (1977) (holding that changing the roles of judge and jury

was procedural and, therefore, not an ex post facto violation)).

And because considering victim input in parole decisions, like other procedural

changes, does not change the definition of the crime, available defenses, or punishment for

the offense for which Reed was convicted, we likewise find no ex post facto violation in

this respect either. At the time of the offense, the statutory punishment for aiding and

abetting first-degree murder was life imprisonment. Minn. Stat. § 609.185, subd. 1

(“Whoever . . . is guilty of murder in the first degree . . . shall be sentenced to

imprisonment for life . . . .”). That is the sentence the district court imposed. The

additional requirement to consider victim input during the parole process does not “render

[aiding and abetting first-degree murder] punishable in a manner in which it was not

punishable when it was committed.” Rew, 845 N.W.2d at 790 (quotation omitted). The

additional requirement directing the commissioner to consider victim input when

determining whether parole is proper, therefore, is merely procedural and does not violate

the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

9 Separation of Powers

“[T]he power to prescribe punishment for criminal acts is vested with the legislature

and the judiciary may only impose sentences within the statutory limits prescribed by the

legislature.” State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 764 (Minn. 1999).

Reed claims that “it is a violation of the separation of power[s] doctrine to allow the

legislature to modify the terms and condition[s] of his sentence after the court exercised its

judicial authority to sentence him based upon the limits put in place by the legislature at

the time of the offense.” Reed’s claims rest on his unsupported premise that changes to

the parole process have made it more difficult for him to receive parole. Reed was

sentenced pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.185, which required him to serve a minimum of

20 years’ imprisonment, “less the diminution which would have been allowed for good

conduct had his sentence been for 20 years,” before becoming eligible for parole. Minn.

Stat. § 243.05. Even if we accept Reed’s premise, a change in the parole process

purportedly making it more difficult to get parole “does not alter the sentence of the court

or impose a new sentence.” State v. Schwartz, 628 N.W.2d 134, 140 (Minn. 2001).

Because the changes to the parole process did not impact Reed’s sentence, the district court

properly determined that the changes in the parole authority and considerations does not

violate separation of powers.

Affirmed.