Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 24-BG-0205
IN RE MATTHEW A. LEFANDE, RESPONDENT
A Suspended Member of the Bar Of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Bar Registration No. 475995)
On Report and Recommendation Of the Board on Professional Responsibility
(BDN: 22-BD-024; DDN: 2020-D018, 2019-D050, 2019-D041, & 2018-D061)
(Submitted October 2, 2024 Decided January 2, 2025)
Matthew A. LeFande, pro se.
Hamilton P. Fox, Disciplinary Counsel, Theodore (Jack) Metzler, Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, and Jelani C. Lowery, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for Disciplinary Counsel.
Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, and EASTERLY and DEAHL, Associate Judges.
DEAHL, Associate Judge: The Board on Professional Responsibility found
that Matthew A. LeFande committed seven violations of the District of Columbia
and Maryland Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Board was evenly split on
the appropriate discipline for those violations: four members recommend a three- 2
year suspension with reinstatement conditioned on a demonstration of fitness, and
four members recommend disbarment.
We agree that LeFande committed the alleged rules violations and agree with
those Board members who recommend that he be disbarred.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
We summarize the Board’s factual findings in six parts: (1) the District Title
litigation; (2) the Warren bankruptcy matter; (3) the Carvalho bankruptcy matter;
(4) LeFande’s personal bankruptcy matter; (5) LeFande’s failure to participate in the
disciplinary proceedings below; and (6) the Board’s divided recommendation
regarding sanctions.
1. The District Title litigation
District Title handled the 2014 sale of Anita Warren’s property. While
managing the sale, District Title erroneously wired $293,514.44 to Warren instead
of Wells Fargo, Warren’s mortgage lender who was the intended recipient of the
funds as the holder of a security interest in the property. District Title asked Warren
to return the money, but she had other ideas. She instead transferred the funds to her
son, Timothy Day, and other relatives of hers. District Title sued in D.C. Superior
Court to recover the money, and Warren and Day hired LeFande as their attorney in 3
the matter. The case was then removed to the federal district court for the District
of Columbia.
In 2014, District Title moved in the district court for an injunction to prevent
Warren and Day from spending the funds that were mistakenly transferred to them
or from otherwise disposing of or encumbering any real property or other substantial
assets. The day after District Title sought that injunction, LeFande represented Day
as he closed on a sale of real property, and then directed that $82,051.81 in proceeds
from that sale be wired to a New Zealand bank account affiliated with a company
named Escrow Hill Limited. The Board ultimately concluded that “[d]ue to the
absence of any testimony from [LeFande], his clients, or third parties,” there was not
substantial evidence showing LeFande himself had the intent to steal District Title’s
property. But it is undisputed that LeFande orchestrated the transfer that was clearly
designed to conceal those assets amidst pending litigation.
The district court granted District Title’s request for an injunction a few weeks
later and eventually granted summary judgment—a monetary award of $293,514.44,
the erroneously transferred amount, plus interest—in District Title’s favor. Warren
and Day did not pay the judgment, prompting District Title to seek post-judgment
discovery for collection purposes. Day and Warren both passed away shortly
thereafter. District Title sought to depose LeFande about Day’s property sale and
subsequent transfer of $82,051.81 in proceeds to the New Zealand bank account. 4
LeFande opposed the motion and sought a protective order, asserting his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and further asserting that District Title
was seeking information protected by the attorney-client privilege. The district court
directed that “LeFande must sit for the deposition,” and rejected LeFande’s request
for a protective order, concluding that he could not make a blanket assertion of
privilege to avoid testifying. Dist. Title v. Warren, 265 F. Supp. 3d 17, 21-23
(D.D.C. 2017). He would instead need to assert any privileges on a question-by-
question basis. Id.
LeFande then refused to sit for a deposition and was held in contempt for that
refusal. As the D.C. Circuit summarized in upholding LeFande’s contempt
conviction, LeFande did not respond to District Title’s letters, emails, or six separate
attempts to make contact via process server. In re LeFande, 919 F.3d 554, 559 (D.C.
Cir. 2019). The district court responded to those refusals by directing LeFande to
sit for an in-court deposition, which LeFande also tried to avoid. LeFande filed a
bankruptcy petition on behalf of Warren in an effort to stay the litigation and stall
any deposition, though that bankruptcy filing was later determined to be frivolous,
as discussed in the next section.
While LeFande ultimately appeared for the in-court deposition, he refused to
take the stand after receiving seven court orders to do so, repeating his already-
rejected arguments that the Fifth Amendment and attorney-client privilege allowed 5
him to avoid sitting for the deposition entirely. The court then found LeFande guilty
of criminal contempt and fined him $5,000. The court issued a finding of civil
contempt as well, imposing a fine of $1,000 per day until he complied with the order
to sit for the deposition. It appears that LeFande has still not complied with the order
to sit for a deposition.
2. The Warren bankruptcy matter
As previously mentioned, LeFande filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of
Warren while the District Title litigation was ongoing, and that petition triggered an
automatic stay in the District Title litigation. The Board found that LeFande filed
the petition for the improper purpose of avoiding being deposed in the District Title
litigation. LeFande also filed a motion for contempt against District Title’s
attorneys, claiming they were violating the automatic bankruptcy stay by still trying
to depose him in the District Title litigation despite the ongoing bankruptcy matter.
The bankruptcy court directed LeFande to show cause why he should not be
sanctioned for making frivolous arguments in his motion for contempt. After
LeFande failed to appear at the show-cause hearing, the bankruptcy court imposed
monetary and non-monetary sanctions (attending “two ethical courses”) against him.
In re Warren, No. 17-22544, 2019 WL 3995976, at *9 (Bankr. D. Md. Aug. 22,
2019). The bankruptcy court found sanctions were warranted because LeFande’s 6
contempt motion was “knowingly and egregiously misleading” and contravened
“black-letter law,” and the court scheduled a hearing to determine his ability to pay
monetary penalties. Id. at *6-7. LeFande failed to appear at that hearing and ignored
multiple show-cause orders regarding why he had not timely paid penalties that were
ultimately imposed (though he eventually paid them).
3. The Carvalho bankruptcy matter
In a matter unrelated to the District Title litigation, LeFande represented
Teodora Simu in a contract dispute where she obtained a judgment against Sharra
Carvalho. Carvalho then filed for bankruptcy, which triggered an automatic stay of
Simu’s suit. LeFande violated the stay by appealing three adverse rulings in the
contract case, which caused Simu to be held in contempt.
LeFande also filed numerous motions in the bankruptcy matter—as well as a
complaint against Carvalho—which the bankruptcy court found to be frivolous and
sanctionable. In a lengthy decision, the court found that LeFande misrepresented
facts, continued to repeat arguments that the court had already rejected, and engaged
in a “bad faith pattern of harassing and impugning the character of Carvalho, her
counsel, and the court.” In re Carvalho, No. 15-00646, 2019 WL 4877272, at *37
(Bankr. D.C. Oct. 1, 2019). This pattern included multiple instances of making
“patently offensive” and unfounded accusations that opposing counsel was engaged 7
in fraud. Id. As a penalty, LeFande was ordered to pay Carvalho $32,250 in
attorney’s fees, plus interest.
4. LeFande’s personal bankruptcy matter
After District Title sued LeFande in relation to his representation of Warren
and Day, and while Disciplinary Counsel’s investigation into LeFande was
underway, LeFande filed a bankruptcy petition on his own behalf. The bankruptcy
court dismissed the petition after finding that it “scream[ed] bad faith” and was “yet
another of [LeFande’s] efforts to manipulate the legal system with no regard for how
his vexatious tactics affect others.” In re Le Fande, 641 B.R. 430, 434 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 2022). Noting that LeFande had “vanished”—he failed to respond to court
orders and to appear at hearings—the bankruptcy court concluded that “there is little,
if any, purpose to this bankruptcy beyond simply evading liability to District Title.”
Id. at 435.
5. LeFande’s failure to participate in disciplinary proceedings
LeFande did not cooperate with Disciplinary Counsel’s investigation into his
conduct. For example, LeFande did not comply with or file any response to
subpoenas for his client files for Warren and Day, or otherwise respond to inquiries
for information. Neither did LeFande respond to Disciplinary Counsel’s
specification of charges or appear before the Hearing Committee or the Board. 8
Before this court, LeFande has not filed any exceptions to the Board’s Report
and Recommendation. This court directed that he show cause why he should not be
suspended during the pendency of this case, and LeFande responded with a one-page
letter stating that he “stand[s] by every single action [he] took to preserve” his
clients’ rights and proclaims that he “will not participate in a system that is so
fundamentally broken.” He ends the letter with the following: “Please do what you
will with my law license, I have no further use for it.”
6. A majority of the Board could not agree on a recommended sanction
The Board was evenly divided regarding the appropriate sanction for
LeFande’s misconduct. The Board’s members disagreed about whether LeFande’s
conduct rose to the level of “flagrant dishonesty,” which could readily serve as a
basis for disbarment. See In re Johnson, 298 A.3d 294, 317 (D.C. 2023).
Four members, believing that LeFande was not flagrantly dishonest,
recommend that we suspend LeFande from the practice of law for three years with
a requirement that he demonstrate his fitness before reinstatement. They focus on
the fact that Disciplinary Counsel failed to prove that LeFande knowingly helped
Warren and Day commit a crime when he transferred money to the New Zealand
bank account. As those members saw it, LeFande’s conduct was generally not
“criminal or quasi-criminal” (aside from his criminal contempt). They also opined 9
that Disciplinary Counsel had not used sufficient “investigative tools” to provide a
basis for flagrant dishonesty, while acknowledging that Disciplinary Counsel’s
investigation was “[p]erhaps hampered by [LeFande’s] failure to respond to its
inquiries.”
The other four members of the Board recommend disbarment. They reason
that although LeFande’s assistance to Day in wiring money to the New Zealand bank
account “cannot on this record be found to be criminal,” that should not be
considered a mitigating circumstance that carries the day in the sanction analysis.
Rather, the totality of the circumstances—including LeFande’s contempt conviction,
“frivolous bankruptcy filings, prolonged dishonesty, and refusal to obey court
orders,” as well as his “prolonged and remorseless course of misconduct”—
constitute serious interference with the administration of justice over six years and
support a finding of flagrant dishonesty, thus warranting disbarment.
II. Analysis
A. Violations
The Board unanimously concluded that LeFande violated six rules of
professional responsibility: D.C. Rules 3.1 (frivolous arguments), 8.4(d) (serious
interference with the administration of justice), and Maryland Rules 19-303.1
(frivolous arguments), 19-303.3(a)(1) (knowingly false statements to a tribunal), 10
19-308.4(c) (dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 19-308.4(d)
(conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). And a majority of the Board
concluded that LeFande also violated D.C. Rule 3.4(c) (knowingly disobeying rules
of a tribunal). LeFande does not contest that he committed each of those seven
infractions, and we see no independent reason to doubt that he did, so we do not
scrutinize the matter further.
But the Board was evenly split as to the appropriate sanction, so we must
consider the appropriate sanction de novo. In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190, 192 n.3
(D.C. 1990) (in cases where there is no majority recommendation on sanction, the
court must “decide each case on its own particular facts” (citing In re Haupt, 422
A.2d 768, 771 (D.C. 1980))).
B. Sanction
The Board’s members were evenly divided about whether LeFande’s
violations warrant disbarment. Disbarment is an appropriate sanction for attorney
conduct when it arises to the level of “flagrant dishonesty.” Johnson, 298 A.3d at
317. Dishonesty that is “flagrant” is either (1) “continued and pervasive” or
otherwise (2) “accompanied by aggravating factors.” Id. Determining whether
conduct rises to the level of flagrancy involves a “fact-specific approach” that
considers an attorney’s “particular misconduct, and not simply the rules that he 11
violated,” In re Guberman, 978 A.2d 200, 206 n.5 (D.C. 2009), and whether the
misconduct was “criminal or quasi-criminal,” In re Pennington, 921 A.2d 135, 141
(D.C. 2007). As a general matter when imposing a sanction, we consider the nature
and seriousness of the conduct at issue, prior discipline, prejudice to clients, the
attorney’s acceptance of responsibility (or lack thereof), mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, and our mandate to achieve consistency in bar discipline cases. In re
Baber, 106 A.3d 1072, 1076 (D.C. 2015) (per curiam).
Considering the entire record and the relevant case law, we conclude that
LeFande’s conduct rose to the level of flagrant dishonesty and disbarment is the
appropriate sanction. LeFande’s misconduct was “continued and pervasive” over a
period of more than six years, with the District Title litigation as the centerpiece of
his misconduct. See Johnson, 298 A.3d at 317. LeFande’s misconduct began in
2014, when he directed $82,051.81 of Day’s funds be transferred to a New Zealand
bank account immediately after District Title sought an injunction to preclude
dissipation of those funds. The apparent purpose of that transfer was to conceal
those funds so that District Title could not recover amounts it was due. LeFande
then went to great lengths—including by filing a frivolous bankruptcy petition on
Warren’s behalf—to evade being deposed in that case after the evidence suggested
that he played a role in concealing the funds owed to District Title. 12
And even after the district court ordered that he submit to a deposition,
LeFande refused, impeding the administration of justice and leading to a criminal
contempt conviction and civil contempt finding. Moreover, in motions filed in the
Warren bankruptcy proceeding, LeFande misrepresented that Warren was the only
party in the District Title litigation and disguised the real reason District Title sought
to depose LeFande. In two additional bankruptcy proceedings, relating to his other
client Simu and himself, LeFande was responsible for a series of frivolous, bad-faith
court filings and made baseless accusations against opposing counsel. With these
many incidents happening over the course of several years—all reflecting a lack of
“integrity” and “straightforwardness,” see In re Mitrano, 952 A.2d 901, 925 (D.C.
2008)—it is clear that LeFande has engaged in a long-term pattern of dishonesty.
LeFande’s dishonesty was also “accompanied by aggravating factors”: his
lack of remorse and refusal to either participate in Disciplinary Counsel’s
investigation or appear in any of the proceedings before the Hearing Committee or
the Board. See Johnson, 298 A.3d at 317. That LeFande cannot be bothered to
respond to accusations of serious misconduct weighs in favor of disbarment. See,
e.g., In re Moawad, 268 A.3d 820, 821-22 (D.C. 2022) (per curiam) (finding that
denial of responsibility, lack of remorse, lack of attempt at restitution, and lack of
cooperation during disciplinary proceedings constituted aggravating factors
warranting disbarment under flagrant dishonesty theory); In re Howes, 39 A.3d 1, 13
25 (D.C. 2012) (Disbarment is proper “where, despite repeated misconduct, an
attorney remains unwilling to show contrition or responsibility for his actions.”).
His recent letter submitted to this court—in which he doubled down and proclaimed
that he stands by all of his actions—further demonstrates LeFande’s lack of remorse.
Disbarment is also most consistent with our case law. This case is similar to
In re Pelkey, where we disbarred an attorney for making false statements while under
oath, stealing money from his business partners, and burdening his business partner
with “frivolous appeals” and “unnecessarily protracted arbitration.” 962 A.2d 268,
279-82 (D.C. 2008). Even though Pelkey had “not been subjected to prior
discipline,” we disbarred him while recognizing that courts had previously imposed
sanctions against Pelkey for his conduct and he demonstrated a “lack of remorse . . .
despite the overwhelming evidence against him.” Id. at 282. LeFande, who likewise
has no prior disciplinary history, embarked on a six-year course of frivolous filings
that resulted in multiple contempt findings and impositions of sanctions against him.
He has also shown comparable disdain for the disciplinary process while facing
serious and well-founded charges of misconduct.
This case is also similar to In re Bynum, where we disbarred an attorney for
making intentional misrepresentations to clients, providing false testimony to a
hearing committee, and falsely blaming other counsel for his neglect towards client 14
matters over the course of five years. 197 A.3d 1072, 1073-74 (D.C. 2018) (per
curiam). LeFande likewise made unfounded representations to multiple tribunals
over several years. Moreover, like Bynum, LeFande’s dishonesty was “exacerbated
by his lack of remorse” and his “effort to shift the blame to others,” which LeFande
has done by ignoring the accountability process and pointing his finger at the
disciplinary system for his troubles. See id. at 1074. These “hallmarks of flagrant
dishonesty” tip the scales in favor of disbarment. Id.; see also, e.g., In re Shieh, 738
A.2d 814, 818-19 (D.C. 1999) (reciprocally disbarring attorney after his “habitual,
bad faith misuse of the judicial process” led to legal sanctions and criminal contempt
convictions). While we recognize that Pelkey and Bynum are not picture-perfect
analogs to the facts in this case, “we are satisfied that disbarment here is consistent
with the sanction imposed in” those cases and others. See Johnson, 298 A.3d at 318.
Conversely, the dishonesty cases where we have imposed suspension instead
of disbarment typically involve misconduct that is less “pervasive” or respondents
who take some responsibility for their wrongdoing, which can serve as some limited
assurance that it will not be repeated. See, e.g., In re Vohra, 68 A.3d 766, 772-73
(D.C. 2013) (three-year suspension instead of disbarment where misconduct
occurred in only one client matter and “respondent at a critical time took full
responsibility for his failures”). Such cases have also involved a more deferential
standard of review that does not apply in this case, because here the Board has not 15
recommended that LeFande be merely suspended (the Board failed to arrive at a
recommendation at all). See id.; see also, e.g., In re Slaughter, 929 A.2d 433, 447
& n.9 (D.C. 2007) (“Were it not for our deferential standard of review with respect
to the Board’s recommendation, we would have no hesitation in ordering
disbarment” for respondent’s “repeated acts of dishonesty” and forgery); In re
Steele, 868 A.2d 146, 153-54 (D.C. 2005) (accepting Board’s recommendation of
three-year suspension for pattern of “intentional neglect and dishonesty”).
We recognize that the Board declined to conclude on the record before it that
LeFande intentionally helped his clients commit theft when he transferred the
proceeds from the sale of Day’s Maryland property to the New Zealand bank
account. Such a finding would have made disbarment an easy call, as it would have
involved “criminal or quasi-criminal” conduct that LeFande spent several years
trying to conceal through further misconduct. See Pennington, 921 A.2d at 141. But
even without a finding of criminality as to that initial transfer, LeFande’s misconduct
still includes behavior giving rise to a criminal contempt conviction. Plus, the dearth
of evidence about LeFande’s intent stems largely from his failure to cooperate with
Disciplinary Counsel’s investigation, especially given the deaths of both Warren and
Day, who were presumably the only other witnesses who could have shed any
meaningful light on his intent. The Board recognized that Disciplinary Counsel was 16
unable to obtain testimony from LeFande, his clients, or third parties because of
these factors.
So we do not think the lack of clear evidence of criminal intent as to that initial
transfer is of much help to LeFande; there is at least a strong appearance that he had
criminal intent with respect to that transfer, while any uncertainty on the matter is
largely attributable to LeFande’s own malfeasance and refusal to comply with court
orders directing that he provide answers about it. While we continue to express no
view on whether a “successful assertion of [a] Fifth Amendment privilege . . . could
form the basis for an adverse inference against” a respondent, see In re Clark, 311
A.3d 882, 893 n.29 (D.C. 2024) (per curiam), rejected assertions of such a privilege
followed by years of contemptuous behavior seeking to avoid answering questions
can surely supply such an inference.
It is also true that LeFande does not have a prior history of discipline and that
the Board found LeFande’s misconduct was not directly aimed at his clients; indeed,
his misconduct seems to have been at least partly in his clients’ interests. But as
described, LeFande’s misconduct was serious, protracted across multiple client
matters, and accompanied by the aggravating circumstance of his unrepentant
attitude towards the disciplinary process. And on the record before us, we do not
see any “countervailing considerations weighing significantly against disbarment.” 17
Baber, 106 A.3d at 1077. All things considered, to protect the integrity of the legal
profession, and to deter future similar misconduct, we disbar LeFande.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that respondent Matthew A. LeFande is hereby disbarred from
the practice of law in the District of Columbia. For purposes of reinstatement, the
period of LeFande’s disbarment shall not begin to run until such time as he files an
adequate affidavit of compliance with D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g). See D.C. Bar R. XI,
§ 16(c).
So ordered.