In re L.C. CA4/2

Opinion

Filed 11/5/25 In re L.C. CA4/2 Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re L.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E081670

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J292768)

v. OPINION

A.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,

Judge. Conditionally reversed.

Jason Szydlik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Joseph R. Barrell, Deputy County Counsel, for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant A.C. (Mother) appeals from the June 21, 2023 orders

terminating parental rights to Mother’s child, L.C. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26,

395.)1 Mother claims that plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and

Family Services (CFS), failed to discharge its initial duty of inquiry, under section 224.2,

subdivision (b) (§ 224.2(b)), by asking several of L.C.’s maternal extended family

members (five of Mother’s six siblings) whether L.C. is or may be an “Indian child” for

purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act. (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et. seq.; ICWA). Mother

asks that we conditionally reverse the section 366.26 orders and remand the matter with

directions to the juvenile court to ensure that CFS discharges its initial duty of inquiry

(§ 224.2(b)), regarding L.C.’s material extended family members.

In our original opinion, we concluded that section 224.2, subdivision (b), did not

apply because the children were taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant. Our

Supreme Court granted review, remanded the cause to us for reconsideration in light of

its decision in In re Ja.O. (2025) 18 Cal.5th 271, and we invited the parties to submit

supplemental briefing on the matter. In supplemental briefing, CFS argues that, under the

specific facts of this case, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that

an adequate inquiry had been conducted. We conclude that the record in this case does

not contain substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s implied finding that CFS

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 fulfilled its duty under section 224.2 and conditionally reverse the order terminating

Mother’s parental rights.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

L.C. was born in December 2021. On March 22, 2022, Mother went to a sheriff’s

substation in Hesperia with L.C. and reported there were suspicious vehicles parked in

front of her home, she was being “scammed out of $5,000,” and a person she met through

social media was sending fraudulent checks to her bank account. Mother became

“distraught to the point . . . she was shaking uncontrollably” and was told to “put the baby

down.” Mother reported receiving psychiatric services and suffering panic attacks.

Following her assessment by “TEST social workers,” Mother was released to go home

with L.C.

On April 6, 2022, a social worker went to Mother’s home to see whether Mother

had family members who could help Mother with a safety plan. At the “front house” on

the property, the worker spoke with the property owner who reported: Mother had lived

in the “back house” for several years but was not home; L.C.’s father did not “come

around,” but Mother’s ex-husband and the father of Mother’s older daughter, A., helped

Mother with L.C.; and Mother had recently been in car accident with L.C. in the car. The

owner also said that L.C.’s maternal grandmother had died several years earlier, and that

Mother had “an aunt from Oregon who sent her cards in the mail.” The owner denied

other knowledge of Mother’s friends or family.

Later on April 6, 2022, the worker spoke with Mother’s ex-husband, J.C., who

reported Mother cared for L.C.’s basic needs but agreed Mother’s paranoia had “been

3 increasing” since L.C. was born. J.C. and Mother divorced in 2016; their daughter, A.

(age 15), lived with J.C. J.C. said there was a history of mental health issues in Mother’s

family; Mother suffered sexual abuse, physical abuse, and domestic violence as a child;

and Mother had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, depression, panic attacks, and

PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder).

Also on April 6, the worker spoke with Mother at a hospital where Mother had

taken L.C. When asked why she had taken L.C. to the hospital, Mother told “a very

lengthy story regarding people scamming her and taking pictures of [L.C.] for money.”

Mother also claimed that L.C.’s biological father, C.B., was hurting L.C. The hospital

would not discharge L.C. to Mother. CFS obtained a detention warrant and served the

warrant on Mother at the hospital on April 6. L.C. was initially placed with J.C.

On April 8, 2022, a dependency petition for L.C. was filed, alleging Mother

suffered from mental health problems that limited her ability to care for L.C. and the

whereabouts of L.C.’s alleged father, C.B., were unknown. (§ 300, subds (b)(1), (g).)

The petition stated CFS had been unable to complete an ICWA inquiry because Mother

was “unable to answer” and C.B.’s whereabouts were unknown.

At the detention hearing on April 11, 2022, Mother was present with her father

and one of her three sisters. In response to the court’s questions, Mother, her father, and

her sister each told the court that they did not have any Native American ancestry.

Mother also completed a “Parent: Family Find and ICWA Inquiry” form and a “Parental

Notice of Indian Status” form (ICWA-020), indicating on both forms that neither Mother

nor L.C. had Native American ancestry. On the family find form, Mother provided

4 phone numbers for her father, her sister, and for Mother’s two other sisters. The court

appointed a guardian ad litem for Mother and ordered L.C. detained outside of parental

custody.

On April 14, 2022, L.C. was placed with a nonrelative extended family member

(NREFM). On April 28, CFS filed a jurisdiction and disposition report stating that

Mother and “all available relatives denied any Native American ancestry.” The report

also stated that Mother was born and raised in Utah; Mother’s mother was deceased;

Mother’s father still lived in Utah; and Mother had six siblings. Mother identified her

sisters as her support network. C.B. denied he was L.C.’s biological father and did not

wish to participate in the proceedings. The April 28 report did not indicate whether CFS

had asked Mother’s five other siblings about L.C.’s possible Native American ancestry

and status as an Indian child. On May 2, the court found that ICWA did not apply,

declared L.C. a dependent, and ordered L.C. removed from parental custody.

On January 18, 2023, the court terminated Mother’s reunification services. On

June 21, the court terminated parental rights to L.C. and selected adoption as L.C.’s

permanent plan. (§ 366.26.) At the time of the section 366.26 hearing, the NREFM was

willing to adopt L.C. Mother timely appealed from the section 366.26 orders.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Background and Standard of Review

“Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 to address concerns regarding the separation of

Indian children from their tribes through adoption or foster care placement, usually in

non-Indian homes. [Citation.] ICWA established minimum standards for state courts to

5 follow before removing Indian children from their families and placing them in foster

care or adoptive homes.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048.)

Section 224.2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code “creates three distinct duties

regarding ICWA in dependency proceedings. First, from the [Department's] initial

contact with a minor and his family, the statute imposes a duty of inquiry to ask all

involved persons whether the child may be an Indian child. [Citation.] Second, if that

initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child is an Indian child, then the

[Department] ‘shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child,

and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ [Citation.] Third, if that further

inquiry results in a reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice

requirements of section 224.3 apply.” (In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052;

§ 224.2)

Following the inquiry stages, the juvenile court may make a finding that ICWA

does not apply because the department’s inquiry and due diligence was “ ‘proper and

adequate’ but no ‘reason to know’ whether the child is an Indian child was discovered.”

(In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050.) “The finding implies that notice to a tribe

was not required because social workers and the court did not know or have a reason to

know the [dependent] children were Indian children and that social workers had fulfilled

their duty of inquiry.” (In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 885, overruled in part

by In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152.) “ ‘ “On a well-developed record, the

[juvenile] court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry

6 was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case.” ’ ” (In re Dezi

C., at p. 1141.)

B. Application

As an initial matter, we disagree with Mother’s argument that an adequate inquiry

necessarily required CFS to ask every identified family member regarding the children’s

potential status as Indian children. As our Supreme Court has explained: “[i]f, upon

review, a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA

does not apply are found to be supported by sufficient evidence and record

documentation as required by California law [citation], there is no error and conditional

reversal would not be warranted even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who has

an interest in the child.” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) Thus, we disagree

with Mother’s argument to the extent she contends that the mere failure to interview a

handful of extended family members is sufficient to show a lack of substantial evidence

in support of the juvenile court’s implied finding that social workers fulfilled their duty of

inquiry.

Nevertheless, upon review of the record in this case, we conclude that the juvenile

court’s implied finding that CFS fulfilled its inquiry duty under section 224.2 is not

supported by substantial evidence and, as a result, any finding by the juvenile court that

an adequate ICWA inquiry had been conducted constitutes an abuse of discretion. While

we agree with CFS that an ICWA investigation need not be exhaustive, the juvenile

court’s finding that social workers fulfilled their duty of inquiry under section 224.2

generally turns on (1) whether social workers conducted an inquiry of extended family

7 members whom they were already investigating as part of their usual course of work (In

re S.S. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 694, 704-705; In re H.B. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 711, 720);

and (2) whether the record was sufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that the

inquiry “ ‘has reliably answered the question at the heart of the ICWA inquiry: Whether

a child involved in a proceeding “is or may be an Indian child.” ’ ” (In re H.B., at p.

720.) In our view, the ICWA inquiry efforts documented by CFS in this case were not

sufficient to meet the first prong of this test.

As CFS concedes, Mother provided contact information for two maternal aunts at

the time the children were detained.{CT 35} By statute, CFS was obligated to contact at

least these individuals to inform them of their right to request participation in the care and

placement of the child. (§ 309, subd. (e)(1); California Rules of Court, rule 5.534(b)(3);

In re K.B. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 689, 697.) Thus, these two maternal aunts were

extended family members whom CFS was already obligated to investigate as part of their

usual course of work. The failure to contact these family members renders CFS’s ICWA

inquiry efforts in this case inadequate. As a result, any implied finding by the juvenile

court that the inquiry was adequate under section 224.2 is not supported by substantial

evidence and constitutes an abuse of discretion. And when an ICWA inquiry is

inadequate, “conditional reversal is warranted in order to develop the record and cure the

inadequacy.” (In re Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1145.)

We emphasize that, upon remand, our opinion should not be construed as limiting

any subsequent inquiry to any specifically identified family members. Instead, the duty

is to make reasonable efforts to conduct an inquiry that reliably answers the question of

8 whether the children are Indian children. Thus, depending on the responses received in

the course of any subsequent investigation, it may become unnecessary to inquire of

additional identified family members currently identified in the record. Conversely, it

may become necessary to inquire of a family member who has yet to be disclosed.

Ultimately, the juvenile court has discretion to find that CFS has fulfilled its duty of

inquiry so long as the record supports the conclusion that CFS contacted family members

whom it is already obligated to contact as part of its normal duties and took reasonable

steps sufficient to reliably answer the question of whether the children are Indian children

within the meaning of ICWA.

IV. DISPOSITION

The order terminating Mother’s parental rights is conditionally reversed and

remanded to the juvenile court for compliance with the inquiry and notice requirements

of sections 224.2 and 224.3 and the documentation provisions of Rules of Court, rule

5.481(a)(5). If the juvenile court thereafter finds a proper and adequate further inquiry

and due diligence has been conducted and it concludes ICWA does not apply, then the

juvenile court shall reinstate the order terminating parental rights. If, instead, the juvenile

court concludes ICWA applies, then it shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and

California implementing provisions. (See 25 U.S.C., §1912, subd. (a); §§224.2, subd.

(i)(1); 224.3 and 224.4.)

9 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS J. We concur:

CODRINGTON Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL J.