In re L.C. CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: June 5, 2026
• Docket: E086697
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 6/5/26 In re L.C. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re L.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES, E086697

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. DPRI2500190)

v. OPINION

L.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Malvina Ovanezova,

Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, §21.) Affirmed.

Law Offices of Vincent W Davis and Associates and Vincent W Davis for

Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Jamila T. Purnell and Prabhath Shettigar, Deputy

County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 Defendant and appellant L.C. (Father) appeals from the exit order of the juvenile

court, which granted L.T. (Mother) sole physical and legal custody of their daughter,

La.C. (born April 2016; Minor), and then dismissed the dependency proceedings. On

appeal, Father contends (1) the jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions

Code1 section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c), were not supported by substantial evidence;

(2) the juvenile court erred by removing Minor from his care as the clear and convincing

standard for removal was not met; (3) plaintiff and respondent Riverside County

Department of Public Social Services (Department) failed to ensure he received visitation

with Minor; (4) the juvenile court erred by ignoring the joint custody order entered in

family law court; (5) the juvenile court erred when it failed to order reasonable visitation

for him with Minor; (6) the juvenile court violated his due process rights; (7) res judicata

and/or collateral estoppel barred the custody and visitation orders; and (8) the juvenile

court erred by refusing to return Minor to his care based on Minor’s preference to be with

Mother. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. SECTION 300 PETITION

On April 21, 2025, the Department received a referral alleging emotional and

physical abuse of nine-year-old Minor by Father. Minor reported that Father had spanked

her. Father had called her stupid, weird, dumbass, retard and scary as fuck. He only let

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 her eat applesauce, yogurt and pudding because he said she was fat. Father spanked her

whenever she cried.

A social worker made an unannounced visit to Minor’s elementary school on April

22, 2025. She had no visible marks or bruises. Minor had allergies, which caused her to

experience headaches and nosebleeds. She took medication for her allergies when she

was staying with Mother. Minor reported that Mother and Father did not get along; he

called Mother the “ ‘B-word and F-word.’ ” Minor denied any physical punishment from

Mother. Father disciplined her by spanking her with an open hand on her buttocks over

her clothes. Father had hit her with a belt when she was younger, leaving marks, but had

not recently hit her with a belt. She was spanked as recently as April 20, 2025. Father

had called Minor bitch, fuck, dumb and dumbass. She denied he called her stupid, weird

or retarded.

Minor got very sad and mad at herself when her Father called her names. She had

felt like she wanted to hurt herself while staying with Father, including while staying

with him the prior weekend. She also reported wanting to throw herself off a bridge. She

could not tell Father about wanting to hurt herself because he would get “really, really

mad.” Minor had talked to Mother about being fearful of Father, and Mother would just

“ ‘sigh.’ ” Mother had talked to someone in “Court” about how Father disciplined her.

Minor also reported that she was bullied at school because Father had her wear the same

clothes to school every day. She wanted to change schools but Father would not let her.

3 Minor felt safe in Mother’s home and she was given food. Minor believed that

Mother was signing her up for therapy and she thought it would be beneficial if she could

talk to someone about how she felt.

During this same time, a social worker made an unannounced visit to Father’s

home with an officer from the Menifee Police Department. Father reported having 50/50

custody of Minor. Minor visited his home every other weekend and spent half of the

summer at his home. He denied ever calling her negative names or that he spanked her

for crying. He had never withheld food from Minor or made comments that she was

overweight. He refused to allow anyone in his home to conduct an assessment to ensure

there were adequate provisions for Minor. He did not want Minor involved in counseling

because he believed they “ ‘dig into things’ ” and he felt it was traumatizing for Minor.

Mother was interviewed in her home on April 23, 2025. She stated that Father

was Minor’s biological father. There were family law orders in effect, and she gave the

social worker the case number. The most recent hearing in the family law case was on

April 9, 2025. Mother confirmed that Minor stayed with Father every other weekend and

every other week during the summer. Mother reported that Minor suffered with allergies

and needed to take over-the-counter medication daily to mitigate headaches and

nosebleeds. Father refused to give her the medications when Minor was staying with

him. Minor had told Mother that Father had yelled at her, called her bad names, bullied

her and was mean to her the last weekend she stayed with him. Minor also told Mother

that Father had called Minor stupid, weird, dumb and dumbass. Minor also reported to

Mother that Father had spanked her.

4 Mother stated that Minor was very “sensitive to name-calling” and “takes it

seriously when someone calls her bad names.” Minor also reported to Mother that

another child of Father’s, who resided in his home, bullied her. Minor had mentioned

self-harm to Mother. Mother had signed Minor up for therapy at school, but Father had

called the school and threatened to sue them, so they discontinued her therapy. Father

refused to sign off on therapy for Minor and had fought mental health therapy for Minor

in family law court.

Mother told the social worker that the family law orders issued on April 9, 2025,

ordered that Minor be provided with therapy services for six sessions. Father was to be

given three options for a therapist and was to choose one within 10 days. Father had

responded after the social worker and Menifee police officer went to his home and gave

Mother the name of the therapist he had chosen. The order also banned any corporal

punishment in the home. However, Father had spanked Minor the prior weekend.

Mother felt that she had no “recourse” in getting Minor the mental health services she

needed and making visits with Father safer. She had expressed her concerns numerous

times in family law court and insisted that they were ignored. Mother was not sure if

Minor would return to Father’s home the following weekend.

Father was interviewed on the phone. He expressed not wanting Minor to

participate in mental health services—even though he was aware she had thoughts of

self-harm—and that the family law court had “forced” it on him. The allegations in the

referral were a “tactic” by Mother to get increased custody of Minor. Father denied ever

spanking Minor the prior weekend, and any claim by Minor or Mother to the contrary

5 was “absurd.” Mother had coached Minor to say she had been spanked by him. He

believed the family law court orders may not be legal as “ ‘how can they tell me what to

do in my own home?’ ” He refused to answer if he had firearms in the home.

On May 1, 2025, Mother called the Department and reported Minor had a

breakdown about having to stay with Father on his weekend. Minor told Mother she felt

“worthless” and “bullied” when staying with Father. Father also had not confirmed

Minor’s mental health appointments, and he did not want her attending therapy when she

was with him. There were prior referrals in August, September and October 2024 that

were unfounded or inconclusive for physical abuse by Father against Minor. There was

also a report of emotional abuse, which was inconclusive and unfounded.

The Department was concerned that if Minor was allowed to go to Father’s home

she would engage in self-harm or suicide. Father had shown indifference to Minor’s

mental health issues and continued to use corporal punishment despite the family law

order. The Department was requesting that Minor be removed from Father’s care and

remain placed with Mother. Father was given a resource packet on April 22, 2025, for

parenting classes and mental health services. He denied that any services were needed

for himself or Minor even if Minor was expressing thoughts of self-harm. The

Department believed that Father would benefit from counseling, anger management and

general parenting education. The Department recommended supervised visitation two

times a week for one hour. A protective custody warrant was obtained for Minor on May

1, 2025.

6 The Department filed a section 300 petition (petition) for Minor and Father on

May 5, 2025. It was alleged under failure to protect against Father under section 300,

subdivision (b)(1), that (1) Father failed to recognize and address Minor’s mental health

needs. Minor described having symptoms of unresolved mental health, including suicidal

ideations due to Father’s treatment of her and being bullied at school. Father did not

want Minor to participate in therapy because “they dig into things.” Father had stated

that even if Minor wanted to participate in mental health services, he would not allow her

to participate; and (2) Father neglected the health, safety and well-being of the child in

that he did not provide Minor with her allergy medication used to treat Minor’s allergy-

induced headaches and nosebleeds despite having medical documentation of Minor’s

medication needs. In addition, Father continued to use corporal punishment in his home

despite the current family law order stating there was to be no corporal punishment used

by either parent. It was alleged under section 300, subdivision (c), serious emotional

damage, that Minor suffered from emotional abuse, in that she had thoughts of suicidal

ideation. Minor disclosed wanting to hurt herself by throwing herself off a bridge, as

well as having feelings of sadness and being mad at herself due to Father calling her

inappropriate names such as “bitch, dumbass and dumb.” In addition, Minor reported

being fearful of Father due to his belt spanking her. Further, Father made her wear the

same clothes from Friday to Monday, which caused her to be bullied at school.

The detention hearing was conducted on May 6, 2025. Minor’s counsel asked for

immediate counseling for Minor, and that visitation with Father be suspended with a

finding by the juvenile court that visitation would be detrimental based on the allegations

7 in the petition that Father inflicted emotional abuse and trauma on Minor. Mother’s

counsel supported no visitation for Father. Father’s counsel stated that Father

vehemently denied the allegations. Father’s counsel also stated, “[a]lthough this Court

does have superior jurisdiction to the family law court at this time, upon the filing of this

petition,” the family law court had ordered 50/50 custody. Father’s counsel stated that

supervised visitation should be ordered as it would be an opportunity for healing between

Father and Minor.

The juvenile court declared Father the presumed father. The juvenile court

quashed the protective custody warrant. The juvenile court found a prima facie showing

had been made that Minor came within section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c). Minor was

ordered detained from Father based on the “substantial danger to the physical health of”

Minor and that she may suffer “severe emotional damage.” Minor would remain with

Mother. The juvenile court ordered no visitation pending the next hearing as it found that

visits would be detrimental based on the reports it had reviewed. It also authorized

counseling services for Minor. The juvenile court noted that once counseling was set up

for Minor, visitation could be increased. Father’s counsel demanded a detention hearing.

A detention hearing was conducted on May 9, 2025. Father testified at the

hearing. Father described the last weekend that Minor had a visit with him. Father

picked up Minor at school on Friday afternoon. Minor was in a good mood when Father

picked her up and they went out to dinner. They watched a movie and fell asleep. Minor

got along with Father’s other daughter, E.C., that weekend. They all went to an

amusement park and had a great time. Minor never told him that she was upset during

8 the weekend. Minor had never told him that E.C. was being a bully to her. Father never

deprived Minor of food and did not punish her that weekend. He had never made

negative comments to her. He stated that a prior family law court order required him to

return Minor to school in the same clothes but that order ended and he put her in his new

clothes when he dropped her off that Monday. He was unaware that Minor was currently

being bullied at school but was aware of a boy bullying her in the past.

Father noted that Minor suffered from allergies and he gave her over-the-counter

medicine. He never withheld medication from Minor. He had distrust of the Department

based on prior interactions and did not let them do a home assessment as he felt that they

just looked for evidence to prove what they already believed. He insisted he was

complying with the family law court order regarding counseling. He felt that the

Department was asking for additional counseling than what was already ordered by the

family law court, which he did not think was necessary. He was willing to abide by any

juvenile court order for counseling.

Father admitted that, in the past, he would discipline Minor by spanking her but

had not spanked her for two years; she was being encouraged by Mother to claim that he

was spanking Minor. He “vehemently” denied that he physically disciplined Minor the

last time she was at his house.

Father’s counsel argued that there was no reason for Father to have physically

disciplined Minor on the weekend, as they had a good time and there was no trauma.

Based on Father’s testimony, the Department, in its reports, gave a distorted and biased

perspective of Minor’s home and school life, her relationship with E.C., and her

9 relationship with Father. Father’s counsel was seeking not to have Minor detained, and if

she was detained, that he be granted unsupervised visitation.

The Department submitted on the detention report. Minor expressed feeling that

she wanted to hurt herself when in the care of Father. She was unable to tell Father how

she felt because Father would get mad at her. She felt safe in Mother’s home. Father did

not consent to counseling until ordered to do so by the family law court. There was a

prima facie showing that Minor should be detained from Father. Further, the juvenile

court had already found that visitation with Father was detrimental to Minor.

Minor’s counsel asked that the juvenile court look at the detention report in its

entirety, including numerous prior referrals involving Father calling Minor names and

keeping her from mental health treatment. Minor’s counsel argued that Minor’s mental

health was being affected by the abuse or neglect she was receiving in Father’s home.

Minor’s statements in the detention report supported that Father was spanking her and

depriving her of food.

The juvenile court noted that it had heard Father’s testimony, had reviewed the

detention report and considered the arguments of the parties. The juvenile court was

concerned that Minor was indicating that she needed help. Even hearing about Minor’s

mental health struggles, Father still did not want Minor to participate in therapy. The

juvenile court adopted its prior findings that detention was necessary, noting the decision

was only temporary until the jurisdiction hearing. The juvenile court kept its order of no

in-person visits but allowed supervised telephone visits.

10 B. JURISDICTION/DISPOSITION REPORT

The Department filed its jurisdiction/disposition report on May 27, 2025. The

Department asked that the juvenile court find the allegations in the petition true by a

preponderance of the evidence. It recommended that the juvenile court terminate the case

with juvenile custody orders giving Mother sole physical and legal custody of Minor.

Section 361, subdivision (c)(1), findings for removal of Minor from Father’s care should

be made.

On May 21, 2025, Father declined to provide a full interview based on a

recommendation from his counsel. No further family law orders were in place since the

hearing on April 9, 2025. The Department provided further information about the prior

history with the family. In a report for October 17, 2024, Minor stated that when she

dropped something or did not eat her food, Father would make her go to her room and

she could not come out the rest of day. Father and his girlfriend would laugh at Minor

for being dark-skinned. She also reported that Father hit her with a belt to discipline her

when she was six years old and recently spanked her with his hand. She was scared to be

with Father. Father denied the allegations and no safety concerns were found.

A referral in August 2024 involved an allegation by Father that stepfather and

Mother had engaged in domestic violence, which was unfounded. In May 2023, it was

reported that Father was hitting Minor with a belt. Minor had reported bruises but, at the

time of the report, there were none. The allegation of physical abuse was inconclusive.

A referral in March 2022 was regarding the stepfather, which was unfounded.

11 As for the (b)(1) and (c)(1) allegations in the petition, Minor was asked on May 21

and 22, 2025, to tell the Department about her Father. Minor reported that E.C. had been

kind to her and gave her snacks when Father was asleep. Father had called Minor a

“Bitch” in early 2024; Minor immediately apologized for “cussing.” Minor expressed

that Father made comments about her “ ‘under his breath.’ ” He called her dumb or

dumbass when she did things she was not supposed to do. These comments made her

feel sad. She had learned not to cry in front of Father. She admitted previously wanting

to hurt herself, including wanting to jump off a bridge. She felt this way when Father

yelled at her or when he spanked her. She stated, “ ‘Everything bad I want to do is when

he is mean to me.’ ” When asked if she ever told Father about how she felt, she

responded, “ ‘Noooooooooo, he would get mad and say are you talking back to me?’ ”

Minor was aware that Father had guns in his room.

Minor wanted to go to therapy. The last time she had been spanked by Father over

her clothes on her buttocks was because she had accidentally spilled milk. She provided

no further information. Minor did not feel safe in Father’s home because he yelled at her

and spanked her. Minor was taking medication at Mother’s home but only at Father’s

home if she was “really sick.”

Minor was in third grade and was doing well in school. Minor complained about

being bullied at school. Mother was considering a change of schools. Minor had

attended one therapy session. Minor had been seeing a counselor at her school but Father

had ordered that the school discontinue the sessions in February 2025. Minor had an

emergency room visit on March 3, 2025, complaining of chest pain. Minor expressed

12 that her heart was hurting and she could not be calmed. She was diagnosed with anxiety.

Minor expressed she had the attack because of bullying by other children, and she was

also thinking about Father.

Mother was also interviewed. Minor had complained about being bullied as early

as kindergarten and first grade. Minor blamed being bullied on Father coming to the

school on several occasions yelling and screaming and causing a scene. Mother

recommended to Father at the end of kindergarten that Minor could benefit from therapy.

Father denied that Minor needed therapy. The school finally recommended that Minor

participate in therapy and Mother agreed.

In early October 2024, Mother received notices from Minor’s school that Minor

was being sent to school without food, water and in the same clothing as the week prior.

Mother began meeting Minor at school on Monday mornings to provide her with any

missing items. One time, Father saw Mother meeting up with Minor at school. Minor

and Mother were walking together, holding hands. Father, who had just dropped off

Minor, yelled out his car, “ ‘let my fucking daughters hand go.’ ” Father continued to

yell at Mother with Minor present and yelled at several bystanders who tried to intervene.

At some point, Father grabbed Minor’s arm. Minor was taken to the office, hysterically

crying. After the incident, Minor expressed she was angry with Father and wanted to

hurt herself. After this Minor made several comments about not wanting “to be here

anymore” and wanting to hurt herself to “see if he cares.”

13 Mother believed that Minor was telling the truth about Father calling her names.

Mother also believed that Father refused to give Minor allergy medication. Mother was

concerned that Father would not comply with any court orders. Mother reported that

Minor loved Father but struggled with enforcing boundaries when he mistreated her.

The Department concluded that, based on the statements and evidence, the

juvenile court should find the petition allegations true by a preponderance of the

evidence. It was necessary that Minor be placed outside the home of Father as he used

derogatory terms in speaking with Minor. Father’s abuse led to Minor feeling suicidal.

Father had shown indifference to Minor’s mental health. Minor did not want to have

visits with Father. During the reporting period, there had been no communication

between Father and Minor. The Department recommended the case be dismissed with

orders granting sole custody to Mother.

On May 30, 2025, Father’s counsel filed a “brief in opposition [to] requested

jurisdic[ti]onal findings” (all caps omitted). Father’s counsel contended the juvenile

court was barred from entering any jurisdictional findings as the matter was res judicata.

Father’s counsel requested that the matter be dismissed and the parties referred back to

family law court.

Father explained that Mother filed a request for order (RFO) in family law court

on October 21, 2024, seeking sole physical and legal custody of Minor. Mother alleged in

the RFO many of the same facts that were included in the jurisdiction/disposition and

detention reports. The matter was sent to mediation. Mother, Father and Minor

participated. Minor disclosed that she had been spanked by Father. A full hearing was

14 conducted on April 9, 2025. The family law court, after considering the report of the

mediator, found joint custody was appropriate. The family law court did not refer the

case to the Department based on the allegations by Minor. Father alleged that Mother

brought her allegations to juvenile court because she “did not ‘get her way’ ” in family

law court. Father’s counsel alleged that the juvenile court could only consider what had

occurred since April 9, 2025, as the family law court had heard and tried the other

allegations and found they were not significant.

Father attached the RFO filed by Mother. Mother filed a declaration to support

the RFO seeking sole custody of Minor. Mother complained that Father’s behavior had

become erratic. Mother stated that Minor had been physically harmed by Father at her

school and was begging not to go back to Father’s home. She insisted that Father failed

to provide Minor with food and water for school and dressed her in the same clothes.

Mother recounted the incident where Father yelled at Mother in front of Minor, grabbed

Minor’s arm, and Minor was hysterical. She was able to get witnesses to provide

statements about the incident and attached them to her declaration. Mother was seeking a

change in the custody orders and supervised visits for Minor and Father in the RFO.

Mother attached a letter written by Minor to Mother. She begged not to be sent

back to Father’s house. Other attachments to the RFO included witness statements about

the incident at school; the Department’s reports for prior involvement with the family;

and the ruling by the family court on the RFO on April 9, 2025. The ruling included that

Father provide Minor with lunch and water on Mondays, that Minor participate in at least

15 six counseling sessions, neither parent was to use corporal punishment, and the parents

were to choose two extracurricular activities for Minor to participate in.

On June 30, 2025, Father filed a brief in support of his request to dismiss the

petition. Father argued that the juvenile court must give full faith and credit to the family

law court findings. Father again argued that the issues were res judicata. Further, there

was no current risk of harm as required by section 300. The allegations were over one

year old; if there was no current risk of harm, the juvenile court had to dismiss without

findings and orders.

The Department filed a response to the request to dismiss filed by Father. The

Department noted that the family law orders were entered on April 9, 2025, awarding

joint custody. A referral was received by the Department of emotional and physical

abuse of Minor by Father on April 21, 2025. The Department determined that it was

necessary to file the petition to protect Minor from Father. Once the petition was filed,

the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Department recounted the facts in the detention and jurisdiction/disposition

reports. It argued against res judicata, citing to cases that hold that the family law courts

prior consideration of custody did not deprive the juvenile court of the right to make

orders protecting a child. Once the petition was filed in this case, the juvenile court

gained exclusive jurisdiction over the matters of child custody, visitation and parentage.

Further none of the elements of res judicata—final judgment on the merits, same claim

asserted in both matters, and privity—had been met. The family court was a distinct and

separate entity from the dependency court and its judgment would not be considered a

16 final judgment as it applies to the dependency court. The Department also argued that

there was a prima facie showing of current risk of harm to Minor.

The Department filed an addendum report on July 25, 2025. The

recommendations remained the same. A social worker met with Minor on June 20, 2025.

She had last spoken with Father on Father’s Day. She was unsure about visiting him in

person but was interested in talking to him. Mother supported her decision to talk to

Father. Minor was seeing a therapist at least once each week. She had no suicidal

ideations at the time. Minor would be attending a new school in August, which made her

happy. Minor felt safe in Mother’s home. Father did not agree to speak with the social

worker without his attorney present.

Mother reported that Minor had not disclosed any further thoughts of self-harm or

suicidal ideation since being in her care. A second meeting was held on July 20, 2025,

with Minor and Mother. Minor was very energetic and playful during the conversation.

She constantly laughed and smiled. Minor was excited about the extracurricular

activities she was participating in, and she had fun at a summer camp. The Department

noted that Minor was thriving in her environment and demonstrated “noticeable

emotional and behavioral stability.” She had a secure and supportive environment in

Mother’s home. Over the past several months, she expressed no suicidal ideation and

showed no signs of emotional distress. The Department believed that Mother should be

granted full legal and physical custody. Father had not engaged with the Department, and

his current circumstances were unknown.

17 An amended petition was filed on July 30, 2025, to correct Mother’s name

(amended petition). The allegations remained the same.

C. JURISDICTION/DISPOSITION HEARING AND EXIT ORDER

The jurisdiction/disposition hearing was conducted on July 30, 2025. The

Department submitted on its reports and requested that the matter be terminated with the

filing of juvenile court orders granting Mother sole physical and legal custody of Minor.

Father would be allowed supervised telephone contact once each week. Minor’s counsel

submitted on the Department’s recommendations. The juvenile court acknowledged it

had read the briefs filed by Father.

Father’s counsel again argued that the matter was res judicata and that there was

no current risk of harm to Minor. Father’s counsel argued there was a full hearing in

family court and Mother did not like the result but the juvenile court should abide by

those orders. The Department and Minor’s counsel responded that many of the events

that were alleged in the petition occurred after the family law court order.

Father’s counsel responded that Mother needed to stop coaching Minor and filling

“her head with negative things” about Father. Father’s counsel began to recite what

Mother said to Minor to cause her to have a breakdown. The juvenile court stopped

Father’s counsel, stating there was no foundation or personal knowledge of what Mother

said to Minor when they were alone together. It was sufficient just to allege that Mother

was coaching Minor.

18 The juvenile court first ruled the matter was not res judicata. “And the Court does

have exclusive jurisdiction. And there are many courts where the same issue is litigated

with different consequences.” The requirements of res judicata were not met. Further,

Mother did not file the petition, so it rejected that she was trying to obtain a different

result. The juvenile court believed that part of the reason the petition was filed was

because Father was not cooperative with the Department by refusing to allow a home

assessment. The Department had to protect Minor. The juvenile court noted that after

the order on April 9, 2025, ordering no corporal punishment, Minor reported that Father

had spanked her. The juvenile court was also concerned that Minor had mentioned self-

harm and Father did not want her to go to therapy.

The juvenile court found there was a current incident with Father, which showed

there was a current risk of harm. There was a sufficient basis to detain Minor from

Father. The juvenile court agreed with the recommendations by the Department but

believed there should be supervised in-person visits between Father and Minor. The

juvenile court found the allegations in the petition true by a preponderance of the

evidence. There was clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances stated in section

361 regarding Father. The juvenile court ordered the case terminated, with sole physical

and legal custody being awarded to Mother. There would be supervised telephonic

contact once each week at a minimum. The juvenile court also ordered that Father had

the option of supervised in-person visitation four hours each week. The juvenile court

orders would be filed in family law court.

19 Father filed an appeal from the Custody Order—Juvenile—Final Judgment order

filed on August 11, 2025, and the findings at the July 30, 2025, hearing.

DISCUSSION

A. JURISDICTION FINDINGS

Father contends the juvenile court “lacked substantial evidence in making its’

jurisdiction findings and orders.” (All caps and boldface omitted.) Father claims the

evidence did not support the allegations pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) and (c),

that Minor suffered or was at substantial risk that she would suffer because of his neglect

or failure to protect.

“[S]ection 300, subdivision (b)(1), authorizes dependency jurisdiction where ‘[t]he

child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical

harm or illness, as a result of ... [¶] ... [¶] ... [t]he inability of the parent or guardian to

provide regular care for the child.... Jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b),

requires proof of (1) the specified parental condition or conduct (2) that has caused

(3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” (In

re L.W. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1012, 1019; see also In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th

591, 601.) Section 300, subdivision (c), provides, in pertinent part, that jurisdiction may

be assumed if, “[t]he child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk

of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression,

withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the

conduct of the parent or guardian or who has no parent or guardian capable of providing

appropriate care.” (See also In re D.B. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 613, 620-621 [juvenile

20 court properly sustained dependency petition under section 300, subdivision (c), where

the father’s conduct caused his daughter to feel scared and anxious, to cry frequently, and

to fear interacting with the father and the father lacked insight].)

The burden of proof at the jurisdictional hearing is a preponderance of the

evidence. (In re I.C. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 869, 876; In re B.H. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 469,

479-480.) “ ‘ “We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for sufficiency of

the evidence. [Citations.] We review the record to determine whether there is any

substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s conclusions, and we resolve all

conflicts and make all reasonable inferences from the evidence to uphold the court’s

orders, if possible. [Citation.] ‘However, substantial evidence is not synonymous with

any evidence. [Citations.] A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not

be affirmed on appeal. [Citation.] Furthermore, “[w]hile substantial evidence may

consist of inferences, such inferences must be ‘a product of logic and reason’ and ‘must

rest on the evidence’ [citation]; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or

conjecture cannot support a finding [citations].” [Citation.] “The ultimate test is

whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the

whole record.” ’ ” ’ ” (In re J.A. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1046.)

The petition alleged as to section 300, subdivision (b), that (1) Father failed to

recognize and address Minor’s mental health needs and did not want her to participate in

therapy because “they dig into things.” Minor’s unresolved mental health issues included

suicidal ideations due to Father’s treatment of her and being bullied at school; and

(2) Father neglected the health, safety and well-being of Minor in that he did not provide

21 her with her allergy medication used to treat her allergy-induced headaches and

nosebleeds despite having medical documentation of her medication needs. In addition,

Father continued to use corporal punishment in his home despite the family law order

stating that corporal punishment was not to be used by either parent. As for section 300,

subdivision (c), serious emotional damage, it was alleged that Minor suffered from

emotional abuse in that she had thoughts of suicidal ideation and disclosed wanting to

hurt herself by throwing herself off a bridge. She had feelings of sadness due to Father

calling her inappropriate names such as “bitch, dumbass and dumb.” In addition, Minor

reported being fearful of Father due to his spanking her.

There is substantial evidence in the record to support the section 300, subdivision

(b) and (c), allegations. It was first reported to the Department that Father had been

calling Minor derogatory names and spanked her. He was also withholding food because

he did not want her to be fat. On April 22, 2025, a social worker made an unannounced

visit to Minor’s school and spoke with her without Mother present. She reported that

Father spanked her on April 20, 2025. He called her bitch and a dumbass. Based on her

most recent visit with Father the prior weekend, she wanted to hurt herself and had

contemplated throwing herself from a bridge. She wanted to attend therapy and change

schools due to bullying, but Father had refused. At the same time, another social worker

went to Father’s home. He refused to allow the social worker into his home so the social

worker could complete a home assessment. He also admitted to the social worker that he

did not want Minor to participate in mental health treatment.

22 Minor had also reported that she never told Father how she was feeling because he

would get mad. He did not give her medication for her allergies, and he had guns in the

house. Minor had an anxiety attack on May 3, 2025. She blamed the anxiety attack on

being bullied at school and because of Father.

These statements made by Minor supported the section 300, subdivision (b) and

(c), allegations. Minor was suffering from suicidal ideation and self-harm based on

Father calling her derogatory names, spanking her as a means of discipline and refusing

to give her medication to treat nosebleeds and headaches. She had an anxiety attack and

feared telling Father how she felt because he would be mad. She was at risk of serious

harm based on Father’s physical and emotional abuse, and his refusal to allow her to get

help through therapy. The juvenile court properly found the allegations in the amended

petition true by a preponderance of the evidence.

Father claims Mother manipulated Minor to change her statements. He contends

that Minor told the mediator in the family law court that she was not injured by Father

when he spanked her and that she ate well at Father’s home. “The juvenile court’s

judgment is presumed to be correct, and it is appellant’s burden to affirmatively show

error. [Citation.] To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis

supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the

claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 (S.C.).) “[C]onclusory

claims of error will fail.” (Ibid.)

23 In Father’s opening brief, he refers to mediation during which he claims Minor

stated she had not been injured when Father spanked her and that she ate well in Father’s

home, which he claims is evidence that Mother coached Minor to change her story in

juvenile court. Father cites to the clerk’s transcript pages 144 through 203. We are not

required to comb through these 50 pages to find this evidence (see Nwosu v. Uba (2004)

122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246), and any of the claims Father makes that Mother forced

Minor to change her story after the family law court orders is not supported by Father

properly citing to the record. Such failure to direct this court to the record citation waives

the claim on appeal. (Id. at p. 1246 [“ ‘ [i]f a party fails to support an argument with the

necessary citations to the record, ... the argument [will be] deemed to have been

waived’ ”].)

Father also claims that Mother was not credible. In following the Department’s

recommendations to grant full custody to Mother, the juvenile court necessarily found

Mother and Minor to be credible and rejected Father’s argument that Minor had been

coached by Mother. “Weighing evidence, assessing credibility, and resolving conflicts in

evidence and in the inferences to be drawn from evidence are the domain of the trial

court, not the reviewing court.” (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) The

juvenile court reasonably relied on Minor’s statements to support the jurisdictional

findings. Substantial evidence supports the jurisdiction findings under section 300,

subdivisions (b) and (c).

24 B. REMOVAL OF MINOR FROM FATHER’S CUSTODY

Father contends the juvenile court erred by removing Minor from his care, as the

clear and convincing standard for removal under section 361 was not met.

Section 361, subdivision (c)(1), provides that the juvenile court may remove a

child from the custody of a parent if it finds, by clear and convincing evidence, “[t]here is

or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or

emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no

reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without

removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s ... physical custody.” The court must also

determine “whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for

removal.” (§ 361, subd. (e).) Accordingly, “[b]efore the court may order a child

physically removed from his or her parents, it must find, by clear and convincing

evidence, the child would be at substantial risk of harm if returned home and there are no

reasonable means by which the child can be protected without removal.” (In re Hailey T.

(2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 145-146.)

“It is not required that the parent be dangerous or that the child have been harmed

before removal is appropriate. [Citation.] ‘The focus of the statute is on averting harm to

the child.’ ” (In re D.D. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 985, 996.) “A juvenile court’s removal

order at a disposition hearing will be affirmed on appeal if it is supported by substantial

evidence.” (In re V.L. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154.)

We note the order granting sole custody to Mother and providing for supervised

visitation and termination of the dependency amounted to an exit order governed by

25 section 362.4. “Section 362.4 authorizes a juvenile court to issue exit orders for

visitation and custody when terminating dependency jurisdiction, and those orders remain

in place even after jurisdiction is terminated.” (In re R.F. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 459,

473.) “Section 361 findings are required at the disposition stage of dependency

proceedings. The statute does not apply to custody and visitation determinations made at

a section 364 review hearing concurrent with the termination of juvenile court

jurisdiction.” (In re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 113 (J.M.).) “Section 362.4 does not

require a finding of detriment under any circumstances; as a result, courts have applied

the best interest standard in determining appropriate custody and visitation exit orders at

this stage.” (Id. at p. 113; see also In re C.M. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 101, 109 [“When a

juvenile court makes custody and visitation orders, it does so ... guided by the totality of

the circumstances in issuing orders that are in the child’s best interests”].)

The hearing where the exit order was issued by the juvenile court was the

jurisdiction/disposition hearing not a hearing under section 364. Regardless of the type

of hearing, the juvenile court made specific findings as to the removal of Minor from

Father’s custody under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). Such findings were supported by

the evidence, and it was in Minor’s best interests to be removed from Father’s custody.

Here, Father’s emotional abuse caused Minor to express a desire to self-harm and

caused her to have suicidal thoughts. Father refused to allow Minor to continue

counseling at school and only acquiesced to counseling once the family law court ordered

that she participate in six sessions. He also expressed that the family law orders may not

be legal, asking how he could be told what to do in his own home. He also refused

26 access to his home for an assessment and it was reported that he owned guns. There was

a history of reports from Minor that Father had inappropriately disciplined her, once by

hitting her with a belt in May 2023, and that he spanked her in October 2024. Minor had

an anxiety attack based partly on her concern about having to return to Father’s care in

May 2025. Minor was only doing better when she was in Mother’s care. There were no

other reasonable alternatives as Father did not believe that Minor should receive therapy,

refused a home assessment and did not want to participate in services.

Based on the foregoing, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that Minor

faced substantial danger to her emotional well-being if returned to Father’s care. (§ 361,

subd. (c)(1).) Father again contends that Mother coached Minor into making these

allegations. The juvenile court did not find this claim credible. There was clear and

convincing evidence that removal of Minor from Father was necessary as she would be at

substantial risk of harm if returned to his care; there are no reasonable means by which

she could be protected without removal. It was in Minor’s best interests to remove

custody from Father.

C. VISITATION

Father makes two claims regarding visitation with Minor. First, he claims the

Department failed to ensure he received visitation with Minor. Specifically, he contends

that visitation is a critical component of reunification and that the juvenile court can only

deny visitation if it finds it would be detrimental to the child. Father argues that Mother

filed “false allegations” of child abuse against Father and the Department “facilitated” her

false allegations by filing the petition. Adverse to the family law order, which granted

27 50/50 custody, the Department “took away … father’s equal parenting time, terminated

his visits, and then reduced his visits to supervised.” Since the Department and Mother

knowingly and intentionally denied Father visitation, what he argues is “the critical

component of any reunification plan,” the juvenile court’s finding cannot stand. Father’s

argument is not entirely clear. Since Father’s second argument addresses the visitation

order made at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, we assume Father is contending that

the juvenile court erred by finding, prior to the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, that visits

between Father and Minor were detrimental to Minor.

“As a general rule, an order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction renders an

appeal from a previous order in the dependency proceedings moot.... ‘An issue is not

moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings.’ ” (In re C.C.

(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488.)2 Prior to the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the

juvenile court suspended visitation based on a finding of detriment to Minor. It later

changed that order to allow supervised telephone calls. In its exit order, it granted Father

four hours of supervised visits each week. There is no indication from Father how the

finding that visits were detrimental in a prior proceeding impacted the exit order of the

juvenile court. He also fails to explain how the limited visitation afforded by the

Department impacted the outcome of the case. The claim that the Department did not

2 We have not concluded that the jurisdictional findings and finding that removal of custody from Father was supported by clear and convincing evidence are moot, as it reasonably impacted the exit order. (See In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431- 1432.) Here, the suspension of visitation was not part of the exit order.

28 provide adequate visitation or that the juvenile court erred in suspending visits, finding

them to be detrimental to Minor prior to the jurisdiction/disposition hearing is moot.

Even were we to consider the issue, the juvenile court determined that visits with

Father in-person were detrimental, finding that visits posed a danger to Minor’s physical

and emotional well-being. Minor stated that Father had called her “fat,” “dumb,” and

“dumbass,” causing her to feel like she wanted to throw herself off a bridge. Father had

recently spanked her. The finding by the juvenile court that visitation between Father

and Minor was dangerous to Minor’s emotional well-being was supported by substantial

evidence.

Father titles his next claim of error regarding visitation as “the trial court erred

when it failed to order reasonable visitation.” (All caps and boldface omitted.) He then

claims that it was in Minor’s best interests for her parents to have joint legal and physical

custody. Father relies on Family Code sections 3020 and 3100 to support his claim that

the juvenile court’s primary concern is to assure the child’s health, safety and welfare.

He concludes “the Court’s ruling was in error and must be reversed.” Father, in the reply

brief, seems to be asking this court to grant him a reasonable visitation schedule to

rebuild his relationship with Minor.

Again, it is not entirely clear what Father is arguing here. He seems to be arguing

that he should be granted additional visitation but also seems to be attacking the juvenile

court’s exit order granting Mother sole custody of Minor.

“Dependency proceedings are governed by the Welfare and Institutions Code,

rather than the Civil Code or the Family Code. [Citation.] When a juvenile court makes

29 custody and visitation orders, it does so pursuant to its authority under the Welfare and

Institutions Code, guided by the totality of the circumstances in issuing orders that are in

the child’s best interests.” (In re C.M., supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 109.) Section 362.4

states: “If the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a minor who has been

adjudged a dependent child of the juvenile court ..., the juvenile court on its own motion,

may issue ... an order determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.” Hence,

“ ‘[w]hen the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a dependent child, section

362.4 authorizes it to make custody and visitation orders that will be transferred to an

existing family court file and remain in effect until modified or terminated by the superior

court.’ ” (In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 203.)

“ ‘[T]he juvenile court has broad discretion to make custody [and visitation] orders

when it terminates jurisdiction in a dependency case [citation].’ [Citation.] We review

the juvenile court’s exit orders for an abuse of that discretion.” (J.M., supra, 89

Cal.App.5th at pp. 112-113.)

The juvenile court made jurisdictional findings that Father posed a substantial risk

of harm to Minor and found by clear and convincing evidence that Minor should be

removed from Father’s custody—orders which we have found were supported by

substantial evidence. Based on this same evidence, the juvenile court reasonably

concluded that it was in Minor’s best interest to have Mother granted sole legal and

physical custody. The juvenile court granted Father supervised visits for four hours each

week despite such visits not being recommended by the Department. Father has not

30 shown that the juvenile court abused its discretion by making its custody and visitation

order.

D. FAMILY COURT ORDERS

Father contends the juvenile court “wholly ignored” the existing family law order

and granted Mother’s wishes to have sole custody of Minor, which was error and requires

reversal. As we previously stated, “ ‘When the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction

over a dependent child, section 362.4 authorizes it to make custody and visitation orders

that will be transferred to an existing family court file and remain in effect until modified

or terminated by the superior court.’ ” (In re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 203.)

The juvenile court has “broad discretion” to make exit orders. (J.M., supra, 89

The juvenile court was not bound by the previous custody order issued by the

family law court. The juvenile court properly determined that it was in Minor’s best

interest for Mother to have sole legal and physical custody based on Minor’s statements

that she was suffering due to Father’s actions. As previously stated, the juvenile court

found Minor credible and we do not reassess that decision. The juvenile court did not

have to follow the order of the family law court.

E. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

Father contends the juvenile court violated his due process rights by failing to be a

neutral decision maker. He claims the juvenile court acted as an “advocate” for the

Department when it failed to return Minor to the care and custody of Father.

31 Father has forfeited this claim by making conclusionary statements without

citation to the record to support such claim. Father has the burden of showing error by

presenting meaningful legal analysis with “citations to facts in the record that support the

claim of error.” (S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.)

Father simply claims by awarding Mother sole custody, the juvenile court was an

advocate for her and colluded with her and the Department to deprive him of custody of

Minor. We have exhaustively assessed the proceedings, which include the juvenile court

reviewing the entirety of the evidence presented to it, and affording Father the right to

present his evidence. Father makes no effort to pinpoint in the record how the juvenile

court was an advocate for Mother, and where in the record it was clear the juvenile court

was not a neutral decisionmaker. Father’s failure to cite to authority for his claim waives

the issue on appeal. (Nwosu v. Uba, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.)

F. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Father claims the principles of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel barred the

dependency matter. He insists that the current proceeding and the family law matter

related to Minor’s best interests relied on the same evidence, involved the same parties,

and the family law matter was final and on its merits. The dependency proceeding should

have been dismissed without any orders.

“ ‘The doctrine of res judicata gives certain conclusive effect to a former judgment

in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy. It seeks to curtail multiple

litigation causing vexation and expense to the parties and wasted effort and expense in

judicial administration.’ [Citation.] ... Under collateral estoppel, the litigation and

32 determination of an issue by final judgment is conclusive upon the parties or their privies

in a subsequent suit on a different cause of action.” (In re Joshua J. (1995) 39

Cal.App.4th 984, 992-993, italics omitted.)

However, “[p]rior consideration of the custody of a minor by a family law court

cannot deprive a juvenile court of jurisdiction to make orders to protect the minor.

[Citations.] The purposes and parties of family law and juvenile proceedings, while often

overlapping, are not the same. The family law court adjudicates the rights of private

parties vis-a-vis each other. The juvenile court takes into account the interest of the

state.” (In re Benjamin D. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1464, 1469, fn. omitted.) “[A]

juvenile court is not required to exclude evidence that may have already been presented

in a family law forum.” (Ibid.)

“[O]ur Supreme Court [has explained] that the ‘issues’ before the family law court

and juvenile court can never, in fact, be ‘identical,’ even if some or all of the facts of

abuse or neglect adduced in the two proceedings are the same, because of the important

differences between the purposes and operations of the two courts, and the state’s

overriding concern for the protection of the children.’ ” (In re Travis C. (1991) 233

Cal.App.3d 492, 502, citing to Dupes v. Superior Court (1917) 176 Cal. 440, 441-442.)

“[T]he actions of private parties ... , cannot defeat the obligations of the juvenile court.

Indeed, where there is abject acrimony between the parents, the juvenile court, with its

inclusion of the state as a litigant and it provisions for the appointment of counsel to

represent the minor, is the best forum for consideration of issues concerning custody

when the child comes within one of the descriptions contained in section 300. [Citation.]

33 [¶] ... The litigation of custody issues in family court does not estop the juvenile court

from reconsidering factually identical issues.” (In re Desiree B. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th

286, 293.)

The dependency proceeding here was not barred by principles of collateral

estoppel or res judicata. Initially, the juvenile court was presented with new evidence of

abuse that occurred after the family law order. Minor reported that Father spanked her on

April 20, 2025, after the family law order was issued on April 9, 2025, expressly

prohibiting any type of corporal punishment. Minor also stated that after spending the

weekend with Father, which was after the family law order, she had considered suicide

and self-harm. This new evidence was properly considered in the dependency

proceeding. Moreover, the juvenile court could consider the same evidence as the family

law court in reaching its decision on custody and visitation. The dependency proceeding

was not barred by principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel.

G. MINOR’S PREFERENCE FOR PLACEMENT

Father’s final claim is that the juvenile court erred by refusing to return Minor to

his care based on Minor’s preference that she be in the care of Mother. Father once again

fails to cite to anything in the record to support that the decision to grant Mother sole

physical and legal custody was based on a stated preference by Minor. Father’s failure to

provide “citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error,” forfeits the claim

on appeal. (S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408.) Even if this court considered the

claim, the juvenile court at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing stated that it was granting

Mother sole physical custody based on its concern that Minor was at risk of substantial

34 harm if she remained in Father’s custody. The exit order was based on the totality of the

circumstances and was decided based on Minor’s best interests.

DISPOSITION

The Custody Order—Juvenile—Final Judgment order filed on August 11, 2025, is

affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER Acting P. J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON J.

FIELDS J.