OLSZEWSKI, Judge:
This is an appeal from an order dismissing the appeals and exceptions filed by David and Gloria Zeafla, and entering judgment in accord with the findings and report of the Board of View (hereinafter, “Board”). In September 1988, Harry Aldinger filed a petition to appoint viewers and lay out and open a private road in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County. Aldinger’s petition sought to open a private road from his land in Lycoming County, across the adjacent farm of the Zeaflas, to a public road. By motion of the Zeaflas, an additional defendant, Double Tree Camp, Inc., was joined. Double Tree subsequently joined Dorothy Volckmer. Both Double Tree and Volckmer also own property adjacent to Aldinger’s. A private road could be laid out across either the Double Tree or Volckmer property to allow Aldinger access to a public road.1
The Board was properly appointed. Following a view of the land in question and hearings on the matter, the Board issued a report concluding that the private road should be opened across the Zeafla farm as Aldinger requested. The Zeaflas appealed the Board’s decision to the court of com[302]*302mon pleas, which affirmed the Board and issued the order in question. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, the Zeaflas raise three issues for our consideration. First, the Zeaflas argue that there is no necessity for a private road, as Aldinger has a permissive right-of-way across the farm to reach his property. Alternatively, the Zeaflas allege that the Board’s failure to make a specific finding of necessity renders its decision void. Second, the Zeaflas claim that, assuming arguendo, necessity exists, the Board abused its discretion in opening the private road over their farm. Finally, the Zeaflas assert that the Board did not have sufficient evidence to render a finding as to damages and that they are entitled to a jury trial as to the issue of damages. Having carefully examined the positions of the parties, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.
The Board made the following relevant findings of fact. The land owned by Aldinger does not have legal access to a public road, except for the the permissive right granted Aldinger by the Zeaflas. (Board Report of 2/8/90, hereinafter, “Report,” finding no. 5, p. 3.) The existing roadway across the Zeafla farm to the Aldinger property was formerly a public road, which continued across the Aldinger and Double Tree properties and was vacated in 1923. (Report, findings nos. 10-11.) The road across the Zeafla farm is the most appropriate site for the private road, because the site of the existing roadway across the Double Tree property is in poor condition and there was no previous existing roadway across the Volckmer property. (Report, findings nos. 11, 12, 17, 18.) No evidence was produced as to the value of the Zeafla farm before and after the private road would be opened. (Report, finding no. 20.) The Board awarded damages to the Zeaflas in the amount of $5,000.00. (Report, finding no. 29.)
As an initial matter, we note that there appears to be some question as to which intermediate court properly has jurisdiction of this appeal. Superior Court has heard appeals from court of common pleas orders affirming the [303]*303findings of a board of view as to the opening of a private road. See, Driver v. Temple, 374 Pa.Super. 389, 543 A.2d 134, alloc. denied 520 Pa. 607, 553 A.2d 969 (1988); In re Private Road In Greene Township, 343 Pa.Super. 304, 494 A.2d 859 (1985). Commonwealth Court has likewise heard this type of appeal. See, Mandracchia v. Stoney Creek Real Estate, 133 Pa.Cmwlth. 510, 576 A.2d 1181 (1990); Bitting v. Beaston, 120 Pa.Cmwlth. 448, 549 A.2d 611 (1988); Mattei v. Huray, 54 Pa.Cmwlth. 561, 422 A.2d 899 (1980).
In point of fact, Commonwealth Court has held that these cases are clearly within its exclusive jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762(a)(6), stating that there is no jurisdictional distinction between public condemnations and private condemnations. Mandracchia, supra 133 Pa.Cmwlth. at 515 n. 2, 576 A.2d at 1183 n. 2. We agree, the laying out and opening of a private road is clearly a taking of private property which could not occur absent the statutory empowerment of the condemnor by the government. The opening of such a road provides access to a public highway, and also provides access to the condemnor’s property under certain circumstances. “Eminent Domain” has been defined as “The power to take private property for public use by the state, municipalities, and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of public character.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 470 (citation omitted). Eminent domain is a technical phrase which must be construed according to its peculiar and appropriate definition. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a). We hold today that appeals from petitions for the laying out and opening of private roads are eminent domain proceedings within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762(a)(6). Nonetheless, as no party has raised the jurisdictional issue, we will consider the merits of this appeal in the interests of judicial economy as per 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 704, Pa.R.A.P. 741. See, Cohen v. Temple University of Commonwealth System of Higher Educ., 299 Pa.Super. 124, [304]*304445 A.2d 179 (1982). Eldred Township v. Monroe County, 330 Pa.Super. 74, 478 A.2d 1357 (1984).
A board of viewers has broad authority under 36 P.S. § 2731 to determine whether a private road is necessary. In re Private Road in Greene Township, supra 343 Pa.Super. at 306, 494 A.2d at 860. In reviewing the board’s decision, a trial court may confirm the report, or reject it and direct a review. Id., 343 Pa.Superior Ct. at 307-08, 494 A.2d at 861 (citation omitted). “Appellate review is limited to ascertaining the validity of the court’s jurisdiction, the regularity of the proceedings, questions of law and whether there has been an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). With these standards in mind, we examine the case at hand. /
The Zeaflas challenge the necessity of the private road in question. Specifically, the Zeaflas argue that because the private road could run across the Double Tree or the Volckmer property, it is not necessary that it run across their property. This argument mistakes the concept of necessity. “[A]n example of ‘strictest necessity’ is where a parcel of land is completely landlocked.” Id. (citation omitted). Here the Board made a specific finding that the Aldinger parcel is landlocked. Hence, a private road over one of the adjoining parcels is a necessity. To accept the Zeaflas’ argument would place Aldinger in a classic catch-22. As long as a parcel is landlocked, a private road is a necessity; however, as long as there is more than one adjoining landowner, the private road does not necessarily have to impinge upon any particular adjoining landowner’s property.
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OLSZEWSKI, Judge:
This is an appeal from an order dismissing the appeals and exceptions filed by David and Gloria Zeafla, and entering judgment in accord with the findings and report of the Board of View (hereinafter, “Board”). In September 1988, Harry Aldinger filed a petition to appoint viewers and lay out and open a private road in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County. Aldinger’s petition sought to open a private road from his land in Lycoming County, across the adjacent farm of the Zeaflas, to a public road. By motion of the Zeaflas, an additional defendant, Double Tree Camp, Inc., was joined. Double Tree subsequently joined Dorothy Volckmer. Both Double Tree and Volckmer also own property adjacent to Aldinger’s. A private road could be laid out across either the Double Tree or Volckmer property to allow Aldinger access to a public road.1
The Board was properly appointed. Following a view of the land in question and hearings on the matter, the Board issued a report concluding that the private road should be opened across the Zeafla farm as Aldinger requested. The Zeaflas appealed the Board’s decision to the court of com[302]*302mon pleas, which affirmed the Board and issued the order in question. This timely appeal followed.
On appeal, the Zeaflas raise three issues for our consideration. First, the Zeaflas argue that there is no necessity for a private road, as Aldinger has a permissive right-of-way across the farm to reach his property. Alternatively, the Zeaflas allege that the Board’s failure to make a specific finding of necessity renders its decision void. Second, the Zeaflas claim that, assuming arguendo, necessity exists, the Board abused its discretion in opening the private road over their farm. Finally, the Zeaflas assert that the Board did not have sufficient evidence to render a finding as to damages and that they are entitled to a jury trial as to the issue of damages. Having carefully examined the positions of the parties, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.
The Board made the following relevant findings of fact. The land owned by Aldinger does not have legal access to a public road, except for the the permissive right granted Aldinger by the Zeaflas. (Board Report of 2/8/90, hereinafter, “Report,” finding no. 5, p. 3.) The existing roadway across the Zeafla farm to the Aldinger property was formerly a public road, which continued across the Aldinger and Double Tree properties and was vacated in 1923. (Report, findings nos. 10-11.) The road across the Zeafla farm is the most appropriate site for the private road, because the site of the existing roadway across the Double Tree property is in poor condition and there was no previous existing roadway across the Volckmer property. (Report, findings nos. 11, 12, 17, 18.) No evidence was produced as to the value of the Zeafla farm before and after the private road would be opened. (Report, finding no. 20.) The Board awarded damages to the Zeaflas in the amount of $5,000.00. (Report, finding no. 29.)
As an initial matter, we note that there appears to be some question as to which intermediate court properly has jurisdiction of this appeal. Superior Court has heard appeals from court of common pleas orders affirming the [303]*303findings of a board of view as to the opening of a private road. See, Driver v. Temple, 374 Pa.Super. 389, 543 A.2d 134, alloc. denied 520 Pa. 607, 553 A.2d 969 (1988); In re Private Road In Greene Township, 343 Pa.Super. 304, 494 A.2d 859 (1985). Commonwealth Court has likewise heard this type of appeal. See, Mandracchia v. Stoney Creek Real Estate, 133 Pa.Cmwlth. 510, 576 A.2d 1181 (1990); Bitting v. Beaston, 120 Pa.Cmwlth. 448, 549 A.2d 611 (1988); Mattei v. Huray, 54 Pa.Cmwlth. 561, 422 A.2d 899 (1980).
In point of fact, Commonwealth Court has held that these cases are clearly within its exclusive jurisdiction under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762(a)(6), stating that there is no jurisdictional distinction between public condemnations and private condemnations. Mandracchia, supra 133 Pa.Cmwlth. at 515 n. 2, 576 A.2d at 1183 n. 2. We agree, the laying out and opening of a private road is clearly a taking of private property which could not occur absent the statutory empowerment of the condemnor by the government. The opening of such a road provides access to a public highway, and also provides access to the condemnor’s property under certain circumstances. “Eminent Domain” has been defined as “The power to take private property for public use by the state, municipalities, and private persons or corporations authorized to exercise functions of public character.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., p. 470 (citation omitted). Eminent domain is a technical phrase which must be construed according to its peculiar and appropriate definition. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a). We hold today that appeals from petitions for the laying out and opening of private roads are eminent domain proceedings within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 762(a)(6). Nonetheless, as no party has raised the jurisdictional issue, we will consider the merits of this appeal in the interests of judicial economy as per 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 704, Pa.R.A.P. 741. See, Cohen v. Temple University of Commonwealth System of Higher Educ., 299 Pa.Super. 124, [304]*304445 A.2d 179 (1982). Eldred Township v. Monroe County, 330 Pa.Super. 74, 478 A.2d 1357 (1984).
A board of viewers has broad authority under 36 P.S. § 2731 to determine whether a private road is necessary. In re Private Road in Greene Township, supra 343 Pa.Super. at 306, 494 A.2d at 860. In reviewing the board’s decision, a trial court may confirm the report, or reject it and direct a review. Id., 343 Pa.Superior Ct. at 307-08, 494 A.2d at 861 (citation omitted). “Appellate review is limited to ascertaining the validity of the court’s jurisdiction, the regularity of the proceedings, questions of law and whether there has been an abuse of discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). With these standards in mind, we examine the case at hand. /
The Zeaflas challenge the necessity of the private road in question. Specifically, the Zeaflas argue that because the private road could run across the Double Tree or the Volckmer property, it is not necessary that it run across their property. This argument mistakes the concept of necessity. “[A]n example of ‘strictest necessity’ is where a parcel of land is completely landlocked.” Id. (citation omitted). Here the Board made a specific finding that the Aldinger parcel is landlocked. Hence, a private road over one of the adjoining parcels is a necessity. To accept the Zeaflas’ argument would place Aldinger in a classic catch-22. As long as a parcel is landlocked, a private road is a necessity; however, as long as there is more than one adjoining landowner, the private road does not necessarily have to impinge upon any particular adjoining landowner’s property. Each adjoining landowner could claim that it was possible to place the private road on a different adjoining landowner’s property, thereby preventing the landlocked parcel’s owner from obtaining any private road. We do not believe the legislature intended such an absurd result. “Absolute necessity” is not a requirement of the statute. Id. (citation omitted).
Nor are we persuaded by the Zeaflas’ argument that the Board never made a finding of necessity. As described [305]*305above, a landlocked parcel is an example of “strictest necessity.” We will not require a board of viewers to use the specific term “necessity” in its findings. We agree with the trial court that the Board’s finding that the parcel was landlocked implies the requisite necessity. (Trial court order at 1.)
Finally, the Zeaflas argue that Aldinger’s characterization of the present permissive right as an irrevocable license negates any necessity. This overlooks the nature of an irrevocable license. Assuming, arguendo, that Aldinger does have an irrevocable license,2 the right to traverse the Zeafla farm does not necessarily run with the landlocked parcel. Successors in interest to the Zeafla farm would take subject to the license only if they had notice of it. Kovach v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Pa., 340 Pa.Super. 144, 147-49, 489 A.2d 883, 885 (1985). The ephemeral nature of such a license is sufficient to render the more permanent remedy of a private road a necessity, at least in the context of a landlocked parcel as presented here.
We also do not agree that the Board abused its discretion in granting the private road across the Zeafla farm. The Board viewed the properties in question and held the appropriate hearings. The Board’s findings amply support its determination that the existing road across the Zeafla farm is the most appropriate place for the private road.3 The Zeaflas’ argument that the agricultural use of their property makes it more appropriate to place the road on the Double Tree or Volckmer tracts is unavailing. See, Driver, supra 374 Pa.Super. at 398-400, 543 A.2d at 138-[306]*306139.4 The use to which the land being taken has been put goes to the issue of damages, not the propriety of the route chosen, so long as the choice is otherwise proper. Id.
The Zeaflas’ last argument is that the computation of damages was erroneous. We agree. Damages for a private road are to be ascertained as if the land was being taken for a public road. 36 P.S. § 2736 (Purdon’s Supp. 1990). The Zeaflas argue that this requires that damages be ascertained in accord with the Eminent Domain Code, 26 P.S. § 1-101, et seg., which provides:
Just compensation shall consist of the difference between the fair market value of the condemnee’s entire property interest immediately before the condemnation as unaffected thereby and the fair market value of his property interest remaining immediately after such condemnation and as affected thereby, and such other damages as are provided in this code.
26 P.S. § 1-602 (Purdon’s Supp.1990). Further, the burden is on Aldinger, as the condemnor, to present expert testimony as to the appropriate amount of damages. 26 P.S. § 1-702 (Purdon’s Supp.1990). See, In re Private Road in Greene Township, supra 343 Pa.Super. at 307-10, 494 A.2d at 861-862, for the proposition that the Eminent Domain Code applies to private road actions. Aldinger presented no such evidence. (Report, finding no. 20.)5 The Board appar[307]*307ently substituted the general value of similar land in the community for the valuation of the Zeaflas’ land required. (Report, findings nos. 25, 26.) Proper evidence must support a board’s findings as to damages. In re Private Road in Greene Township, supra at 309-10, 494 A.2d at 862. We find no record of any being presented here.
The opening of a private road is a statutorily granted privilege allowing one citizen to condemn his neighbor’s land for his own purpose. His neighbor is entitled to fair and just compensation for the land taken. The condemnor must present adequate evidence of the fair market value of that land to determine the exact amount of damages due his neighbor.6
The Zeaflas also assert that they are entitled to a jury trial as to damages if the new findings of the Board are appealed to the court of common pleas. We agree. See, In re Private Road in Monroeville Borough, Allegheny County, 204 Pa.Super. 552, 556-57, 205 A.2d 885, 887 (1965); Mattei, supra 54 Pa.Cmwlth. at 565 n. 5, 422 A.2d at 901 n. 5 (noting the existence of a right to jury trial on damages). Therefore, upon remand, Aldinger must present expert evidence as to the value of the Zeafla farm before [308]*308and after the taking, and the Zeaflas are entitled to a jury trial as to the amount of damages. Of course, the Zeaflas are entitled to present their own evidence as to the fair market value of the land taken.
We note that the Zeaflas filed an “Application for Relief” four days before the scheduled date of argument for this case. That application alleges that Aldinger has not yet paid the damages as determined in the order being appealed and has conveyed his property to another party. The application requests a remand to the court of common pleas with instruction to dismiss Aldinger’s petition on the grounds that he is no longer a party in interest as he does not own the property which will be benefitted by the opening of the private road. It is true that payment of damages is a statutorily mandated prerequisite to the opening of a private road, and has, in fact, long been the law in Pennsylvania. 36 P.S. § 2736 (Purdon’s Supp.1990); Clowe’s Private Road, 31 Pa. 12 (1854). Nonetheless, Aldinger has not yet had an opportunity to answer the allegations contained in the Zeaflas’ application. Further, as an appellate court, we are not as well suited to the requisite initial factual inquiry as our trial court brethren. Therefore, we remand this case to the court of common pleas which shall conduct a hearing to determine whether Aldinger is a proper party to these proceedings. If Aldinger is no longer a party in interest to the petition, it must be dismissed; if Aldinger is a proper party to this petition, the Zeaflas are entitled to a jury trial as to the proper amount of damages. Aldinger must present expert testimony of the fair market value of the property before and after the opening of this road. The Zeaflas are also free to present evidence as to this issue.
As a final matter, we encourage the legislature to revisit this area. The taking of private property for a private road is an action in the nature of an eminent domain proceeding. The statutes governing this taking, however, in our opinion, do not provide adequate protection to the party whose property is taken. In proceeding under the Eminent Do[309]*309main Code, an attorney must be the chairman of the Board of View. 26 P.S. § 1-503 (Purdon’s Supp.1990). A Board of View for the taking of a private road only requires that one-third of its members be admitted to the bar. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 2142 (Purdon’s Supp.1990).7 The Eminent Domain Code requires expert evidence as to the value of the property taken. 26 P.S. § 1-702 (Purdon’s Supp.1990). Although evidence of the value of the property taken is required when assessing damages for the opening of a private road, there is no express statutory requirement that expert evidence be presented. Further, in a private road case the petitioner does not have to post a bond assuring that the party whose property is taken will receive compensation. This deficiency has led to the present state of affairs in this case, where the condemnor is alleged to have obtained a decree opening the road and then conveyed the dominant tenement to a third party before paying the damage award to the owner of the servient tenement. The absence of such protections is especially critical in light of our holding today that appeals of these cases lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court and that Court’s position that the Eminent Domain Code does not apply to these cases. See, Mattei, supra. Finally, allowing a private citizen to exercise the eminent domain power for a private purpose may raise constitutional implications. As neither party has alleged any such violation, we abstain from passing upon the question.
Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
TAMILIA, J., concurs in the result.
BECK, J., files a concurring opinion.
[310]*310EXHIBIT A
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