[587] OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT
William M. Dittmar and James M. Corl (Corl)2 appeal an order of the Court of Common Pleas of the 44th Judicial District,' Sullivan County Branch (trial court), overruling their‘exceptions to a report of a Board of View (Board) issued in a proceeding under the Private Road Act.3 The Board recommended that Burton and Joanne Adams be granted the right to use an existing private road (Roadway) on Corl’s property. The Board found that opening the -Roadway to the Adamses was necessary and would serve a public purpose. The trial court confirmed the Board’s report, and Corl appealed.
The Adamses own a 231-acre parcel of land in Colley Township,'Sullivan'County, and most of this parcel is located on top of a mountain. Corl’s 500-acre parcel lies immediately to the west of the Adamses’ parcel. Route 87 lies south of both parcels. On the western side of the two parcels, Holly Hill Road travels north from Route 87 up the hill and ends on Corl’s parcel, approximately 2,000 feet from the Adams-es’ property. On the eastern side of these two parcels, Star Road, a dirt road, travels north from Route 87 in a valley, along a river.4 Approximately one-half mile after it leaves Route 87, Star Road meets the southern and eastern boundaries of the Adamses’ parcel.
In 2009, Chesapeake Corporation (Chesapeake) built the Roadway to provide access .from Holly Hill Road, a public road, to its natural gas drilling site on Corl’s land. Notes-' of Testimony at 12 (N.T. -); Reproduced Record at 51a (R.R. -). Chesapeake’s Roadway begins where Holly Hill Road meets- Corl’s property. The Roadway crosses Corl’s property for 2,200 feet, where it meets the Adamses’ property line. The Roadway then continues across the Adamses’ property for 3,400 feet before-it reenters Corl’s property; it continues for two hundred yards to the gas pad on Corl’s land. Id.
After the Roadway was' built, the Adamses used the 2,200-foot stretch of the Roadway on Corl’s land to access their property from Holly Hill Road. Three years later, Chesapeake erected gates at two'points on the Roadway. The first gate was placed on Corl’s land, close to where the Roadway connects to Holly Hill Road. The second gate was placed on the Adams-es’ land, shortly after it leaves Corl’s land. The Adamses have access to the gate on their property, and at one time they had access to the gate on Corl’s property. Corl directed Chesapeake to change the lock and not to give the combination to the Adamses.
On February 26,. 2013, the Adamses filed a petition pursuant to Section 11 of the Private Road Act, 36 P.S. § 2731,5 to open [588] a private road. Alleging that their property was effectively landlocked, the Adamses sought the right to resume their use of the 2,200-foot stretch of the Roadway that was built, maintained and used daily by Chesapeake. The trial court granted the petition and appointed a Board of View to inspect the properties and determine whether the Adamses’ use of the Roadway was necessary. The parties agreed that the site visit alone would provide the basis of the Board’s decision and, thus, “a full eviden-tiary hearing was waived,” Supplemental Report, 9/15/2015, at 2.
On November 18, 2013, the Board conducted a site visit. Following the visit, the Board issued a report dated February 21, 2014, where it made, inter alia, the following finding:
f) ... Petitioners’ land is effectively landlocked due to the fact that the only other means of access to their land that was identified to the Board would be via an approximately one mile long unimproved logging trail located off of Star Road that involved an extremely steep upward and winding incline to the crest of the Petitioners’ land. It was observed to be significantly more narrow and inhospitable than the Roadway, and in the opinion of the Board would' be extremely expensive and arduous for the Petitioners to effectively and efficiently construct a [passable] road that would allow for safe and reliable transit to allow a residential construction crew to gain access to the Petitioners’ land.
Board Report, 2/21/2014, at 3-4. The Board concluded that the Adamses “should be granted unlimited access over and upon” the Roadway. Id. at 5.
Corl-filed exceptions to the Board’s report, arguing that the Adamses’ property was not landlocked for the stated reason that Star Road, an abandoned township road, provided “easy access” to their property. Exceptions to Report of Board of View and Request for Remand to Create a Record; R.R. 26a. Thereafter, Corl filed a supplemental objection that the Adamses’ intended use of the Roadway would not serve a public purpose. R.R. 27a. The trial court remanded the matter to the Board to create a record. At the Board’s hearing on July 24, 2015, the Adamses presented .evidence. Corl did not present any evidence to support his exceptions.
Burton Adams testified about the need to use the existing Roadway to access his property. On .direct examination, Adams testified as follows:
[Counsel]: What is the closest township road to your property?
[Adams]: Holly Hill Road.
[Counsel]: And do you have any direct access at all from Holly Hill Road which is also Colley Township Road T-443 to your property?
[Adams]: No.
[Counsel]: Is there a way that you can access your property from Holly Hill Road?
[Adams]: Yes.
[Adams’ Counsel]: And describe that access to the Board [ ].
[Adams]: That access is a commercial road that crosses [Corl’s] property two thousand one hundred and thirty-nine point something feet and that road is used constantly by Chesapeake to access [589] the gas pad which is on the other side of my property and which on my property I have 3,387 feet approximately and there’s another couple hundred yards where it’s on Mr. Corl’s property and that is a gas pad and it’s producing and it is providing gas to the general public through a pipeline.
N.T. 9-10; R.R. 48a-49a.
Adams also testified about Star Road, a dirt road, that abuts the eastern border of his property, which lies in the valley. Adams testified that Star Road was an abandoned township road.6 Star- Road ends in a logging trail on the Adamses’ land. Howevér, the logging trail cannot be used to access the hilltop part of the Adamses’ property. Adams testified as follows:
[Counsel]: Can you describe the alleged other access suggested by [Corl] to the Court?
[Adams]: Yes sir... [b]asically from where the public road [Route 87] ends and I can access my property it’s an old — the lower end of it is actually a skid road and then part way up is nothing more than a path where they skidded logs down and that’s how we access the property.
[Counsel]: And is that access steep?
[Adams]: Yes. It’s over a thousand foot rise and it’s over a mile long to get there.
[Counsel]: And approximately what would be the cost of making that road [passable] so you could access your property?
[Adams]:' I don’t know an exact cost but we’re looking at over hundreds of thousands of dollars to do that I suspect.
N.T. 24; R.R. 63a.
Following the hearing, the Board issued a supplemental report dated August 31, 2015, finding the Adamses’ land to be effectively landlocked. The Board explained its decision as follows:
h) In the opinion of the Board of View, the Petitioners’ land is effectively landlocked due to the fact that the only other means of access to their land that was identified to the Board would be by way of an approximately one mile long unimproved logging trail located off of Star Road that involved an extremely steep upward and winding 1000 foot incline to the crest of the Petitioners’ land. Access via Star Road was personally observed by the Board to be significantly more narrow and inhospitable than the route from Holly Hill Road to the Roadway, and in the opinion of the Board the cost of improvement of the logging trail to allow for the safe and reliable transit of vehicular traffic to and from the Petitioners’ land would be prohibitively expensive and arduous for the Petitioners to have effectively and efficiently constructed and would not be financially feasible or cost-effective. Consequently, unless an appropriate alternate means of [590] access is identified, the Board is of the opinion that the Petitioners’ land is indeed landlocked and otherwise inaccessible to the Petitioners for their stated use and purpose.
Board Report, 8/31/2015, at 6 (emphasis added),7
The Board found. that the “Roadway [is] the shortest, safest, most convenient, accessible and reliable current means of access, which will result in no discernible injury to [Corl’s] Property,” Id. at 10. Accordingly, the Board concluded that “[the Adamses] should, be granted the requested access over and upon [Corl’s] land for the stated purpose of constructing and accessing a. seasonal cabin to be constructed upon [them] land.” Id. The Board did not award compensation to Corl, noting that Corl did not ask for it. The Board further explained that. the Roadway was .maintained by Chesapeake and that the additional use by the Adamses would be .minimal, particularly when compared to Chesapeake’s heavy and daily truck traffic over the Roadway,
Corl filed exceptions to the Board’s supplemental report. He argued that the Board erred in finding that the Adamses’ land was, effectively landlocked and that the Adamses’ opening of the Roadway was for a public purpose. On March 24, 2016, the trial court overruled Corl’s exceptions and accepted the Board’s report. Corl appealed to this Court.
On appeal,8 Corl raises several issues. Corl. contends that the Adamses have access to their land by way of Star Road. Although the Adamses may prefer to use Holly Hill Road and the existing Roadway to- access their land, they are not entitled to the access of their choice. Corl also argues that the Board erred in finding that the Roadway’s use to generate natural gas for public consumption provides a public benefit that warrants the establishment of a private road.
The Private Road Act authorizes a landowner to petition for the use of, or the creation of, a private road across another’s land to access his property. In re Opening Private Road for Benefit of O’Reilly, 607 Pa. 280, 5 A.3d 246, 284 (2010). Section 12 of the Private Road Act states as follows:
If it shall appear by the report of the viewers to the court directing the view, that such road is necessary, the said court shall direct what breadth the road so reported shall be opened, and the proceedings in such cases shall be entered on record, as before directed, and thenceforth such road shall be deemed and taken to be a lawful private road.
36 P.S. § 2732 (emphasis added). The standard for granting a private road petition is a finding that “such road is necessary.” Id. “Necessary” is not defined in the Private Road Act. Our Superior Court has construed Section 12 as follows:
[591] While the [Private Road] Act does not require an absolute necessity, such as being completely landlocked, the mere inconvenience in the use of an existing road is not enough. Pocopson Road, 16 Pa. 15, 17 [ (1851) ]. The existing road must be of a limited privilege, Stewart’s Private Road, 38 Pa. Super 339, 342 [ (1908) ], Or ‘extremely difficult and burdensome’ in its use....
Application of Little, 180 Pa.Super. 555, 119 A.2d 587, 589 (1956). In short, necessity does not require the property to be “completely landlocked,” but necessity is more than “mere inconvenience.” Id.
A board of view has broad authority to determine whether a private road is necessary. In re Laying Out and Opening a Private Road, 405 Pa.Super. 298, 592 A.2d 343, 346 (1991). “To determine what in fact is necessary the Board naturally has to know as a matter of law what the Act requires, and in this sense the Board must interpret the law.” Application of Little, 119 A.2d at 589. We review the board of view’s findings and conclusions for abuse of discretion. In re Forrester, 773 A.2d at 221. The board of view’s determination must be affirmed “unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.” Belleville v. David Cutler Group, 118 A.3d 1184, 1195 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
The most oft-quoted precedent on whether a private road ■ is necessary is Application of Little, 119 A.2d 587. In that case, the landowner did not claim that her property was landlocked or that her existing access by a public road was difficult or burdensome. Rather, she sought to open a private road over an adjacent parcel in order to facilitate her future and inchoate plan for a commercial development. In holding that the board of view did not err in refusing her petition, the Superior Court reasoned that the landowner sought only an “advisory” opinion “that she will have a cheap, easy and direct access to her contemplated development before she goes to the. trouble of expending any money on it,” Id. at 560, 119 A.2d 587. This did not constitute necessity.
■More recently, in In re Laying Out and Opening Private Road in Sullivan Township, Tioga County, 964 A.2d 495 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), this Court established the factors to be considered when deciding whether a proposed private road is necessary.: In Sullivan Township, the members of the Hilltop Hunting Club used an existing private road that passed over the middle of Tri-County Hunting Club’s land to reach their land for 40 years. In 2003, TriCounty advised Hilltop it could no longer use the^ road unless it signed a ten-year lease. In response, Hilltop filed a petition under the Private Road Act, seeking continued use of the existing road over TriCounty’s property. The board of view granted the petition, and the trial court confirmed the board’s report. This Court affirmed the trial court.
In doing so, we acknowledged that Hilltop owned, by deed, a right-of-way for ingress and egress to a public road over another landowner’s parcel. However, the evidence showed that Hilltop’s exercise of this property right was not feasible. When determining necessity, we held that -the factors to consider were the cost, topography of the land, and environmental consequences of constructing a new road to Hilltop’s land. The presence of the existing roadbed across Tri-County’s parcel that could be opened without additional construction was specifically held to be an important factor in this determination. Id. at 504. We held that Hilltop’s land was effectively landlocked because there was no realistic access to Hilltop’s land other [592] than by the existing private road across Tri-County’s property.
Corl contends that Application of Little is dispositive because it established that mere inconvenience does not demonstrate necessity. He contends that because the Adamses can access some part of then-property by Star Road, they are not landlocked.9 This argument cannot be squared with either the Board’s findings or the legal principles expressed in Application of Little, which established that where the existing access is “extremely difficult and burdensome,” necessity is shown. The Board found that the closest paved and public road to any part of the Adamses’ parcel is Holly Hill Road. Star Road, by contrast, is a dirt road that was found to be “more narrow and inhospitable than the route from Holly Hill Road.” Board Report, 8/31/2015, at 6.10 Further, the construction of a new road to the crest of the Adamses’ property would be so costly as to render the Adamses’ “land indeed landlocked and otherwise inaccessible.” Id. In short, the principles expressed in Application of Little favor the Adamses, not Corl.
The trial court held that Sullivan Township was dispositive on necessity, and we agree. As in Sullivan Township, the Adamses do not seek to construct a new road on Corl’s land but only to use an existing roadbed. In Sullivan Township, the evidence showed that the cost of constructing a new road up an incline of 220 feet was estimated at between $10,000 and $60,000, which was cost-prohibitive. Here, the Board found that building a new road up an incline of 1,000 feet at an estimated cost of over $100,000 was cost-prohibitive. The factors identified in Sullivan Township, i.e., cost, topography and the placement of the private road over an existing roadbed, apply with equal force here.
The dissent argues that Sullivan Township is distinguishable because the costly and difficult alternative access rejected by the board of view did not involve land owned by the petitioner, Hilltop. This is not strictly accurate. Hilltop had a right by deed to construct a new private road on the land in question, which was found not feasible by reason of cost and topography. Real property interests take a variety of forms, not just ownership by fee simple title.
The trial court’s holding is also consistent with In re Private Road in Union Township, 148 Pa.Cmwlth. 522, 611 A.2d 1362 (1992). In Union Township, the landowners had direct access by a public road to the western half of their property. They also had an easement over adjacent property from another public road to access the eastern half of their land for timbering. The eastern and western halves of the property were separated by a ravine measuring 80 feet deep and several hundred feet wide. The landowners petitioned to open a private road for more complete access to the eastern portion of their property. The board of view found
necessity for opening a private road to allow [landowners] to use their landlocked land located on the east side of the [ravine] on the ground that the easement by prescription granted by the trial court in the 1987 equity action [was] limited in size and use and that the cost of constructing a bridge across the [ravine] would be prohibitive.
[593] Id. at 1364. The board of view ■ recommended the private road be laid out over the existing prescriptive easement to a width of twenty feet. The trial court confirmed the board’s report, and this Court affirmed the trial court.
As in Union Townskvp, the Adamses do not have access to the western part of their parcel. Star Road does not provide access to the mountainous portion of the Adamses’ parcel. As in Union Township, topography presents a serious impediment. Instead of a ravine, the Adamses confront a steep and wooded .1,000-foot incline. In Union Township the board of view found that the cost of constructing a bridge across the ravine was prohibitive.11 Likewise heres the Board found that the cost of improving the logging trail to reach the mountainous part of the Adamses’ land was not economically feasible.
The dissent relies upon the discussion in Mazzante v. McClintock, 976 A.2d 648 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), in which the trial court refused to appoint a board of view because the landowner’s pleading was inadequate. The landowner’s petition admitted that he had access to his property from a public road and did not plead facts to show necessity. A trial court’s decision to deny appointment of a board of view is based solely on the pleading. Pope v. Muth, 332 Pa.Super. 264, 481 A.2d 355, 356 (1984). Where the pleading is sufficient, it is the board of view that gathers the facts and decides whether the opening of a private road is “necessary” under the Act. Id. Here, the pleading was sufficient. Accordingly, the Board of View then collected the evidence and found that the Adamses were effectively landlocked. Mazzante is inappo-site because thiere was no fact finding by a board of view.
The dissent contends that the Board improperly focused on the difficulty of converting the logging trail on the Adamses’ property into an access road. However, Union Township considered the same problem, i.e., the difficulty of construction on the petitioner’s land. The ravine in Union Township is comparable to the 1,000-foot incline here. In both cases, the prohibitive cost of. transforming the geographical features into “realistic access” satisfies the necessity standard enunciated in Little, 119 A.2d at 589.12
The Board’s decision is consistent with our precedent on necessity. The Board found that Star Road offers, at best, extremely difficult access because the logging trail cannot be feasibly converted into a private road given the mountainous to[594] pography. Sullivan Township, 964 A.2d 496. For access to be feasible it must provide access to the entire parcel. Union Township, 611 A.2d at 1364. We hold-that the Board did not abuse its discretion in holding that opening the Roadway for use by the Adamses was necessary.
Proving necessity does not end the inquiry. Our Supreme Court, in O’Reilly, 5 A.3d 246, held that the taking of private property for a private purpose is inconsistent with the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions. The Supreme Court did not declare the Private Road Act facially unconstitutional but, rather, clarified that the opening of a private road under the Private Road Act is subject to the constitutional restrictions that govern a taking under eminent domain. Id, at 258. Accordingly, the opening of a private road must have a public purpose, which exists where the public is the “primary and paramount beneficiary of the taking.” Id. (citing Middletown Township v. Lands of Stone, 595 Pa. 607, 939 A.2d 331, 337 (2007)).
The Adamses argue that the primary and paramount beneficiary of the Roadway is the public because it allows Chesapeake to supply natural gas to the public. Additionally, the Adamses argue that the Roadway will be used by hunters to access the Adamses’ 231-acre ■ parcel, which also serves the public. The Adamses concede that their use of the Roadway will allow them to construct a seasonal home, but that fact does- not vitiate the overriding public purpose of the Roadway. '
Corl responds that the beneficiary of the Roadway is a private corporation, Chesapeake. Alowing the Adamses access to the Roadway will provide a private benefit to them, not the public. As to the Adamses’ argument that - opening the private road will advance game management, Corl responds that hunters can access the Adams-es’ property on foot.-
The Board found a public purpose for the opening óf the Roadway. It relied upon Westrick v. Approval of Bond of Peoples Natural Gas Co., 103 Pa.Cmwlth. 578, 520 A.2d 963, 965 (1987), which held that the transportation and supply of natural gas constitutes a public use. The-Board also noted that a taking does not lose its public character merely because a “private interest may also be benefited.” Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277, 283 (1947). The trial court agreed with the Board’s public purpose analysis. It also found that the Roadway will provide a public benefit because the Adamses have entered into a Public . Access Program Cooperative Agreement with the Game Commission that will give hunters access to the Adams-es' property.
Game and wildlife are renewable natural resources.13 The Pennsylvania Constitution requires thé Commonwealth to conserve and maintain natural resources for the benefit of all people.14 The legislature [595] charged the Game Commission with the duty to “protect, propagate, manage and preserve” game and wildlife populations throughout the Commonwealth. 34 Pa. C.S. § 322(a). In executing this duty, the Game Commission is authorized to use hunting and trapping as means of managing wildlife populations. 34 Pa. C.S. § 103(b). One way the Game Commission ensures adequate population management is through cooperative agreements with private • landowners. 34 Pa. C.S. § 323 (“The [Game C]ommission may enter into cooperative agreements with any.. .individual. . .to further the programs of the commission.”) (emphasis added). Under these agreements, the parties .work in concert to improve public hunting opportunities and wildlife .habitats on the enrolled property.
The Game Commission entered into a Cooperative Agreement with the Adamses to allow, deer hunting on their entire 231-acre parcel. Cooperative Agreement; R.R. 99a. Corl argues that hunters can access the Adamses’ property on foot from Star Road. However, the Cooperative Agreement specifically allows hunters to access all 231 acres of the Adamses’ parcel and contemplates that they will do so by vehicle. Id. The logging trail simply does not offer this contemplated access to the Adamses’ land. The Roadway does. We agree with the trial court that opening the Roadway will allow hunters to reach all of the Adamses’ property and assist in the management of the deer population, which principally benefits the public.
The Board found that the “taking” from Corl was too minimal to warrant an award of compensation, and Corl does not challenge that holding.15 The extent of a taking in a Private Road Act case is relevant and should be a factor when considering the primary public purpose required by O’Reilly. Indeed, given the lack of feasible access to their land, it is the Adamses, who will suffer a taking of the: use and enjoyment of their land if they;aré denied use of the existing Roadway. In this context, we discern no abuse of discretion in the -trial court’s holding that opening the Roadway for use by the Adamses satisfies the public purpose test established by our Supreme Court in O’Reilly,
For all these reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 21st day of September, 2017, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of the 44th Judicial District, Sullivan County Branch dated April 6, 2016 in the above-captioned matter is AFFIRMED.