In Re Jeffrey A.
This text of 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314 (In Re Jeffrey A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In re JEFFREY A. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Placer County Department of Health and Human Services, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Tena F., Defendant and Appellant.
Court of Appeal, Third District.
*315 Mario de Solenni, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.
Anthony LaBouff, County Counsel and James R. Yeo, Special Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SIMS, Acting P.J.
Appellant, the mother of the minors, appeals from the order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 366.26, 395[1].) Appellant contends the juvenile court failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). (25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq.) We will remand for a determination as to whether the "request for verification" sent to the Pawnee tribe by the Placer County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) complied *316 with the requirements of the ICWA and of federal regulations implementing that act.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1998, the minors, then 10 and 13 years old, were made dependents of the juvenile court based on allegations that appellant regularly left them for weeks at a time with various caretakers, including a registered sex offender. A subsequent petition alleged that the minors' father had been convicted of raping the minors' 13year-old half-sister and that he was a registered sex offender with a condition that he have no contact with children. Appellant reported that the minors' father was her uncle, with whom she had lived beginning at age 13. According to appellant, the father had been released from prison and she had minimal information concerning his whereabouts.
Appellant was granted reunification services, which were denied to the minors' father based on section 361.5, subdivision (b)(8) (minor conceived by means of the commission of an offense listed in Penal Code §§ 288 or 288.5).
In April 2000, the juvenile court terminated reunification services and ordered a permanent plan of long-term foster care for the minors. Subsequently, the minors' foster parents requested guardianship of the minors and a section 366.26 hearing was scheduled.
The report for the section 366.26 hearing stated: "It has recently come to the social worker's attention that [the minors] may be of Native American de[s]cent." According to the report, "[t]he appropriate ICWA request for verification" was sent to the Pawnee tribe and the social worker was "awaiting return." A subsequent report indicated: "The biological father has stated in the past that he believes [the minors] may be of Native American de[s]cent." It was again reported that a "request for verification" had been sent to the Pawnee tribe but "ha[d] not been returned." In the meantime, the foster parents had decided that they were willing to adopt the minors.
There was no discussion of the ICWA at the contested section 366.26 hearing. At the hearing, the juvenile court terminated parental rights and ordered a permanent plan of adoption.
DISCUSSION
Appellant claims that reversal is mandated because there was a failure "to properly notify the tribes, appellant, and the Secretary of the Interior of the pendency of the proceedings" in accordance with the ICWA.
Congress passed the ICWA in 1978 "to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum standards for removal of Indian children from their families and placement of such children `in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture....'" (In re Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 195, 92 Cal. Rptr.2d 648; 25 U.S.C. § 1902; Mississippi Choctaw v. Holyfield (1989) 490 U.S. 30, 109 S.Ct. 1597,104 L.Ed.2d 29.)
The ICWA's procedural and substantive requirements must be followed in involuntary child custody proceedings when an "Indian child" is involved. An "Indian child" is defined by the ICWA as "any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe." (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).)
Among the procedural safeguards included in the ICWA is the provision for *317 notice. The ICWA provides in part: "In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention. If the identity or location of the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe cannot be determined, such notice shall be given to the Secretary [of the Interior] in like manner, who shall have fifteen days after receipt to provide the requisite notice to the parent or Indian custodian and the tribe...." (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) "Notice shall be sent whenever there is reason to believe the child may be an Indian child, and for every hearing thereafter unless and until it is determined that the child is not an Indian child." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1439(f)(5).[2])
The circumstances under which a juvenile court has reason to believe that a minor is an Indian child are set forth in the Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings (Guidelines), promulgated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). (44 Fed.Reg. 67584 (Nov. 26, 1979).) The Guidelines provide, in part, that a state court has reason to believe a child is an Indian child if "[a]ny public or state-licensed agency involved in child protection services or family support has discovered information which suggests that the child is an Indian child." (Guidelines at p. 67586.) The substance of this Guideline has been incorporated into California law. (See rule 1439(d)(2).)
"Determination of tribal membership or eligibility for membership is made exclusively by the tribe." (Rule 1439(g).) "[O]ne of the primary purposes of giving notice to the tribe is to enable the tribe to determine whether the child involved in the proceedings is an Indian child. [Citation.]" (In re Desiree F. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 460, 470, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 688.) Enrollment is not determinative of membership in a tribe. (Rule 1439(g)(2); Guidelines at p. 67586.) "The Indian status of the child need not be certain to invoke the notice requirement, [Citation.] Because the question of membership rests with each Indian tribe, when the juvenile court knows or has reason to believe the child may be an Indian child, notice must be given to the particular tribe in question or the Secretary. [Citations.]" (In re Desiree F., supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p.
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127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 103 Cal. App. 4th 1103, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-jeffrey-a-calctapp-2002.