In re J.C.

2023 Ohio 3070

Opinion

[Cite as In re J.C., 2023-Ohio-3070.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

IN RE: J.C. : APPEAL NO. C-220544 TRIAL NO. 22-1680Z :

: O P I N I O N.

Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Appellant Discharged

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 1, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Anton Lapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Joshua A. Thompson, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

KINSLEY, Judge.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant J.C. appeals her adjudication for resisting arrest. In two

assignments of error, J.C. challenges whether there was sufficient evidence to support her

adjudication and whether her adjudication was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Following our review of the record, we hold there was insufficient evidence to support J.C.’s

adjudication. Accordingly, the judgment of the juvenile court is reversed, and J.C. is

discharged.

Factual and Procedural Background

{¶2} On May 21, 2022, Officer Kevin Woodruff received a call to investigate potential

problems at a group home. Woodruff made two visits to the group home that day to

investigate two separate issues. During his second visit, he spoke with the group home

supervisor and the alleged victim. Based on these conversations, Woodruff determined he

had probable cause to arrest J.C. for aggravated menacing. When Woodruff and another

officer arrested J.C., she yelled, attempted to kick the officers, and threw herself ont0 the

ground. Further, as the officers physically forced J.C. into a police cruiser, she continued to

threaten the officers and use physical force against them.

{¶3} J.C. was charged with aggravated menacing and resisting arrest. The

complaint alleged that J.C. threatened another juvenile, who was living at the same group

home as J.C., with violence. But at trial, the state voluntarily dismissed the aggravated-

menacing charge.

{¶4} The juvenile court then held a trial on the resisting-arrest charge. Woodruff

was the sole witness. He testified that his conversations with the group home supervisor and

the alleged victim were the basis for his determination that he had probable cause to arrest

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J.C. But he did not testify as to the details of these conversations or as to any other basis for

why he arrested J.C. J.C. did not cross-examine Woodruff and did not call any witnesses.

{¶5} J.C. moved for an acquittal under Crim.R. 29, arguing there was insufficient

evidence that there was probable cause for a lawful arrest. The magistrate denied the motion

and adjudicated J.C. delinquent for resisting arrest. J.C. filed objections, which the juvenile

court overruled. The juvenile court adopted the magistrate’s findings. At the hearing on the

disposition, the juvenile court held that it no longer had the legal authority to hold J.C. in

detention given that she had reached the age of majority. The juvenile court imposed court

costs as a disposition against J.C., which it remitted due to her indigency.

{¶6} J.C. now appeals.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶7} “The standard of review when determining whether a juvenile court’s

adjudication of delinquency is supported by sufficient evidence is identical to the standard

used in adult criminal cases.” In re R.B., 2021-Ohio-3749, 179 N.E.3d 749, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.).

“The court on review asks whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

{¶8} R.C. 2921.33(A) provides, “No person, recklessly or by force, shall resist or

interfere with a lawful arrest of the person or another.” “A lawful arrest is an element of

resisting arrest and the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the arrest

was lawful.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pitts, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

220080, 2022-Ohio-4172, ¶ 13. Warrantless arrests made without probable cause are

unlawful. State v. Hughes, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-070755, 2008-Ohio-3966, ¶ 22. As this

court has held, where the record demonstrates that officers had only an articulable suspicion

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that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity, rather than probable cause, there exists

insufficient evidence to support a charge of resisting arrest. State v. Raines, 124 Ohio App.3d

430, 432, 706 N.E.2d 414 (1st Dist.1997).

{¶9} Under these principles, the prosecution was therefore required to prove that

Woodruff had probable cause to arrest J.C. for aggravated menacing.

{¶10} “[P]robable cause exists when the facts and circumstances are sufficient to

provide a reasonable belief that the accused has committed a crime.” State v. Martin, 170

Ohio St.3d 181, 2022-Ohio-4175, 209 N.E.3d 688, ¶ 17. But “probable cause requires more

than bare suspicion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ¶ 18. “The circumstances

must demonstrate a fair probability that a crime has been committed.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish probable cause.

State v. Reed, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200104, 2022-Ohio-3986, ¶ 25.

{¶11} The evidence of probable cause to arrest in this case was extremely slim.

Woodruff was clear that he was arresting J.C. for aggravating menacing under R.C.

2903.21(A). That statute prohibits knowingly causing “another to believe that the offender

will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person, the other

person’s unborn, or a member of the other person’s immediate family.” Thus, to demonstrate

that Woodruff had probable cause to believe J.C. committed aggravated menacing, and

therefore to arrest her for that offense, the state had the burden of presenting evidence

creating a reasonable belief that J.C. knowingly caused the alleged victim to believe J.C. would

cause serious physical harm to her.

{¶12} To that end, the state presented nothing but Woodruff’s extremely sparse

testimony. Woodruff stated that he spoke with the group home supervisor and the alleged

aggravated menacing victim, but he gave no details as to what these witnesses said. Not only

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did Woodruff fail to provide these details, he also did not testify as to any circumstantial

evidence to his belief that J.C. had engaged in aggravated menacing. In fact, the only

testimony he gave as to his decision to arrest was simply that he talked to two people. Absent

more detail, there was no evidence in the record to justify Woodruff’s estimation that probable

cause existed to arrest J.C. for aggravated menacing. And because the state is required to

prove a lawful arrest as an element of resisting arrest, the absence of testimony from

Woodruff as to the basis for arresting J.C. is fatal to the state’s case.

{¶13} In its brief, the state attempted to address this gap by relying on the complaint

and arrest report to supplement Woodruff’s bare-bones testimony. But the state conceded at

oral argument that these documents were not introduced at trial and therefore are irrelevant

to the question of whether the state presented sufficient evidence of a lawful arrest. See State

v. Rodano, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104176, 2017-Ohio-1034, ¶ 26; see also State v. Palmer, 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-050750, 2006-Ohio-5456, ¶ 15-16.

{¶14} Because probable cause requires more than bare suspicion, Woodruff’s

testimony alone is insufficient to establish there was probable cause to arrest J.C. for

aggravated menacing. See Martin, 170 Ohio St.3d 181, 2022-Ohio-4175, 209 N.E.3d 688, at

¶ 18. Accordingly, given the absence of any proof as to the essential element of a lawful arrest,

J.C.’s adjudication for resisting arrest cannot stand. Her first assignment of error is therefore

sustained.

{¶15} J.C.’s second assignment of error, alleging that her adjudication was against

the manifest weight of the evidence, is made moot by our disposition of her first assignment

of error.

Judgment reversed and appellant discharged.

CROUSE, P.J., concurs. WINKLER, J., dissents.

5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

WINKLER, J., dissenting,

{¶1} Because the juvenile court dismissed the state’s delinquency case against J.C.

prior to holding a dispositional hearing, and the juvenile court did not impose a disposition

on J.C.’s adjudication, this court lacks jurisdiction over J.C.’s appeal. Therefore, I dissent

from the majority’s opinion reversing J.C.’s adjudication.

{¶2} The state filed two complaints against J.C. alleging that J.C. was a delinquent

child for committing acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offenses of

aggravated menacing and resisting arrest. On the day of trial, the state dismissed the

aggravated-menacing complaint, but proceeded with its complaint for resisting arrest by

introducing testimony from the arresting officer. The magistrate adjudicated J.C. delinquent

of resisting arrest and continued the case for disposition. Prior to any dispositional hearing,

J.C. filed objections to the magistrate’s adjudication decision. While J.C.’s objections

remained pending, the magistrate entered an order terminating J.C.’s case. At the hearing on

the objections, J.C.’s attorney admitted to the juvenile court judge that the magistrate had

“actually closed the case out.” The juvenile court entered an order adopting the magistrate’s

decision terminating J.C.’s case and remitted court costs. J.C. now appeals to this court.

{¶3} Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2), provides that courts of appeals

“shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law” to review “judgments or final orders.”

It is axiomatic that a delinquency adjudication without a disposition is not a final appealable

order. In re Sekulich, 65 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 417 N.E.2d 1014 (1981); see R.C. 2505.02.

{¶4} In this case, J.C. filed objections to the magistrate’s decision regarding her

delinquency adjudication prior to any dispositional hearing. J.C. turned 18 shortly after her

adjudication, and even though the juvenile court maintained jurisdiction over J.C.’s

delinquency case under R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), the magistrate nevertheless chose to enter an

6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

order terminating J.C.’s case prior to disposition. When a juvenile court dismisses a

delinquency complaint after adjudication without imposing a disposition such dismissal is

the functional equivalent of “an acquittal of the charges.” In re D.R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos.

100034 and 100035, 2014-Ohio-832, ¶ 13, citing In re N.I., 191 Ohio App.3d 97, 2010-Ohio-

5791, 944 N.E.2d 1214 (8th Dist); see Juv.R. 29(F)(2)(d) (permitting the juvenile court to

dismiss a complaint after adjudication but prior to disposition if it “is in the best interest of

the child and the community.”).

{¶5} The fact that the juvenile court remitted court costs in J.C.’s case does not

equate to a “disposition” on J.C.’s adjudication. See State v. Bennett, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos.

C-140507 and C-140508, 2015-Ohio-3246, ¶ 5-6 (in a criminal case, the trial court’s judgment

entry remitting court costs without any further punishment does not constitute a “sentence”

and therefore no final appealable order exists).

{¶6} Because J.C. never received a disposition after her delinquency adjudication, I

would hold that this court lacks jurisdiction over J.C.’s appeal, and it should be dismissed.

Nevertheless, even if this court had jurisdiction over J.C.’s appeal, as the majority necessarily

determines, I would determine that J.C.’s adjudication for resisting arrest was supported by

sufficient evidence. J.C. argues that the police officer did not have probable cause to arrest

her for aggravated menacing, but the police officer testified that he responded to a call for an

issue at the group home where J.C. lived, and that he spoke to both the supervisor of the group

home and the alleged victim, another female juvenile, before placing J.C. under arrest.

Therefore, the police officer did not act on bare suspicion in arresting J.C.

{¶7} I respectfully dissent.

Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.