[Cite as In re J.C., 2022-Ohio-850.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: J.C. : APPEAL NO. C-210318 TRIAL NO. 20-1906 :
: O P I N I O N.
Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 18, 2022
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alex Scott Havlin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, Joshua A. Thompson, Assistant Public Defender, and Catherine Douglas, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant- Appellant. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BERGERON, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} A ride home from work led to a delinquency adjudication for carrying a
concealed weapon when defendant-appellant J.C.’s brother (the driver of the car) turned
around and handed her his gun as police pulled the vehicle over. He assured her that, as a
juvenile, she would not face any repercussions for possession of the weapon—a prediction
that proved inaccurate. On appeal after her adjudication, J.C. protests several of the
juvenile court’s evidentiary determinations, challenges the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence in support of the judgment, and disputes the denial of her Juv.R. 29(F)(2)(d)
motion. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.
I. {¶2} J.C. had just finished her shift at a local fast food restaurant when her older
brother (A.J.) arrived to pick her up in his car (along with two other passengers). J.C. was
both surprised and apprehensive about this because she didn’t expect her brother to drive
her home and she harbored fear of him based on his past criminal history. But without any
other means of getting home, she hopped in the back seat of his car.
{¶3} While in transit, an officer saw a cigar filter fly out of the window of A.J.’s
vehicle. The officer decided to run the vehicle’s license plate, which revealed that the
owner’s license was suspended. The officer accordingly activated his lights for a traffic stop,
but the vehicle continued to roll for around 100 yards at about five m.p.h. before coming to
a complete stop. During this time, the officer saw the driver of the vehicle reaching from his
seat over into the passenger’s seat as if he were trying to procure something. In fact, A.J.
had grabbed his handgun, and fearful of an arrest for possessing the firearm, he turned
around and handed it to J.C., admonishing her to keep it because, as a juvenile, she
presumably would face no consequences from possessing it.
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{¶4} After pulling the vehicle over, the officer began questioning the occupants of
the vehicle before noticing some marijuana, at which point he ordered everyone out of the
vehicle one by one. When the officers asked J.C. to exit the vehicle, she awkwardly inched
her way out of vehicle, with her sweatshirt and work apron tightly pressed against her
abdomen. After J.C. stepped outside, she dropped her sweatshirt, at which point one of the
officers saw the firearm in her waistband. That officer yelled “gun” and took J.C. to the
ground. In the midst of that, the gun slid down her pants. J.C. began to cry hysterically,
begging the officers to take the firearm from her. The officers recovered the firearm (which
was unloaded at the time) and discovered ammunition in J.C.’s purse.
{¶5} J.C. was charged with carrying a concealed weapon. At trial, J.C. testified that
A.J. gave her the gun, ordering her to put it on her hip because “nothing’s going to happen”
to a minor like her. J.C. concedes that A.J. did not explicitly threaten her if she refused to
comply, but she nonetheless raised the affirmative defense of duress. In support, she
testified that she feared A.J. because of his history of assaulting his girlfriends. Defense
counsel sought to introduce A.J.’s criminal history to establish that J.C. was under duress,
but the magistrate found that the criminal record was irrelevant, and thus inadmissible.
The magistrate eventually adjudicated J.C. delinquent for carrying a concealed weapon,
concluding that she failed to establish the defense of duress by a preponderance of evidence.
J.C. moved for a dismissal under Juv.R. 29(F)(2)(d), but the magistrate overruled the
motion, reasoning that:
I do think that your brother handed you this gun, but the problem is that you
kept it and you took it. You could have gotten out of the car. You could have
said to the officers, ‘my brother just handed me this gun, I don’t know what to
do.’ You didn’t, so you chose to conceal that from the police, which could
have created a really dangerous situation for you and other people. * * * I
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
understand that it’s not fair that your brother put you in the position he did,
but you’re old enough to know better and to make different choices.
{¶6} J.C. filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, but the juvenile court
overruled those objections, adopting the magistrate’s decision. After a dispositional
hearing, the juvenile court placed J.C. on probation. On appeal, J.C. argues that the juvenile
court abused its discretion by admitting the state’s exhibit 1 (the firearm) and excluding
A.J.’s criminal record. J.C. also challenges the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in
support of the adjudication and contests the denial of her Juv.R. 29(F)(2)(d) motion.
II.
{¶7} J.C.’s first assignment of error maintains that the juvenile court abused its
discretion in connection with two evidentiary rulings—admitting state’s exhibit 1 (the
firearm) and excluding A.J.’s criminal record.
A.
{¶8} With respect to the handgun, J.C.’s objection boils down to an authentication
challenge, disputing whether it was the same handgun recovered at the scene. “The
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims.” Evid.R. 901(A). “Authentication is ‘a very low threshold, which is less
demanding than the preponderance of the evidence.’ ” State v. Patterson, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-170329, 2018-Ohio-3348, ¶ 13, quoting Burns v. May, 133 Ohio App.3d
351, 355, 728 N.E.2d 19 (12th Dist.1999). “Testimony by a witness with knowledge, ‘that a
matter is what it is claimed to be,’ is an acceptable method of authentication.” Patterson at
¶ 13, quoting Evid.R. 901(B)(1). We review a challenge to authentication for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Searles, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-180339 and C-180340, 2019-Ohio-
3109, ¶ 7.
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{¶9} Both officers testified that state’s exhibit 1 was the firearm that they recovered
at the scene. J.C. challenges the adequacy of this testimony because neither of them
detailed the chain of custody. However, “[a]s a general matter, ‘the state [is] not required to
prove a perfect, unbroken chain of custody.’ ” State v. Gross, 97 Ohio St.3d 121, 2002-Ohio-
5524, 776 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 57, quoting State v. Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d 646, 662, 693 N.E.2d 246
(1998). “Any breaks in the chain of custody go to the weight, rather than the admissibility,
of the evidence.” State v. Crossty, 2017-Ohio-8382, 99 N.E.3d 1048, ¶ 30 (1st Dist.).
{¶10} Since two officers testified, with personal knowledge, that state’s exhibit 1 “is
what it is claimed to be,” the state satisfied the threshold for authenticating exhibit 1. See
Evid.R. 901(B)(1). J.C.’s challenges go to weight, not admissibility, and we see no abuse of
discretion with respect to the admission of this exhibit.
B.
{¶11} We turn now to J.C.’s argument that the juvenile court abused its discretion
by excluding A.J.’s criminal record. When defense counsel sought to introduce A.J.’s
criminal record, the state objected, citing relevancy grounds. Defense counsel countered
that the record would help establish J.C.’s duress defense.
{¶12} “ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Evid.R. 401. “The admission of
evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. * * * We will not disturb a trial
court’s ruling on evidentiary issues * * * absent an abuse of discretion and proof of material
prejudice.” State v. Buck, 2017-Ohio-8242, 100 N.E.3d 118, ¶ 109 (1st Dist.).
{¶13} To establish the affirmative defense of duress, the criminal defendant must
prove five elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
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(1) a harm due to the pressure of a human force; (2) the harm sought to be
avoided was greater than, or at least equal to that sought to be prevented by
the law defining the offense charged; (3) the actor reasonably believed at the
moment that his act was necessary and was designed to avoid the greater
harm; (4) the actor was without fault in bringing about the situation; and (5)
the threatened harm was imminent, leaving no alternative by which to avoid
the greater harm.
City of Cincinnati v. White, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190262, 2020-Ohio-1231, ¶ 17, quoting
State v. Flinders, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26024, 2012-Ohio-2882, ¶ 30. “[T]he duress
defense ‘is strictly and extremely limited in application and will probably be effective in very
rare occasions.’ ” White at ¶ 18, quoting State v. Cross, 58 Ohio St.2d 482, 488, 391 N.E.2d
319 (1979).
{¶14} We do not believe that the juvenile court committed reversible error by
excluding A.J.’s criminal record. While we can imagine ways in which a criminal record
might assume relevance to establishing a duress defense, the probative value of A.J.’s
criminal record is relatively slight under the circumstances. Since 2018, A.J.’s only
convictions are for misdemeanor traffic violations such as driving under suspension,
pedestrian violation, and operation of a motor vehicle without reasonable control. Although
J.C. testified that A.J. has a history of domestic violence, his criminal record lists no
convictions for domestic violence (and we see no indication of any assaults on family
members). To be sure, A.J. has been convicted of three more serious offenses—robbery,
aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault—but these convictions are over 12 years old.
{¶15} Based on the facts at hand, we do not believe that the exclusion of the
criminal record materially prejudiced J.C. Even if the criminal record were admitted into
evidence, J.C. cannot satisfy the fifth element of the duress defense (i.e., the immediacy of
6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
the threatened harm, which leaves no alternative course of action). There is simply no
evidence that A.J. would have, or could have, immediately harmed J.C. had she refused to
conceal the firearm (particularly with police surrounding the car). To that end, even if the
juvenile court abused its discretion by excluding the criminal record, this evidentiary error
would not constitute reversible error because the absence of the criminal record did not
materially prejudice J.C.
{¶16} Accordingly, we overrule J.C.’s first assignment of error.
III.
{¶17} For J.C.’s second assignment of error, she challenges the adjudication of
delinquency as against the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.
{¶18} The standards for evaluating the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in
juvenile adjudications track the standards used in adult criminal cases. In re A.P., 2020-
Ohio-5423, 163 N.E.3d 116, ¶ 9, 18 (1st Dist.). In reviewing whether the conviction runs
counter to the manifest weight of the evidence, we sit as a “thirteenth juror.” State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). We will reverse the trial court’s
decision to convict and grant a new trial only in “ ‘exceptional cases in which the evidence
weighs heavily against the [adjudication].’ ” State v. Sipple, 2021-Ohio-1319, 170 N.E.3d
1273, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st
Dist.1983). “To determine whether [an adjudication] is supported by sufficient evidence,
‘the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Walker, 150 Ohio St.3d 409, 2016-Ohio-8295,
82 N.E.3d 1124, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus.
7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶19} We first consider whether the juvenile court’s finding that J.C. possessed a
“deadly weapon” under R.C. 2923.12(A) was against the weight or sufficiency of the
evidence.
{¶20} Although J.C. challenges the weight of the evidence here, she points to
nothing that weighs against the finding that she possessed a deadly weapon. And since we
see nothing in the record that weighs heavily against the finding that J.C. possessed a deadly
weapon, her challenge to the weight of the evidence fails.
{¶21} As for the sufficiency claim, R.C. 2923.12(A) prohibits a person from carrying
“(1) [a] deadly weapon other than a handgun; (2) [a] handgun other than a dangerous
ordnance; [or] (3) [a] dangerous ordnance.” J.C. argues that “deadly weapon other than a
handgun” distinguishes “deadly weapon” from a “handgun.” J.C. posits that “deadly
weapon” has a different meaning than “handgun” under R.C. 2923.12(A).
{¶22} J.C.’s interpretation of “deadly weapon” is inconsistent with the term’s
statutory definition. Under R.C. 2923.11(B)(1), a firearm is “any deadly weapon capable of
expelling or propelling one or more projectiles by the action of an explosive or combustible
propellant.” (Emphasis added.) Under R.C. 2923.11(C)(1), a handgun is “[a]ny firearm that
has a short stock and is designed to be held and fired by the use of a single hand.”
(Emphasis added.) Reading R.C. 2923.11(B)(1) and (C)(1) together, a handgun is a type of
firearm, and a firearm is a type of deadly weapon. As a matter of logic, therefore, proving
that J.C. concealed a handgun would suffice to prove that she concealed a deadly weapon
under R.C. 2923.12(A). Since there is no dispute that J.C. possessed a handgun, the state
presented sufficient evidence to establish that she possessed a deadly weapon.
{¶23} At oral argument, J.C.’s appellate counsel appeared to reframe this sufficiency
challenge as an attack on the adequacy of the complaint because it alleged that J.C.
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concealed a “deadly weapon,” and it charged her under R.C. 2923.12 without specifying the
subsection. Because subsection (A)(1) encompasses deadly weapons other handguns, J.C.
insists that the state charged her under the wrong subsection of R.C. 2923.12.
{¶24} “The purpose of accusatory instruments like criminal complaints is ‘to inform
the accused of the identity and the essential facts constituting the offense charged.’ ” State
v. Montoya, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210154, 2021-Ohio-3429, ¶ 4, quoting State v.
Broughton, 51 Ohio App.3d 10, 11, 553 N.E.2d 1380 (12th Dist.1988). In other words, “a
criminal complaint provides the defendant notice of the charges against him so that he may
prepare a defense.” Montoya at ¶ 4. “[C]omplaints lacking the relevant subsection are not
per se defective where ‘the complaint’s substance [is] sufficient to inform’ the defendant
which subsection was violated.” Id. at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-
120570 and C-120572, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 17. “The language used in the complaint ‘is
deemed sufficient if an individual of ordinary intelligence would not have to guess as to the
type and scope of the conduct prohibited.’ ” Montoya at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Sallee, 6th
Dist. Erie No. E-11-042, 2012-Ohio-3617, ¶ 8.
{¶25} The complaint alleged that J.C. “did knowingly have concealed on his/her
person a deadly weapon, to wit: Black Smith & Wesson .40 cal handgun * * * in violation of
Section 2923.12 of the Ohio Revised Code, a Felony of the Fourth Degree.” Since the
complaint did not specifically charge J.C. under either subsection (A)(1) or (2), and
unambiguously described the “deadly weapon” as the same handgun that officers recovered
at the scene, “the complaint required no guesswork” on the part of J.C. to discern the
identity of the allegation. Montoya at ¶ 9.
{¶26} The complaint, therefore, put J.C. on adequate notice as to the nature of the
allegations against her and was not deficient for failing to specify the relevant subsection of
the statute.
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{¶27} We next turn to a consideration of whether the juvenile court’s finding that
J.C. concealed the handgun runs afoul of the weight or sufficiency of the evidence.
{¶28} For J.C.’s manifest-weight claim, she points to conflicting testimony between
herself and the arresting officers. The arresting officers testified that, when they ordered
J.C. out of the vehicle, she had her sweatshirt and work apron pressed firmly against her
abdomen, concealing the firearm in her waistband. On the other hand, J.C. testified that
she was in the process of informing the officers that she had the firearm before they took her
to the ground, which implies that she made no attempt to hide the firearm from the officers.
{¶29} We ultimately conclude that the juvenile court’s resolution of this conflicting
evidence constituted a credibility determination that falls within its sound discretion. See In
re A.K., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210178, 2021-Ohio-4199, ¶ 26 (“[T]he juvenile court’s
resolution of this conflicting evidence amounts to credibility determinations that fall within
its sound discretion.”), citing State v. Robinson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2018-08-163, 2019-
Ohio-3144, ¶ 29 (“ ‘When conflicting evidence is presented at trial, [an adjudication]
is not against the manifest weight of the evidence simply because the trier of
fact believed the prosecution testimony.’ ”), quoting State v. Lunsford, 12th Dist. Brown No.
CA2010-10-021, 2011-Ohio-6529, ¶ 17. For this reason, we find J.C.’s challenge to the
weight of the evidence unavailing.
{¶30} As for J.C.’s sufficiency challenge, she claims that the state did not establish
concealment because one of the officers noticed the firearm in plain sight after she exited
the vehicle. “[P]roof of concealment does not require the state to establish complete
invisibility.” State v. Pryor, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110205, 2012-Ohio-1033, ¶ 14. The
state is merely required to prove that the handgun was not “ ‘discernable by ordinary
observation.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Davis, 15 Ohio App.3d 64, 64-65, 472 N.E.2d 751 (1st
10 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Dist.1984). “Even a partially concealed gun can be found to be ‘concealed’ under R.C.
2923.12.” In re M.M., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-140628, C-140629, C-140630, and C-
140631, 2015-Ohio-3485, ¶ 16.
{¶31} But this was not simply a partially concealed gun—as J.C. exited the vehicle,
her manner of holding her work apron and sweatshirt operated to fully conceal the gun from
the officers. Only when she dropped her apron/sweatshirt did a portion of the gun become
visible. On these facts, we conclude that the state adequately established sufficient evidence
that J.C. concealed the handgun.
C.
{¶32} The third issue is whether the juvenile court’s rejection of J.C.’s duress theory
aligned with the manifest weight of the evidence.1 Again, as noted above, J.C. must
establish five elements to establish duress. White, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190262, 2020-
Ohio-1231, at ¶ 17, quoting Flinders, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26024, 2012-Ohio-2882, at ¶ 30.
{¶33} J.C.’s claim that she feared A.J. because of his history of domestic violence
may provide some support for various duress elements, but the fact that A.J. did not
explicitly threaten J.C., and had not threatened her at any time prior to this incident, points
in the other direction. We believe that the trial court’s resolution of this conflicting evidence
fell within its sound discretion. See In re A.K., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210178, 2021-Ohio-
4199, at ¶ 26 (“[T]he juvenile court’s resolution of this conflicting evidence amounts to
credibility determinations that fall within its sound discretion.”). In any case, since J.C.
presented no evidence to establish the fifth element of duress (imminent harm leaving no
alternative but compliance), the juvenile court’s decision to reject her duress theory
1 J.C. also insists that the juvenile court should have applied a reasonable-juvenile standard when assessing whether she was under duress. We take no position on whether the reasonable-juvenile standard is appropriate here since we believe that, even if the juvenile court had applied such a standard, the court could nevertheless reject her duress theory.
11 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
comported with the weight of the evidence. J.C. has failed to show that this is an
extraordinary case where the evidence weighs heavily against the adjudication.
D.
{¶34} The final issue in J.C.’s second assignment of error inquires whether the state
presented sufficient evidence to establish that she knowingly concealed the handgun. “A
person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s
conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” R.C.
2901.22(B).
{¶35} J.C. analogizes her case to State v. Murphy, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93093,
2010-Ohio-1422. In that case, after police executed a traffic stop, the officer found drugs on
the floor of the vehicle between the passenger seat and the driver seat. Id. at ¶ 9. As soon as
the defendant exited the vehicle, he told the officer that the driver of the vehicle put the
drugs on his person, and that he attempted to pass them back to the driver. Id. The
defendant was convicted of drug possession, but the Eighth District reversed, holding that
his “momentary involuntary possession” of drugs was insufficient to establish that he
knowingly possessed the drugs. (Emphasis sic.) Id.
{¶36} Murphy is inapposite for at least two reasons. First, the issue in Murphy was
whether the defendant possessed drugs within the meaning of R.C. 2925.11(A), and not
whether the defendant had the requisite mental state for that offense. The Murphy court
interpreted “possession” under R.C. 2925.11(A) to require more than “momentary
involuntary possession,” but said nothing about the meaning of “knowingly” under R.C.
{¶37} Second, we see significant factual distinctions between Murphy and this case.
In Murphy, the driver placed the drugs on the defendant’s person, whereas in this case, the
driver handed the gun to J.C. and she placed it in her waistband. In other words, J.C.
12 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
performed a voluntary act of placing the firearm in her waistband, but the Murphy
defendant performed no voluntary act to accept possession of the drugs. Moreover, the
arresting officers testified that as J.C. exited the vehicle, she awkwardly held her sweatshirt
and work apron near her abdomen, in such a manner as to conceal the firearm in her
waistband. No such evidence was present in Murphy. Under these facts, we believe that a
rational trier of fact could conclude that J.C. knowingly concealed the firearm. For these
reasons and those described above, we overrule J.C.’s second assignment of error.
IV.
{¶38} J.C.’s third assignment of error challenges the denial of her Juv.R. 29(F)(2)(d)
motion. Juv.R. 29(F)(2)(d) provides that “[u]pon the determination of the issues” the
juvenile court may “[d]ismiss the complaint if dismissal is in the best interest of the child
and the community.” “A juvenile court has broad discretion to dismiss a case after
adjudication if dismissal is in the ‘best interest of the child and the community.’ ” In re S.D.,
1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-200304 C-200305, C-200306 and C-200307, 2021-Ohio-2747,
¶ 9, quoting Juv.R. 29(F)(2)(d). “Whether a delinquency proceeding should be dismissed is
within the sound discretion of the trial judge. * * * We review the court’s determination for
an abuse of discretion.” Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when “a court exercis[es] its
judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary
authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35; Hayes v.
Durrani, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190617, 2021-Ohio-725, ¶ 8 (“An abuse of discretion
connotes more than a mere error of judgment; rather, ‘it implies that the court’s attitude is
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable.’ ”), quoting Boolchand v. Boolchand, 1st Dist.
Hamilton No. C-200111, 2020-Ohio-6951, ¶ 9.
{¶39} J.C. argues that the court should have dismissed under Juv.R. 29(F)(2)(d)
because she has no criminal record and her brother pressured her into concealing the
13 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
firearm on his behalf. We acknowledge the difficult position that J.C. found herself in, at
the behest of an elder sibling. Although these could be reasons to grant a Juv.R. 29(F)(2)(d)
motion, we do not believe that the juvenile court abused its broad discretion when denying
the motion. We accordingly overrule J.C.’s third assignment of error.
* * *
{¶40} Accordingly, we overrule J.C.’s first, second, and third assignments of error in
full, and affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
Judgment affirmed. WINKLER and BOCK, JJ., concur. Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.